Forfeiture of the Right to a Twelve-Person Jury for Egregious Juror-Directed Misconduct:
A Commentary on People v. Sargeant, 2025 NY Slip Op 06361 (NY Court of Appeals)

I. Introduction

People v. Sargeant is a landmark decision of the New York Court of Appeals addressing a question of first impression: under what circumstances, if any, may a criminal defendant forfeit the New York constitutional right to trial by a jury of exactly twelve persons?

The case arises from a Queens County felony trial in which, during jury deliberations, the defendant allegedly confronted the jury foreperson at his home in an apparent attempt to influence the verdict. The juror was discharged as a result, no alternates remained, and the trial court proceeded with the remaining eleven jurors over the defendant’s objection. The defendant was convicted on some counts and acquitted on others.

The core issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, in these circumstances, the defendant’s misconduct could operate as a forfeiture of his state constitutional right to a trial by a twelve-person jury, thereby permitting the trial court to proceed to verdict with an eleven-person jury without a formal waiver that complied with the Constitution’s waiver provisions.

The Court answered yes, in narrowly defined, “exceedingly rare” circumstances. Specifically, it held that:

A defendant who, by clear and convincing evidence, is shown to have engaged in egregious conduct affecting a sworn juror after deliberations have commenced, thereby requiring the discharge of that juror at a time when no alternate juror is available, forfeits the right to a twelve-person jury, and the trial court may, in its discretion, proceed with the remaining eleven jurors.

This commentary analyzes the decision’s doctrinal foundations, the Court’s reasoning, the precedents it invokes (and reshapes), and the likely impact on New York criminal practice and constitutional law.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Derek Sargeant, was tried in Queens County on various charges including: assault in the third degree, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, multiple counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of forgery devices. After the People’s case and the defense case (including the defendant’s own testimony), the jury was charged and began deliberating.

Earlier in the trial, one juror had been dismissed for reasons unrelated to the defendant’s conduct and was replaced with the only alternate juror. By the time deliberations began, there were no alternates left.

On January 24, during deliberations, defense counsel reported that the defendant had a severe migraine and could not participate meaningfully. The court adjourned and directed defendant to seek urgent care.

That afternoon, however, the court received two alarming contacts:

• A call from the jury foreperson, stating that “something happened” and he could no longer be impartial.
• Information from a Brooklyn assistant district attorney (ADA), a friend of the foreperson, who reported that the foreperson had called and said the defendant had confronted him at his home.

The next morning, the trial court held a People v. Buford hearing to inquire into the juror issue. The foreperson testified that, shortly after leaving court:

• A man approached him outside the gate to his home, stated he was there “on behalf of” the defendant, asserted that defendant was innocent and being extorted, and handed him legal documents (which the foreperson produced in court).
• When asked how he knew where the foreperson lived, the man answered: “Public records.”
• The foreperson described the man’s physical appearance and clothing (including hat, sunglasses, and high collar), and testified the interaction lasted less than a minute.
• He felt fear for his family’s safety, contacted his ADA friend, and then the court.
• He testified that he could no longer be impartial.

The ADA testified consistently but stated that, in the immediate phone call, the foreperson had unequivocally identified the defendant as the person who confronted him. The trial court credited the ADA’s testimony, found that the foreperson’s equivocal in-court identification was due to “overwhelming fear,” and found as a fact that the defendant himself confronted the juror and had orchestrated a scheme involving feigned illness to create the opportunity to do so.

The court discharged the foreperson for cause, instructed him not to discuss the matter, and then faced the question: with no alternates and one juror discharged during deliberations, could the case be completed with the remaining eleven jurors?

The People moved to proceed with eleven jurors, arguing that defendant had, by his egregious jury tampering, forfeited his state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury. The defendant refused to waive the right and moved for a mistrial. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that:

• The defendant personally confronted the deliberating foreperson at his home.
• He obtained the juror’s address via public records, disguised himself, and falsely claimed to be acting “on behalf of” himself (or as a third party) to influence the verdict.
• He had earlier feigned illness to obtain an adjournment and free up the afternoon to carry out the confrontation.
• His actions were an intentional attempt to interfere with the jury’s impartial deliberations.

Treating this as “egregious” misconduct, the court concluded that defendant had forfeited his right to a twelve-person jury. It denied the mistrial motion and proceeded to verdict with eleven jurors, who convicted defendant on some counts and acquitted on others.

