Clarifying Federal-Sector Title VII and COVID-19 Mask Accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act: Commentary on Laura Dang v. Postmaster General (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This unpublished, per curiam opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Dang v. Postmaster General, No. 25‑10379, Nov. 24, 2025) arises from a pro se discrimination suit by a federal employee against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). The case sits at the intersection of:

Federal-sector race discrimination under Title VII, as interpreted by Babb v. Wilkie and Babb II,
Disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act in the specific context of COVID‑19 mask mandates,
The evidentiary demands at summary judgment (especially for pro se plaintiffs), and
Issue preservation (retaliation and discovery disputes) on appeal.

The plaintiff, Laura Dang (later noting a name change to Kieu Trinh Mack), is an Asian-American mechanic at USPS who suffers from bronchiectasis, a chronic lung condition. During the COVID‑19 pandemic, USPS implemented a face‑covering mandate. Dang refused to wear a mask, claimed a medical inability to do so, resisted the offered accommodation of a face shield, and ultimately accepted leave from work until the mask mandate was lifted.

Dang sued the Postmaster General alleging:

Race discrimination (Title VII – federal-sector provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑16),
Disability discrimination (pled under the ADA but analyzed under the Rehabilitation Act),
Retaliation (in the EEO process and on appeal), and
Discovery-related improprieties.

The district court denied her motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the Postmaster General. Dang appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, addressing both procedural and substantive questions and clarifying—albeit in a nonprecedential opinion—how existing doctrine applies to federal employees challenging COVID-era safety rules.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s core holdings are:

Race discrimination (Title VII – federal sector): Even under the relatively plaintiff-friendly Babb standard—which requires that federal personnel decisions be “untainted” by any race-based consideration—Dang failed to produce admissible evidence that race played any role in USPS’s decision to remove her from the work floor or place her on emergency placement. Summary judgment for USPS was proper.
Disability discrimination (Rehabilitation Act): USPS engaged in a proper interactive process after Dang requested an accommodation, offered two reasonable accommodations (a face shield and leave), and was not required to accept Dang’s preference for working without any face covering. Dang’s refusal to consider a face shield and her acceptance of leave made her responsible for any breakdown in the interactive process. Summary judgment for USPS was again appropriate.
Retaliation: Dang’s retaliation theory was not adequately raised in the district court and was only mentioned in a perfunctory way on appeal. Under Eleventh Circuit preservation and abandonment rules, the court declined to consider the retaliation claim.
Discovery: Dang did not file a motion to compel discovery or comply with the certification requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The district court was not required to treat her generalized complaints about discovery as a motion to compel, and there was no abuse of discretion.
Procedural defects in Dang’s appellate briefing (FRAP 28): Although Dang’s brief violated Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A) by failing to include citations to the record or legal authority, the court elected, in light of her pro se status, to reach the merits of the issues she clearly identified (race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and discovery).
Motion to seal exhibits: Denied as moot because the exhibits she sought to seal were already under seal.

Notably, the opinion is designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION.” Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36‑2, such opinions are not binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority. Nonetheless, the case provides useful guidance in several recurring areas of employment litigation, particularly in the federal sector and in the post‑COVID accommodation landscape.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Framework and Pro Se Briefing: FRAP 28

Before turning to the substantive claims, the court addressed a threshold procedural question: whether Dang’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 warranted outright affirmance.

FRAP 28(a)(8)(A) requires an appellant’s brief to contain:

the appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.

Dang’s initial brief:

Identified the issues she was appealing (race and disability discrimination, retaliation, discovery), but
Contained no citations to the record or to legal authority.

The government urged the Eleventh Circuit to affirm solely on this basis. The panel relied on Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014), where the court held that pro se pleadings are construed liberally, but courts may not act as “de facto counsel” or rewrite deficient filings.

Here, the court struck a balance: it recognized Dang’s clear identification of the issues and her pro se status, and therefore decided to reach the merits despite the Rule 28 defect. This reflects a practical and relatively generous approach to pro se appellants—important in a circuit where a large share of civil rights litigants are unrepresented.

One important limit: Dang attempted in her reply brief to add a judicial bias challenge, arguing the district judge improperly resolved disputed facts against her. Citing Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003), the panel correctly refused to consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.

B. Race Discrimination under Federal-Sector Title VII

1. Legal Framework – The Babb “Untainted” Standard

Dang is a federal employee. Her race discrimination claim therefore arises under Title VII’s federal-sector provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑16(a), which requires that:

all personnel actions affecting [federal] employees ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race ...

