Fletcher v. Doig (7th Cir. 2025): A Denial of Summary Judgment Does Not Immunize Parties from Later Rule 11 and § 1927 Sanctions

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Robert Fletcher & Bartlow Gallery, Ltd. v. Peter Doig resolves a highly publicised art-authorship dispute that morphed into an attorneys’-fees slug-fest. Beyond the unusual factual backdrop—a painting allegedly created by the celebrated artist Peter Doig while he was (supposedly) incarcerated in Canada—the decision lays down an important procedural principle: a court’s earlier refusal to grant summary judgment does not foreclose later findings that a claim became frivolous and sanctionable once the factual record evolved.

Key parties and roles:

Robert Fletcher – former Canadian corrections officer who bought the painting in the 1970s.
Bartlow Gallery, Ltd. / Peter Bartlow – Chicago art dealer who attempted to market the work.
Peter Doig – internationally known Scottish-Canadian painter, defendant.
Peter Edward Doige (deceased) – the other artist who proved to be the painting’s true author.
William F. Zieske – plaintiffs’ counsel and the appellant subject to sanctions.

The district court ultimately found Doig had not painted the work, and, after trial, imposed more than US$ 2.5 million in joint-and-several sanctions against Fletcher, Bartlow, and Zieske for persisting in litigation long after evidence made their claim untenable. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed every aspect of the sanctions order, thereby crystallising new guidance on how Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and summary-judgment doctrine interact.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The appellate court affirmed district-court orders that: (a) granted sanctions covering the period after 7 May 2014, and (b) denied Zieske’s Rule 59(e) motion to reduce or vacate those sanctions.
The panel (Judges Brennan, Kirsch, and Lee) held that:
- An earlier denial of summary judgment—where the court must credit the non-movant’s version of events—does not preclude a later finding that continuing to litigate became objectively unreasonable or vexatious.
- Ability to pay is irrelevant when sanctions are imposed under § 1927 because that statute is compensatory, not punitive.
- The district court did not invert the burden of proof regarding fee reasonableness; it merely required specific objections, ultimately reducing the fee request by 20 percent.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) – Recited to contrast summary-judgment standards (all inferences to non-movant) with post-trial sanction analysis.
Durukan Am., LLC v. Rain Trading, Inc., 787 F.3d 1161 (7th Cir. 2015) & Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013) – Illustrate that self-serving affidavits can defeat summary judgment, reinforcing why denial of summary judgment sets a low evidentiary threshold.
Cuna Mutual Ins. Soc’y v. OPEIU Local 39, 443 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2006) – Articulates objective-reasonableness test under Rule 11.
Dal Pozzo v. Basic Mach. Co., 463 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2006) – Used for § 1927 standard: pursuit of a claim a “reasonably careful attorney” would find “unsound.”
Hill v. Norfolk & Western R.R. Co., 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987) – Quoted for condemning “ostrich-like” ignorance of contrary evidence.
Shales v. General Chauffeurs Local 330, 557 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2009) – Provides rule that § 1927 awards are not mitigated by attorney’s financial condition.
Comparative authorities from other circuits (LeBeau, Lemaster, Calloway) were distinguished to show that surviving summary judgment does not erect an absolute bar to sanctions.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

Dual Standards, Different Moments. Summary-judgment review (Rule 56) is forward-looking and plaintiff-friendly; sanctions review (Rule 11 / § 1927) is backward-looking, objective, and fact-intensive. The panel emphasised the Advisory Committee note that litigants must reaﬃrm their positions throughout the case.
Critical Date – 7 May 2014. By this hearing, plaintiffs had lost their only potential rebuttal witness (Doige’s mother) and possessed no tangible evidence countering defendants’ documentary trove (school, prison, union, and family records). Continuing thereafter was, in the district judge’s view, objectively unreasonable; the circuit said that finding was not an abuse of discretion.
Sanction Type and Measure.
- Rule 11: deterrent and disciplinary.
- § 1927: compensatory, measured by the excess costs generated after the litigation turned frivolous.
- The district court blended both but hewed to § 1927’s compensatory focus—hence no inquiry into ability to pay.
No Burden-Shifting Error. Defendants submitted extensive billing back-up; the court invited specific challenges. After evaluating objections, it cut 20 %—evidence that it exercised independent judgment rather than rubber-stamping the request.

C. Impact on Future Litigation

Clarifies Post-Summary-Judgment Duties. Lawyers cannot rely on an earlier Rule 56 denial as a safe-harbor. As factual holes emerge, counsel must reassess and, where warranted, withdraw or settle.
Encourages Early Re-Evaluation. The opinion will likely spur litigants to conduct thorough mid-case audits, lest sanctions attach for “ostrich-like” behavior.
Confirms Seventh Circuit View on § 1927. Inability-to-pay remains irrelevant in this circuit, creating a split with circuits that allow consideration of financial hardship (e.g., Ninth Circuit).
Art-market Litigation. The case signals that courts may impose heavy costs where provenance claims persist in the face of mounting contrary proof, incentivising more rigorous pre-suit investigation in art-authorship disputes.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(b) (Fed. R. Civ. P.): Requires that every pleading, motion, or paper filed with the court be (1) legally warranted, (2) factually supported or likely to become so after discovery, and (3) not interposed for improper purposes. Violation can result in monetary or non-monetary sanctions.
28 U.S.C. § 1927: Authorises a court to shift “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees” to any attorney who “multiplies the proceedings ... unreasonably and vexatiously.” Objective unreasonableness suffices.
Summary Judgment: A pre-trial mechanism where the movant argues there is no genuine dispute of material fact requiring a trial. The judge must view evidence in the light most favourable to the non-movant; therefore, weak or self-serving affidavits can sometimes defeat the motion.
Joint and Several Liability for Sanctions: Each sanctioned party is independently responsible for the full amount, leaving the prevailing party free to collect from any or all of them.
Ability-to-Pay Consideration: Relevant under Rule 11 (because of deterrence and proportionality) but not under § 1927 in the Seventh Circuit, where the statute is viewed as purely compensatory.

V. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Fletcher v. Doig serves as a potent reminder that litigation conduct is judged dynamically, not frozen at the moment a complaint survives summary judgment. Lawyers must continuously evaluate their factual foundation; failure to do so can convert a colourable claim into a sanctionable escapade. By affirming a multi-million-dollar award and rejecting ability-to-pay arguments, the court underscores that post-frivolous costs will fall squarely on counsel who press ahead heedless of reality. Future litigants, particularly in provenance-heavy art cases, ignore this lesson at their financial peril.