Conditional Partial Voluntary Dismissals and Context Evidence in Prison Excessive‑Force Trials: Commentary on Jackson v. Catanzariti

I. Introduction

This published Eleventh Circuit decision, Miguel Jackson v. Joseph Catanzariti, No. 23‑12459 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025), arises from a violent prison riot at Smith State Prison in Georgia on December 31, 2010. Two inmates, Miguel Jackson and Kelvin Stevenson, brought a § 1983 civil-rights action alleging that correctional officers used excessive force and failed to intervene when others did so, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

What began as a large, multi-defendant case against thirty‑nine corrections officers narrowed over more than a decade into a jury trial against just two officers, Catanzariti and Harrison. On the very morning of trial, plaintiffs asked to dismiss seven of the remaining nine defendants, prompting a sharp reaction from defense counsel and a pivotal ruling from the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). At trial, the court also admitted several pieces of contested evidence, including:

Jackson’s prior felony convictions;
evidence that Jackson and Stevenson were gang leaders;
evidence that marijuana and contraband cellphones were found in Jackson’s cell;
testimony that Jackson swung at Officer Catanzariti; and
evidence that multiple officers were injured during the riot.

The jury:

rejected Jackson’s excessive force claim against Officer Catanzariti, but
found that Catanzariti failed to intervene when other officers used excessive force, awarding Jackson $1 in nominal damages; and
rejected Stevenson’s claims entirely.

On appeal, Jackson and Stevenson raised two main issues:

The district court’s handling of their eleventh-hour Rule 41(a)(2) motion to voluntarily dismiss seven defendants, including:
- entering final judgment in favor of those dismissed defendants; and
- declining to treat plaintiffs’ attempted “withdrawal” of the motion as effective when the court indicated it might impose costs or sanctions.
Multiple evidentiary rulings admitting prejudicial background and character evidence, which plaintiffs argued had little or no relevance to whether excessive force was used after they were handcuffed and compliant.

The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Marcus, joined by Judges Jill Pryor and Grant) affirmed across the board. In doing so, the court:

reaffirmed the very broad discretion district courts hold under Rule 41(a)(2), including to:
- permit dismissal of fewer than all defendants; and
- condition such dismissal on entry of judgment for those defendants and on later consideration of costs and sanctions; and
emphasized the high deference appellate courts give to trial judges’ evidentiary rulings—especially Rule 403 balancing—in the context of a prison riot case; and
approved robust use of prior convictions and “context” evidence (gang affiliation, contraband, officer injuries) to evaluate credibility and the reasonableness of force under the Eighth Amendment standard.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On December 31, 2010, Dormitory D‑2 at Smith State Prison housed roughly ninety-five inmates, including plaintiffs Jackson (serving fifty years for three armed robberies) and Stevenson (serving twenty years for rape). Normally, inmates could move about the dorm; lockdown required them to remain in their cells.

That day, surveillance video showed an inmate breaching an exterior fence and bringing items into the dorm. Officials locked down D‑2 and conducted a “shakedown.” When Officer Joseph Catanzariti searched Jackson’s cell, he smelled marijuana and discovered:

a green leafy substance apparently consistent with marijuana; and
contraband cellphones hidden behind a heater vent, accessed with a hammer, screwdriver, and Channel‑lock pliers.

After inmates returned from a meal, Lt. McFarlane ordered another lockdown. Inmates protested. According to Jackson, as Officer Catanzariti exited his cell, Jackson “playfully swiped” at him and joked about the items he was carrying but didn’t touch him. According to Catanzariti, Jackson looked back at other inmates and said, “Y’all ready,” then swung at his hand to knock away the contraband and tools. Officers testified that a riot broke out, with officers being punched and kicked, one officer hit with a hard object in a sock, and multiple injuries sustained.

During the melee, officers subdued and handcuffed Jackson and Stevenson. Here the parties’ narratives diverged sharply:

Stevenson’s version: After being fully restrained and compliant, he was hit in the face with a hammer 10–15 times by Officer Catanzariti, causing severe facial injuries, including a broken eye socket and jaw, nerve damage, and lacerations.
Officers’ version: Catanzariti used only a limited number of brachial stun strikes to Stevenson’s shoulder to secure his arm, did not have the hammer in his possession during the takedown, and used only necessary force to restrain a resisting inmate in a dangerous riot.

