Deference to Magistrates and Evidentiary Rigor in § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claims: Commentary on Leon Barcley Stusalitus v. Angelique Ortiz

I. Introduction

The unpublished Fourth Circuit decision in Leon Barcley Stusalitus v. Angelique Ortiz & Kelvin Wright, No. 25‑1186 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), affirms summary judgment against a plaintiff who brought a federal malicious prosecution claim against a police officer and the chief of police. While the opinion is designated “unpublished” and therefore not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit, it provides a clear, compact restatement of several important principles:

The heavy deference federal courts give to magistrates’ probable cause determinations;
The stringent standard for attacking a warrant affidavit under Franks v. Delaware;
The distinction between procedural or policy irregularities in obtaining a warrant and the constitutional question of probable cause for a malicious prosecution claim;
The importance of authentication and admissibility of documents at the summary judgment stage.

The case arises out of felony abduction allegations made in Virginia by the plaintiff’s former partner, followed by the issuance of arrest warrants by a magistrate based on her affidavit. After the criminal case ended in a nolle prosequi with a protective order, the plaintiff sued, claiming that the officer and police chief were liable for malicious prosecution.

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion is especially instructive for litigants and practitioners in § 1983 malicious prosecution cases: it underscores that such claims stand or fall on whether the plaintiff can produce competent, non‑conclusory evidence that undermines the factual basis of the warrant affidavit sufficiently to attack probable cause, not merely evidence of procedural missteps or hindsight criticism of police handling.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Events and Criminal Proceedings

The plaintiff, Leon Barcley Stusalitus, had a former partner, Alaina Cmelik. In 2021, Cmelik went to a Chesapeake Police Department station and reported three alleged incidents of abduction by Stusalitus, occurring on:

July 22, 2021;
August 12, 2021; and
August 15, 2021.

Defendant Officer Angelique Ortiz took Cmelik’s statement and then accompanied her to the magistrate judge’s office. Cmelik presented an affidavit to the magistrate, who found probable cause and issued three felony arrest warrants for abduction. Based on these warrants, Stusalitus was arrested.

Eventually, rather than proceed to trial, the parties reached an agreement:

The prosecution entered a nolle prosequi (a formal discontinuance) on the abduction charges; and
In return, Stusalitus agreed to a two‑year no‑contact protective order.

Under Virginia law, a nolle prosequi “discharges the accused from liability on the indictment to which the nolle prosequi is entered.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 234 S.E.2d 269, 273 (Va. 1977).

B. Internal Police Review

After this resolution, Stusalitus filed a complaint with the Chesapeake Police Department concerning the way his case had been handled. The department conducted an internal investigation and concluded that Officer Ortiz should have elevated the felony abduction charges to the department’s criminal investigations section before proceeding to the magistrate. The department notified Stusalitus by letter that the matter had been investigated and “handled administratively.”

Notably, the internal review did not conclude that the warrants lacked probable cause; rather, the critique concerned adherence to departmental procedure on how felony complaints should be routed.

C. Federal Civil Action and District Court Ruling

In federal district court (E.D. Va.), Stusalitus sued:

Officer Ortiz; and
Chief of Police Kelvin Wright (in his supervisory capacity).

He alleged malicious prosecution, framing the claim under the Fourth Circuit’s § 1983 malicious prosecution jurisprudence, which treats such a claim as a Fourth Amendment seizure “pursuant to legal process” not supported by probable cause.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, emphasizing that Stusalitus had not presented any evidence contradicting the factual allegations in Cmelik’s affidavit that was presented to the magistrate (J.A. 80). Without such evidence, the court concluded he could not show that the arrest warrants were issued without probable cause.

D. Appeal to the Fourth Circuit

On appeal, Stusalitus raised two primary arguments:

Under Virginia Code § 19.2‑71, he argued, a magistrate may only issue a felony arrest warrant based on a civilian complaint if it has been authorized by the Commonwealth’s Attorney or a law enforcement agency with jurisdiction. Because Officer Ortiz did not first elevate the complaint to the criminal investigations section, he contended that the warrants were invalid and this undermined his arrest.
He claimed that the district court ignored “clear” evidence contradicting Cmelik’s affidavit—namely, diary entries purportedly written by Cmelik, which he attached (as photos) to his summary judgment opposition.

