Clarifying the Boundary Between Local Court Rules and Administrative Orders: Commentary on In re Amendments to Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration (Fla. 2025)

Clarifying the Boundary Between Local Court Rules and Administrative Orders in Florida Trial Courts

I. Introduction

In In re: Amendments to Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration, No. SC2024‑1403 (Fla. Dec. 18, 2025), the Supreme Court of Florida exercised its constitutional rulemaking authority to substantially clarify and reorganize the way trial-court practice is regulated through local court rules and administrative orders. The opinion, issued per curiam, amends Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration (FRGP&JA) 2.120, 2.140, and 2.215, with an effective date of January 1, 2026, at 12:02 a.m.

The immediate impetus for these amendments was a concern, identified by the Workgroup on Judicial Practices in the Trial Courts (created by Administrative Order AOSC21‑57), that there was widespread confusion about:

  • What must (or may) be adopted as a local court rule, and
  • What may be handled instead by a chief judge’s administrative order.

In response, the Court directed the Local Rule Advisory Committee (LRAC) to study the issue and propose clarifying rule amendments. After public comment and further refinement, the Court has now:

  • Re‑defined “local court rule” and “administrative order” in Rule 2.120;
  • Simplified and centralized the process for proposing local court rules in Rule 2.215; and
  • Conformed Rule 2.140’s treatment of local rules to the revised framework.

The case is an original rulemaking proceeding, not a dispute between litigation parties. Formally, the petitioner was the LRAC (through its Chair, Judge Ross Bilbrey, with staff liaison Bart Schneider). Comments were filed, among others, by:

  • The Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration Committee;
  • The Florida Bar (through its Executive Director and staff liaison);
  • The Florida Association of Court Clerks & Comptrollers (Florida Court Clerks & Comptrollers); and
  • Thomas D. Hall, on behalf of interested stakeholders.

Collectively, these amendments create a new, clearer division of labor between statewide rules, local rules, and administrative orders, and signal a deliberate policy choice: chief judges may, and are expected to, regulate most courtroom practice through administrative orders rather than through formally approved local rules.

II. Summary of the Opinion and Key Holdings

A. Core Holdings

The Court’s principal actions can be summarized as follows:

  1. Rule 2.120 (Definitions)
    • Local Court Rule now has a two‑part definition:
      1. It remains a rule of practice or procedure for circuit or county application only, adopted due to local conditions, to fill gaps in or facilitate application of statewide rules;
      2. It also explicitly includes rules addressing matters that the Florida Constitution, general law, rules of court, or supreme court opinions require to be adopted in a local court rule.
    • Administrative Order is re‑defined to:
      • Explicitly acknowledge that administrative orders may include rules of practice or procedure; and
      • Impose a clear hierarchy: a chief judge’s administrative order must not conflict with:
        • the Constitution,
        • court rules,
        • local court rules, or
        • administrative orders issued by the Chief Justice.
  2. Rule 2.215 (Trial Court Administration)
    • Local Rules Proposal Process Simplified:
      • Local court rules may now be proposed by the chief judge (after consultation with other judges), rather than requiring a majority of all circuit and county judges.
      • The chief judge must:
        • Notify local bar associations of the proposal;
        • Allow a bar representative, and potentially other interested persons, to be heard (orally or in writing) before submission to the Supreme Court.
      • A structured timetable is imposed for:
        • Submission (generally each January);
        • Distribution to the Supreme Court Local Rules Advisory Committee;
        • Comment by Florida Bar committees and others; and
        • Advisory Committee recommendation back to the Court.
    • Challenge Mechanism for Administrative Orders Changed:
      • The previous mechanism—application to the LRAC to declare that an “administrative order” was in substance a “rule”—is abolished.
      • Instead, any challenge that an administrative order is inconsistent with the Constitution, court rules, local rules, or Chief Justice orders must be brought:
        • by a petition for an extraordinary writ, or
        • via an objection in a pending trial-court case where the order is being applied.
    • Publication and Review of Administrative Orders:
      • Chief judges must publish current administrative orders on the circuit court’s website.
      • They must retain copies of both current and rescinded orders as public records, available upon payment of duplication costs.
      • An annual review of local administrative orders is required to ensure the maintained set remains current and non‑conflicting with supreme court or local court rules.
  3. Rule 2.140 (Amending Rules of Court)
    • The rule is clarified to confirm that the usual statewide rule-amendment procedures do not apply to local court rules proposed by trial courts.
    • It further provides that the Chief Justice may appoint a Local Rule Advisory Committee to handle local rules and administrative orders under Rule 2.215(e).