Similarly, Jackson claimed that after he was handcuffed:

his nose was broken with a flashlight by Catanzariti;
officers smashed his face into a door, slammed him against a fence, kicked, punched, and jumped on him;
he was beaten with a blackjack and another metal object while still restrained; and
he suffered multiple facial lacerations, dental injuries, and fractures, requiring numerous stitches and treatment at an outside hospital.

The medical evidence confirmed extensive injuries—lacerations to the face, nasal and tooth-socket fractures, and scalp swelling. But officers vigorously disputed that any force used was malicious or unnecessary; they insisted it was a response to a violent, chaotic riot in which they reasonably feared weapons and serious harm.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed suit in December 2012 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming thirty‑nine officers and asserting:

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims;
failure-to-intervene claims; and
supervisory liability claims against certain officers (including Catanzariti, McFarlane, and Eason).

The district court stayed the case for about three years under Younger v. Harris because criminal charges arising from the riot were pending against Jackson and Stevenson.

Over the years:

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed claims against fifteen defendants in 2018;
the court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing certain defendants and rejecting supervisory liability;
plaintiffs then dismissed ten more defendants; and
nine defendants remained for trial.

Discovery concluded in late 2017. Thereafter, the pretrial conference was rescheduled three times at plaintiffs’ request. Finally, in June 2023—more than eleven years after filing—trial was set to begin.

C. The Eleventh‑Hour Rule 41 Motion

On the morning of trial, before jury selection, plaintiffs’ counsel orally moved to dismiss seven of the nine remaining defendants (all but Officers Catanzariti and Harrison), explaining that this would:

“increase our chances of winning if [we] just go with Catanzariti and … Caleb Harrison,” and
“streamline” the case and make trial “easier, smoother, more efficient.”

Defense counsel, representing the state, objected strenuously. She noted:

the state had prepared for trial three times;
counsel had incurred substantial time and travel expenses, including non-refundable lodging; and
Georgia taxpayers had borne the cost of trial preparation for all defendants.

She characterized the timing as showing “absolute contempt for this court’s processes” and asked either:

for all claims to be dismissed; or at minimum
for final judgment in favor of the seven defendants, plus costs and sanctions.

The district court confirmed with plaintiffs’ counsel that plaintiffs indeed wished to drop all claims against the seven defendants. Counsel reiterated that strategy favored focusing on the remaining two officers. The judge indicated those seven defendants would be “out” and took a brief recess to consider conditions.

When the court returned and indicated it would treat the request as a Rule 41(a)(2) motion, plaintiffs’ counsel interjected:

“I would like to say for the court if you’re going to make us pay costs … I would rather withdraw the motion and just go forward because this is crazy to me.”

Nonetheless, the district court:

granted plaintiffs’ “eleventh-hour” voluntary dismissal;
entered judgment in favor of the seven dismissed defendants; and
deferred any decision on costs and sanctions until after appellate proceedings.

D. Trial and Evidentiary Rulings

At the four-day jury trial against Officers Catanzariti and Harrison, the district court:

allowed impeachment of Jackson with prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault under Federal Rule of Evidence 609;
admitted similar impeachment of Stevenson with rape and obstruction convictions (unobjected to on appeal);
admitted deposition testimony from inmate George Anderson that Jackson and Stevenson were “two ranking individuals” in the Gangster Disciples prison gang;
admitted testimony that marijuana and contraband cellphones had been discovered in Jackson’s cell; and
admitted evidence that Jackson swung at Officer Catanzariti and that multiple officers suffered injuries in the riot.

The jury viewed multiple video recordings of the event from different angles. Plaintiffs argued that the video evidence conclusively showed Jackson being struck after he was handcuffed and no longer resisting; therefore, they contended, background evidence about the riot, contraband, gang membership, and officers’ injuries was irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial under Rules 401, 402, and 403.

E. Jury Verdict and Appeal

The jury returned a mixed verdict:

Jackson’s excessive force claim against Officer Catanzariti failed.
Jackson prevailed only on a failure-to-intervene claim against Catanzariti and received just $1 in nominal damages.
All of Stevenson’s claims against both officers failed.