The Fourth Circuit—Judge Benjamin writing for a unanimous panel (Judges King and Rushing joining)—affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

III. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fourth Circuit framed the case squarely within its § 1983 malicious prosecution doctrine, citing Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2012). To prevail, a plaintiff must show:

He was seized pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause; and
The criminal proceedings terminated in his favor.

The court focused exclusively on the probable cause element and held that Stusalitus failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on that question.

The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

Deference to Magistrate’s Probable Cause Determination: A magistrate’s finding of probable cause, based on an affidavit, is entitled to significant deference and a presumption of validity. The court applied the standard from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and United States v. Davis, 94 F.4th 310 (4th Cir. 2024): a court will decline to defer to a magistrate only where the determination lacks substantial evidentiary support or rests on a knowingly or recklessly false affidavit.
Statutory/Warrant-Procedure Defects vs. Probable Cause: Even assuming that Virginia law (§ 19.2‑71) required prior authorization from the Commonwealth’s Attorney or law enforcement, and even assuming that requirement was not followed, this is “irrelevant” to the constitutional probable cause inquiry that governs a federal malicious prosecution claim.
Authentication and Summary Judgment Evidence: The diary entries upon which Stusalitus relied were unauthenticated; they were not attached to an affidavit or declaration, nor were they sworn to be genuine. Under Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, unauthenticated documents cannot be considered at summary judgment.
Substantive Insufficiency of the Diary Entries: Even if considered, the diary entries did not actually contradict any specific statement in Cmelik’s affidavit: most entries lacked dates; a dated entry (July 19, 2021) did not correspond to any of the alleged abduction dates; and the plaintiff did not identify specific factual conflicts between the diary and the affidavit.
Failure to Meet the Franks Standard: To defeat the presumption of validity of the affidavit under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1971), a plaintiff must show that the affidavit contained knowingly or recklessly false statements (or material omissions). The court found that the plaintiff offered only conclusory assertions that the affidavit was “entirely illogical,” which is insufficient under Franks.

Consequently, the panel held that there was no genuine dispute about the existence of probable cause for the arrest, and the grant of summary judgment to Ortiz and Wright was affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework: § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine

The Fourth Circuit’s touchstone for federal malicious prosecution claims is Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff alleging “malicious prosecution” under § 1983 must show:

A Fourth Amendment seizure pursuant to legal process (such as an arrest warrant);
The legal process (e.g., warrant) was not supported by probable cause; and
The criminal proceeding terminated in his favor.

The Fourth Circuit in Stusalitus cites Durham for the first two elements and focuses exclusively on the probable cause component. The court does not analyze whether the nolle prosequi with a two‑year protective order constitutes “favorable termination,” likely because the defendants chose to litigate only the probable cause element and the panel found that dispositive.

Thus, the controlling question becomes: Was the plaintiff seized pursuant to legal process (the arrest warrants) that lacked probable cause? If the answer is no—as the court holds— the malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law, regardless of any other alleged misconduct or procedural irregularity.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

1. Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2012)

Durham establishes the basic elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in the Fourth Circuit: seizure via legal process, lack of probable cause, and favorable termination. In Stusalitus, the court quotes the first two elements and uses Durham to frame the central question as whether there was probable cause for the arrest.

Importantly, this doctrinal framing clarifies that the case is not about common‑law malicious prosecution in isolation; it is about a constitutional claim, tied to the Fourth Amendment, with its own constitutional standards—especially probable cause and deference to judicial officers.

2. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)

Leon is a foundational Supreme Court decision dealing with the “good‑faith exception” to the exclusionary rule in the context of search warrants. One of its key premises is that courts should give “great deference” to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.

In Stusalitus, the panel invokes Leon not in an exclusionary rule context, but for its broader principle that magistrates’ probable cause determinations are entitled to deference. The court states:

“A reviewing court generally accords ‘great deference’ to a magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause.” (citing Leon).