The Supreme Court in Babb v. Wilkie (“Babb I”), 589 U.S. 399 (2020), and the Eleventh Circuit in Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs (“Babb II”), 992 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2021), interpreted the phrase “made free from any discrimination” to mean:

The decision-making process must be completely untainted by impermissible considerations (e.g., race), even if those considerations were not the “but-for” cause of the final outcome.
If discrimination plays any part in the way a decision is made, the decision violates § 2000e‑16(a), even if the same result would have occurred absent discrimination.

However, under Babb I and Babb II, the scope of remedies may be limited (e.g., declaratory or injunctive relief versus back pay) where discrimination did not change the ultimate outcome. This opinion primarily concerns liability, not remedies, but the “any taint” standard sets a relatively low bar for the plaintiff if there is any evidence that race entered the process.

The Eleventh Circuit in Dang acknowledges and applies this Babb framework: if “discrimination plays any part in the way a decision is made,” the decision is not “made in a way that is untainted by such discrimination.”

2. Adverse Employment Action and Comparator Theory

The district court treated Dang’s “three-day unpaid suspension” as the only adverse employment action properly established in the record. On appeal, the panel does not disturb that framing, but its reasoning makes clear that, even assuming the emergency placement and related leave issues were adverse, there was no evidence of racial taint.

Dang relied heavily on a comparator theory:

She, an Asian-American female mechanic, was walked out and placed on emergency off‑duty status for refusing to wear a mask.
Richard Waller, a white male, also refused to wear a mask, but was eventually allowed back to work.

The record, however, showed:

Both Dang and Waller were walked out on the same day by manager Tom Feaster.
Waller was only allowed to return after he entered into a union settlement agreeing to comply with the mask mandate.
Dang refused to comply with any face covering (including a shield) and instead accepted leave.

Thus, Waller was ultimately treated differently because he agreed to follow the rule; Dang did not. As the panel notes, this undercuts her comparator argument and tends to show that the differential treatment was based on conduct (mask compliance), not race.

3. Alleged “Shifting Reasons” and Pretext

Dang asserted that Feaster’s letters showed shifting justifications for her emergency placement—classic evidence of pretext in employment cases. Initially, Feaster’s letter stated that she was placed on emergency off‑duty status for failing to obey a direct order; a later letter rescinded the first and stated that she was placed on emergency placement because she refused to wear a face covering.

The court rejected this as evidence of pretext. Both letters are substantively consistent: the “direct order” was to comply with the same mask mandate. The procedural correction (having the letter properly issued by the labor department and in correct form) was not a shift in the underlying rationale. Without more, this minor variation did not create a genuine dispute of material fact that could defeat summary judgment.

4. Evidentiary Problems: Hearsay and Authentication

The opinion places substantial emphasis on evidentiary rules at the summary judgment stage:

Hearsay: Dang submitted statements by coworkers indicating that management enforced the mask mandate more strictly against white and Asian employees and more leniently toward favored or “connected” employees. The court treated these statements as inadmissible hearsay because they were out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted and did not fall within any identified exception. Citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) and Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012), the panel reaffirmed that hearsay cannot be used to defeat summary judgment.
Authentication: Dang relied on photos purportedly showing coworkers without masks or with masks pulled under their chins. She received these pictures from someone she could not identify, did not take them herself, and could not reliably identify many of the individuals depicted. Under Fed. R. Evid. 901(a), the proponent must offer evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Without such authentication, the photos were inadmissible at summary judgment.
Self-serving allegations: The court cited Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that purely self-serving assertions without personal knowledge or corroboration are insufficient to carry a summary judgment burden.

These evidentiary rulings are crucial: they strip away most of Dang’s attempted proof of selective enforcement and racial animus. Once the inadmissible materials are excluded, what remains is:

A uniform mask policy,
Undisputed testimony that multiple employees (including white males) were warned or walked out for noncompliance, and
No race-related comments or conduct by decisionmakers.

In that evidentiary posture, even the more plaintiff-friendly Babb standard cannot save the claim: there is simply no admissible evidence that race played any role in the decision-making process.

5. Result: No Triable Race Claim Even Under Babb

After applying the Babb standard to the cleaned-up evidentiary record, the court concluded:

no evidence reflects that USPS discriminated against Dang based on her race.