Plaintiffs appealed, arguing:

The district court abused its discretion in:
- granting their Rule 41(a)(2) motion despite a purported withdrawal; and
- dismissing only some defendants rather than the entire “action.”
The district court abused its discretion under Rules 401–403 and 609 in admitting:
- Jackson’s prior convictions;
- evidence of gang membership;
- marijuana found in his cell;
- testimony that Jackson initiated the physical confrontation; and
- testimony that officers were injured in the riot.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding:

The district court acted within its “considerable discretion” under Rule 41(a)(2) in granting partial voluntary dismissal, entering judgment for the seven defendants, and deferring costs and sanctions.
The plaintiffs’ attempt to “withdraw” the motion was conditional and ambiguous and did not deprive the court of authority to rule.
Rule 41(a)(2) permits dismissal of fewer than all defendants so long as all claims against each dismissed defendant are dropped, consistent with longstanding circuit precedent.
The challenged evidentiary rulings, including admission of prior convictions under Rule 609 and context evidence under Rules 401 and 403, were well within the trial court’s discretion, particularly given:
- the centrality of credibility;
- the ambiguity of the video evidence; and
- the Eighth Amendment necessity of evaluating the broader context of a prison riot.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. The Rule 41(a)(2) Voluntary Dismissal Rulings

1. The Legal Framework

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) governs voluntary dismissal of actions when the defendant has already answered or moved for summary judgment. It provides:

“[A]n action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”

Key features:

Dismissal is not automatic; court approval is required once the defendant has answered.
The court may impose “terms” on dismissal—such as payment of costs, attorneys’ fees, or entry of judgment for the dismissed party—to prevent unfair prejudice.
Appellate review of such decisions is highly deferential: abuse of discretion.

The Eleventh Circuit has long held that:

The purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) “is primarily to prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly affect the other side, and to permit the imposition of curative conditions.” McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1986).
District courts must “weigh the relevant equities and do justice between the parties in each case, imposing such costs and attaching such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate.” Emergency Recovery, Inc. v. Hufnagle, 77 F.4th 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting McCants).
“A plaintiff ordinarily will not be permitted to dismiss an action without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) after the defendant has been put to considerable expense in preparing for trial, except on condition that the plaintiff reimburse the defendant for at least a portion of his expenses of litigation.” McCants, 781 F.2d at 860.

Jackson applies this framework in a particularly stark timing scenario: an “eleventh-hour” motion to jettison most remaining defendants on the morning of trial.

2. Conditioning Dismissal on Final Judgment for the Dismissed Defendants

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to:

grant plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal request; and
simultaneously enter final judgment for the seven dismissed defendants as a condition of that dismissal.

The key equitable factors:

The case had been pending for eleven years.
Discovery closed six years before trial.
The pretrial conference and trial had been rescheduled multiple times, largely at plaintiffs’ request.
Defense counsel had prepared for trial at least three times and incurred substantial expense.

In this context, the panel concluded that entering judgment in favor of the seven defendants was a permissible “curative condition” to mitigate the prejudice caused by plaintiffs’ last-minute tactical shift. This is consistent with McCants’s principle that, where defendants have been put to “considerable expense” preparing for trial, voluntary dismissal is often conditioned on cost-shifting or similarly protective measures.

Notably, the court approved not merely dismissal without prejudice plus costs, but entry of final judgment for those defendants. That effectively barred plaintiffs from reviving their claims later, which is a significant substantive consequence. Yet because plaintiffs had voluntarily sought dismissal after years of litigation and trial prep, the panel regarded this as a fair and proportionate condition.

3. The Attempted Withdrawal of the Motion

Plaintiffs argued they withdrew their voluntary dismissal motion when it became clear the court might impose costs and sanctions. The record showed:

They twice unequivocally asked to dismiss seven defendants, for stated strategic reasons.
Only after defense counsel requested judgment, costs, and sanctions did plaintiffs’ counsel say:
“If you’re going to make us pay costs … I would rather withdraw the motion and just go forward because this is crazy to me.”