By drawing on Leon, the panel reinforces the notion that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case faces an uphill battle when attacking a magistrate’s probable cause finding. The magistrate’s role as a neutral decision‑maker is central to the constitutional analysis.

3. United States v. Davis, 94 F.4th 310 (4th Cir. 2024)

Davis is a more recent Fourth Circuit decision elaborating on when a reviewing court may decline to defer to a magistrate’s probable cause determination. The Stusalitus panel quotes Davis for the principle that deference should be refused only:

when the finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or
when the basis of the determination is a knowingly or recklessly false affidavit.

The appellant argued that Davis should not apply because, in his view, courts give more deference for search warrants than for arrest warrants. The panel rejects that distinction, noting that the Fourth Circuit has “routinely used the standard in Davis to review a magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause for arrest warrants,” citing:

United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2011); and
Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015).

This is an important doctrinal clarification: the same deferential standard applies to probable cause determinations for both search and arrest warrants in the Fourth Circuit.

4. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1977)

Franks established that a defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant (search or arrest) by showing:

The affidavit contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and
The false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.

Stusalitus leverages these Franks principles in the civil context. The panel stresses that:

An affidavit supporting a warrant is entitled to a “presumption of validity”; and
To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must do more than offer conclusory allegations; there must be evidence supporting the claim that the affidavit is false.

The court notes that even if a plaintiff successfully shows that some statements are false, the analysis must proceed to determine whether the remaining affidavit would still support probable cause (citing Cahaly and Franks).

In Stusalitus, the plaintiff did not identify any specific falsehood in the affidavit, nor did he show that Ortiz or Cmelik acted knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly in including false statements. His sweeping characterizations that the affidavit was “entirely illogical” do not meet the Franks standard.

5. United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2011)

Clenney is cited simply as an example in which the Fourth Circuit applied the Franks/Leon framework to arrest warrants. Its use here rebuts the appellant’s attempt to treat search and arrest warrants differently for deference purposes.

6. Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015)

Cahaly is another key Fourth Circuit case applying Franks and articulating how courts excise false statements from an affidavit and then reassess probable cause.

In Stusalitus, the panel invokes Cahaly to clarify the second stage of the Franks inquiry: even if false statements are proven, probable cause may still exist unless the corrected affidavit (with falsehoods removed) fails to establish probable cause.

Because the plaintiff failed at the first step—he did not meaningfully show that any statement in Cmelik’s affidavit was false—there was no need for the court to engage in the second‑step analysis.

7. Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993)

Orsi addresses the admissibility of documentary evidence at the summary judgment stage. The rule is straightforward but crucial: documents must be authenticated—typically by attaching them to an affidavit or declaration of a person with knowledge—before they can be considered by the court on summary judgment.

In Stusalitus, this rule is applied to the diary entries:

They were submitted as photographs;
They were not attached to any affidavit or declaration;
Stusalitus did not swear to their authenticity; and
There was no deposition or other testimony authenticating them.

Under Orsi and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), the court held those diary entries could not be considered for summary judgment purposes. This is a procedural but outcome‑determinative point: because the plaintiff’s purported key evidence was inadmissible, he effectively had no evidence undermining the affidavit at all.

8. Bhattacharya v. Murray, 93 F.4th 675 (4th Cir. 2024) and Guthrie v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 79 F.4th 328 (4th Cir. 2023)

These cases are cited for the general proposition that the court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. They do not substantively influence the malicious prosecution analysis, but they situate the opinion within standard Fourth Circuit summary judgment jurisprudence.

9. Miller v. Commonwealth, 234 S.E.2d 269 (Va. 1977) and Va. Code § 19.2‑71

Miller is cited only to define “nolle prosequi” under Virginia law: it is a discontinuance that discharges the accused from liability on that indictment.

