Beyond Reversal: The Texas Supreme Court Narrows the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine and Limits Agency Power to Create Judicial Review

I. Introduction

Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 24-0340 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), sits at the intersection of administrative law, constitutional free-speech protections, and professional regulation.

The case arises from an unusual assertion of regulatory power: the Texas Medical Board (TMB), a licensing and disciplinary agency for physicians, disciplined a congressional candidate for how he described himself on the campaign trail. The candidate, Rey Gonzalez, holds both a medical degree (M.D.) and a law degree, is licensed as an attorney, but has never been licensed to practice medicine. While running for Congress, he referred to himself as “Dr. Gonzalez” and a “physician” in campaign materials and speeches.

The TMB concluded this violated the Texas Medical Practice Act and the Healing Art Identification Act, and it issued a cease-and-desist order prohibiting Gonzalez from using “doctor,” “Dr.,” or “physician” without simultaneously disclosing that he is not licensed to practice medicine in Texas. Gonzalez responded with a multi-pronged legal challenge, arguing:

• the Board’s order was unsupported by substantial evidence;
• the governing statutory provision, Texas Occupations Code § 104.004, is unconstitutional as applied to him;
• § 104.004 is facially unconstitutional because it blocks truthful speech about educational credentials;
• the Board exceeded its statutory authority (an ultra vires claim) by regulating someone who is not licensed and has not practiced medicine.

The trial court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed most of that ruling but held that Gonzalez’s facial constitutional challenge could proceed. On review, the Texas Supreme Court substantially reshaped the jurisdictional landscape: it held that Gonzalez’s ultra vires claim and his as-applied constitutional claim are not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine, and must also be allowed to go forward.

At the same time, the Court affirmed dismissal of Gonzalez’s substantial-evidence challenge to the cease-and-desist order, finding no statutory basis for judicial review outside the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and reiterating that agencies cannot enlarge court jurisdiction by rule.

On the merits of the First Amendment and Texas Constitution free-speech arguments, the Court said very little—because it did not yet reach them. But its closing line is telling: If the Texas Medical Board thinks it has the power to police campaign speech, it will have to defend that position on the merits.

The opinion therefore establishes two core doctrinal points:

1. The redundant-remedies doctrine focuses on whether the remedies available elsewhere are truly coextensive, not merely whether the same claims could have been raised under another statute; and
2. An agency rule cannot independently create a right to judicial review or expand a district court’s jurisdiction; that power belongs only to the Legislature or the Constitution.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

After the TMB issued a cease-and-desist order and denied Gonzalez’s motion for rehearing by operation of law, Gonzalez waited 81 days and then filed suit in Travis County district court. He sought:

• reversal of the cease-and-desist order (via a substantial-evidence challenge);
• declarations that:
  • the Board had exceeded its statutory authority (ultra vires); and
  • § 104.004 was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied;
• injunctive and “such other and further equitable” relief.

The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction across the board. The Third Court of Appeals:

• held that the APA governed review of the cease-and-desist order;
• found Gonzalez’s APA review untimely (the 30-day deadline had long passed);
• concluded that the redundant-remedies doctrine barred most of Gonzalez’s claims under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), except his facial challenge to § 104.004;
• remanded only the facial challenge for further proceedings.

Gonzalez petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas. The TMB did not file a cross-petition, meaning it could not seek to overturn the appellate court’s decision to remand the facial challenge.

B. Holdings

1. Redundant-remedies doctrine. The Court held that Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as-applied constitutional claims are not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine, even though he could have raised similar issues in a timely APA petition. The decisive factor is that the APA could only have yielded reversal of the specific order, while Gonzalez seeks broader prospective relief.
2. Substantial-evidence claim. Gonzalez’s substantial-evidence attack on the cease-and-desist order was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He explicitly disclaimed reliance on the APA, and no independent statutory right of judicial review exists for such orders. An agency rule that once referenced judicial review could not create such a right.
3. Remand. The Court:
   • affirmed the remand of Gonzalez’s facial constitutional challenge (already ordered by the court of appeals); and
   • expanded the remand to include his as-applied constitutional claim and ultra vires claim.
   The merits of those claims—including the free-speech issues and the Board’s statutory authority—remain open.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)

Patel is the doctrinal backbone of this opinion. There, eyebrow threaders challenged cosmetology regulations as unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution. The agency argued the redundant-remedies doctrine barred a UDJA suit because the plaintiffs could have used the APA to contest citations that had been issued against them.

