Dangerousness, Domestic Violence, and As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges to § 922(g)(1): Commentary on United States v. Gary Crawford (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Gary Crawford, No. 23‑5429 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025), a case that operates at the intersection of federal firearms law, the Commerce Clause, and the post‑Bruen Second Amendment landscape.

Gary Crawford was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. On appeal, he argued:

that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it fails to require that a felon’s firearm possession “substantially” affect interstate commerce; and
that, as applied to him, § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment because he is allegedly not a “dangerous” individual, notwithstanding his prior record.

Having failed to raise these constitutional challenges in the district court, Crawford faced the stringent “plain error” standard of review. Judge Bush, writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed the conviction. The court held:

The Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed by binding Sixth Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1).
The as‑applied Second Amendment challenge fails because existing Sixth Circuit caselaw—the dangerousness framework developed in United States v. Williams and elaborated in subsequent cases— treats Crawford’s criminal history as compelling evidence of dangerousness.

Although the opinion is “not recommended for publication” and therefore not precedential in the Sixth Circuit, it is an important application of the circuit’s rapidly developing Second Amendment jurisprudence. It clarifies how:

plain‑error review interacts with constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), and
prior convictions—especially homicide, drug trafficking, and domestic violence—operate as powerful indicators of “dangerousness” for purposes of as‑applied Second Amendment challenges.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Crawford’s Criminal History

The panel begins by detailing Crawford’s extensive criminal record, which is central to the Second Amendment “dangerousness” analysis:

Juvenile homicide and reckless endangerment (age 16): Crawford fired a handgun into a crowd and killed someone, leading to convictions for criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment.
Drug convictions (early twenties): He accumulated several drug convictions, including:
- simple possession of marijuana; and
- two convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (drug trafficking offenses).
Domestic assault (age 22): He was convicted of domestic assault for punching his girlfriend under her left eye.
Domestic-violence-related felon-in-possession (age 24): The same girlfriend later reported:
- he punched her in the face,
- repeatedly choked her,
- threatened to kill her, and
- a handgun was found at the scene.
This resulted in a prior conviction under § 922(g)(1) and a sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release.
Prison misconduct: While incarcerated on the felon‑in‑possession case, Crawford repeatedly violated prison rules and was twice found in possession of a dangerous weapon.

B. The New Offense

In January 2021, Crawford began his supervised release. In October 2021, the Memphis Police Department received reports of a man walking down the street waving a machete and firing a handgun into the air. The man was Crawford.

When officers approached:

He became irate and screamed while brandishing the handgun.
The officers drew their weapons and ordered him to surrender the gun.
Crawford eventually sat down, placed the gun on his lap, but refused to relinquish it despite repeated commands.
When he stood up, the handgun slid to the ground, and he walked toward the officers, beginning to remove his clothing.
Officers tackled him and took him into custody.

These facts are not only relevant to the current § 922(g)(1) charge but also reinforce the court’s conclusion that Crawford presents an ongoing danger.

C. District Court Proceedings

Crawford was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 100 months’ imprisonment.

Importantly for the appellate posture, Crawford did not raise either his Commerce Clause argument or his as-applied Second Amendment challenge in the district court. The constitutional issues therefore came to the Sixth Circuit under the demanding plain-error framework.

III. Summary of the Court’s Opinion

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two major steps: (1) applying plain‑error review; and (2) addressing each of Crawford’s constitutional challenges.

Standard of Review – Plain Error. Because Crawford did not object below, the panel applied the four-prong plain error test drawn from Greer v. United States and other cases:
1. There must be an error;
2. the error must be "plain" under current law;
3. the error must affect the defendant’s "substantial rights"; and
4. the error must seriously affect the "fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
Commerce Clause Challenge. Crawford argued § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it does not require that a felon’s firearm possession “substantially” affect interstate commerce. The court held this argument is squarely foreclosed by binding Sixth Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Chesney, which recognizes that § 922(g)(1)’s "jurisdictional element"— the requirement that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce—is sufficient under United States v. Lopez. Thus, there was no "plain error."
Second Amendment As‑Applied Challenge. Relying on United States v. Williams and subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions, Crawford argued that, as applied to him, § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment because he is not "dangerous" and should not be disarmed.
- The panel held that Williams makes § 922(g)(1) facially constitutional and sets out a framework for as‑applied challenges that places the burden squarely on the defendant to prove that he is not dangerous.
- Applying that framework, the court concluded that Crawford’s criminal record—including a homicide conviction, two drug trafficking convictions, a domestic-violence conviction, a prior felon-in-possession conviction arising from alleged domestic violence, and prison weapons infractions—overwhelmingly establishes his dangerousness.
- Even if the district court erred by not making an explicit "dangerousness" finding, any such error was not "plain" under current law and did not affect Crawford’s substantial rights because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that he is non‑dangerous.