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that defendant forfeited his jury right through egregious misconduct. A dissenting Justice agreed the conduct was egregious but argued that forfeiture of such a fundamental right should require persistent misconduct akin to the standard for forfeiting the right to counsel.

B. Holding of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed, and articulated a new, tightly circumscribed rule:

A defendant who engages in egregious conduct affecting a sworn juror after the jury has commenced its deliberations, where such conduct requires the discharge of that juror and no alternates are available, may be found to have forfeited the state constitutional right to a jury of twelve. In such cases, the trial court has discretion to proceed with the remaining eleven jurors or to declare a mistrial or impose some other remedy.

Applying that standard, the Court held that:

• The defendant’s premeditated, deceptive, and intimidating confrontation of the deliberating foreperson at his home was “egregious” within the meaning of New York’s forfeiture doctrine.
• The trial court properly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant orchestrated the misconduct to influence deliberations and cause the juror’s withdrawal.
• Proceeding with eleven jurors under these specific facts was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
• There was no violation of the federal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in light of Williams v. Florida, which holds that the federal Constitution does not require twelve jurors.

III. Doctrinal and Historical Background

A. The New York Constitutional Right to a Twelve-Person Jury

The opinion traces the right to a 12-person jury in New York back to:

• English common law, where a jury in serious criminal cases traditionally consisted of twelve laypersons.
• The 1683 Charter of Liberties and Privileges, which codified trial by a 12-person jury in colonial New York.
• The 1777 New York Constitution, guaranteeing that the right to trial by jury in cases where it had “heretofore been used” would “remain inviolate forever.”
• The current NY Constitution, art I, § 2, preserving the right to jury trial “in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed” and mandating that this right “shall remain inviolate forever.”
• NY Constitution, art VI, § 18, added in 1961, explicitly providing that “crimes prosecuted by indictment shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve persons, unless a jury trial has been waived as provided in” art I, § 2.

Historically, New York courts read this constitutional guarantee as requiring a strict, non-negotiable twelve-person jury in felony cases. The pivotal case is Cancemi v. People, 18 NY 128 (1858).

B. From Structural “Mode of Proceeding” to Personal Right

In Cancemi, the Court held that:

• The requirement of a twelve-person jury was not merely a personal right of the accused but a fundamental “mode of proceeding” binding on the court and affecting the public at large.
• As such, a verdict rendered by fewer than twelve jurors was invalid even if the defendant consented.

This conception made the twelve-person jury effectively non-waivable and treated any deviation as a structural defect requiring reversal.

Over time, however, both the text of the New York Constitution and case law evolved. In 1938, the state adopted language expressly permitting a defendant in a criminal case to waive a jury trial, provided the waiver is in writing, in open court, with court and prosecutor consent (now in art I, § 2). And in 1961, art VI, § 18 fixed the number of jurors in indicted cases at twelve, “unless” a jury trial has been waived under art I, § 2.

The leading modern case on this evolution is People v. Gajadhar, 9 NY3d 438 (2007), where the Court held that:

• These constitutional amendments transformed the twelve-person jury requirement into a personal right of the accused, rather than an immutable mode of proceeding.
• A defendant could therefore waive the right to a twelve-person jury (e.g., consent to proceed with eleven jurors) if the waiver complied with art I, § 2.

Sargeant builds directly on Gajadhar, reasoning that once the twelve-person jury is understood as a personal right, it is susceptible not only to waiver but also to forfeiture through serious misconduct.

C. Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights Through Misconduct

The decision situates the new rule within a broader body of New York and federal law recognizing that certain fundamental rights may be forfeited by wrongdoing, including:

• Right to counsel:
  • A defendant may forfeit the right to counsel through “egregious conduct,” but only as a matter of “extreme, last-resort” (e.g., violent or persistent abuse of counsel). See People v. Shanks, 37 NY3d 244 (2021); People v. Smith, 92 NY2d 516 (1998); People v. Wilkerson, 294 AD2d 298 (1st Dept 2002).
• Right to confront witnesses:
  • Where a defendant’s “violence, threats or chicanery” causes a witness’s unavailability, the defendant forfeits confrontation rights with respect to that witness, allowing admission of the witness’s prior statements. See People v. Geraci, 85 NY2d 359 (1995).
• Right to be present at trial:
  • A defendant may be removed from the courtroom—and thus forfeit the right to be present at trial—if their conduct is so disruptive that proceedings cannot continue in their presence. See People v. Byrnes, 33 NY2d 343 (1974); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 337 (1970).
• Right to self-representation:
  • A pro se defendant may forfeit the right to represent themselves through disruptive or obstructive conduct. See People v. McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10 (1974).