The Court in Patel rejected that position, drawing a critical distinction:

• APA judicial review permits, at most, reversal of specific agency orders (e.g., citations);
• the UDJA suit sought broader prospective relief, including declarations that the statute itself was unconstitutional and injunctions against future enforcement.

The Court there held:

“The available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.” Because the plaintiffs wanted “more than a reversal of the citations issued” and sought “prospective injunctive relief against future agency orders based on the statutes and regulations,” the APA did not provide a redundant remedy.

In Gonzalez, the Court explicitly extends this reasoning:

• The fact that Gonzalez could have raised his constitutional and ultra vires claims in a timely APA petition is “true but irrelevant.”
• The key question is the scope of remedies the APA could offer—here, only reversal of the cease-and-desist order, not protection against future enforcement efforts based on his campaign speech.
• Because Gonzalez seeks forward-looking declarations about statutory authority and constitutional limits, the APA remedy is not “redundant” of what he seeks under the UDJA.

The opinion also underscores the conceptual point with a memorable line: that’s why we call it the redundant-remedies doctrine, not the redundant-claims doctrine.

2. Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016)

Serafine, though a federal Fifth Circuit case, provides important constitutional background. There, the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists disciplined a candidate for political office for using the title “psychologist” in campaign speech. The Fifth Circuit held that this violated her First Amendment rights.

The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion notes:

“Indeed, as far as TMB is aware, this case marks the first time it has disciplined someone for statements made on the campaign trail. Cf. Serafine … (holding that the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists violated a candidate’s First Amendment rights by forbidding her from using the title ‘psychologist’ in her campaign).”

This citation signals that the Court is acutely aware of—and perhaps sympathetic to—the constitutional concerns raised when professional licensing authorities attempt to regulate the content of political campaign speech, especially where the speech is arguably truthful (Gonzalez does hold an M.D.).

While the Court does not resolve the First Amendment or Texas Constitution claims here, this reference suggests that, on remand, TMB will face a high bar in defending its attempt to police campaign titles under the Medical Practice Act and Healing Art Identification Act.

3. Patel Applied and Clarified: Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

The opinion cites Jones v. Turner to reinforce the remedial focus of the redundant-remedies doctrine:

Plaintiffs “could be awarded relief that would render a declaratory judgment redundant and thus improper” (emphasis added).

The emphasis on relief—not on the overlapping availability of claims—again supports the conclusion that a UDJA suit is not barred where it seeks distinct or broader relief than the APA can provide.

4. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001)

The Court notes that constitutional claims—including facial challenges—can be raised in APA-driven judicial review of agency orders:

The Court in City of Corpus Christi considered a facial constitutional challenge upon review of a contested-case proceeding.

This reference is deployed to make a fine but critical point: González could have raised facial and as-applied constitutional challenges via the APA, but that possibility does not by itself render his independent UDJA suit redundant. Again, the determinative question is what remedies the APA would have furnished, not whether the claims could have been shoehorned into APA review.

5. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich governs Texas ultra vires suits. The Court there held that such suits:

• must be brought against state officials in their official capacity, not against the agency as an entity;
• are permissible only to restrain officials from acting beyond their legal authority, not to control lawful discretion.

In Gonzalez, the Court:

notes that on remand Gonzalez may “add a claim for prospective relief and name other defendants as he thinks proper,” citing Heinrich.

This is a practical signal to litigants: if Gonzalez wants to maintain a viable ultra vires action, he will need to sue the appropriate TMB officials (e.g., board members or executive director), not just the Board itself.

6. King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017)

King Street Patriots is cited for the “usual judicial practice” of deciding as-applied challenges before reaching facial attacks:

“[T]he usual judicial practice is to determine an as-applied challenge before addressing a facial challenge.” (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1989)).

The Supreme Court notes that the court of appeals’ decision—remanding only the facial challenge while dismissing the as-applied claim—would have placed the district court in an “awkward position.”

The expanded remand, now including both types of constitutional claims, restores the conventional (and doctrinally sound) sequencing:

1. First, determine whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to this plaintiff and these facts.
2. Only if necessary, reach the broader question of whether the statute is invalid in all or most applications.

7. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000)

Continental Casualty supplies the critical rule on judicial review of administrative decisions:

“There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order … violates a constitutional right.”

And, importantly:

“[A]n agency’s rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature’s own enactments.”

