Ellis v. Jolley: Ordinary Driving by Municipal Trash Truck Drivers Is Not Protected by Sovereign Immunity, While Municipal Trash Collection Itself Remains Immune

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Ellis v. Jolley, Record No. 240930 (Dec. 11, 2025), refines the doctrine of sovereign immunity in two important ways:

It reaffirms that a Virginia municipality is immune from tort liability for negligence arising from the governmental function of trash collection, regardless of whether its employee is personally immune.
It holds that a municipal trash truck driver is not protected by sovereign immunity when, at the time of the accident, he is engaged in “ordinary driving in routine traffic,” rather than in the discretionary, risk-laden aspects of the trash collection function.

The case arises from a collision between a City of Chesapeake trash truck driven by Jason N. Ellis and a vehicle driven by plaintiff Taylor B. Jolley. The City and Ellis asserted sovereign immunity as a bar to Jolley’s negligence action. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to both the City and the driver. The Supreme Court, in turn, split the difference: it restored immunity to the City while leaving the driver exposed to suit.

The opinion is significant because it:

Clarifies that municipal immunity is analytically independent from an employee’s derivative immunity.
Applies the “ordinary driving versus discretionary driving” test to sanitation workers, a context not previously addressed at this level.
Cabins arguments that a government driver is immune simply because he is on his route in a specialized vehicle.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Facts

Jason N. Ellis was employed by the City of Chesapeake as a trash truck driver. To operate the vehicle he held a Class B Commercial Driver’s License (CDL). His daily route included approximately 800 homes and over 1,000 cans. The truck differed from a standard passenger car in several ways:

The driver sits on the right side rather than the left.
The truck uses air brakes instead of typical hydraulic brakes.
An arm operated by a joystick on the side of the vehicle lifts and empties trash cans into the hopper.

Ellis testified that while operating the truck he:

Drove “normally” when moving from one location to the next.
Slowed down and used the joystick arm to pick up cans at each stop.
Had to exercise judgment when obstacles (e.g., parked cars) made it difficult or unsafe to collect a can.
Monitored the volume of trash, deciding when to dump a full load before resuming the route.

On the day in question, Ellis was not slowing or maneuvering to pick up a can, was not using the joystick arm, and was otherwise driving “normally.” As he approached an intersection, he ran a stop sign without stopping. Jolley’s vehicle collided with the trash truck in that intersection.

B. Procedural History

Circuit Court: Jolley filed suit in the Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake against both the City and Ellis, alleging negligence and seeking damages for personal injuries. The City filed a plea in bar (a defensive pleading asserting a legal bar to the action) on behalf of itself and Ellis, asserting sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the circuit court sustained the plea, holding that both the City and Ellis were immune, and dismissed the action.
Court of Appeals: A panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed. Jolley v. Ellis, 82 Va. App. 220 (2024). It reasoned that Ellis was engaged in normal driving rather than exercising specialized judgment in trash collection, and therefore was not protected by sovereign immunity. It further stated, without separate analysis, that “the City and Ellis are not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity.”
Supreme Court of Virginia: The Supreme Court granted further review. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that Ellis was not immune, but held that the City itself remains immune because trash collection is a governmental function. The case was remanded for trial as to Ellis only.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

A. Holding as to the City

The Supreme Court held that:

Trash collection is a governmental function because it “promote[s] public health and comfort” (Ashbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 283 (1929)).
When performing governmental functions, a municipality is immune from liability for negligence in performing or failing to perform those functions (Taylor v. Newport News, 214 Va. 9 (1973); Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230 (2002)).
Therefore, the City of Chesapeake is immune from Jolley’s tort claim arising from its trash collection operations.

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held that the City “does not benefit from sovereign immunity,” emphasizing that the City’s immunity does not depend upon whether its employee is personally immune.

B. Holding as to Ellis (the Driver)

As to Ellis, the Court applied the established four-factor test for employee immunity from Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125 (1991), derived from Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301 (1984). The first three factors (nature of function, governmental interest, and governmental control) were not in dispute. The case turned on the fourth factor: whether, at the time of the accident, Ellis’s conduct “involved the exercise of discretion and judgment.”