B. Express Statement of Policy Direction

A brief but important 2025 Court Commentary attached to Rule 2.215 makes the Court’s intent unmistakable:

The definitions of local court rules and administrative orders were amended to allow rules of practice and procedure to be issued in administrative orders from trial court chief judges instead of being issued by the local court rules approval process.

This statement confirms that, going forward, most trial-level procedural regulation should occur through chief judges’ administrative orders, not through local rules requiring formal Supreme Court approval.

III. Authorities and “Precedents” Cited

A. Constitutional and Rule-Based Citations

Unlike a merits opinion resolving a contested case, this rulemaking order cites no prior case law. Instead, it references the Court’s constitutional authority and relevant internal rules:

  • Article V, section 2(a), Florida Constitution
    This provision authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts. The Court invokes it as the jurisdictional basis: “We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.”
  • Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.140(d)
    Rule 2.140 governs procedures for amending rules of court. Subdivision (d) addresses the Court’s power to initiate or act upon rule changes outside the regular cycle, including in response to reports from committees. The opinion cites this as the procedural vehicle for the amendments.
  • Administrative Order AOSC21‑57
    This administrative order by then‑Chief Justice Canady established the Workgroup on Judicial Practices in the Trial Courts, which investigated trial-level practices and identified confusion between local rules and administrative orders. The present opinion is best seen as the rule-level implementation of that workgroup’s findings.

No other judicial precedents are cited, underscoring that the Court is acting here in its rulemaking capacity, not interpreting or applying existing precedent in an adversarial context.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Amendments

A. Re‑defining “Local Court Rule” (Rule 2.120(b))

1. The Traditional Role of Local Court Rules

Subdivision (b)(1) largely preserves the longstanding understanding of a local court rule:

A rule of practice or procedure for circuit or county application only that, because of local conditions, supplies an omission in or facilitates application of a rule of statewide application and does not conflict therewith.

This language expresses three core principles:

  • Geographic limitation: A local rule applies only within a particular circuit or county, not statewide.
  • Gap‑filling and facilitation: It is justified only where “local conditions” require:
    • Filling an “omission” in statewide rules; or
    • Making the statewide rule workable in that locality (e.g., allocation of hearing days, courtroom usage, or other logistical details).
  • No conflict: It must not contradict any statewide rule. It can add detail, but cannot change the substance of statewide practice and procedure.

This preserves the long‑standing Florida policy that local rules are exceptions, not the norm, and are tolerated only to the extent they support, rather than undermine, statewide uniformity.

2. The New Second Prong: Rules Required to Be “Local”

The significant innovation is subdivision (b)(2):

A rule that addresses other matters that are required by the Florida Constitution, general law, rules of court, or a supreme court opinion to be adopted by or in a local court rule.

This has several consequences:

  • It narrows and clarifies when a local rule is appropriate: not simply whenever local judges want one, but when a higher-level source of law requires that a particular matter be addressed via a local rule.
  • It recognizes that some statutes, constitutional provisions, or statewide rules might explicitly direct certain procedures to be implemented through local rules (for example, allocation of certain trial divisions, specialized dockets, or local case management structures).
  • It signals the Court’s policy preference: unless some superior authority requires a “local rule,” local practice should typically be handled through administrative orders, not local rules.

Consequently, practitioners and judges must now ask a threshold question when considering a local rule: Is this something the Constitution, a statute, a statewide rule, or a Supreme Court opinion specifically requires to be handled by local rule? If not, the default mechanism is now the administrative order.

B. Re‑defining “Administrative Order” (Rule 2.120(c))

1. Key New Language Allowing Practice and Procedure

Rule 2.120(c) historically defined administrative orders as directives necessary to administer the court’s affairs, which must not conflict with the Constitution or Supreme Court rules and orders. The amendment adds crucial language:

A directive, necessary to administer properly the court's affairs but not inconsistent with the constitution or with court rules and administrative orders entered by the supreme court that may include rules of practice or procedure, issued to administer the court's affairs.

This does two important things:

  • It resolves prior uncertainty over whether a chief judge’s administrative order can legitimately regulate courtroom procedure (such as motion practice, hearing formats, scheduling blocks, submission of written materials). The rule now expressly says: yes, it can.
  • It recognizes that, in modern court administration, front‑line procedural adjustments are often better handled through relatively nimble administrative orders rather than full, formal local rules requiring Supreme Court review.

2. A Clear Hierarchy of Norms

The amended definition adds a new, second sentence underscoring the hierarchy:

An administrative order issued by a chief judge must not be inconsistent with the constitution, court rules, local court rules, or with administrative orders entered by the chief justice of the supreme court.