On this basis, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Opinion

1. Plain-Error Framework

The court draws on a series of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit decisions to articulate and apply the plain-error standard:

United States v. Johnson, 95 F.4th 404 (6th Cir. 2024) – cited for the basic articulation of plain-error review and the four-prong test.
Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021) – the Supreme Court’s modern restatement of the plain-error test, emphasizing that the burden is on the defendant to show all four prongs, including prejudice.
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) – establishes that an error is “plain” if it is clear under “current law” at the time of appellate review, not necessarily at the time of trial.
United States v. Al‑Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015) – reinforces the same timing rule for “plainness” in the Sixth Circuit.
United States v. Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 2020), and Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016) – these cases explain the "substantial rights" prong: an error affects substantial rights if there is a "reasonable probability" that the result would have been different absent the error.

These authorities collectively establish the high bar Crawford had to clear: not merely to show that the district court might have erred, but that any error was clear under existing law and outcome‑determinative.

2. Commerce Clause and § 922(g)(1)

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) – the seminal Commerce Clause decision limiting Congress’s ability to regulate non‑economic criminal conduct that does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez invalidated the Gun‑Free School Zones Act because it lacked a jurisdictional hook to interstate commerce.
United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996) – post‑Lopez, the Sixth Circuit upheld § 922(g)(1) on the ground that the statute contains a jurisdictional element: each offense requires proof that the firearm has moved in or otherwise affected interstate commerce. Chesney concluded that this element satisfies the constitutional requirement identified in Lopez.

The Crawford panel relies on Chesney to reject the contention that § 922(g)(1) must require a “substantial” effect on commerce in each individual case. Under binding circuit precedent, the interstate nexus is satisfied if the firearm has ever moved in interstate commerce—even if the defendant’s particular act of possession is purely local.

3. Second Amendment and Dangerousness: Williams and Progeny

The core of the opinion concerns the Sixth Circuit’s post‑Bruen Second Amendment framework as articulated in:

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024).

In Williams:

The Sixth Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, even after the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which emphasized the need for historical analogues to modern gun regulations.
At the same time, the court acknowledged that § 922(g)(1) could be vulnerable to an as‑applied challenge in “certain cases”—particularly where a felon can show that he does not fit within the historically disarmed category of "dangerous" persons.
Critically, Williams placed the burden on the defendant to prove that he is not dangerous and thus falls outside the historically disarmed category.

Williams articulated several important principles on “dangerousness” that the Crawford panel applies:

Crimes against the person. The court described crimes “against the body of another human being” (such as murder, rape, assault, and robbery) as highly probative of dangerousness. Williams indicated that it is “very difficult” for a defendant with such convictions to demonstrate non‑dangerousness.
Drug trafficking. Williams recognized that certain non‑violent crimes, especially drug trafficking, can still present a "significant threat of danger" because of their social harms and association with violence, even if a particular incident does not involve actual violence.
Domestic violence. Crimes involving domestic violence are especially probative of dangerousness because they demonstrate an actual willingness to use force against intimate partners.

The Crawford opinion also cites follow‑on Sixth Circuit decisions applying Williams:

United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492 (6th Cir. 2024) – crucially, Morton held that courts assessing dangerousness are not confined to the bare fact of conviction. They may consider how an offense was committed, i.e., the actual underlying conduct.
United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2024) – the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of disarming people with domestic‑violence convictions, reinforcing that such offenders fall within the category of persons historically subject to firearms restrictions.
United States v. Martin, No. 24‑3750, 2025 WL 1913185 (6th Cir. July 11, 2025); United States v. Watson, No. 24‑3002, 2025 WL 833246 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025); United States v. Wellington, No. 24‑3151, 2024 WL 4977138 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024) – these (largely unpublished) decisions, as summarized by the Crawford panel, frequently treat domestic‑violence convictions as powerful evidence of dangerousness for purposes of as‑applied challenges.

