Woolf v. Evans, 264 Mont. 480, 872 P.2d 777 (1994), describes contempt as:

“a discretionary tool used to enforce compliance with a court's decisions.”

Steinbeisser relies on Woolf to underscore that contempt is appropriate and discretionary where a spouse deliberately frustrates the implementation of a dissolution decree. It is particularly relevant given Craig’s pattern of non‑payment, asset transfers, and non‑cooperation.

d. Broad Equitable Power in Dissolutions: Karr v. Karr

Karr v. Karr, 192 Mont. 388, 628 P.2d 267 (1981), is the key equity precedent. The Court there described an intransigent spouse as:

no “ordinary reluctant litigant. He is an embittered and resolute opponent of ‘the system,’ bent on defying and defeating it whenever and wherever possible and taking unscrupulous advantage of it when he can.”

From that context, Karr articulated a broad principle:

A District Court, sitting in a marriage dissolution case, has the same broad powers as a court of equity in fashioning decrees that will be responsive to the fact situations before it, effective to accomplish the objectives that the District Court, through its judgment, determines must ensue and to do complete justice.

Steinbeisser explicitly invokes Karr to justify the District Court’s post‑judgment modification of the decree—striking the partnership‑transfer option and ordering restoration of misappropriated assets. The opinion effectively extends and applies Karr to contemporary scenarios involving complex, closely held entities and sophisticated post‑judgment maneuvering.

e. Broad Discretion Under § 40‑4‑202, MCA: In re Marriage of Frank

In re Marriage of Frank, 2022 MT 179, 410 Mont. 73, 517 P.3d 188, reiterates that § 40‑4‑202, MCA, “vests the district court with broad discretion to equitably apportion the marital estate.” Steinbeisser cites Frank to frame the initial distribution and to reinforce that an equitable, not strictly equal, division of property is the goal.

f. Inherited Property and Commingling: In re Funk

In re Funk, 2012 MT 14, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39, addresses the treatment of inherited property in dissolution. Funk recognizes:

• Inherited property is not automatically insulated from distribution; it can be subject to equitable apportionment under § 40‑4‑202, MCA.
• Commingling inherited property with marital funds can support including it in the marital estate.

Steinbeisser applies Funk to uphold the District Court’s decision to award LPL account 4092 to Karen. The court found that, to the extent the account contained life insurance or inheritance proceeds, Craig had commingled them with marital funds, and awarding that account to Karen was equitable given the totality of the circumstances.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Contempt Finding

a. Was There a “Command” to Support Contempt?

Craig’s central contention was conceptual: he argued that contempt requires disobedience of a command, and that the decree’s equalization provision did not command him to pay $3,500 per month. Instead, he claimed, the decree afforded him a lawful “choice”:

• Either make the equalization payments; or
• Transfer his 25% interest in the 5‑S Partnership to Karen.

On this theory, selecting the “transfer” option—and then struggling with its implementation—could not be contempt, because he was acting “in accordance” with the decree.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

1. The District Court correctly viewed the equalization payments as a mandatory obligation. At the contempt hearing, it described Craig’s interpretation as “bad faith” and explained that the transfer provision was intended as a backup to secure the payments, not as an alternative elective performance.
2. Even if Craig’s “option” interpretation were assumed arguendo to be correct, he still engaged in contemptuous conduct because:
   • He made no equalization payments at all;
   • He failed, for a long period, to effectuate the transfer of the 25% interest; and
   • He participated in or benefited from changes to the partnership and a management arrangement that materially reduced the value and control associated with that 25% interest, undermining the very remedy he purported to have “chosen.”

In other words, Craig neither paid nor ensured a meaningful transfer of the interest as valued in the decree. His post‑judgment conduct rendered the alternative remedy illusory. That behavior readily fits within § 3‑1‑501(1)(e), MCA: disobedience of a lawful judgment.

b. Pattern of Non‑Compliance and Obstruction

The contempt finding was also grounded in a broader pattern of non‑compliance, including:

• Failing to make any equalization payments despite having the obligation;
• Unilaterally transferring funds out of accounts, such as LPL 4092, that the decree had awarded to Karen, based on his own belief that they were inherited, instead of seeking judicial relief;
• Refusing to sign a deed conveying the marital home to Karen despite the decree awarding it to her; and
• Obstructing post‑trial discovery regarding the status of awarded assets.

This pattern mirrors the kind of intransigent conduct described in Karr. The Supreme Court agreed that this case is an apt context for using contempt as “a discretionary tool to enforce compliance with a court’s decisions” (Woolf).

c. Civil Versus Criminal Contempt

The sanctions imposed were coercive and remedial (e.g., orders to restore funds, pay arrears, and pay attorney’s fees), aimed at forcing Craig to comply with the decree and restore Karen to the position she should have occupied. This fits the statutory definition of civil contempt under § 3‑1‑501(4), MCA: sanctions designed to compel future compliance rather than to punish past behavior as a crime against the court.

2. Modification of the Property Distribution

a. Was the Decree Improp­erly Modified as a Contempt Sanction?