Va. Code § 19.2‑71 is not quoted in full, but the appellant relies on it for his argument that the magistrate could not issue felony arrest warrants on a civilian complaint without prior authorization from the Commonwealth’s Attorney or law enforcement. The panel assumes, without deciding, that this is the statute’s effect, but deems it irrelevant to the federal malicious prosecution element of lack of probable cause.

The court’s message is: statutory compliance with warrant‑issuance procedures is distinct from the constitutional question of whether probable cause existed. A failure to follow state‑law authorizations does not, standing alone, show that the magistrate lacked probable cause when he or she issued the warrant based on the affidavit’s content.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment Posture

Applying de novo review, the Fourth Circuit stands in the same position as the district court: it must determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact such that a reasonable jury could find for the non‑moving party (here, the plaintiff) on the probable cause issue.

Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving lack of probable cause, he must put forth admissible evidence that could allow a jury to conclude the affidavit lacked a sufficient factual basis or contained knowingly or recklessly false statements that were material to probable cause.

2. Deference to the Magistrate’s Probable Cause Determination

The panel reiterates that a magistrate’s probable cause determination is entitled to:

“great deference” (Leon); and
a presumption of validity (Franks).

In other words, the starting presumption is that the magistrate correctly found probable cause based on the sworn affidavit. A plaintiff must do substantial work to overcome this presumption.

The court adopts the Davis framing: it will decline to defer only if:

the probable cause finding was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record; or
the finding rests on a knowingly or recklessly false affidavit.

Importantly, this framework is applied identically to arrest warrants, shutting down the appellant’s request for a lower deference standard in that context.

3. Distinguishing Probable Cause from Statutory Authorization Defects

The plaintiff’s first argument focused on a state‑law requirement (Va. Code § 19.2‑71), contending that because the felony warrant based on a civilian complaint was not authorized by the Commonwealth’s Attorney or law enforcement, it was unlawfully issued. The panel characterizes this argument as:

“irrelevant. … [T]he first prima facie element to meet a malicious prosecution claim is whether the person was arrested without probable cause—not whether the arrest warrant itself was properly issued.”

That sentence is a key move in the court’s reasoning. It draws a sharp line between:

Validity of the warrant process under state law (e.g., whether the magistrate complied with § 19.2‑71’s authorization requirements), and
Existence of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.

Even if the warrant might be “invalid” in a state‑law sense (e.g., because a required sign‑off was omitted), that does not, by itself, show that—on the facts presented in the affidavit—there was no probable cause. The malicious prosecution claim, as framed under § 1983, turns on probable cause, not on technical compliance with state warrant‑issuance rules.

This is closely aligned with longstanding doctrine that federal constitutional claims are distinct from and not automatically coextensive with state procedural rules. A violation of state law might be relevant evidence in some contexts, but it is not automatically a constitutional violation.

4. The Diary Entries: Authentication and Substantive Relevance

The plaintiff’s second argument relied on photographed pages of what he claimed were Cmelik’s diary, submitted with his summary judgment opposition. He argued that these entries contradicted her affidavit.

The court addresses this in two stages:

(a) Authentication

First, the panel finds the diary entries are unauthenticated:

They were not attached to an affidavit or declaration;
There was no sworn statement that the entries were written by Cmelik;
There was no foundational testimony about when, where, or how they were created.

Relying on Orsi and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), the court holds that unauthenticated evidence “should not be considered” at summary judgment. As Orsi notes, documents must be authenticated and attached to a proper affidavit; letters (and by analogy, diaries) must be authenticated by their author or by a witness with personal knowledge.

Without proper authentication, the diary entries are functionally no evidence at all.

(b) Substantive Contradiction of the Affidavit

Second, the court explains that even if it were to consider the diary entries, they do not actually contradict the affidavit’s assertions in a way that would undermine probable cause:

Most diary entries lack dates, so it is unclear when the events described occurred;
The only dated entry (July 19, 2021) predates the first alleged abduction by three days (July 22);
The plaintiff never identifies a specific statement in the affidavit that is inconsistent with any diary entry; and
His description of the affidavit as “entirely illogical” is a conclusory assertion, not evidence.