Invoking its “ordinary driving versus discretionary driving” framework from prior driving cases (McBride v. Bennett, Friday-Spivey v. Collier, Heider v. Clemons), the Court held:

Sovereign immunity does not protect a government employee engaged in “ordinary driving in routine traffic.”
Sovereign immunity may protect driving that requires “a degree of judgment and discretion beyond ordinary driving situations in routine traffic” and that is integral to effectuating the governmental function.
At the moment of the collision, Ellis was driving “normally,” not picking up trash, not maneuvering around obstacles to reach a can, and not using the joystick arm; he simply ran a stop sign.

Accordingly, Ellis was not performing a discretionary act integral to the governmental function of trash collection at that moment, and he is not entitled to sovereign immunity.

C. Disposition

The Supreme Court:

Affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment insofar as it denied sovereign immunity to Ellis.
Reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment insofar as it denied sovereign immunity to the City of Chesapeake.
Remanded with instructions for further proceedings in circuit court limited to Jolley’s negligence claim against Ellis.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. The Sovereign Immunity Framework in Virginia

Virginia maintains a robust common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. As Messina v. Burden observed, the doctrine is “alive and well” in the Commonwealth and serves multiple policy objectives:

Protecting the public treasury.
Ensuring efficient and “smooth operation of government.”
Preventing government officials and employees from being unduly deterred by fear of personal liability.
Encouraging citizens to accept public employment.
Preventing improper influence on government via vexatious litigation.

The Court reiterates that the existence of sovereign immunity is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Lee v. City of Norfolk, 281 Va. 423, 439 (2011); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 633 (2004). That standard matters here because the Court independently assesses whether the facts, essentially undisputed, place Ellis’s conduct within or outside the immunity shield.

B. Municipal Immunity: Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions

1. The governmental/proprietary distinction

For Virginia municipalities, sovereign immunity turns on whether the activity at issue is:

Governmental in nature (public, legislative, or police powers undertaken for the common good), or
Proprietary (functions more akin to a private corporation’s business activities, often revenue-generating or not uniquely governmental).

As summarized in Patterson v. City of Danville, 301 Va. 181, 189 (2022), municipalities:

“are protected from tort liability arising from governmental functions but not proprietary functions.”

When exercising governmental powers, “a municipal corporation is held to be exempt from liability for its failure to exercise them, and for the exercise of them in a negligent or improper manner.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238 (2002) (quoting Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147 (1939)).

2. Trash collection as a governmental function

The Supreme Court treats as settled that trash collection is a governmental function. In Ashbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 283 (1929), the Court held that garbage removal “promote[s] public health and comfort,” placing it squarely within the ambit of governmental activity. This characterization was reaffirmed in Taylor v. Newport News, 214 Va. 9 (1973), where the Court held the city immune for negligence in trash collection.

In Ellis v. Jolley, the Court simply applies this settled doctrine: because the function “at issue here, the removal of trash,” is governmental, “the City of Chesapeake ‘is immune from liability for negligence in performing or in failing to perform’ this function.” (quoting Taylor).

3. The Court of Appeals’ error: conflating municipal and employee immunity

The Court of Appeals concluded that “the City and Ellis are not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity.” The Supreme Court criticizes this as conflating two distinct inquiries:

Whether the City is immune based on the nature of the function (governmental v. proprietary).
Whether the employee is immune based on the Messina/Colby four-factor test, particularly the discretionary nature of the employee’s act.

The City’s immunity, the Court stresses, “does not hinge on whether its employee derivatively benefits from sovereign immunity.” The City is immune directly because it is performing a governmental function; that determination stands regardless of the employee’s personal immunity status.

This clarification is doctrinally important. It forecloses arguments that if an employee is found not immune (e.g., because engaged in ordinary driving), the municipality thereby loses its own immunity for the underlying function. Instead, the City’s immunity flows from its role and the nature of the service (trash collection), not from the status of its agents at any particular moment.