Craig claimed that the District Court:

• Used contempt as a vehicle to modify the substantive property division, thereby violating § 3‑1‑520, MCA; and
• Failed to comply with the strict conditions of § 40‑4‑208, MCA, for modifying property dispositions, including the requirement of written consent or express findings justifying reopening.

The Supreme Court rejected this characterization and carefully distinguished between:

• Sanctions for contempt – fines, incarceration, or coercive orders tied to contempt; and
• Equitable modifications of the property disposition under §§ 40‑4‑202 and 40‑4‑208, MCA, in light of post‑judgment developments and evidence.

The District Court, the Supreme Court emphasized, explicitly stated that it was reserving judgment on penalties for contempt. The key changes—striking the partnership transfer clause and ordering restoration of accounts—were framed as necessary to:

preserve the original intention of the decree, which Craig had undermined.

Thus, the modifications were not punishment for the contempt but rather equitable steps to ensure that Karen received the benefit of a fair property division that the original decree had intended.

b. Authority to Modify Under § 40‑4‑208(3)(b), MCA, and Karr

Under § 40‑4‑208(3)(b), MCA, a property disposition can be modified if there are “conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.” Steinbeisser does not exhaustively enumerate such “conditions,” but it implicitly treats the following as qualifying:

• Material alteration of a key marital asset (Craig’s 25% partnership interest) after judgment, specifically in ways that:
  • Reduced the voting threshold such that Karen’s 25% could no longer block capital calls or influence distributions; and
  • Rechanneled partner draws into a separate entity (VS Inc.), depriving a partner’s interest of distributions while preserving Craig’s overall income.
• A pattern of post‑judgment conduct by Craig that directly contradicted the decree’s intent, including draining accounts awarded to Karen and resisting transfer of the marital home.

Guided by Karr, the Supreme Court endorsed the District Court’s use of broad equitable powers to:

do complete justice.

The court noted that Craig’s counsel effectively acknowledged this equitable power at the hearing, stating:

“I understand the Court sits in equity, and that in equity you have the option to fashion relief that you seem to feel most appropriate, and with that there could be modifications to the decree.”

This acquiescence, while not strictly a waiver of appellate rights, reinforces the view that the District Court’s actions were within the understood scope of its equitable jurisdiction.

c. Striking the Partnership Transfer Option

Central to the modification was the District Court’s decision to strike the language on page 13 of the original decree that allowed transfer of Craig’s 25% interest in 5‑S Partnership if he failed to pay equalization.

The Supreme Court accepted the District Court’s finding that, due to the post‑decree restructuring and the VS Inc. management arrangement, the partnership interest had been “materially altered.” The revised interest:

• Offered substantially less control to the holder; and
• Provided no direct draws, with income effectively diverted through VS Inc.

Accordingly, forcing Karen to accept that altered interest in lieu of the original equalization payments would:

defeat the court's intent that Karen receive an equitable share of the estate.

Striking the transfer option thus “closed the loophole” Craig was attempting to exploit, ensuring that the equalization obligation remained enforceable in the manner originally contemplated.

d. Restoration of Accounts and the “Inheritance” Argument

The District Court ordered Craig to restore:

• The full balance of LPL account 4092 ($153,336.83 plus post‑judgment interest), which had been awarded to Karen in the decree;
• The balances of other LPL accounts (ending in 5607 and 6371) and a Yellowstone Bank account ending in 3434, with interest; and
• $45,671 to make up for missed equalization payments.

Craig argued that account 4092 contained inherited funds and should not have been included in the marital estate in the first place, so ordering its restoration contradicted the decree. The Supreme Court disagreed:

• The District Court found that, even if the account once contained life insurance or inherited proceeds, those had been commingled with marital funds.
• Applying § 40‑4‑202, MCA, and Funk, the court had explicitly decided in the original decree that awarding account 4092 to Karen was equitable.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that this decision was supported by substantial evidence and fell within the court’s broad discretion. Craig’s unilateral contrary belief did not authorize him to disregard the decree or to self‑help the funds out of Karen’s account.

In affirming, the Court reiterated that the distribution was intended to be equitable, not strictly equal; any alleged “error” about exact shares did not undercut the equity of the division.

D. Impact and Future Application

1. Clarifying the Limits of “Option” Clauses in Decrees

Steinbeisser has significant drafting and enforcement implications. While decrees may include alternative mechanisms to satisfy an obligation—such as sale of property, transfer of an interest, or installment payments—the decision makes clear:

• A party cannot avoid contempt by claiming that the existence of an alternative performance erased their core duty, particularly where the alternative is never fully and fairly implemented.
• Where a backup remedy (like a transfer of a partnership interest) is materially undermined by that party’s own post‑judgment conduct, courts may disregard or strike that remedial option and enforce the primary obligation directly.

Practitioners should draft “backup” clauses as security/enforcement devices rather than as freestanding elective alternatives and advise clients that “option” language does not insulate them from contempt if they sabotage the alternative.