Consequently, even if admissible, the diary would not meet the Franks threshold for attacking the affidavit:

No particular statement in the affidavit is shown to be false; and
There is no showing that any such statement was made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.

5. Failure to Meet the Franks Burden

The court emphasizes that to support a Franks challenge, one must do more than call an affidavit “illogical” or “false” in general terms. A plaintiff must:

Identify specific statements (or material omissions) in the affidavit;
Produce evidence that they are factually false; and
Show that the affiant (here, effectively Cmelik as the declarant, and—if relevant—Ortiz as the officer involved) knew of the falsehood or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

Only then does the court proceed to the second step: removing the false statements from the affidavit and reevaluating whether probable cause remains. Because that first step is not met in Stusalitus, the analysis ends there.

6. Result: No Genuine Dispute of Material Fact on Probable Cause

With the affidavit presumed valid, the magistrate’s determination entitled to deference, and no admissible evidence meaningfully undermining that determination, the panel concludes:

“[Stusalitus] fails to show a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether his arrest was supported by probable cause.”

That conclusion is fatal to the malicious prosecution claim. Even accepting that the department later concluded Ortiz should have handled the case differently (by referring it to investigations), and even assuming some breach of § 19.2‑71’s authorization requirements, the constitutional core—probable cause—remains intact.

D. Impact and Implications

1. Future § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claims

The decision, though unpublished, has clear persuasive implications for future § 1983 malicious prosecution litigation in the Fourth Circuit:

Plaintiffs must come forward with specific, admissible evidence that attacks the factual basis of the warrant affidavit.
Arguments based solely on:
- police policy violations,
- state‑law warrant‑issuance irregularities, or
- post‑hoc internal findings of procedural error
are insufficient to prove the absence of probable cause.
Courts will continue to give significant deference to magistrates’ probable cause findings, and plaintiffs who rely on thin or conclusory challenges are likely to face summary judgment.

2. Police Practices and Internal Policy Violations

The case draws a line between internal departmental standards and constitutional minima:

Police departments may require additional internal checks (e.g., referring felony charges to an investigations unit), but a failure to follow those procedures does not automatically translate into a Fourth Amendment violation.
Internal findings that an officer “should have” followed a different protocol are, by themselves, not enough to show a lack of probable cause.

This distinction preserves space for internal administrative discipline without turning every procedural misstep into § 1983 liability.

3. Summary Judgment and Evidence Authentication

The opinion also sends a clear message about litigation practice:

At summary judgment, parties must submit documents in a form that could be admissible at trial.
Informal submissions—photos of writings, unsworn attachments, unverified statements—will not be considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Authentication requires an affidavit, declaration, or testimony from a person with knowledge.

This is particularly important for civil rights plaintiffs, including those proceeding with limited resources: failure to properly authenticate key documents can be outcome‑determinative, as it was here.

4. Virginia’s Citizen Complaint Procedures and Federal Claims

The plaintiff’s argument under Va. Code § 19.2‑71 reflects a broader pattern: attempting to bootstrap state procedural violations into federal constitutional claims. The panel’s response signals that:

Even if state law restricts when and how magistrates may issue felony warrants on civilian complaints, and even if those procedures are not followed, the federal malicious prosecution analysis still turns primarily on probable cause as a constitutional matter.
Plaintiffs seeking to rely on such state‑law defects must still show how those defects resulted in factual inaccuracies or omissions that bear on probable cause.

5. Favorable Termination Issues (Background Context)

Although not addressed in detail in the opinion, the case occurs against the backdrop of recent Supreme Court precedent on “favorable termination,” particularly Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), which held that a plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction, not that the termination affirmatively indicated innocence.

The panel appears to assume, without deciding, that the nolle prosequi with a two‑year protective order suffices or at least is not dispositively adverse on this element. By narrowing the decision to probable cause, the court leaves “favorable termination” issues for another case.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Malicious Prosecution under § 1983 vs. State Tort Law

Traditional malicious prosecution is a state tort with elements such as initiation of proceedings, malice, lack of probable cause, and favorable termination. In the Fourth Circuit, however, the phrase “malicious prosecution” in § 1983 cases refers to a Fourth Amendment claim for seizure pursuant to legal process not supported by probable cause.