C. Employee Immunity: The Colby–Messina Four-Factor Framework

For government employees, Virginia uses a structured test drawn from Messina v. Burden, refined in Colby v. Boyden:

The nature of the function the employee performs.
The extent of the government’s interest and involvement in that function.
The degree of control and direction exercised by the government over the employee.
Whether the act in question involved discretion and judgment, as opposed to a merely ministerial duty.

Additionally, as Professor Kent Sinclair has noted (quoted with approval in the opinion), there is a “threshold factor”: the employee’s immunity can only be considered if the entity itself is immune for the activity involved. Here, that threshold is satisfied because trash collection is governmental.

In this case:

The first three factors are essentially conceded:
- Ellis was performing a governmental function (trash collection).
- The City had a strong interest in and involvement with that function.
- The City exercised substantial control and direction over how Ellis performed his job.
The fourth factor — whether Ellis’s specific conduct at the time of the accident was discretionary or merely ministerial — is outcome-determinative.

D. Ordinary Driving vs. Discretionary Driving: Application to Government Drivers

The Supreme Court has repeatedly drawn a line between:

Ordinary driving in routine traffic: a ministerial task, generally not protected by sovereign immunity.
Driving involving heightened risks and governmental judgment: discretionary conduct integral to the governmental mission, which may be covered by immunity.

Key precedents applied here include:

Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143 (1991): A deputy sheriff who had finished serving process and was driving under ordinary conditions was held not immune for a traffic accident. The Court explained that while all drivers make many decisions, in “ordinary driving situations the duty of due care is a ministerial obligation.”
Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 268 Va. 384 (2004): A firefighter driving to a non-emergency “public service call” in routine traffic was not immune. Specialized training or operating a heavy-duty vehicle is not controlling; what matters is whether the driving involves special risks and discretionary judgment arising from the governmental activity itself.
McBride v. Bennett, 288 Va. 450 (2014): Synthesizing earlier cases, the Court stated that it looks to whether the employee is engaged in “ordinary driving in routine traffic” or in driving that requires “a degree of judgment and discretion beyond ordinary driving situations in routine traffic.” Sovereign immunity attaches in the latter but not in the former.

Conversely, immunity has been recognized where the driving was inherently bound up with governmental discretion and special risks:

A police officer engaged in vehicular pursuit.
A firefighter responding to a car fire.
A snowplow operator actively plowing and spreading salt on icy roads (Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339 (1993)).
A school bus driver transporting special-needs students, requiring continuous monitoring of the children while driving (Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30 (2001)).

Application to Ellis

Applying this dichotomy to Ellis, the Court carefully distinguishes:

Protected, discretionary aspects of trash truck operation: slowing to position the truck for collection, maneuvering around obstacles to reach a can, using the joystick arm to lift and empty cans, deciding whether it is safe or feasible to pick up a particular can, deciding when to leave the route to dump a full load.
Unprotected, ordinary aspects: simply driving the truck along the road in routine traffic, following (or failing to follow) standard traffic controls such as stop signs and signals.

The evidence established that Ellis “could encounter special risks and, further, that at times he was required to exercise judgment and discretion beyond ordinary driving” while on his route. But at the specific time of the accident:

He was not slowing to pick up a can.
He was not using the joystick arm.
There was no trash can in the intersection.
There was no evidence that his manner of entering the intersection was affected by any trash-collection judgment.

He was, in his own words, driving “normally,” and he simply failed to stop at a stop sign. Under Heider, Friday-Spivey, and McBride, this is classic “ordinary driving in routine traffic,” making his duty one of ministerial due care rather than discretionary governmental judgment. Consequently, sovereign immunity does not extend to his conduct at that moment.

E. Rejecting Route-Wide Immunity: Clarifying the Stanfield Precedent

The City argued, relying on Stanfield v. Peregoy, that Ellis should be immunized for any driving that occurs while he is on his assigned trash collection route — in effect, a “route-wide” immunity theory.

In Stanfield, a snowplow operator was held immune for an accident that occurred while he was both driving and actively spreading salt. The Court there emphasized that the “combination of driving and spreading salt” formed an “integral part” of the governmental function. It explicitly rejected the notion that the driver was merely engaged in “the simple operation” of a truck in routine traffic.