The Court grounds these doctrines in a public policy principle articulated in cases such as People v. Sanchez, 65 NY2d 436 (1985), and Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878): the Constitution does not protect a defendant from the legitimate consequences of their own wrongful acts, and a defendant may not be allowed to “defeat” the state’s ability to prosecute by deliberate obstruction.

Sargeant extends that logic to the right to a twelve-person jury, holding that this right too may be subject to forfeiture, albeit under particularly stringent conditions.

IV. Precedents and Authorities in Detail

A. Cancemi v. People (1858) and People v. Gajadhar (2007)

Cancemi stands as the original articulation of the twelve-person jury as a fundamental structural requirement in New York criminal trials. The Court there:

• Invalidated a verdict returned by eleven jurors, despite the defendant’s consent.
• Treated the twelve-person requirement as a “mode of proceeding,” not a waivable personal right, emphasizing the public interest in criminal prosecutions.

Gajadhar reinterpreted that history in light of subsequent constitutional amendments permitting waiver of jury trial. The Court recognized that:

• The constitutional evolution rendered the twelve-person rule a personal right of the accused.
• Therefore, a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive the presence of a twelfth juror, provided the waiver strictly follows constitutional procedures.

Sargeant explicitly relies on this “evolving text” rationale, concluding that what became waivable can, under certain conditions, also be forfeited.

B. People v. Geraci (1995) – Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights

The trial court in Sargeant drew an analogy between:

• Witness tampering (leading to forfeiture of confrontation rights under Geraci), and
• Jury tampering (leading to forfeiture of the twelve-person jury right in this case).

In Geraci, the Court of Appeals held that when a defendant causes a witness’s unavailability by “violence, threats or chicanery,” the defendant forfeits the right to confront that witness at trial, and the prosecution may offer prior statements of that witness provided the People prove the defendant’s misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.

Sargeant imports this clear and convincing evidence standard and the conceptual frame of “forfeiture by wrongdoing” into the context of juror interference. The Court views direct, intentional interference with a sworn juror’s safety and impartiality as analogous in gravity and effect to making a witness unavailable.

C. People v. Shanks, People v. Smith, and the Forfeiture of Counsel

The Appellate Division dissent analogized the forfeiture of the twelve-person jury right to the forfeiture of counsel, which is permitted only upon “brutal, violent, or persistent abuse” of counsel and only as an “extreme, last-resort analysis” (see Smith, 92 NY2d at 521; Shanks, 37 NY3d at 253–54).

The dissent reasoned that because “a juror, like counsel, is replaceable,” forfeiture should require more than a single episode of misconduct; “one strike is not enough.” The Court of Appeals rejects this analogy, emphasizing:

• The egregiousness of the particular misconduct, rather than repetition, is the key.
• Jurors are not mere “replaceable parts,” but ordinary citizens performing a significant civic duty at personal cost and modest compensation. To repeatedly expose new jurors to intimidation until misconduct becomes “persistent” would be unacceptable.
• The “replaceable” notion misapprehends the gravity of juror intimidation and the importance of protecting jurors and the integrity of deliberations.

D. People v. Ryan and CPL 270.35 – Substitution of Alternate Jurors

People v. Ryan, 19 NY2d 100 (1966), held that substituting an alternate juror after deliberations have begun violates the state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury, because the new juror has not participated in initial deliberations, effectively creating a de facto “thirteenth” juror dynamic. As a result, any such substitution can occur only if the defendant properly waives the right under the Constitution.

This rule is codified in CPL 270.35(1), which permits substitution of alternates before, but not after, deliberations begin, absent a proper waiver.

Sargeant uses Ryan to highlight why timing is crucial:

• So long as a lawful twelve-person jury exists, or can lawfully be composed by substituting an available alternate consistent with Ryan and CPL 270.35, there is no need to consider forfeiture.
• Forfeiture becomes relevant only when a deliberating juror must be discharged and no alternate is available, so that the only lawful options are mistrial or proceeding with fewer than twelve jurors—if the right to twelve has been forfeited.

E. Federal Law – Williams v. Florida and the Sixth Amendment

Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals note that the federal constitutional challenge under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is foreclosed by Williams v. Florida, 399 US 78 (1970), which held that the federal Constitution does not require a twelve-person jury in criminal cases.