This is significant: even where the substantive standard requires only that race play “any part” in the decision, plaintiffs must still:

Comply with evidentiary rules, and
Offer non-speculative, admissible evidence.

The case thus illustrates that Babb lowers the causation bar but does not relax evidentiary standards at summary judgment.

C. Disability Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation

1. Statutory Background: Rehabilitation Act and ADA Interplay

Dang styled her disability claim under the ADA, but because USPS is a federal agency, the governing statute is actually the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794). The opinion correctly pivots to this framework and notes the well-established rule that:

cases involving the ADA are precedent for those involving the Rehabilitation Act.

Under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, covered employers may not discriminate against qualified individuals on the basis of disability and must provide reasonable accommodations to known disabilities, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.

2. Triggering the Duty to Accommodate

Citing Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2022), the court reiterates that an employer is not required to speculate about unrequested accommodations. The duty to accommodate arises only when the employee:

Makes a specific demand for an accommodation, and
Demonstrates that the requested accommodation is reasonable.

Here, although Dang earlier mentioned her lung condition to supervisor Schaffer in connection with mask disputes, the formal request that properly triggered the interactive process occurred during her investigative interview with Feaster, when she:

Raised her lung condition as a barrier to mask use, and
Submitted a written reasonable accommodation request seeking exemption from all face coverings based on social distancing.

3. The Interactive Process and Reasonableness of USPS’s Response

After receiving Dang’s request, USPS did the following:

Feaster contacted labor relations (Cynthia Davis) and relayed Dang’s request.
The District Reasonable Accommodation Committee reviewed a medical assessment from Dang’s doctor.

The medical assessment stated:

Prolonged mask-wearing affected Dang’s “lung/respiratory status,”
She should be allowed to place a mask around her mouth and expose her nose when working at least six feet from others, and
She should avoid “prolonged masking” of her nostrils.

Crucially, the doctor did not address face shields, and nothing in the medical documentation suggested that Dang could not wear a shield or that any covering whatsoever was medically impossible.

Based on this information, the Committee:

Proposed a face shield as an accommodation.
When Dang refused any face covering, offered leave (paid and then unpaid) until the mask mandate lifted.

The court held that:

Offering a face shield was reasonable: it would not block Dang’s nostrils and thus complied with the doctor’s restrictions.
Offering leave as a backup accommodation was also reasonable, especially given uncontroverted testimony that Dang could not consistently maintain six feet of distance from others while performing her essential duties.

The court emphasized long-standing principles (again from Owens and D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2020)):

Employers are not required to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.
An employer is not liable if the employee is responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process.

Here, Dang categorically rejected the face shield without evidence of medical necessity and accepted leave instead. The court therefore concluded that any breakdown in the interactive process was attributable to Dang, not USPS.

4. Failure to Consider Alternative Accommodations (e.g., “Roping Off” Area)

Dang argued that USPS should have considered alternative measures such as roping off her work area to allow her to work mask‑free while socially distanced. The court rejected this for two reasons:

Dang never actually requested this as a specific accommodation, and the Rehabilitation Act does not require employers to guess at possible accommodations not requested or supported by evidence.
There was testimony that social distancing was not consistently possible in her work environment, meaning any such proposal would have been dubious in terms of operational feasibility and safety.

Because USPS offered at least one reasonable accommodation consistent with the medical evidence (a face shield) and a second (leave) as a practical alternative, the court found no violation.

5. Result: No Disability Discrimination

The panel concludes that Dang failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that USPS denied her a reasonable accommodation. The Rehabilitation Act claim thus failed as a matter of law.

D. Retaliation Claim: Preservation and Abandonment

Dang argued on appeal that USPS retaliated against her for filing an EEO complaint—pointing to the temporal proximity between her EEO activity and adverse treatment.

The key issue is not the substantive standard for retaliation, but whether she preserved the claim below. Under:

Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004), and
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008),

issues not raised in the district court may not be raised for the first time on appeal, and issues not properly briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned—even for pro se litigants.

The court found:

Dang only mentioned “retaliation” in passing in certain EEO-related documents and in a deposition,
She did not plead retaliation in her complaint or raise it in her summary-judgment briefing, and
Her appellate discussion of retaliation was perfunctory and unsupported by authority (running afoul of the standard set in Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)).

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit declined to consider retaliation, illustrating the importance—even for pro se litigants—of:

Explicitly stating each claim in the operative pleading, and
Squarely addressing each claim in summary judgment briefing.