Although some case law suggests a plaintiff may withdraw a Rule 41 motion prior to entry of an order (e.g., McGregor, Mortgage Guar.), the Eleventh Circuit focused on the conditional and ambiguous nature of this attempted withdrawal:

It was contingent on whether the court would impose costs (“if you’re going to make us pay…”).
It did not clearly and unconditionally revoke plaintiffs’ prior requests to dismiss the seven defendants.
Plaintiffs did not renew or clarify any withdrawal after the judge stated on the record that he would:
- dismiss the seven defendants;
- enter judgment in their favor; and
- reserve on costs and sanctions.

The court held that, in these circumstances:

The district court was entitled to “take the Plaintiffs at their word,” treat the oral motion as a Rule 41(a)(2) request, and grant it with conditions.
There is no authority requiring a district court to decide on costs or sanctions in advance of ruling on a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal motion.

In practical terms, this means a plaintiff cannot safely assume they may “test the waters” by seeking voluntary dismissal and then withdraw the motion if they dislike the court’s proposed conditions—at least not where, as here, the purported withdrawal is vague, conditional, or not clearly maintained once the court announces its ruling.

4. Partial Dismissal of “an Action” and the “Action vs. Claim” Debate

Plaintiffs advanced a textual argument: because Rule 41(a)(2) speaks of dismissing “an action,” it supposedly only authorizes dismissal of an entire case, not selective dismissal of some defendants. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument as inconsistent with its own long-standing precedent.

The panel relied on:

In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664, 677 (11th Cir. 2023): The court explicitly “allow[ed] plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss less than the entire action so long as they dismiss[ed] a defendant in its entirety (i.e., they dismiss[ed] all of the claims brought against that defendant).”
Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004): “Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims against a particular defendant.”
Plains Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973): Rule 41(a)(2) was intended to permit dismissal against some defendants even if the case proceeds against others; under Bonner v. City of Prichard, pre‑1981 Fifth Circuit decisions are binding in the Eleventh Circuit.

Under this line of authority:

Rule 41(a)(2) does permit partial dismissal of an “action” as to some defendants, so long as all claims against each dismissed defendant are dropped.
The district court correctly dismissed all claims against seven defendants while leaving the case intact against the two remaining officers.

Thus, the panel reaffirmed that “action” in Rule 41 is not read so rigidly as to bar dismissal of individual parties. Instead, the operative distinction is:

You may not use Rule 41(a) to surgically drop some claims against a defendant while retaining others—that is usually done by amending the pleadings under Rules 15 or 21.
You may use Rule 41(a)(2) to dismiss an entire defendant (all claims against that defendant) even if the case continues as to others.

Jackson thus cements, in a high-profile civil-rights case, the permissibility of defendant-specific voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2) in the Eleventh Circuit.

B. Evidentiary Rulings and the Eighth Amendment Context

1. Standards of Review and the Rules of Evidence

Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. That standard is highly deferential: reversal occurs only if the trial court’s decision was a clear error of judgment or based on an incorrect legal standard.

The key rules implicated in Jackson are:

Rule 401 – Relevance: Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable.
Rule 402 – Admissibility: Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless otherwise barred.
Rule 403 – Unfair Prejudice: Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers such as unfair prejudice or confusing the issues. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly emphasizes:
- Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy” used “sparingly.”
- The district court’s discretion to exclude as unduly prejudicial is “narrowly circumscribed.” United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1048 (11th Cir. 1991).
- On appeal, courts must consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to its admission,” maximizing probative value and minimizing prejudicial impact. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014).
Rule 609 – Impeachment by Prior Conviction: In a civil case, felony convictions “must be admitted” for impeachment of a witness (including a party) subject to Rule 403, where the crime was punishable by more than one year in prison. See Rule 609(a)(1)(A).

2. Impeachment with Jackson’s Prior Felony Convictions

Jackson had prior convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery, both punishable by more than one year. Under Rule 609(a)(1)(A), these convictions:

were automatically within the scope of permissible impeachment; and
had to be admitted unless their probative value for credibility was substantially outweighed by Rule 403 concerns.