New York’s twelve-person requirement, therefore, is a matter of state constitutional law. Sargeant operates entirely in that domain.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Waiver vs. Forfeiture

The Court is careful to distinguish waiver from forfeiture:

• Waiver: a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. See People v. Parker, 57 NY2d 136 (1982); Gajadhar, 9 NY3d 438.
• Forfeiture: a loss of a right due to the defendant’s misconduct, especially conduct that “unambiguously indicates a defiance of the processes of law” (quoting Sanchez) and threatens to derail or manipulate the criminal process.

The justification for forfeiture is threefold:

1. Public policy: The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that trials cannot be thwarted by defendants’ intentional obstruction.
2. Accountability: The Constitution does not protect defendants from the natural, legitimate consequences of their wrongful acts.
3. Integrity of the justice system: Courts must resist allowing defendants to benefit from misconduct that undermines the fairness of proceedings and the safety of participants.

B. Is the Twelve-Person Jury Right Forfeitable at All?

The defendant argued that the textual command that the right to trial by jury “shall remain inviolate forever” (art I, § 2) barred any notion of forfeiture. The Court rejected that reading, reasoning that:

• The “inviolate forever” language has historically been harmonized with other doctrines allowing waiver and forfeiture of related rights.
• The phrase is better understood as constraining legislative abolition or dilution of the right, not as a guarantee that the right survives even in the face of intentional, egregious misconduct by the right-holder.
• The existence of explicit waiver mechanisms in art I, § 2 and art VI, § 18 indicates that the right, though fundamental, is not absolutely unalterable.

The Court emphasizes that it is not downgrading the importance of the right. Instead, it is recognizing that when a right is framed as a personal entitlement of the defendant, rather than an immutable structural requirement, doctrines of waiver and forfeiture naturally apply.

C. The Standard: “Egregious Conduct” Toward a Sworn Juror

The Court adopts a high threshold for forfeiture:

Only “egregious conduct” toward a sworn juror—defined as “extremely or remarkably bad,” “flagrant,” or “conspicuously offensive” conduct that clearly flouts law or morality— will suffice.

Key elements of the standard:

• The misconduct must be directed at a sworn juror, not merely a prospective juror or the panel at large.
• It must occur after the jury has commenced deliberations, when alternates can no longer be substituted absent a waiver.
• It must be serious enough to require the discharge of that juror.
• There must be no alternate juror available to maintain a twelve-person panel.
• The misconduct must amount to a calculated, improper interference with the integrity or impartiality of the jury, not mere rudeness or incidental contact.

The Court stresses that the mere fact that a juror becomes unwilling to continue service due to some “bad behavior” of the defendant does not automatically constitute “egregious conduct” sufficient to trigger forfeiture. There must be something fundamentally flagrant and law-flouting about the defendant’s actions.

D. Timing and Necessity: Why Deliberations Matter

The Court identifies the discharge of a deliberating juror with no alternate as a necessary condition for considering forfeiture:

• Before deliberations, alternates may typically be substituted pursuant to CPL 270.35 without violating the twelve-person requirement.
• Once deliberations begin, however, Ryan and the statute bar unilateral substitutions. If a deliberating juror must be discharged and no alternates remain, the court faces a binary choice: mistrial, or continuation with fewer than twelve if legally permissible.
• Forfeiture supplies a narrow legal basis for that second option where the defendant’s own egregious misconduct created the problem.

E. Application to Sargeant’s Conduct

The Court’s application of the standard turns on the totality of the circumstances:

• Premeditation and planning: Defendant did not have a spontaneous or minor interaction with the juror. The court found he:
  • Feigned a migraine on a previous day to lay groundwork for a later “illness” claim.
  • On the key day, used the illness ruse to obtain an early recess freeing his afternoon.
  • Located the juror’s home using public records and went there disguised (hat, sunglasses, high collar) to confront him.
• Deception and intimidation:
  • He falsely claimed to be acting “on behalf of” the defendant and delivered legal documents drawn from defendant’s discovery.
  • The confrontation occurred at the juror’s front gate, invading the juror’s personal and family space.
  • The encounter caused the juror to fear for his family’s safety and rendered him unable to continue impartially.
• Purposeful interference with the deliberative process:
  • The trial court found defendant’s goal was to influence deliberations—either to secure a favorable verdict or to force a mistrial.
• Clear and convincing evidence:
  • The foreperson’s immediate identification of defendant to the ADA; his sworn testimony about the encounter; and the documents handed to him (taken from defendant’s discovery) collectively supported the finding.
  • The court credited the ADA’s testimony that the foreperson had unequivocally identified defendant earlier, explaining the foreperson’s later equivocation as fear-driven.