In plain terms, the normative hierarchy is:

  1. Constitution(s) (federal and state);
  2. Statewide court rules (e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure, FRGP&JA);
  3. Local court rules (approved by the Supreme Court under Rule 2.215(e));
  4. Administrative orders of the Chief Justice (statewide administrative directives);
  5. Administrative orders of trial-court chief judges (local directives).

If a chief judge’s administrative order conflicts with anything above it in this hierarchy, it is invalid to that extent and may be challenged via the mechanisms described in Rule 2.215(e)(2).

C. Local Rules Proposal Process Streamlined (Rule 2.215(e)(1))

1. From Majority of Judges to Chief Judge Leadership

Previously, a local rule could only be proposed by a majority of the circuit and county judges in the circuit. Now:

Local court rules as defined in rule 2.120 may be proposed by a chief judge after consulting other judges in the circuit.

This change is subtle but significant:

  • It centralizes responsibility in the chief judge, making the process more efficient and less politically cumbersome.
  • The requirement of “consulting” other judges preserves a measure of internal buy‑in, but the chief judge is the final proposer.
  • In practice, this may reduce the total number of local rule proposals, reinforcing the policy that most local procedural detail should be left to administrative orders.

2. Required Notice to the Local Bar and Opportunity to Be Heard

The amended rule clarifies the obligation to involve the bar:

The chief judge must notify any local bar association within the circuit of the proposal, after which the chief judge must permit a representative of the local bar, and may permit any other interested person, to be heard orally or in writing on the proposal before submitting it to the supreme court for approval.

This ensures:

  • Transparency: The practicing bar within the circuit will know when a local rule is being considered.
  • Participation: The bar must be permitted to present its views, at least through a representative; the chief judge may open the process wider to other stakeholders.
  • Better vetting: Local rules that do reach the Supreme Court should be better informed and less controversial.

3. Timetables for Submission, Comment, and Recommendation

The prior version of Rule 2.215(e) contained specific calendar deadlines keyed to annual cycles (e.g., February 15, March 15, etc.). The amendment updates this framework:

  • Submission by Chief Judge:
    “Local court rule proposals must be submitted by a chief judge to the clerk’s office in the supreme court in January of each year.”
    The Court may accept “emergency” proposals at other times.
  • Distribution to Advisory Committee and Bar Committees:
    The Supreme Court clerk must send all proposals to the Supreme Court Local Rules Advisory Committee within 20 days of receipt. At the same time, the clerk must send copies to appropriate Florida Bar committees and notify them of the deadline for comments.
  • Comments Deadline:
    Rather than a fixed date (such as “March 15”), comments are due by the “time set forth in the notice”, giving the Court flexibility to adjust timelines.
  • Advisory Committee Meeting and Recommendation:
    The Local Rules Advisory Committee must “meet on or before April 15” to consider proposals and comments. It must transmit recommendations to the Court within 75 days after receiving the proposal from the clerk (extending the prior 15‑day window).
  • Court Action:
    The Supreme Court will consider the committee’s recommendations, may seek “editorial comment” only, may set oral argument, or act on written submissions. It must act “promptly” once recommendations are received or heard.

Overall, this framework remains structured and participatory but is more flexible and realistic about timelines, likely reflecting the Court’s experience with prior cycles.

D. Eliminating the “Classification” Challenge to Administrative Orders (Rule 2.215(e)(2))

1. Old Mechanism: LRAC as Gatekeeper

Previously, a judge or Bar member who believed an “administrative order” was in substance a court rule or local rule (and therefore improperly adopted) could:

  • Apply to the Supreme Court Local Rules Advisory Committee;
  • Obtain a committee decision on classification (rule vs. administrative order);
  • Have that decision reported to the Court, which would then follow procedures akin to those for evaluating a proposed local rule.

This mechanism made sense when administrative orders were understood as purely administrative (e.g., assignment of judges, internal management) and procedural regulation was supposed to be done by rules only. If an administrative order looked like a procedural rule, the remedy was to convert it into a formally adopted rule.

2. New Mechanism: Direct Judicial Review for Inconsistency

That entire mechanism is now repealed and replaced by:

A challenge to an administrative order on the ground that it is inconsistent with a constitution, court rules, local court rules, or with administrative orders entered by the chief justice of the supreme court must be made either by a petition for an extraordinary writ or an objection before the trial court in a pending case in which the administrative order applies.