In Gonzalez, these principles are applied to dispose of his substantial-evidence claim:

• Gonzalez expressly disclaimed reliance on the APA as a basis for review.
• Instead, he pointed to a now-repealed TMB rule that had mentioned judicial review in the district court, and argued that this created a review right with no deadline.
• The Court held that a rule cannot create judicial-review jurisdiction where no statute does, and Gonzalez did not assert a freestanding constitutional right to review.

Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the substantial-evidence claim.

8. Other Authorities

• Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963) – noted, but not applied, for the concept that in some circumstances there may be an “inherent constitutional right to judicial review.” Gonzalez did not invoke such a right.
• Starr v. Ferguson, 166 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1942) – cited for the rule that a general prayer for “such other and further relief” can sometimes support relief not specifically pleaded, though the Court declines to decide whether Gonzalez’s petition already adequately sought prospective injunctive relief.
• Vazquez v. Health & Human Services Commission and Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc. v. West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice – Third Court of Appeals cases addressing the meaning of “contested case” when an agency holds a discretionary hearing. The Supreme Court flags but does not resolve a potential disagreement with that approach.
• Robert W. Hamilton & J.J. Jewett III, The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1976) – cited for the proposition that “contested case” likely refers to hearings mandated by statute, not simply discretionary hearings an agency chooses to hold. The Court, however, expressly does not decide the issue in this case.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Reframing the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The decision’s central doctrinal move is to emphasize remedy over claim.

The court of appeals had reasoned that:

• Gonzalez could have raised his constitutional and ultra vires arguments in a timely APA petition challenging the cease-and-desist order;
• therefore, his UDJA-based ultra vires and as-applied claims were “redundant” of APA remedies and barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine;
• only his facial constitutional challenge went “beyond” reversal of the order and thus survived.

The Supreme Court rejects this analysis as both too narrow in how it reads the petition and too broad in how it applies redundancy.

a. Reading the petition fairly

The Court calls the appellate court’s reading of the petition “unfairly cramped.” While the petition repeatedly mentions the cease-and-desist order, it also:

• asserts that TMB lacks statutory authority to regulate non-licensees who have not practiced or attempted to practice medicine (ultra vires claim); and
• argues that enforcing § 104.004 against Gonzalez’s campaign speech would be unconstitutional as applied to him.

The Court reads the “plain thrust” of these claims as an effort to restrain future enforcement as well as to overturn the existing order:

“A declaration that the statutes do not apply to Gonzalez would protect him from future sanctions, not just from the cease-and-desist order. The same is true of a declaration that it would violate Gonzalez’s constitutional rights for TMB to punish him for calling himself a doctor or physician.”

In other words, the petition is not merely retrospective (undoing what happened), but also prospective (preventing similar actions going forward).

b. Distinguishing “redundant remedies” from “redundant claims”

Drawing directly from Patel, the Court explains that the correct question under the redundant-remedies doctrine is:

whether “the APA would’ve afforded him the same remedy”—not whether the same claims could have been raised.

This leads to a two-step analysis:

1. What can the APA provide? At most, reversal of “the particular orders at issue.” It cannot, as a general matter, yield broad prospective declarations cutting off future enforcement against other conduct or future speech.
2. What does the UDJA suit seek? Here, more than merely vacating the cease-and-desist order. Gonzalez seeks declarations that TMB has no statutory authority to regulate him in this context and that such enforcement would violate his constitutional rights going forward.

Because the APA’s remedial scope is narrower, the UDJA action is not redundant, and the doctrine does not bar it.

2. Substantial-Evidence Review and the Limits of Agency Power

In contrast, the Court affirms dismissal of Gonzalez’s substantial-evidence challenge.

The court of appeals engaged in a detailed analysis of whether the cease-and-desist proceeding was a “contested case” under the APA and concluded that it was, rendering the APA and its 30-day deadline applicable.

The Supreme Court takes a “more direct path”:

• Gonzalez disclaims any reliance on the APA as the basis for judicial review.
• Instead, he invokes a former TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) (2017), since repealed) that referred to filing a petition for review in district court without specifying a deadline.

The Court holds this is insufficient to create jurisdiction. Relying on Continental Casualty, it reiterates:

“There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order … violates a constitutional right.”

And:

“An agency’s rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature’s own enactments.”

Since Gonzalez did not invoke the APA, did not identify any statutory basis for judicial review of a cease-and-desist order, and did not argue a standalone constitutional right to judicial review, the courts simply lack jurisdiction to conduct substantial-evidence review of the order.

Whether the proceeding was a “contested case” under the APA thus becomes unnecessary to decide, and the Court explicitly sidesteps that question.