Against this backdrop, the Court concludes that defendant’s actions qualify as egregious misconduct toward a sworn, deliberating juror, directly causing the juror’s removal at a point where no alternates remained. That, in turn, triggers forfeiture.

F. Discretion and Remedies

Importantly, the Court does not hold that forfeiture automatically requires continuation with fewer than twelve jurors. Instead, it emphasizes:

• Whether to proceed with eleven jurors or declare a mistrial remains a matter of sound discretion of the trial court, guided by all facts and circumstances.
• Forfeiture simply removes the constitutional barrier to proceeding with fewer than twelve.
• Other remedies—such as separate prosecution for juror tampering (Penal Law §§ 215.23, 215.25) or other appropriate sanctions—remain available.
• In this particular case, it was especially significant that no alternates remained, and that the court had taken steps (segregating the foreperson, instructing the other jurors to stop deliberating) to avoid tainting the remaining jurors.

Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court affirms the decision to proceed with eleven jurors in Sargeant’s trial.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. A New Forfeiture Rule in New York Jury Law

People v. Sargeant establishes a new, specific rule of New York constitutional law:

A defendant may forfeit the state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury where there is clear and convincing evidence of egregious, deliberate misconduct directed at a sworn, deliberating juror that requires that juror’s discharge at a time when no alternate juror is available. The trial court then has discretion to proceed to verdict with the remaining eleven jurors.

This rule:

• Harmonizes New York’s historic commitment to a twelve-person jury with modern doctrines of waiver and forfeiture.
• Aligns the jury right with other fundamental rights—counsel, confrontation, presence— that may be forfeited by serious misconduct, while maintaining a narrow and demanding threshold.
• Signals that jury tampering can have immediate procedural consequences in the very trial the defendant is attempting to influence, not merely collateral criminal consequences later.

B. Protection of Jurors and System Integrity

The Court’s strong language about jurors being more than “replaceable” components underscores a broader institutional concern:

• Jurors are ordinary citizens compelled into service, often at personal cost, and deserve robust protection from intimidation and harassment.
• If courts were required always to declare mistrials in the face of egregious juror-directed misconduct (even where the defendant caused the problem), defendants might be incentivized to tamper with jurors to secure second chances.
• The forfeiture doctrine serves a deterrent function: it signals that tampering with jurors may result in a loss of procedural protections rather than a tactical benefit.

C. Guidance for Trial Judges

For trial courts, Sargeant provides both authority and constraints:

• Authority:
  • Courts are empowered to conduct Buford-type hearings on juror interference, segregate affected jurors, and make factual findings on whether defendant misconduct occurred.
  • Where clear and convincing evidence of egregious juror-directed misconduct exists, courts may treat the twelve-person jury right as forfeited and consider proceeding with eleven jurors.
• Constraints:
  • The standard is high: conduct must be “extremely or remarkably bad,” “flagrant,” and a clear affront to law and morality.
  • Forfeiture is appropriate only after deliberations have begun and a deliberating juror is discharged with no alternates available.
  • The court must build a solid record, including witness testimony and explicit factual findings, supporting the conclusion by clear and convincing evidence.
  • Even where forfeiture is found, the decision whether to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors or to declare a mistrial is discretionary, not automatic.

D. Practical Implications for Defense and Prosecution

For defense counsel:

• There is an increased need to counsel clients strongly about avoiding any contact with jurors and about the severe consequences of even a single egregious incident.
• Defense strategies must account for the possibility that client misconduct could irreversibly constrain trial options, including the possibility of forcing continuation with fewer than twelve jurors.

For prosecutors:

• The decision provides a doctrinal basis to seek forfeiture findings in rare cases of stark jury tampering, potentially salvaging lengthy trials that might otherwise end in mistrial.
• However, the high standard and the Court’s emphasis on “exceedingly rare” circumstances warn against overuse; attempts to extend forfeiture to borderline conduct risk reversal.