Key aspects of this change:

  • Classification issue largely disappears:
    Because Rule 2.120 now expressly allows administrative orders to include rules of practice or procedure, there is no longer a need to ask: “Is this really a rule?” An administrative order may legitimately be procedural. The relevant question is now whether it conflicts with higher authority.
  • Shift from administrative to judicial remedy:
    Instead of going to the LRAC for an advisory determination, challengers must invoke traditional judicial avenues:
    • Extraordinary writ (such as prohibition, mandamus, or quo warranto) filed in an appellate court; or
    • Objection in a pending case—for example, arguing that application of the administrative order in that case violates a statewide rule or constitutional right.
  • Concrete context requirement:
    By requiring either a case-specific objection or a writ petition, the Court strongly encourages challenges to arise in the context of an actual controversy, rather than as abstract institutional disputes.

Practically, this may somewhat raise the cost and threshold of challenging administrative orders, but it aligns with the broader policy of treating chief judges’ procedural administrative orders as valid unless and until they are adjudged inconsistent with higher law.

E. Publication and Annual Review (Rule 2.215(e)(3))

Rule 2.215(e)(3) emphasizes transparency and currency of administrative orders:

  • Publication: Current administrative orders must appear on the circuit court’s website.
  • Retention as Public Records: The chief judge must ensure copies of current, vacated, and rescinded orders are retained and available on request, consistent with Florida public‑records principles.
  • Annual Review: Chief judges must direct an annual review of all administrative orders to verify:
    • The clerk’s maintained set is current (no obsolete or unrescinded orders);
    • No conflicts exist with supreme court or local court rules.

This requirement is particularly important in light of the expanded procedural content that administrative orders may now bear. It ensures that lawyers and litigants have reliable access to the operative procedural framework in any given circuit.

F. Conforming Amendments to Rule 2.140(h)

Rule 2.140(h) is adjusted to align with the new regime:

  • It confirms that the general procedures for amending statewide rules do not apply to local court rules proposed by trial courts.
  • It recognizes the Chief Justice’s authority to appoint a Local Rule Advisory Committee to review local rules and administrative orders submitted under Rule 2.215(e), integrating that committee into the revised process.

These changes are largely organizational and cross‑referential, but they help prevent confusion between the roles of various rulemaking committees and processes.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Local Court Rules vs. Administrative Orders

Local Court Rule: Think of this as a miniature version of a statewide rule, but applicable only within a specific circuit or county. It:

  • Requires formal Supreme Court approval;
  • Must be justified by local conditions or be required by higher law to be local;
  • Cannot conflict with any statewide rules or constitutional requirements;
  • Is relatively hard to change because it must go through a formal process.

Administrative Order: This is a directive issued by a chief judge to manage how the court runs. Under the new amendments, an administrative order:

  • Can now legitimately include rules of practice and procedure;
  • Is quicker and easier to issue, modify, or rescind than a local rule;
  • Must not conflict with constitutions, court rules, local rules, or Chief Justice orders;
  • Must be made publicly accessible via the court’s website.

In practical terms, everyday questions such as how to schedule hearings, how remote appearances are handled, specific filing requirements for local dockets, or division assignments are increasingly likely to be governed by administrative orders, not local rules.

B. “Rules of Practice or Procedure”

“Practice and procedure” refers to how cases move through the courts, not the substantive rights of the parties. Examples include:

  • Deadlines for filing motions or responses;
  • Requirements for pretrial conferences or case management;
  • Whether certain arguments must be made in writing, or can be made orally;
  • Use of remote technology for hearings or trials;
  • Format of proposed orders or required forms.

By contrast, substantive law determines what legal rights and remedies exist (e.g., what constitutes negligence, what damages can be awarded).

The amendments do not authorize administrative orders to change substantive law; they simply clarify that they may address the procedural details of courtroom practice.

C. Extraordinary Writs

An extraordinary writ is a specialized remedy used to correct a serious legal error or to prevent a court or official from acting outside their lawful authority. Common examples in Florida include:

  • Prohibition: Used to stop a lower court from acting where it lacks jurisdiction or is about to exceed its jurisdiction.
  • Mandamus: Used to compel a lower court or official to perform a ministerial duty required by law.
  • Certiorari (as a writ): Used to review non‑final orders of lower courts for a departure from the essential requirements of law causing material harm not remediable on appeal.

By directing that challenges to administrative orders be pursued through extraordinary writs (or objections in pending cases), the Court ensures that such challenges are focused, formally presented, and judicially resolvable.

D. Original Proceeding vs. Appeal

This opinion arises from an “original proceeding”—the Court’s own initiative or its review of committee proposals—under its rulemaking authority. It is not an appeal from a lower court’s judgment.