3. Cross-Petitions and the Scope of Remand

The Court notes that TMB did not file a cross-petition for review. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.1:

“A party who seeks to alter the court of appeals’ judgment must file a petition for review.”

This matters because the court of appeals’ remand of the facial constitutional challenge was thus beyond the Supreme Court’s power to disturb (absent a cross-petition). However, the Court is free to expand that remand by restoring additional claims, and it chooses to do so for the as-applied and ultra vires claims.

The Court also notes that, on remand, Gonzalez may amend his petition and name appropriate defendants in line with ultra vires doctrine (Heinrich), an acknowledgment that the pleadings can be conformed to the jurisdictional and remedial framework clarified by this opinion.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Administrative Law and the UDJA

This opinion consolidates and slightly sharpens the trajectory begun in Patel:

• Litigants are not necessarily barred from UDJA suits simply because they could have pursued APA review of an adverse agency order.
• The central inquiry is whether the APA and the UDJA suit would yield the same relief. If the UDJA action seeks prospective declarations and injunctive relief that would restrain future enforcement efforts, and the APA cannot provide that breadth of remedy, then the UDJA action is not “redundant.”
• Missing the APA’s 30-day deadline may foreclose review of the specific order, but does not necessarily foreclose a broader constitutional or ultra vires suit about the statutory authority or the statute’s constitutionality.

This will likely:

• Encourage litigants to frame challenges broadly, emphasizing prospective relief (especially when alleging constitutional violations or ultra vires action);
• Limit agencies’ ability to invoke the redundant-remedies doctrine to dismiss UDJA suits simply because APA review could have addressed the same legal questions, albeit in a narrower remedial posture;
• Generate more ultra vires and constitutional litigation targeting agencies’ statutory authority and enforcement practices, not just their orders in particular cases.

2. Agency Rulemaking and Judicial Review

On the flip side, the opinion is a strong reminder of the limits of agency power:

• Agencies may adopt procedural rules, hold hearings, and structure internal processes, but they cannot grant or expand judicial-review jurisdiction by rule. Only the Legislature (or, in rare cases, the Constitution) can create a right to judicial review.
• Regulated parties cannot rely on agency rules alone to circumvent statutory deadlines or to claim open-ended review rights.

For practitioners, this has two concrete implications:

1. When seeking judicial review of an agency order, always identify the statutory basis for review and ensure compliance with any statutory deadlines.
2. If the agency offers a hearing or references judicial review in its rules, that does not, by itself, create a new right of review or alter jurisdictional limits.

3. Professional Regulation and Political Speech

While the Court does not yet decide the constitutional question, its framing is notable. It emphasizes:

• The novelty of TMB’s action: as far as the Board knows, this is its first discipline of a candidate for statements made on the campaign trail.
• The parallel with Serafine, where a federal court protected a candidate’s use of professional title in political speech against Texas board enforcement.
• The closing admonition that if TMB believes it can police campaign speech, it must justify that power on the merits.

This suggests that, on remand, the district court—and ultimately perhaps the Texas Supreme Court again—will grapple with:

• The line between regulating the practice of a profession and regulating the use of professional titles in campaign speech;
• Whether—and to what extent—truthful references to one’s educational credentials (e.g., holding an M.D.) can be restricted when used outside the clinical context;
• The interplay between the First Amendment, Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution, and statutes like § 104.004 that purport to control how “healing arts” titles may be used.

For licensing boards generally, this case is a warning:

• Efforts to extend regulatory reach into pure political speech—especially speech that is facially truthful—will face intense constitutional scrutiny.
• Even if an order survives on substantial-evidence grounds (or goes unchallenged under the APA), agencies may still be vulnerable to broader constitutional and ultra vires attacks on their enforcement authority.

4. Litigation Strategy and Pleading Practice

The opinion also contains a number of practical lessons:

• Plead prospective relief clearly. Although the Court hints that Gonzalez’s existing prayer for “such other and further equitable relief” might be sufficient under Starr, it expressly leaves that question open. It also stresses that on remand Gonzalez may amend his petition to clarify claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and to name the correct officials.
• File a cross-petition to protect favorable judgments. Because TMB did not file one, it could not ask the Supreme Court to undo the court of appeals’ decision to remand the facial constitutional claim. Agencies and other appellees must seek review of adverse rulings via cross-petition if they want them reconsidered.
• Sequence constitutional challenges wisely. As King Street Patriots and now this opinion reinforce, courts are likely to expect litigants to develop as-applied theories first before pressing sweeping facial attacks.