The Eleventh Circuit underscored two points:

Credibility was central. This case turned almost entirely on conflicting testimony between inmates and officers. The video evidence was described as “ambiguous” and did not conclusively show whether Jackson was struck while compliant or still resisting. In such a “swearing contest,” the probative value of prior felony convictions for assessing credibility is significant. See United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The implicit assumption of Rule 609 is that prior felony convictions have probative value.”).
Incremental prejudice was modest. The jury already knew Jackson was a convicted felon because he was incarcerated in a state prison. In Brown v. Flury, 848 F.2d 158, 159 (11th Cir. 1988), the court held that where jurors already know an inmate has been convicted of some crime, evidence of prior convictions adds relatively little prejudice. Also, the case being civil (not criminal) reduced the danger of undue propensity reasoning. See Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 817 (11th Cir. 2017).

Against that backdrop, the panel found no “clear abuse of discretion” in admitting Jackson’s prior felonies for impeachment. The court also noted that Stevenson’s prior convictions were admitted without objection, implicitly reinforcing the routine nature of such impeachment in prisoner civil-rights actions.

3. Context Evidence: Gang Affiliation, Contraband, the “Swipe,” and Officer Injuries

The more contentious evidentiary issue involved the admission of a constellation of “context” evidence:

Gang affiliation (Jackson and Stevenson as “ranking” Gangster Disciples);
the discovery of marijuana and contraband cellphones in Jackson’s cell;
Jackson’s initiation of physical contact by swiping at Officer Catanzariti’s hand; and
the extent of injuries suffered by correctional officers during the riot.

Plaintiffs argued that this evidence:

had little relevance to the narrow question: whether officers used gratuitous force after plaintiffs were handcuffed; and
was highly prejudicial, painting plaintiffs as gang leaders and criminals involved in contraband and assaulting officers—inviting the jury to decide based on bad character rather than the specific conduct at issue.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and emphasized the doctrinal context: this was an Eighth Amendment excessive force case arising in the midst of a prison riot.

4. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Standards and Relevance of Context

Under the Eighth Amendment, force by prison officials is excessive only if applied:

“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” rather than
“in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.”

This standard, drawn from Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), is highly deferential to prison officials in the context of disturbances and riots. The jury was expressly instructed to consider factors like:

the need for application of force;
the relationship between that need and the amount of force used;
the extent of injury to the prisoner;
the threat to the safety of staff and inmates; and
any efforts made to temper the severity of the response.

In prison-riot cases, the Eleventh Circuit reiterates the need to afford a “wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security.” See Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019). To apply this standard, the fact-finder must understand:

how the altercation began;
what risk officers reasonably perceived; and
how serious the situation appeared in real time.

Against that legal framework, the panel found all of the challenged evidence relevant:

Contraband and the “swipe”: Evidence that Jackson had contraband marijuana and phones, and that he tried to swipe them from the officer’s hand, goes directly to:
- how the confrontation began;
- why Jackson might initiate force; and
- what officers reasonably understood about the threat.
Gang affiliation: Testimony that Jackson and Stevenson were ranking Gangster Disciples members:
- explained why Jackson might resist confiscation of contraband;
- illuminated potential coordination among inmates (“Y’all ready”); and
- added to the perceived danger facing officers confronting gang leaders in a volatile setting.
Officer injuries and riot conditions: Evidence that multiple officers were assaulted and injured:
- showed the extent of chaos and violence (“major disturbance”);
- demonstrated that the threat to safety was not theoretical; and
- helped the jury weigh whether force used in subduing inmates was proportionate to the threat.

In the court’s view, this “corpus of materials” formed the necessary factual context for judging whether the officers acted with malicious intent or in a good-faith effort to restore order.

5. The Role of Video Evidence and the Scott v. Harris Line

Plaintiffs tried to rely on the principle from Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), and its Eleventh Circuit progeny, including Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 692 n.1 (11th Cir. 2021): where video evidence is conclusive, a court must not credit contradictory testimony.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the premise of plaintiffs’ argument: it found the video evidence not conclusive:

The videos did not clearly establish that Jackson was handcuffed and not resisting when he was allegedly struck.
They did not unambiguously show that Officer Catanzariti struck Jackson with a flashlight as opposed to “wanding” him for contraband.
The jury’s rejection of Jackson’s excessive force claim against Catanzariti was itself strong evidence that the videos did not compel plaintiffs’ narrative.