The opinion also notes two district court decisions:

United States v. Wynn, No. 23‑cr‑29, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2602605 (E.D. Tenn. June 23, 2025);
United States v. Green, No. 23‑cr‑20506, 2024 WL 4469090 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2024).

These district courts, applying Williams, have "contemplated that juvenile offenses may be less indicative of lasting dangerousness." The Crawford panel uses these cases to highlight that while some judges view juvenile conduct as less predictive of enduring dangerousness, the Sixth Circuit has not yet adopted that view as binding law.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Application of Plain-Error Review

The panel first emphasizes that Crawford’s failure to object in the district court triggers plain‑error review. This is crucial because:

Under plain-error, an unsettled or debatable constitutional issue usually cannot qualify as a “plain” error.
Even if an error occurred, the defendant bears the burden of showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the error not occurred.

The opinion thus asks two distinct but related questions:

Was there an error that is clear under current law (i.e., "plain")?
Even if so, is there a reasonable probability that a correct application of the law (e.g., a proper dangerousness analysis) would have led to acquittal or dismissal of the charge?

2. Commerce Clause Challenge

Crawford advanced a commerce-based attack on § 922(g)(1), arguing that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce in each case. The panel dispatches this claim swiftly:

Chesney held that § 922(g)(1)’s jurisdictional element—which requires proof that the firearm "has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce" or "otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce"—brings the statute within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
Because Chesney is binding circuit precedent, the panel is not free to revisit it. A contrary argument is, by definition, not a basis for finding plain error in the district court’s application of § 922(g)(1).

The court therefore holds that Crawford’s Commerce Clause claim is foreclosed and cannot satisfy the plain-error standard.

3. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenge and the Role of Dangerousness

The heart of the opinion is the as‑applied Second Amendment challenge. Crawford argued:

that his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment should prevent the government from prosecuting him under § 922(g)(1) because he is allegedly not a dangerous person; and
that the case should be remanded for a dangerousness determination by the district court or a jury.

The panel’s analysis proceeds in several steps.

a. The Burden of Proving Non-Dangerousness

Drawing from Williams, the panel reaffirms that:

The government need not prove dangerousness as an element of a § 922(g)(1) offense.
Instead, in an as‑applied Second Amendment challenge, the defendant bears the burden of proving that he is not dangerous and that the statute, as applied to him, infringes conduct protected by the Second Amendment.

The court notes that this burden is “very difficult” to satisfy, especially for defendants convicted of violent crimes "against the body of another human being."

b. The Homicide Conviction and Juvenile Age

Crawford’s first line of defense is that his homicide conviction occurred when he was 16, and people typically become less dangerous with age. He argued that the district court should have, at least, evaluated the significance of his age at the time of that offense.

The panel’s response is twofold:

The homicide conviction is precisely the kind of crime—"against the body of another human being"—that Williams treats as powerful evidence of dangerousness.
While some district courts (Wynn and Green) have suggested that juvenile convictions may be less indicative of lasting dangerousness, the Sixth Circuit has "never suggested—much less held—" that juvenile status mitigates the dangerousness inference as a matter of law.

Therefore, even if a district court might, as a matter of discretion, consider youth at the time of the offense, the failure to do so is not “plain” error under current Sixth Circuit law.

c. Drug Trafficking Offenses as Evidence of Dangerousness

Next, the panel examines Crawford’s two drug trafficking convictions. Under Williams:

Drug trafficking is singled out as a category of crime that may "pose a significant threat of danger" even when a specific instance does not involve an immediate or direct threat of violence.

Crawford tried to argue that his drug convictions do not demonstrate dangerousness because:

they did not involve violence,
they did not involve firearms, and
they did not involve large quantities of marijuana.

The panel rejects this argument as contrary to Williams. The relevant question is not whether a specific drug offense was violent; rather, it is whether drug trafficking, as a type of crime, poses a significant threat of danger. The panel emphasizes that:

As a matter of precedent, drug trafficking is treated as inherently dangerous;
Crawford’s trafficking convictions are part of a "broader pattern of serious criminal conduct"— especially significant given his prior homicide conviction and continued offending into adulthood— which supports a finding of continuing dangerousness.

d. Domestic Violence as Strong Evidence of Dangerousness

The most compelling factor in the panel’s analysis is Crawford’s domestic‑violence history:

A conviction for domestic assault (punching his girlfriend in the face); and
A prior felon-in-possession conviction that arose from allegations he again punched the same girlfriend, choked her, threatened to kill her, and possessed a handgun.

