First Circuit Re-Affirms the “Special Clarity” Rule: Nonsignatories Cannot Compel Arbitration or Invoke Delegation Clauses Without an Explicit, Contract-Based Grant of Authority

I. Introduction

Morales Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc., No. 24-1248 (1st Cir. June 18, 2025), addresses a question that recurs whenever businesses try to divert litigation into arbitration: When, if ever, may a company that did not sign the plaintiff’s arbitration agreement force the plaintiff into arbitration anyway?
The First Circuit squarely answered, “Not here.” The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration of wage-and-hour claims brought by foreign au pairs against Cultural Care, Inc. (“CCI”), a Massachusetts-based sponsor of the U.S. State Department’s au pair exchange program.

Although every plaintiff had signed a Swiss-law contract with International Care Ltd. (“ICL”)—a separate, Swiss corporate entity that also does business under the name “Cultural Care”—the First Circuit held that CCI could not piggy-back on ICL’s arbitration clause. The decision clarifies and, in some respects tightens, the already demanding “special clarity” test that governs a nonsignatory’s attempt to compel arbitration in the First Circuit. It also confirms that a purported delegation of arbitrability to an arbitrator cannot be enforced by a stranger to the contract unless that delegation was itself intended for the nonsignatory’s benefit.

II. Summary of the Judgment

Holding: CCI, a non-signatory to the ICL contracts, may not compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ statutory wage-and-hour claims. The district court’s order denying arbitration is affirmed.
Delegation Clause: Even assuming the ICL contract clearly delegated arbitrability to Swiss arbitral tribunals, CCI cannot invoke that delegation because it is not a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the delegation clause.
Third-Party Beneficiary: CCI failed to show with “special clarity” that the signatories (au pairs and ICL) intended to give CCI any right to enforce the arbitration agreement.
Equitable Estoppel: The au pairs’ statutory claims exist independently of the ICL contract; therefore, the “intertwined claims” doctrine does not apply.
Waiver: Because the above grounds were dispositive, the court did not resolve whether CCI waived arbitration by earlier, extensive litigation conduct.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Hogan v. SPAR Grp., Inc., 914 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2019)
—Key for the “special clarity” requirement and for distinguishing between contract-wide benefits and an express intent to give arbitration rights to a nonsignatory.
McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 1994)
—Origin of the “special clarity” language; reiterated that contracts do not typically grant rights to nonsignatories.
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009)
—Confirmed that state or federal contract principles (e.g., third-party beneficiary, estoppel) can permit nonsignatory enforcement but only if such principles are satisfied.
GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432 (2020)
—Held that the New York Convention does not forbid use of domestic nonsignatory doctrines; cited here to show that federal common-law rules still control when they are more stringent.
InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003)
—Articulated the four-part test for compelling arbitration and stressed caution when nonsignatories seek to compel.
Sourcing Unlimited v. Asimco, 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008); P.R. Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine LLC, 102 F.4th 538 (1st Cir. 2024)
—Equitable estoppel framework; used here to show why the au pairs’ statutory claims were not “intertwined” with the ICL contract.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Delegation Clause Argument Rejected. Even if a delegation clause exists, CCI must first establish its right to enforce that clause. Nonsignatory enforcement requires an independent contractual basis. CCI provided none.
Third-Party Beneficiary Analysis.
- The ICL contract’s arbitration clause refers only to “the parties” (au pair & ICL), plus ICL’s successors/assignees— not to affiliates like CCI.
- Six cited provisions benefitted ICL itself; at most they gave CCI incidental or practical advantages, not a specific legal right.
- A seventh provision (the “Release Clause”) that discharged “affiliates” did not expressly grant CCI any right to enforce the arbitration agreement.
- Therefore no “special clarity” exists that the signatories intended CCI to have arbitration rights.
Equitable Estoppel Analysis.
- Au pairs’ wage-and-hour claims stem from federal and state statutes and would exist even if the ICL agreement were void.
- Because the claims do not rely on the contract terms but on statutory employer-control tests, they are not “intertwined.”
- Allowing estoppel here would stretch the doctrine beyond its purpose of preventing a party from “having its cake and eating it too.”
Swiss Law Did Not Alter the Outcome. CCI’s own expert conceded that Swiss rules mirror U.S. contract principles on third-party beneficiaries; no Swiss precedent compelled a different result.
No Discrimination Against Arbitration. Treating arbitration clauses like any other contractual right actually accords them equal—not lesser—status. The court cited Third Circuit authority on forum-selection clauses to demonstrate consistency.

C. Likely Impact of the Decision

Arbitration Drafting & Corporate Structuring: Multinational entities that use parallel affiliates must expressly include all intended beneficiaries (or at least “affiliates”) inside the arbitration clause itself. Boilerplate references elsewhere in the agreement will not suffice in the First Circuit.
Delegation Clauses and Nonsignatories: Parties can no longer assume that embedding a delegation clause shields them from judicial scrutiny if they later rely on nonsignatory status.
Au Pair & Exchange-Visitor Programs: Sponsor entities will face wage-and-hour suits in court unless their contracts directly with exchange visitors (or valid assignments) contain arbitration provisions.
Litigation Strategy: Defendants that litigate merits issues before raising arbitration may simultaneously lose on waiver grounds; here, the First Circuit did not need to reach waiver, signalling that waiver can become a “fall-back” but not always necessary.
Precedential Weight: The ruling cements Hogan’s framework and is likely to be cited nationwide when courts confront similar nonsignatory / third-party beneficiary arguments, particularly in class or collective actions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Delegation Clause: A contractual provision where the parties agree that the arbitrator (not a court) will decide whether a given dispute is arbitrable. It is a contract within a contract and must itself be validly invoked.
2. Third-Party Beneficiary: Someone who, while not signing the contract, was intended by the signatories to receive specific legal rights under it. In the First Circuit, intent must be shown with “special clarity.”
3. Equitable Estoppel (Arbitration Context): A doctrine preventing a party from both (a) suing on rights purportedly arising out of a contract and (b) avoiding that contract’s arbitration clause. The claim must be “intertwined” with the contract.
4. New York Convention: A multilateral treaty requiring signatory states to enforce written arbitration agreements in international disputes. It permits—but does not compel—use of domestic nonsignatory doctrines.
5. “Special Clarity” Test: An evidentiary standard first laid out in McCarthy v. Azure: unless the contract clearly and unmistakably grants arbitration rights to a nonsignatory, courts will not infer such intent.

V. Conclusion

The First Circuit’s decision in Morales Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc. reiterates a fundamental principle: arbitration is always a matter of consent. When a corporate affiliate seeks to compel arbitration, it must point to a contractual provision that unmistakably authorizes it to do so. Incidental or practical benefits arising from the contract are not enough. Nor can a party leapfrog judicial scrutiny by invoking delegation clauses that were never intended to bind or benefit it.

With its thorough treatment of third-party beneficiary status, equitable estoppel, and the interaction between domestic law and the New York Convention, the decision provides a road-map for litigants and drafters alike: Explicitly name all intended beneficiaries inside the arbitration clause itself—and do so with particularity—if you hope to enforce arbitration against them or at their behest.

Ultimately, the ruling strengthens contractual precision and preserves the balance Congress struck between respecting arbitration agreements and protecting parties from being forced into harsh fora absent genuine consent.