Because the video evidence was ambiguous, credibility remained central, and the trial court was entitled to:

admit extensive witness testimony (including from officers and inmates); and
allow impeachment with prior convictions and other context evidence relevant to credibility and perception of threat.

6. Balancing Under Rule 403: Why No Abuse of Discretion?

Under Rule 403, the question was whether the substantial probative value of the challenged evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

Key considerations in the panel’s analysis:

High probative value to central issues. All the contested evidence went to the central Eighth Amendment questions:
- Was there a need to apply force?
- What level of threat did officers reasonably perceive?
- Did the response match that threat?
This is exactly the sort of contextual evidence Hudson/Whitley and Cockrell require.
Jury’s capacity and instructions. The court assumed jurors could follow instructions and use the evidence for proper purposes (context, credibility) rather than improper propensity reasoning.
Nature of the case. In a civil rights suit brought by convicted felons about a prison riot, the baseline prejudice from knowing plaintiffs’ criminal status and prison context is already high; the incremental prejudice from specific details like gang affiliation or contraband was relatively less dramatic compared to a clean-slate context like a civil commercial dispute.
Deference to trial court. The appellate panel reiterated that Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy” and that review must take the evidence “in the light most favorable to its admission,” enhancing probative value and discounting prejudice. This high bar for reversal simply wasn’t met.

Even if one might reasonably debate the precise line of admissibility in a closer case, the combination of:

ambiguous video evidence;
sharply conflicting narratives; and
the high-deference Eighth Amendment standard in riot conditions

made it extremely unlikely that the Eleventh Circuit would find an abuse of discretion in allowing the evidence in.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Abuse of Discretion” Standard

“Abuse of discretion” is one of the most deferential standards of appellate review. It does not mean the appellate court asks what it would have done in the trial judge’s position. Instead, the question is:

Did the district court make a decision that was unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on a wrong legal principle?

If reasonable judges could disagree about the right outcome, there is no abuse of discretion—even if the appellate judges personally would have ruled differently.

2. Rule 41(a)(2) Voluntary Dismissal

In simple terms, once a defendant has answered, a plaintiff cannot simply “drop” a case or defendant without the court’s permission. Under Rule 41(a)(2):

Plaintiffs may ask to dismiss, but
the court decides:
- whether to allow dismissal at all; and
- on what conditions (for example, payment of costs, or entry of judgment for the defendant).

The reason is fairness: defendants should not invest heavily in defending a case, only to see it abandoned at the last minute without safeguards.

3. Rule 403 “Unfair Prejudice”

Rule 403 does not bar all prejudicial evidence—most relevant evidence hurts one side or the other. It only excludes evidence when:

its probative value (its usefulness in proving something important) is substantially outweighed by the risk of:
- unfair prejudice (leading the jury to decide on emotion or character rather than facts);
- confusing the issues; or
- needless delay or cumulative proof.

“Substantially outweighed” is a high threshold; if the scales are close, the evidence usually comes in.

4. Rule 609 Impeachment by Prior Conviction

Rule 609 recognizes that serious prior convictions—usually felonies—may bear on a witness’s honesty and credibility. So:

In civil cases, prior felony convictions are generally admissible to attack a witness’s credibility.
The trial judge must still consider Rule 403, but the rule presumes such convictions are useful evidence about whether the witness should be believed.

This is especially important where, as in Jackson, the case is a contest of credibility and physical evidence does not clearly resolve the dispute.

5. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force in Prisons

The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” In the prison context, this means:

Force must not be used “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Force may be used in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.”

Courts look at:

How serious the security threat was;
The amount of force used vs. the need for it;
How badly the inmate was hurt;
Whether officers tried to limit or moderate their force; and
What officers reasonably believed in the moment, especially during riots or disturbances.