The panel underscores several points:

Domestic-violence convictions are highly probative of dangerousness. Citing Gailes and several other cases (Martin, Watson, Morton, Wellington), the court notes that Congress may disarm domestic‑violence offenders and that such convictions have repeatedly been treated as strong indicators of dangerousness in the Sixth Circuit’s as‑applied Second Amendment jurisprudence.
Underlying conduct matters. Per Morton, the court is not confined to the bare fact of conviction; it may consider the underlying facts. For example:
- The domestic-violence conviction involved punching an intimate partner in the face, a paradigmatic “crime against the person” that Williams deems particularly probative of dangerousness.
- The prior felon-in-possession conviction arose from serious domestic violence and threats to kill, combined with gun possession—all of which powerfully underscore dangerousness.
Crawford offered no meaningful rebuttal. The opinion notes that Crawford did not meaningfully address his domestic-violence conviction in his briefing, and that it is "difficult to imagine" any argument that would substantially diminish its probative value.

e. Consideration of Underlying Conduct in Felon-in-Possession Convictions

Crawford argued that courts should not consider the underlying conduct of a prior felon‑in‑possession conviction in assessing dangerousness. The panel rejects this position as inconsistent with Morton, which squarely held that courts may examine how past offenses were committed.

The opinion thus reinforces that prior § 922(g) convictions are not innocuous or neutral datapoints; when they arise from violent or threatening behavior—as Crawford’s did—they can independently confirm dangerousness in a Second Amendment analysis.

f. No Effect on Substantial Rights

Putting all these strands together—juvenile homicide, adult drug trafficking, domestic violence, prior armed domestic violence, prison weapons violations, and the new offense involving firing a gun in public while wielding a machete—the panel concludes:

Even if the district court might have erred by failing to conduct an explicit "dangerousness" inquiry under Williams, that error did not affect Crawford’s substantial rights, because the record overwhelmingly establishes dangerousness.
There is no reasonable probability that a properly instructed district court, or a jury, would find that Crawford is non‑dangerous and thus that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him.

In other words, any possible error is non‑prejudicial under the third prong of plain‑error review. That alone is fatal to Crawford’s as‑applied challenge.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of the High Bar for § 922(g)(1) As‑Applied Challenges

Although unpublished, Crawford is a telling snapshot of where the Sixth Circuit’s Second Amendment jurisprudence stands:

As-applied victories will be rare. With Williams and its progeny, the Sixth Circuit recognizes a theoretical avenue for as‑applied challenges by "non‑dangerous" felons. But in practice, Crawford shows that a substantial criminal history—even one containing older or juvenile offenses—will almost always doom such a claim.
Domestic violence is especially potent. The opinion underscores and extends a clear pattern: domestic‑violence convictions—and related conduct—are among the most powerful indicators of "dangerousness" in Second Amendment analysis, placing defendants squarely within the historically disarmed class.
Drug trafficking weighs heavily. Even non‑violent drug trafficking, particularly in the context of a broader pattern of serious offenses, will strongly support a dangerousness finding.

2. Youthful Offenses and the Absence of a Clear Mitigation Rule

A notable feature of the opinion is its treatment of juvenile offenses. While some district courts have floated the view that juvenile crimes may be less predictive of enduring dangerousness, the Sixth Circuit:

stops short of endorsing that proposition; and
emphasizes that there is no binding circuit precedent requiring courts to discount juvenile convictions in assessing dangerousness.

Practically, this means that:

Defendants cannot rely on their juvenile status at the time of serious violent offenses to establish "plain error" on appeal.
Any such mitigation argument must likely be raised and developed in the district court in the first instance, both to preserve it and to assemble a factual record on rehabilitation and changed circumstances.

3. Procedural Lessons: The Cost of Failing to Raise Constitutional Claims Below

Crawford is a cautionary tale for defense counsel:

Constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1)—both Commerce Clause and Second Amendment—must be raised in the district court to avoid the crippling constraints of plain-error review.
Under plain-error, novel or evolving constitutional theories rarely qualify as “plain,” and a defendant with a substantial criminal record will struggle to show that the outcome would have been different had the district court considered the issue.