E. Open Questions and Future Litigation

Sargeant sets the basic framework but leaves some questions for future cases:

• Scope of “egregious”: How will courts treat less elaborate, but still serious, forms of juror contact (e.g., repeated social media messages, indirect threats communicated through others)?
• Temporal edge cases: What if the misconduct begins before deliberations but its effects (or discovery) culminate during deliberations? Does the “after commencement” requirement look to when the act occurred or when its impact is felt?
• Impact on remaining jurors: If a juror is discharged due to intimidation, must courts undertake additional inquiry to ensure the remaining jurors are untainted before proceeding with fewer than twelve?
• Appellate review: The Court adopts “abuse of discretion” review for the decision to proceed with eleven jurors, but future cases will refine what constitutes a reasonable exercise of discretion under varied fact patterns.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Waiver” vs. “Forfeiture”

These two terms sound similar but are legally distinct:

• Waiver:
  • The defendant chooses to give up a right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
  • Example: a defendant signs a written waiver to be tried by a judge instead of a jury.
• Forfeiture:
  • The defendant loses a right because of their own misconduct, even if they never formally agreed to give it up.
  • Example: a defendant who threatens a witness may lose the right to confront that witness in person.

In Sargeant, the defendant did not waive the right to a twelve-person jury. Instead, the Court found that he forfeited that right through egregious jury tampering.

B. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

The Court requires that forfeiture of the twelve-person jury right be supported by clear and convincing evidence of the defendant’s misconduct. This is an intermediate standard of proof:

• Preponderance of the evidence (~“more likely than not”): used in most civil cases.
• Clear and convincing evidence: requires a firm belief or high probability that the fact is true; more demanding than preponderance.
• Beyond a reasonable doubt: the highest standard, used to prove criminal guilt.

Because forfeiture involves the loss of a fundamental trial right, the Court chooses the higher “clear and convincing” standard, paralleling Geraci.

C. “Egregious Conduct”

“Egregious” is not just “bad.” The Court uses dictionary definitions:

• “Extremely or remarkably bad” or “flagrant” (Black’s Law Dictionary).
• “Conspicuously offensive” or “so obviously inconsistent with what is right or proper as to appear to be a flouting of law or morality” (Merriam-Webster).

In practical terms, “egregious conduct” in this context means:

• Conduct that is planned, deliberate, and clearly aimed at undermining the fairness or integrity of the trial (especially jury deliberations).
• Conduct that invades jurors’ safety or privacy to a degree far beyond ordinary courtroom misbehavior or emotional outbursts.

D. Buford Hearing

A hearing under People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290 (1987), is a structured, on-the-record inquiry into doubts about a juror’s impartiality. The court typically:

• Questions the juror individually, outside the presence of other jurors.
• Allows counsel for both sides to be present (and often to submit questions).
• Makes findings as to whether the juror can continue to serve impartially.

In Sargeant, such a hearing was used to investigate the foreperson’s home encounter and its impact on his ability to remain impartial.

E. “Mode of Proceedings” vs. Personal Rights

Historically in New York:

• A “mode of proceedings” rule is a fundamental structural requirement of a trial that cannot be waived by the parties (as Cancemi once treated the twelve-person jury requirement).
• A “personal right” belongs to the defendant individually and can usually be waived (and sometimes forfeited) by the defendant.

Gajadhar and Sargeant together firmly situate the twelve-person jury as a personal right subject to both waiver and forfeiture, rather than a rigid mode of proceedings.

VIII. Conclusion: Significance of People v. Sargeant

People v. Sargeant marks a significant development in New York criminal procedure and constitutional law. Building on the reinterpretation of the twelve-person jury in Gajadhar, it holds that:

• The state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury in felony cases, though fundamental and “inviolate” in the sense that the legislature cannot abolish it, is a personal right of the accused.
• That right may be forfeited—without formal waiver—where the defendant engages in egregious, deliberate misconduct directed at a sworn, deliberating juror that necessitates the juror’s discharge at a time when no alternate is available.
• Upon such a forfeiture, the trial court may, in its discretion, proceed with the remaining eleven jurors, declare a mistrial, or fashion another appropriate remedy.

The decision:

• Reinforces the principle that defendants cannot turn their constitutional rights into tools for sabotaging the trial process.
• Strongly reaffirms the state’s interest in protecting jurors from intimidation and in upholding the integrity of jury deliberations.
• Provides clear guidance and a demanding standard for trial courts confronting rare but serious instances of jury tampering.

In practical and symbolic terms, Sargeant sends a decisive message: the jury system cannot be gamed by threats, deception, or harassment of jurors themselves. When a defendant elects to interfere with the core of the jury’s function—its impartial deliberation—he risks losing the very structural protections that the jury right would otherwise afford him.

Within New York’s broader constitutional framework, the case stands as a sophisticated example of how deeply rooted rights can be preserved in principle while adapted in practice to address new challenges to the fairness and integrity of criminal adjudication.