E. Discovery Disputes and Rule 37

Dang complained that USPS:

Misdirected discovery materials to the wrong address,
Redacted evidence, and
Filed documents electronically while she did not receive electronic notifications.

She did not, however, file a motion to compel discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) or certify any good-faith effort to resolve discovery disputes without court intervention, as the rule requires.

The Eleventh Circuit, citing Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992), noted:

Discovery matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Without a properly framed motion to compel, supported by the required certification, the district court had no obligation to act.
Dang was aware she could request extensions of time if needed to handle discovery.

The appellate court therefore found no error in the district court’s failure to construe her passing complaints as a Rule 37 motion or to issue sua sponte discovery orders.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited: Their Role in the Opinion

1. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review

Daniels v. Executive Director of Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission, 127 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir. 2025) – Cited for the standard of review: de novo review of cross-motions for summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant on each motion.
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642 (11th Cir. 1997) – Reiterates that a “mere scintilla” of evidence is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; there must be enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmoving party.

2. Pro Se Standards and Appellate Briefing

Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014) – Supports the court’s approach of liberally construing pro se filings, while refusing to act as “de facto counsel” or rewrite pleadings.
Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003) – Bars consideration of issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.

3. Federal-Sector Title VII: Babb I and Babb II

Babb v. Wilkie (“Babb I”), 589 U.S. 399 (2020) – The Supreme Court’s leading case on the interpretation of § 2000e‑16(a) in the federal sector, holding that personnel actions must be “untainted” by discrimination.
Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs (“Babb II”), 992 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2021) – The Eleventh Circuit’s follow-up decision elaborating on Babb I and describing the “any part” standard: if discrimination plays any part in how a decision is made, there is a violation, though remedies may vary.

4. Evidence at Summary Judgment

Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012) – Confirms that inadmissible hearsay cannot be used to oppose summary judgment.
Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2000) – Addresses the insufficiency of purely self-serving statements lacking personal knowledge or corroboration as a means to defeat summary judgment.
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) – Establishes authentication requirements; the proponent must show that evidence is what it purports to be.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) – Defines hearsay as out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

5. Rehabilitation Act / ADA Accommodation Doctrine

Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2022) – Key precedent that the employer has no duty to guess at accommodations; the employee must make a specific and reasonable request to trigger the interactive process.
D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2020) – Holds that an employer is not liable for a failure to accommodate if the employee is responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process.

6. Preservation, Abandonment, and Discovery

Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) – Articulates the rule that issues not raised below generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008) – Confirms that issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) – Explains that perfunctory or passing references to an issue are insufficient to preserve it on appeal.
Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992) – Provides the standard of review (abuse of discretion) for discovery rulings.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) – Requires a motion to compel to include a certification that the movant attempted in good faith to resolve the dispute without court intervention.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

1. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedure where the court decides a case (or part of it) without a trial if there is no “genuine dispute” about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In practice:

The non-moving party (here, Dang) must produce enough admissible evidence that a reasonable jury could rule in her favor.
Speculation, inadmissible hearsay, and unauthenticated documents generally do not count.

2. Federal-Sector Title VII vs. Private-Sector Title VII

For private employers, Title VII typically requires the plaintiff to show that discrimination was at least a motivating factor (and often a but-for cause) of an adverse action. For federal employers, under § 2000e‑16 and Babb, the standard is conceptually different:

Personnel actions must be made “free from any discrimination.”
This means the process must not be tainted by race at all, even if the outcome would have been the same.

However, as Dang illustrates, the plaintiff still must offer admissible evidence that race played some role in the process.

3. Rehabilitation Act and Reasonable Accommodation

A “reasonable accommodation” is a change in the workplace that enables an employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job. Examples include modified schedules, special equipment, policy exceptions, or reassignment.

Key points:

The employee must request an accommodation and explain the need.
The employer must then engage in an “interactive process” to identify a solution.
The employer need not grant the employee’s preferred accommodation; any reasonable effective accommodation suffices.
If the employee refuses reasonable options or stops cooperating, the employer is generally not liable for failure to accommodate.

4. Hearsay and Authentication

In civil litigation, not all documents or statements can be used to prove facts at summary judgment or trial:

Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered for the truth of what it says (e.g., “Management targets Asian employees”) is hearsay unless it falls within a recognized exception. Hearsay is usually inadmissible.
Authentication: The party offering a document (like a photo or email) must show that it is what they claim. This might mean testimony from someone who saw the photo taken or who sent/received the email.