4. Commerce Clause Challenges Remain Foreclosed in the Sixth Circuit

By re‑affirming Chesney without reservation, the opinion confirms that:

Within the Sixth Circuit, Commerce Clause attacks on § 922(g)(1) based on insufficient interstate‑commerce effect are non‑starters at the court of appeals level.
Any serious attempt to revise that doctrine would need to be directed to the Supreme Court, not the Sixth Circuit.

5. Substantive Second Amendment Doctrine: Dangerousness as the Key Filter

Finally, Crawford solidifies the Sixth Circuit’s emerging interpretation of the Second Amendment:

The central limiting concept is dangerousness; those who are deemed dangerous fall within the historically disarmed class, and their disarmament is presumptively constitutional.
Dangerousness is evaluated holistically: violent crimes against the person, domestic violence, drug trafficking, repeated weapons-related infractions, and recent dangerous conduct (like brandishing weapons in public) all count.
Courts may look behind the formal elements of convictions to the actual circumstances of offenses, significantly broadening the evidentiary base for finding dangerousness.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Plain-Error Review

Plain-error review is a rule that applies when a defendant did not object in the trial court but later claims an error on appeal. To win under this standard, the defendant must show:

Error: The trial court made a legal mistake.
Plain: The mistake is clear under current law—not merely debatable or novel.
Affected substantial rights: There is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different without the error.
Seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings: Even beyond prejudice, the mistake is serious enough that allowing the conviction to stand would undermine public confidence in the justice system.

This standard is intentionally hard to meet. It strongly encourages parties to raise all legal objections in the district court.

2. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges

A facial challenge argues that a law is unconstitutional in all its applications. Williams rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1), holding the statute valid on its face.
An as-applied challenge concedes that the law may be valid in general but argues that applying it to a particular person or set of facts violates the Constitution. Crawford made such an as-applied Second Amendment challenge, claiming he is not “dangerous” and thus cannot be disarmed.

3. Commerce Clause and Jurisdictional Element

The Commerce Clause allows Congress to legislate on matters affecting interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a gun law that lacked any requirement connecting the regulated conduct to interstate commerce.

In contrast, § 922(g)(1) includes a jurisdictional element: to convict, the government must prove that the firearm traveled in or otherwise affected interstate commerce. This "hook" satisfies the constitutional requirement as interpreted in Chesney, even if the defendant’s own possession is local.

4. Dangerousness in the Second Amendment Context

After Bruen, courts must look to history and tradition to decide if a modern gun regulation is constitutional. One historically recognized category of people who could be disarmed is those deemed dangerous.

In the Sixth Circuit’s framework:

Dangerous people can be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.
The defendant must show he is non‑dangerous to prevail in an as‑applied challenge.
Prior violent crimes, domestic violence, drug trafficking, repeated weapons misconduct, and similar conduct are strong evidence that the person is dangerous.

5. Considering Underlying Conduct, Not Just Conviction Labels

Traditionally, some sentencing enhancements focus on the elements of a prior offense rather than the specific facts. But in the dangerousness context, the Sixth Circuit (via Morton) allows courts to consider:

what actually happened in the prior offense,
not merely the statutory title or elements of the conviction.

For example, the fact that a prior § 922(g) conviction arose from a violent domestic-violence incident with death threats and brandishing a gun is highly relevant—even if the formal conviction is just “felon in possession.”

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Gary Crawford reinforces several key doctrinal and practical points in modern federal firearms litigation within the Sixth Circuit:

Commerce Clause attacks on § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed by binding precedent; the statute’s interstate‑commerce element is constitutionally sufficient.
Plain-error review severely constrains late‑raised constitutional claims. Defendants must preserve such issues in the district court to avoid this demanding standard.
As-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) face an extremely high bar, particularly when the defendant has:
- violent crimes against the person (like homicide),
- drug trafficking convictions,
- domestic-violence convictions or related conduct, and
- weapons-related misconduct both in prison and in the community.
The Sixth Circuit’s dangerousness framework, drawn from Williams and its progeny, allows courts to consider the full context of a defendant’s criminal history—including the specifics of prior incidents— to conclude that he falls within the historically disarmed class.

Although nonprecedential, Crawford is a clear signal of how the Sixth Circuit is likely to handle similar as‑applied challenges: where a defendant’s record reflects a consistent pattern of violence, drug trafficking, and domestic abuse, courts will have little difficulty concluding that the Second Amendment does not shield him from the reach of § 922(g)(1).