In Ellis v. Jolley, the Court clarifies that Stanfield does not stand for the proposition that being “on route” automatically cloaks every mile of travel with immunity. The key in Stanfield was the integration of the driving with the active performance of the governmental function (plowing and salting). The snowplow driver was simultaneously:

Operating specialized equipment that altered road conditions in real time.
Making location-specific, judgment-based decisions about how much material to spread, at what speed, and in what manner.

Ellis, by contrast, was merely approaching an intersection; there was no evidence that he was performing any integrated, discretionary trash-collection task at that time. The Court thus rejects any broad reading of Stanfield that would immunize government drivers for all driving done during a governmental work route.

This clarification is a critical guardrail: sovereign immunity is act-specific, not shift- or route-specific. Courts must ask what the employee was actually doing at the time of the alleged negligence.

F. School Bus Cases as a Line-Drawing Tool: Wynn and Linhart

The opinion also revisits two school bus cases to illuminate where the “ordinary driving” line is drawn:

Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590 (1938): A school bus driver was held liable when he negligently operated the bus while merely approaching the place where children were to be embarked. At that moment, he was engaged in “the simple operation of the bus,” not yet in the heightened duty of transporting children.
Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30 (2001): Immunity was granted to a school bus driver transporting children (specifically, special-needs students) because the act of transporting them involved continuous discretionary judgment. The driver had to simultaneously monitor the children and manage roadway conditions, elevating the task beyond ordinary driving.

The Court notes that, in Linhart, the record showed children were actually on the bus, and they were special-needs students. Thus, while the opinion there did not spell out every detail, it is logical to conclude that once children are aboard — especially vulnerable children — the driver’s driving is part and parcel of a sensitive, judgment-laden governmental duty.

By analogy, a trash truck driver may be immune at moments when he is actively collecting trash, maneuvering around hazards to reach cans, or balancing multiple safety concerns related to his route. But when merely driving down the street, with no active trash-collection task in progress, he is in the same position as the school bus driver before picking up children in Wynn.

G. Standard of Review and Factual Findings

The City urged deference to the circuit court’s factual findings following the plea in bar hearing. However, the Supreme Court emphasizes two constraints:

The material facts are not in dispute; Ellis himself testified about his “normal” driving at the time of the accident.
The question of whether those facts satisfy the legal standard for sovereign immunity is a question of law, reviewed de novo.

Where only one reasonable inference can be drawn from undisputed facts, there is little room for “deference”—the court must apply the legal standard to those facts independently.

H. Footnote on Deposition Testimony

The City also objected to the Court of Appeals’ use of deposition testimony in its analysis. The Supreme Court explicitly declines to address this issue, stating that it does not rely on the deposition testimony in reaching its holding. This signals a deliberate narrowing of the decision to avoid procedural side questions and focus solely on the substantive immunity analysis.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is grounded in a robust line of Virginia cases. Each plays a distinct role:

1. Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301 (1984)

Messina is the bedrock case affirming sovereign immunity’s ongoing vitality and articulating the main policy reasons for extending immunity to certain government employees, not just the sovereign entity. It explains that:

“Unless the protection of the doctrine extends to some of the people who help run the government, the majority of the purposes for the doctrine will remain unaddressed.”

This rationale undergirds the entire employee-immunity inquiry: the doctrine must sometimes shield individual employees to prevent the government from being “hamstrung in its operations.” Ellis applies this rationale, but also reinforces that the extension of immunity is limited, particularly where employees engage in routine, ministerial tasks such as ordinary driving.

2. Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125 (1991)

Colby supplies the now-canonical four-factor test for an employee’s entitlement to sovereign immunity. The Ellis Court relies on Colby for this structure and reiterates that the fourth factor — discretion and judgment — is often dispositive in driving cases. This case continues the trend of applying that factor in fine-grained, conduct-specific fashion.

3. Ashbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278 (1929); Taylor v. Newport News, 214 Va. 9 (1973)

These cases establish, and reaffirm, that trash collection is a governmental function. Ellis leans on them to conclude that the City of Chesapeake enjoys sovereign immunity for negligence in trash removal.

4. Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230 (2002); Patterson v. City of Danville, 301 Va. 181 (2022)

These authorities underscore that municipalities are immune from liability for negligence arising from governmental functions (but not proprietary ones). Ellis uses them to reaffirm direct municipal immunity without regard to the employee’s status.

5. Driving Cases: Heider, Friday-Spivey, McBride, Stanfield

Heider v. Clemons: Clarifies that ordinary driving is ministerial. Ellis directly quotes the passage emphasizing that “the simple operation of an automobile” in routine conditions does not involve special risks or employment-related discretionary judgment.
Friday-Spivey v. Collier: Rejects the notion that specialized training or heavy-duty vehicles automatically bring sovereign immunity. Ellis invokes this to show that the trash truck’s size and complexity are not determinative.
McBride v. Bennett: Articulates the “ordinary driving in routine traffic” versus “driving requiring a degree of judgment and discretion beyond ordinary driving” test. Ellis applies McBride’s framework almost verbatim.
Stanfield v. Peregoy: Involves a snowplow actively spreading salt. Ellis distinguishes this case, emphasizing that immunity there was tied to the combined act of plowing/spreading salt, not merely to being on a route.

6. School Bus Cases: Wynn and Linhart

The contrasting outcomes in Wynn v. Gandy and Linhart v. Lawson provide a nuanced model for distinguishing between mere vehicle operation and discretionary performance of a sensitive governmental function. Ellis uses these cases by analogy to show that a trash truck driver, like a bus driver, may be immune while performing special duties but not while simply driving to or between tasks.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that historically shields the government (the “sovereign”) from being sued without its consent. In Virginia:

The Commonwealth (state government) has broad immunity, modified in some areas by statute (e.g., the Virginia Tort Claims Act).
Municipalities (cities, towns) have immunity only when performing governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.
Government employees sometimes share the government’s immunity when performing certain types of governmental work, especially if it involves discretion and judgment.

2. Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions

Governmental functions are those traditionally performed by government for the public good — e.g., police, fire, public education, public health measures (including trash collection).
Proprietary functions look more like ordinary business activities, such as operating a city-owned utility or a commercial enterprise. For these, municipalities generally do not have immunity.

In Ellis, trash collection is treated as clearly governmental, thus granting the City immunity from negligence claims arising from that function.

3. Discretionary vs. Ministerial Acts

A discretionary act involves judgment — choosing among different permissible courses of action, often in light of policy or safety considerations. These acts are more likely to be protected by sovereign immunity.
A ministerial act involves carrying out a fixed duty under clearly defined instructions, with little or no room for judgment. These acts are usually not protected.

Ordinary driving — obeying traffic signals, maintaining a proper lookout — is considered a ministerial duty, even for government employees. By contrast, high-risk or complex driving that is tightly tied to a governmental mission (e.g., emergency response, active plowing) can be discretionary.

4. Ordinary Driving in Routine Traffic

This phrase, repeated across several Virginia cases, refers to driving conditions and behaviors familiar to any ordinary driver:

Non-emergency travel.
Obedience to standard traffic controls (stop signs, lights).
No simultaneous execution of complex governmental tasks (e.g., plowing, controlling children, evading suspects).

If a government employee’s driving at the time of an accident looks like what any private driver would be doing, the courts label it “ordinary driving in routine traffic” and deny sovereign immunity.

5. Plea in Bar

A plea in bar is a defensive pleading asserting a single dispositive issue that, if proven, bars the plaintiff’s claim regardless of other facts — for example, a statute of limitations, res judicata, or sovereign immunity. It allows the court to resolve that legal issue before (or instead of) a full trial. In Ellis, the City’s plea in bar invoked sovereign immunity to seek dismissal of the action at the threshold.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Clarified Separation Between Municipal and Employee Immunity

The most immediate doctrinal effect of Ellis v. Jolley is the emphatic separation of:

Municipal immunity (based on the nature of the function), and
Employee immunity (based on the Colby factors and the nature of the specific act).