IV. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

1. Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The redundant-remedies doctrine is a judicial policy limiting the use of the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). In essence:

You cannot use a declaratory-judgment action as an “extra” or “second” remedy when another statute already provides an equally effective remedy for the same problem.

After this opinion, the doctrine is best understood as:

• focusing on whether the relief (the remedy) sought in the UDJA action duplicates what is available under another statutory procedure (like the APA);
• not automatically barring UDJA suits just because the same legal arguments or claims could have been raised in that other procedure.

2. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

• A facial challenge asserts that a statute is unconstitutional in all or almost all of its applications. Success usually requires showing that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute is valid, or (in some First Amendment contexts) that a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep.
• An as-applied challenge argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s particular facts, without necessarily invalidating the statute in all circumstances.

Courts generally prefer to decide as-applied challenges first, as they are narrower and less disruptive of legislative enactments. That is why the Supreme Court found it problematic that the court of appeals allowed only the facial challenge to go forward.

3. Ultra Vires Claims

An ultra vires claim in Texas is a suit alleging that a government official has acted outside (or beyond) the scope of legal authority granted by statute or constitution.

• Such suits must be brought against the official in his or her official capacity, not the agency as an entity.
• The remedy is typically prospective—stopping the official from acting unlawfully in the future, not undoing past discretionary decisions that were within legal authority.

In this case, Gonzalez’s ultra vires theory is essentially that TMB officials lack statutory authority to regulate a non-licensed person’s campaign speech about his education and credentials where no practice of medicine is involved.

4. The Texas APA, “Contested Cases,” and Substantial-Evidence Review

• The Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a framework for judicial review of certain agency decisions arising from “contested cases”—that is, cases in which a statute requires an agency to determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party after a hearing.
• “Substantial-evidence review” is a deferential standard under which a court asks whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the agency’s findings; it does not substitute its judgment for the agency on matters of fact.
• Judicial review under the APA generally must be initiated within 30 days of the agency’s final order.

In Gonzalez, whether the cease-and-desist hearing was a “contested case” was debated, but became irrelevant because Gonzalez chose not to rely on the APA at all. Without a statutory anchor outside the APA, and with no inherent constitutional right to review argued, his substantial-evidence claim could not proceed.

5. Agency Rules vs. Statutes on Judicial Review

A recurring theme in Texas administrative law is:

Rules cannot do what statutes do not authorize.

Even if an agency rule contemplates judicial review or sets out a procedure suggesting that review may be available, that does not create jurisdiction. A rule is subordinate to the statute. Courts will look first to what the Legislature has provided.

V. Conclusion: Significance of the Decision

Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board is, on its face, a procedural decision about jurisdiction and the scope of declaratory relief. But its broader significance is substantial.

First, it firmly clarifies that the redundant-remedies doctrine is about remedies, not merely claims. Even when a party could have brought constitutional or ultra vires arguments in a timely APA proceeding, a UDJA suit is not barred if it seeks broader, forward-looking relief that the APA cannot match. This keeps pathways open for litigants to challenge the legality and constitutionality of agency enforcement regimes, even when review of a particular order is time-barred.

Second, the opinion reinforces the foundational rule that only statutes (or the Constitution) can confer a right to judicial review. Agencies cannot enlarge judicial power by rule. This preserves the Legislature’s primacy in defining the scope of review and demands careful statutory grounding for any challenge to an agency order.

Third, while deferring the merits, the Court nonetheless frames the TMB’s action as an unprecedented attempt to extend medical-licensing regulation into the realm of political campaign speech—a realm protected by the highest levels of constitutional scrutiny. By invoking Serafine and emphasizing that TMB must now defend its authority to police such speech “on the merits,” the Court foreshadows a searching review of professional-title restrictions when used in political contexts.

Finally, the case offers practical guidance:

• Plead UDJA claims to emphasize prospective relief and clarify ultra vires theories.
• Observe statutory deadlines for APA review, but recognize that failure to do so does not necessarily foreclose broader constitutional or ultra vires litigation.
• Name the correct state officials as defendants in ultra vires actions.
• File cross-petitions when seeking to preserve favorable aspects of lower-court judgments.

As the case returns to the district court, the central unresolved questions—about the scope of TMB’s statutory authority, and the constitutionality of restricting truthful professional titles in campaign speech—remain to be answered. But whatever the eventual outcome on the merits, this opinion will stand as a significant precedent in Texas administrative and constitutional law, shaping how litigants challenge agency actions and how agencies understand the limits of their power.