Courts explicitly give prison officials “a wide range of deference” because they often must make split-second decisions in dangerous environments.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Civil Rights Litigators (Plaintiffs’ Side)

Jackson carries several cautionary lessons for plaintiffs in § 1983 litigation:

Timing of voluntary dismissals matters. Waiting until the morning of trial to dismiss major defendants invites:
- entry of final judgment for those defendants;
- the possibility of costs and sanctions; and
- judicial skepticism about strategic motive.
If streamlining is desirable, it should generally occur soon after discovery closes, not after counsel and the court have expended the resources necessary to begin trial.
“Testing the waters” with Rule 41(a)(2) is risky. A plaintiff who moves for voluntary dismissal should assume the court may:
- grant the motion;
- attach serious conditions (judgment, costs); and
- decline to accept an ambiguous attempt to withdraw the motion after learning of those conditions.
Context and character evidence are likely to be admitted. In prison excessive-force cases, plaintiffs can expect courts to:
- admit prior felony convictions under Rule 609;
- permit evidence of contraband and gang affiliation when relevant to threat assessment; and
- admit officer-injury evidence in riot situations.
Strategic planning must anticipate the jury hearing this kind of background, and witness preparation should reflect it.

B. For Defendants and Government Entities

The decision reinforces several favorable principles for defendants:

Robust Rule 41 protections. Defendants can invoke Rule 41(a)(2) to demand equitable conditions—such as costs, fees, or even final judgment—when plaintiffs seek dismissal after costly pretrial litigation.
Broad admissibility of context evidence. Especially in riot or disturbance cases, defendants may:
- introduce detailed evidence of the circumstances leading up to the use of force;
- emphasize the dangers posed by contraband, gangs, and mass inmate behavior; and
- highlight injuries to staff.
Priority of deference in prison cases. The opinion reaffirms that courts must allow prison officials leeway in real-time response to disturbances, which can be decisive in defending Eighth Amendment claims.

C. For District Courts

Jackson underscores:

Expansive discretion under Rule 41(a)(2). District courts:
- may condition voluntary dismissal on entry of judgment and other terms;
- need not decide costs and sanctions before ruling on dismissal; and
- may authorize dismissal of some, but not all, defendants, as long as all claims against each dismissed defendant are included.
Deference on evidentiary calls. Provided courts:
- articulate the relevance of challenged evidence; and
- engage in some balancing under Rule 403,
appellate courts are unlikely to overturn such decisions, especially where the case’s factual context (like a prison riot) inherently calls for a broader evidentiary picture.

D. Substantive Law: No Dramatic New Rule, But Important Clarifications

Although Jackson does not revolutionize existing law, it makes several points more explicit in a precedential opinion:

Rule 41(a)(2) can be used to dismiss some defendants while others remain, reaffirming Esteva and Klay.
District courts may impose serious conditions—including final judgment—on late-stage voluntary dismissals without abusing their discretion.
Plaintiffs’ conditional, ambiguous attempts to withdraw a Rule 41 motion will not automatically nullify a pending request after the court has invested time in evaluating conditions.
In Eighth Amendment prison-riot cases, “context” evidence that might be prejudicial in other settings is often central to the “malicious and sadistic” vs. “good-faith effort to restore discipline” inquiry and therefore admissible.

VI. Conclusion

Jackson v. Catanzariti is a significant Eleventh Circuit decision at the intersection of civil-rights litigation, procedural strategy under Rule 41(a)(2), and evidentiary practice in prison excessive-force cases.

On the procedural side, the case reinforces the strong equitable power of district courts to manage voluntary dismissals. Plaintiffs who seek to reshape a case at the very doorstep of trial can expect that:

dismissal will not be automatic;
conditions may include entry of final judgment, costs, and potential sanctions; and
district judges are not required to let plaintiffs rescind a motion simply because they dislike those conditions.

On the evidentiary side, the decision demonstrates the breadth of admissible context in Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims arising out of chaotic incidents like prison riots. Prior convictions, gang membership, contraband, and officer injuries—all of which might be deeply prejudicial in other contexts—are viewed as core to the jury’s evaluation of necessity and proportionality of force, particularly where video evidence does not conclusively resolve factual disputes.

Finally, Jackson illustrates the practical difficulty inmates face in proving “malicious and sadistic” use of force in the riot setting, given the deference afforded to officers’ split-second judgments and the court’s willingness to admit broad contextual evidence. For practitioners and scholars, the opinion is a concrete application of longstanding doctrines—Rule 41, Rules 401–403 and 609, and the Hudson/Whitley standard—in a modern, high-stakes civil-rights trial, and it will likely be cited in future Eleventh Circuit cases involving late-stage dismissals and prison use-of-force litigation.