In practical terms:

Plaintiffs may proceed directly against individual employees even when the municipality is fully immune for the same function.
Defendants cannot argue that loss of immunity by an employee somehow strips the municipality of its independent immunity.

This separation will influence pleading and motion practice: plaintiffs will more often name both the municipality (where they see any arguable proprietary function) and the employee, while defendants will be more precise in raising immunity defenses tailored to each.

B. Application to Sanitation and Similar Municipal Services

For municipal sanitation departments, the decision has concrete consequences:

The City remains immune from negligence claims arising from trash collection as a governmental function.
However, individual trash truck drivers can be sued personally when their negligence occurs during ordinary driving, not during discretionary, risk-laden aspects of collection.
Immunity for drivers is activity-specific: at some moments on the route they may be immune (e.g., performing judgment-intensive maneuvers directly tied to trash collection), and at others they are not (e.g., running a stop sign while simply driving between stops).

Other municipal services involving specialized vehicles — street sweepers, public works trucks, utility repair vehicles — may see analogous treatment. Courts will likely ask whether, at the time of an accident, the driver was:

Actively performing the specialized governmental function with integrated, discretionary actions, or
Merely traveling in routine traffic from place to place.

C. Litigation Strategy and Risk Management

From a litigation and risk management standpoint:

Plaintiffs will focus discovery on what exactly the employee was doing at the precise moment of the accident — Was the special equipment engaged? Were they responding to an emergency? Were they performing a core governmental function?
Municipalities will assess whether to provide defense and indemnification for employees who may be personally liable where the City is immune. Public entities may consider insurance or contractual indemnity provisions to protect employees in these circumstances.
Training and protocols for operators of specialized vehicles may increasingly emphasize strict adherence to traffic laws during “ordinary driving” phases, given that sovereign immunity will not protect them there.

D. Refinement of “Ordinary Driving” Jurisprudence

Ellis extends the “ordinary driving in routine traffic” analysis into a new context — sanitation. It reinforces several points that future courts will likely adopt:

Operating a large or specialized vehicle (trash truck, fire engine, snowplow) is not enough, by itself, to confer immunity.
Merely being “on duty” or “on route” is not enough; what matters is the at the moment of alleged negligence.
Courts will parse the employee’s tasks with granularity, recognizing that within a single shift the employee may alternate between immune and non-immune conduct.

E. Consistency with Public Policy

The opinion is carefully calibrated between protecting important public functions and preserving accountability:

Municipalities remain shielded when performing core public health functions like trash collection, preventing large-scale litigation from crippling critical services.
Individual employees remain accountable when they engage in conduct indistinguishable from that of any private driver — promoting road safety and equal treatment under the law.
At the same time, employees are still protected when they must make quick, discretionary decisions in risky contexts integral to governmental missions (e.g., emergency driving, active plowing).

This balance is faithful to Messina’s policy underpinnings while avoiding over-expansion of immunity to ordinary negligence.

VIII. Conclusion

Ellis v. Jolley is a significant refinement of Virginia’s sovereign immunity doctrine, particularly in the context of government-operated vehicles. The Court:

Reaffirms that trash collection is a governmental function, and that the City of Chesapeake is immune from negligence claims arising out of that function.
Clarifies that a municipal employee driving a trash truck is not automatically immune simply because he is on his route or operates specialized equipment.
Holds that ordinary driving in routine traffic, even by a government employee in a specialized vehicle, is a ministerial task not protected by sovereign immunity.
Distinguishes between moments when the employee is engaged in discretionary, risk-laden conduct integral to a governmental function (potentially immune) and moments of simple vehicular operation (not immune).
Emphasizes that municipal immunity and employee immunity are analytically distinct: a city may retain immunity for a governmental function even when its employee is personally liable for negligence.

Going forward, Ellis will guide courts, practitioners, and public entities in evaluating sovereign immunity in cases involving government drivers, ensuring that the doctrine remains both principled and appropriately limited. It underscores that sovereign immunity is a shield for governmental functions and necessary discretionary acts — not a blanket protection for all conduct by public employees, particularly where they are simply doing what any ordinary driver does on Virginia’s roads.