This federal claim:

Does not require proof of “malice” in the traditional tort sense (though malice might be relevant to some aspects);
Focuses heavily on probable cause and the quality of the warrant process; and
Is governed by federal constitutional standards, not just state law.

2. Probable Cause

“Probable cause” is a flexible, practical standard: it exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s (or magistrate’s) knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.

It is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable magistrate may find probable cause based on credible victim statements, even without extensive corroborating investigation, particularly in domestic or interpersonal crime contexts.

3. Magistrate and Warrant Affidavit

A magistrate judge (or magistrate) is a neutral judicial officer who evaluates sworn affidavits to decide whether to issue warrants. An affidavit is a written, sworn statement of facts.

In a malicious prosecution claim involving a warrant, the affidavit’s contents—and whether they are truthful and sufficient—are central. Courts presume the affidavit is valid unless a plaintiff can make a Franks showing.

4. Nolle Prosequi

A nolle prosequi is a formal decision by the prosecutor to discontinue a criminal case. Under Virginia law (Miller), it discharges the accused from liability on that particular indictment or charge.

In the federal malicious prosecution context, a nolle prosequi generally counts as a termination “without a conviction.” Whether it is considered “favorable” can depend on surrounding circumstances (e.g., whether it reflects factual innocence or is part of a negotiated arrangement), but Thompson v. Clark considerably lowers that bar.

5. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism to resolve cases without trial when:

There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact; and
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

At this stage, the non‑moving party must come forward with admissible evidence—such as affidavits, declarations, deposition testimony, or authenticated documents—that would allow a reasonable jury to find in his favor.

6. Authentication of Evidence

Authentication means showing that a document is what its proponent claims it is. For example, a diary entry allegedly written by a witness can be authenticated by:

That witness’s sworn statement (affidavit or deposition) attesting to its authorship; or
Another witness with knowledge; or
Various other methods allowed by evidence rules (handwriting comparison, distinctive characteristics, etc.).

At summary judgment, mere unsworn attachments or unidentified photographs lack evidentiary weight. Orsi makes clear that such materials cannot be the basis for defeating summary judgment.

7. Franks Challenge

A Franks challenge is a specific type of attack on a warrant affidavit. To succeed, a plaintiff (or criminal defendant) must:

Show that the affidavit contains false statements (or material omissions);
Prove that the affiant knew they were false or recklessly disregarded the truth; and
Demonstrate that, once the false statements are removed, the remaining content does not establish probable cause.

Generic assertions that an affidavit is “false” or “illogical” do not meet this standard; concrete, factual, and admissible evidence is required.

VI. Conclusion

Stusalitus v. Ortiz offers a concise but instructive reaffirmation of several key principles in Fourth Circuit § 1983 malicious prosecution jurisprudence:

Magistrate deference and affidavit presumption of validity: Courts start from the premise that a magistrate’s probable cause finding, based on a sworn affidavit, is correct and entitled to great deference.
Probable cause is central: Violations of internal police protocols or state‑law warrant‑issuance procedures do not, by themselves, establish a lack of probable cause for purposes of the federal malicious prosecution claim.
Strict evidence requirements at summary judgment: Plaintiffs must submit properly authenticated, admissible evidence to create a triable issue on the veracity or sufficiency of the warrant affidavit.
High bar for Franks-type challenges: To overcome the presumption of affidavit validity, a plaintiff must identify specific false statements or omissions and show they were made knowingly or recklessly and were material to probable cause.

Although unpublished and non‑precedential, the decision underscores a consistent theme in Fourth Circuit case law: federal malicious prosecution claims are tightly tethered to the existence (or absence) of probable cause, assessed through a deferential lens to the magistrate’s decision and constrained by rigorous evidentiary rules at the summary judgment stage. For practitioners, it is a reminder that substantive critiques of probable cause must be supported by carefully prepared, admissible proof— not by procedural irregularities alone.