The court’s exclusion of much of Dang’s evidence on these grounds illustrates how procedural and evidentiary rules can be outcome-determinative.

5. Motion to Compel Discovery (Rule 37)

If one party believes the other is not properly responding to discovery (e.g., not producing documents, giving incomplete answers), they can file a motion to compel under Rule 37. The motion must:

Identify what specific discovery is at issue, and
Certify that the movant tried in good faith to resolve the problem without involving the court.

Without such a motion, complaints about discovery are generally insufficient to preserve an issue for appeal.

VI. Impact and Significance

1. COVID-Era Safety Policies and Disability Law

Although the COVID‑19 mask mandates have largely been lifted, the principles in Dang are relevant to:

Future pandemics or health crises,
Other safety-related PPE requirements (e.g., respirators, protective goggles, gloves), and
Employees with respiratory or sensory impairments who seek policy exceptions.

The opinion suggests:

Employers may enforce neutral, safety-based mask or PPE rules, even where employees allege disability or discrimination, so long as they reasonably accommodate known disabilities.
Face shields or leave can be reasonable accommodations when consistent with medical documentation and operational realities.
Employees who refuse reasonable alternatives without evidence of medical necessity weaken their own claims.

2. Application of Babb in Federal-Sector Discrimination Claims

Dang demonstrates how the “any taint” standard in Babb operates at summary judgment:

The standard is more plaintiff-friendly on causation, but
It does not reduce the evidentiary thresholds: plaintiffs must still produce admissible evidence of discriminatory influence.

This opinion may be cited (as persuasive authority) in future Eleventh Circuit cases to show that:

Mere speculation about discriminatory enforcement of neutral policies is insufficient.
Comparator evidence must reflect genuine similarity, focusing on outcomes as well as initial actions.
Procedural corrections or clarifying letters do not necessarily prove shifting explanations or pretext.

3. Lessons for Pro Se Litigants

For unrepresented plaintiffs, Dang underscores several lessons:

Issue preservation: All claims (including retaliation) must be explicitly pled and argued in summary judgment briefing.
Briefing standards: Even pro se appellants should cite to the record and legal authorities; while courts may be forgiving, noncompliance is risky.
Evidence management: Affidavits or declarations based on personal knowledge, properly authenticated documents, and deposition excerpts are far more valuable than unsourced photos, anonymous tips, or informal coworker statements.
Discovery motions: Complaints about discovery must be converted into formal Rule 37 motions if the litigant wants appellate review.

4. Guidance for Employers and Counsel

For employers—especially federal agencies—Dang suggests best practices:

Document uniform enforcement of safety policies.
Respond promptly and formally to accommodation requests, involving committees as appropriate.
Offer accommodations aligned with actual medical documentation (e.g., a shield if the limitation is nostril coverage), and document when an employee refuses options.
Ensure communications about discipline and emergency placement clearly identify policy-based reasons and avoid any language that could be misread as discriminatory.

The opinion also provides a roadmap for defense counsel crafting summary judgment motions: focus on evidentiary admissibility, comparator analysis, and the structured narrative of the interactive process.

VII. Conclusion

Laura Dang v. Postmaster General is a nonprecedential but instructive Eleventh Circuit decision that synthesizes several doctrinal strands:

The Babb “untainted decision-making” standard for federal-sector Title VII race claims,
The Rehabilitation Act’s reasonable accommodation and interactive process requirements in the context of COVID‑19 mask mandates,
Strict evidentiary constraints at summary judgment (hearsay, authentication, and self-serving testimony), and
Strict preservation and briefing rules for appellate review of retaliation and discovery issues.

The court’s bottom line:

Dang did not produce admissible evidence that race played any role in USPS’s decision to remove her from the workplace.
USPS provided reasonable accommodations (face shield and leave) consistent with her medical documentation; her refusal of a shield made her responsible for any breakdown in the interactive process.
Retaliation and discovery complaints were not properly preserved or presented.

Although unpublished, Dang will likely serve as persuasive authority in future Eleventh Circuit cases involving similar fact patterns: federal employees who challenge uniform safety rules as discriminatory and who contest accommodations offered for health-related restrictions. It confirms that while federal employees enjoy a favorable causation standard under Babb, they still must meet the same evidentiary and procedural rigors as any other litigant at summary judgment and on appeal.