2. Post‑Judgment Manipulation of Closely Held Business Interests

The case is especially important for divorces involving closely held businesses, family partnerships, and LLCs. It signals that Montana courts will:

• Scrutinize post‑decree reorganizations that change voting rights or distribution structures;
• Treat significant changes that reduce the value or control associated with an awarded interest as “material alterations” justifying equitable modification under § 40‑4‑208(3)(b), MCA;
• Look beyond formal compliance to the economic realities—for example, where partnership draws disappear but an affiliated entity pays equivalent income to the same insider.

For business‑owning spouses, Steinbeisser is a cautionary precedent: restructuring a business post‑decree in a way that erodes the ex‑spouse’s bargained‑for value can prompt the court to reopen and adjust the property aspects of the decree.

3. Strengthening the Use of Contempt in Family Law

By affirming the contempt finding, the Court reinforces several principles:

• Civil contempt is an appropriate enforcement mechanism when a party deliberately fails to comply with dissolution orders regarding payments, asset transfers, and discovery.
• The “family law exception” under § 3‑1‑523, MCA, provides meaningful appellate review of contempt orders when they are embedded in broader rulings affecting substantive rights, but that review is deferential to the trial court’s fact‑finding and discretionary judgment.
• A subjective belief that the court erred—including beliefs about inheritance—does not justify unilateral non‑compliance or self‑help with marital assets.

4. Inherited Property and Commingling

The reaffirmation of Funk underscores that in Montana:

• Inherited or separately owned property can be included in the marital estate if equity so requires; and
• Commingling inherited funds with marital assets is a key factor supporting their inclusion in the divisible estate.

Spouses who wish to preserve the separate character of inherited property must avoid commingling and maintain clear records. Where commingling has occurred, the court retains flexibility to award such assets to the non‑inheriting spouse as part of an equitable division.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Equalization Payments

An equalization payment is a cash award designed to balance out an unequal allocation of assets. When one spouse receives more high‑value property (like a business interest, ranch, or real estate), the other may receive a series of payments over time so that, in total, both end up with roughly comparable economic value.

2. Civil Contempt vs. Criminal Contempt

• Civil contempt is primarily about forcing compliance with a court order (e.g., “pay this amount,” “restore these funds,” “sign this deed”). The sanction usually lasts until the person complies.
• Criminal contempt is about punishing past disobedience to uphold the authority of the court, often through fixed fines or jail terms.

In Steinbeisser, the court used civil contempt—coercive, remedial orders aimed at making Craig comply and restoring Karen’s awarded property.

3. Nunc Pro Tunc

A nunc pro tunc order (“now for then”) corrects the record to reflect what the court actually decided earlier but failed to record accurately due to a clerical or technical error. It is not a vehicle for changing the court’s substantive decisions after the fact. Craig’s attempt to use nunc pro tunc to re‑designate LPL 4092 as non‑marital was controversial because Karen argued there was no clerical mistake, only a substantive disagreement.

4. Commingling

Commingling occurs when separate property (such as an inheritance) is mixed with marital property such that it can no longer be reliably traced or distinguished. For example, depositing inherited funds into a joint account used for family expenses, without keeping them segregated, may be commingling. Once commingled, Montana courts often treat the property as marital and subject to equitable division.

5. Abuse of Discretion and Substantial Evidence

• A court “abuses its discretion” when it acts arbitrarily or without conscientious judgment, or bases its decision on a clearly erroneous view of the evidence.
• “Substantial evidence” is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other evidence points the other way.

The Supreme Court’s role is not to re‑weigh evidence but to ensure that the District Court’s decisions rest on a solid evidentiary foundation and reasonable judgment. In Steinbeisser, the findings about the partnership’s restructuring, Craig’s transfers, and commingling of inherited funds all met this standard.

V. Conclusion

In re Marriage of Steinbeisser stands as a robust affirmation of Montana district courts’ equitable powers in dissolution proceedings. The decision clarifies that:

• Civil contempt remains a potent, discretionary tool to enforce dissolution decrees, especially against parties who engage in patterns of non‑payment, asset manipulation, and obstruction.
• Property dispositions, though generally final, may be reopened under § 40‑4‑208(3)(b), MCA, when post‑judgment events—such as material restructuring of a closely held business— threaten to deprive one spouse of the equitable share contemplated by the decree.
• Backup remedies in a decree (like a conditional transfer of a partnership interest) are enforcement devices, not shields against contempt; a party cannot both avoid payments and simultaneously undermine the value or efficacy of the alternative remedy.
• Inherited property that has been commingled may be equitably awarded to the non‑inheriting spouse, consistent with Funk and § 40‑4‑202, MCA.

Beyond resolving a contentious dispute between Karen and Craig Steinbeisser, the opinion sends a broader message to litigants and counsel: post‑judgment efforts to outmaneuver a dissolution decree—especially through opaque reconfigurations of family businesses or unilateral withdrawals from awarded accounts—will invite close judicial scrutiny, and courts will not hesitate to modify remedies and invoke contempt to ensure that the decree’s equitable intent is fulfilled.