§ 3582(c)(2) Amendment 821 Reductions: Prior § 3553(a) Variances Cannot Expand the § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) Substantial-Assistance Exception

Introduction

In United States v. Wayne Duke (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Wayne Duke’s motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The central dispute was not whether Amendment 821 reduced Duke’s offense level, but whether the district court could use the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) “substantial assistance” exception to reduce Duke’s sentence below the amended guideline range by also replicating a downward variance the court had granted at the original sentencing.

Duke had received (1) a government-sponsored § 5K1.1 departure for substantial assistance and (2) a further § 3553(a) downward variance. When Amendment 821 later reduced his offense level, the recalculated amended range—after accounting for the prior substantial-assistance departure—bottomed out at the same 78-month sentence Duke was already serving. Duke argued the court still had authority to go lower by also incorporating the original variance.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly concluded it lacked authority to further reduce Duke’s sentence. Under § 3582(c)(2) and the binding policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, a court generally may not reduce a sentence below the bottom of the amended guideline range. The only relevant exception—§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)—permits a below-range reduction only to reflect a prior government substantial-assistance departure, not a discretionary variance. Because Duke’s sentence (78 months) already matched the minimum of the amended range after incorporating only the § 5K1.1 component, he was ineligible for a further reduction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2013)
Role in Duke: Provided the standard of review: the Eleventh Circuit reviews de novo whether a district court has legal authority under § 3582(c)(2). This framed Duke’s appeal as a legal-scope question, not a discretionary sentencing question.
United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778 (11th Cir. 2000)
Role in Duke: Supplied the governing methodology for § 3582(c)(2): the court considers only the effect of the retroactive amendment, while leaving all other original sentencing determinations unchanged. This principle undercut Duke’s attempt to reopen or reapply the original variance in the modification proceeding.
United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023)
Role in Duke: Addressed when courts may defer to guideline commentary, explaining that deference is inappropriate where the guideline text is unambiguous. Duke used this as background for the panel’s brief discussion of commentary reliance.
United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023)
Role in Duke: Reinforced that the Eleventh Circuit has relied on commentary where its validity is not contested. In Duke, both sides relied on the § 1B1.10 commentary defining “applicable guideline range,” so the panel accepted and applied it.
United States v. Marroquin-Medina, 817 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2016)
Role in Duke: The key controlling precedent. Marroquin-Medina held that in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, a court may calculate a “comparable” reduction using any reasonable method used for the original § 5K1.1 departure, but—critically—any below-range reduction under § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) may reflect only a prior substantial-assistance departure, not a downward variance. Duke relied on the exception; the panel used Marroquin-Medina to reject expanding that exception to include variances.
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) and Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)
Role in Duke: These cases provided the rule-of-lenity framework. Duke argued lenity should favor a broader reading of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). The panel applied Muscarello’s “grievous ambiguity” threshold and concluded Duke identified no such uncertainty; therefore, lenity did not apply.

Legal Reasoning

Eligibility turns on § 3582(c)(2) plus § 1B1.10’s limits.
The panel treated § 1B1.10 as the controlling policy statement for whether, and how far, a sentence may be reduced. It reiterated the two-step eligibility structure: (a) an amendment listed in § 1B1.10(d) must apply; and (b) the amendment must actually lower the guideline range used for § 3582(c)(2) purposes.
The “applicable guideline range” is the pre-departure, pre-variance range.
Relying on the commentary to § 1B1.10, the court emphasized that the “applicable guideline range” is calculated before any departures or variances. That definition matters because it prevents a defendant from treating a discretionary variance as part of the guideline baseline for § 3582(c)(2).
The below-range exception is narrow and assistance-only.
The general rule, § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), bars reductions below the amended range’s floor. The only exception invoked—§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)—allows below-floor reductions only where the original sentence was below the guideline range due to a government substantial-assistance motion. Under United States v. Marroquin-Medina, the court may make a “comparable” assistance-based reduction, but may not also replicate a separate § 3553(a) variance in the § 3582 proceeding.
Application to Duke’s numbers produced no remaining reducible margin.
Duke’s original calculation: offense level 31, CHC I → 108–135 months. The court then granted a one-level § 5K1.1 departure (97–121) and finally varied downward two levels under § 3553(a), imposing 78 months. After Amendment 821 and incorporating only the substantial-assistance component, the amended range became 78–97 months. Because Duke already had the minimum sentence available under the amended range (as adjusted only for substantial assistance), § 1B1.10 left the district court with no authority to go lower.
Lenity was unavailable.
The panel rejected Duke’s lenity argument because the text and structure of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), reinforced by Eleventh Circuit precedent, did not present the “grievous ambiguity” required by Muscarello v. United States.

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision consolidates an important operational rule for § 3582(c)(2) motions in the Eleventh Circuit: when a defendant’s original sentence reflects both a § 5K1.1 departure and a separate § 3553(a) variance, only the § 5K1.1 component can be “ported over” through § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) in a later retroactive-amendment proceeding. Practically:

Defendants at (or already below) the amended floor after accounting for substantial assistance will be ineligible for further reductions, even if they previously received a variance at original sentencing.
District courts remain constrained to a mechanical recalculation tethered to the amendment and the substantial-assistance exception; they cannot “re-balance” § 3553(a) anew via § 3582(c)(2).
Cooperation benefits are preserved, but not expanded. The panel framed the regime as still rewarding cooperation because the assistance-based discount can remain comparably reflected, but it cannot be combined with additional variance-driven discounts to push below what § 1B1.10 permits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): A limited mechanism allowing a court to reduce an already-imposed federal sentence if the Sentencing Commission later lowers the applicable guideline range and makes that change retroactive—subject to strict policy-statement limits.
“Applicable guideline range”: For § 3582(c)(2), it means the guideline range determined before any departures (like § 5K1.1) or variances (like § 3553(a) adjustments). This prevents § 3582(c)(2) from becoming a full resentencing.
Departure vs. Variance: A departure is an adjustment authorized by the Guidelines themselves (e.g., § 5K1.1 for substantial assistance). A variance is an adjustment based on statutory sentencing factors in § 3553(a), outside the guideline system’s departure provisions. Duke holds that only the former (when government-sponsored for assistance) fits § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) “substantial assistance” exception: A narrow permission slip: if the original sentence went below the guideline range because the government filed a substantial-assistance motion, the court may reduce the sentence below the amended range in a “comparable” way—but only to reflect that assistance-based reduction.
Rule of lenity: A tie-breaker favoring defendants only when a criminal law is grievously ambiguous. The panel found no such ambiguity in the relevant guideline policy statement.

Conclusion

United States v. Wayne Duke reaffirms a strict boundary in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings: retroactive guideline amendments (including Amendment 821) do not permit courts to reapply prior § 3553(a) variances to go below the amended guideline floor. The only pathway below the amended range is the narrowly defined § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) exception for government substantial-assistance departures, and even that exception cannot be leveraged to compound other, variance-based reductions. In effect, § 3582(c)(2) remains a limited recalculation mechanism—not a second chance at the original variance.