Important distinctions:

  • There are no “parties” in the usual adversarial sense; instead, there are committees, petitioners, and commenters.
  • The Court is not deciding who wins or loses a dispute; it is creating or amending rules that govern future cases.
  • The Court therefore speaks in terms of “we amend,” “we adopt,” and “we have jurisdiction” under the constitutional rulemaking power.

VI. Likely Impact on Future Practice and Litigation

A. For Trial Courts and Chief Judges

The amendments explicitly empower chief judges to use administrative orders as the primary vehicle for tailoring procedures to the needs of their circuits, subject to higher-level constraints. Likely consequences include:

  • Greater flexibility: Chief judges can respond more quickly to changing circumstances (e.g., technological developments, emergencies, or local case backlogs) without waiting for the lengthy local-rule approval process.
  • Increased responsibility: Because administrative orders may now substantively regulate practice, chiefs must be especially careful to:
    • Avoid conflicts with statewide rules (e.g., the Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure);
    • Coordinate with any existing local rules and Chief Justice administrative orders;
    • Ensure publication and regular review.
  • Fewer local rule proposals: Local rules are likely to be reserved for those situations where a higher authority explicitly requires a local rule, or where true structural gap‑filling is necessary.

B. For Practitioners

Lawyers practicing in Florida trial courts will need to adjust their compliance habits:

  • Administrative orders are now central: Understanding local practice will increasingly require a careful review of the circuit’s administrative orders posted on its website, not just the statewide rules and occasional local rules.
  • Awareness of potential conflicts: Practitioners must be alert to situations where an administrative order appears to:
    • Shorten or extend deadlines beyond what statewide rules permit;
    • Restrict rights (e.g., jury trial procedures, motion practice) in a way that could be inconsistent with the Rules of Court or constitutional rights.
  • Litigation strategy: If counsel believes an administrative order is invalid as applied to their case, they must now:
    • Timely raise an objection in the trial court, and/or
    • Consider seeking an appropriate extraordinary writ.

C. For Litigants and Public Confidence

The expanded use of administrative orders could generate some concerns about “local variation” in procedure. However, several features guard against unfairness:

  • Publication requirements make it easier for litigants (including self-represented parties) to identify governing procedures.
  • The hierarchical conflict rule ensures that administrative orders cannot legally override constitutional rights or statewide rules.
  • The availability of writs and in‑case objections provides a judicial check on overreaching or conflicting administrative orders.

D. Potential Areas of Future Dispute

Several types of issues may be litigated under the new framework:

  • Alleged conflicts with statewide rules: For example, if a chief judge’s administrative order imposes stricter filing deadlines than those in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, litigants may argue that the order is invalid to that extent.
  • Scope of “local conditions” and necessity: While less central than before, disputes may still arise over whether a local rule (as opposed to an administrative order) was properly justified by local conditions or required by higher law.
  • Choice of remedy: Courts may have to clarify which extraordinary writ is appropriate for particular administrative-order challenges, and under what circumstances a case-specific objection suffices.
  • Retroactivity and rescinded orders: Questions may emerge about the effect of rescinding or amending administrative orders—particularly where ongoing cases were governed by prior versions.

E. Systemic Impact on Rulemaking Practice

From a broader institutional perspective, the amendments continue a long-term trend in Florida toward:

  • Reducing reliance on formal local rules as a means of procedural experimentation or segmentation; and
  • Centralizing fundamental procedural policy at the Supreme Court level, while decentralizing day-to-day implementation details to chief judges via administrative orders.

The LRAC’s role evolves accordingly: less a forum for reclassifying administrative orders as rules, more a technical advisor on proposed local rules and on certain categories of administrative orders formally submitted to the Court.

VII. Conclusion

In re: Amendments to Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration constitutes a significant recalibration of how Florida trial courts structure and publish their procedural frameworks.

By expressly allowing chief judges’ administrative orders to include rules of practice and procedure, the Court:

  • Reduces dependence on formal, Supreme Court–approved local rules;
  • Clarifies the hierarchy among constitutions, statewide rules, local rules, Chief Justice administrative orders, and local administrative orders; and
  • Replaces a committee‑based classification process with direct judicial remedies—extraordinary writs and case-specific objections—for alleged inconsistencies.

Coupled with requirements for online publication and annual review of administrative orders, these changes promote transparency, flexibility, and accountability, while reaffirming the Supreme Court’s central role in defining statewide procedural norms.

Going forward, lawyers and judges in Florida must internalize this new division of labor: local practice is increasingly governed by administrative orders, bounded by and subordinate to the Constitution and statewide rules. Understanding and navigating this framework will be essential to competent and effective advocacy in Florida’s trial courts.

Case Details

Comments