§ 1983 Malicious Prosecution Probable Cause Turns on Preliminary-Exam Proof; Fabricated Jailhouse-Informant Evidence Defeats Qualified Immunity

1. Introduction

In Lacino Hamilton v. James Fleming, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to two Detroit Police Department homicide officers—Detective James Fleming and Homicide Lieutenant William Rice—accused of orchestrating and leveraging a “ninth-floor” jailhouse-informant scheme to procure false testimony that helped secure Hamilton’s murder conviction.

Hamilton served twenty-six years for the murder of his foster mother, Willa Bias. The conviction was later vacated after the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Conviction Integrity Unit concluded Hamilton had been unfairly convicted, principally due to unrevealed inducements and credibility problems surrounding jailhouse informant Oliver Cowan—the prosecution’s sole preliminary-exam witness linking Hamilton to the crime.

The appeal arose at the summary-judgment stage, where the district court denied Fleming and Rice qualified immunity on claims including: (i) suppression of exculpatory/impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland, (ii) fabrication of evidence, (iii) malicious prosecution, and (iv) civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion is most notable for its treatment of probable cause in the malicious-prosecution context when the bindover decision rests entirely on allegedly fabricated testimony.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

• No appellate jurisdiction to consider a Heck bar in this interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, relying on Chaney-Snell v. Young (which overruled the approach suggested by Lucier v. City of Ecorse).
• No collateral estoppel from Hamilton’s vacated conviction; under Peterson v. Heymes, vacated rulings have no preclusive effect under Michigan law.
• Brady claim survives qualified immunity: police officers had a clearly established duty (well before 1994) to disclose material exculpatory/impeachment evidence, including evidence of coerced or fabricated witness statements and inducements. Partial disclosure (“crumbs”) did not eliminate the duty to disclose the full scope of police-induced fabrication and benefits.
• Fabrication-of-evidence claim survives qualified immunity against both Fleming (direct conduct) and Rice (circumstantial evidence and use/embellishment of the statement), with analogies to Jackson v. City of Cleveland.
• Malicious-prosecution claim survives qualified immunity: for Michigan prosecutions, the relevant probable-cause determination for § 1983 malicious prosecution focuses on the evidence actually presented at the preliminary examination; where the prosecutor’s bindover rests solely on allegedly fabricated testimony, probable cause is lacking if fabrication is proved.
• Civil conspiracy claim survives because the record could support a concerted plan to trade favors for false statements and to use those statements to deprive defendants of constitutional rights.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standards and scope on interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal

• Sagan v. United States: invoked for the summary-judgment posture—facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
• Clark v. Abdallah and Heeter v. Bowers: reiterate de novo review and the two-part qualified-immunity framework (constitutional violation and clearly established law).
• Tolan v. Cotton, Hope v. Pelzer, and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd: articulate the “clearly established” inquiry (fair notice; beyond debate), without requiring a case directly on point.
• Johnson v. Jones and Johnson v. Russell: define appellate limits—courts generally cannot reweigh purely fact-bound sufficiency disputes on interlocutory appeal, but may assess whether the (assumed) facts amount to a violation of clearly established law.
• Hopper v. Plummer and Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep't of Corrs.: require defendant-by-defendant qualified-immunity analysis tied to each official’s own conduct.

B. Heck, pendent appellate jurisdiction, and preclusion

• Heck v. Humphrey: defendants argued the claims were barred; the panel declined to reach the argument for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction.
• Lucier v. City of Ecorse and Chaney-Snell v. Young: Chaney-Snell controls; the Sixth Circuit “lack[s] pendent appellate jurisdiction over Heck claims in qualified-immunity appeals.” This channels litigants to raise Heck through ordinary appellate routes, not piggybacked on qualified immunity.
• Peterson v. Heymes: vacatur removes preclusive effect under Michigan law; the court used this to reject collateral estoppel based on the vacated conviction.

C. Brady disclosure obligations for police

• Brady v. Maryland: establishes the constitutional duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence.
• Giglio v. United States: impeachment evidence qualifies as “favorable” Brady material; inducements, coercion, and fabricated statements are classic Giglio impeachment.
• Jackson v. City of Cleveland and Moldowan v. City of Warren: used to show it was clearly established (by 1994) that police have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence, including fabrication/coercion of statements.
• United States v. Warshak: cumulative undisclosed evidence does not establish Brady prejudice.
• Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility (quoted via Clark v. Abdallah): rejects “cookie from a trail of crumbs”—partial hints do not excuse nondisclosure of the materially exculpatory whole.

D. Fabrication of evidence

• Mills v. Barnard: provides the Sixth Circuit fabrication-of-evidence standard—knowing fabrication plus reasonable likelihood the false evidence could affect the jury’s judgment.
• Jackson v. City of Cleveland: supports inferring participation/knowledge in fabrication from circumstantial evidence (e.g., officers’ coordinated movements and the timing of fabricated statements).

E. Malicious prosecution and probable cause in Michigan bindover practice

• Gerics v. Trevino: clarifies that, taking the plaintiff’s facts as true, probable cause is a question of law for the court (not a jury) at summary judgment.
• Tanner v. Walters and Jones v. City of Elyria: officers can be liable even if they do not prosecute, when they supply falsehoods knowing prosecutorial reliance is likely and reliance occurs.
• France v. Lucas: supplies the four-element malicious-prosecution framework (influence/participation; no probable cause; post-arrest liberty deprivation; favorable termination).
• Sykes v. Anderson and Peet v. City of Detroit: crucial to the panel’s approach—distinguishing arrest probable cause from prosecution probable cause, and focusing on the evidence actually used in the bindover/probable-cause determination (here, the preliminary exam).
• Kaley v. United States: cited for the general “not a high bar” conception of probable cause, which the court then contrasts with the rule that fabricated evidence cannot supply probable cause.
• Mays v. City of Dayton and United States v. McPhearson: warrant-application analogy—probable cause is assessed based on what was presented, not on what could have been presented (with narrow exceptions, like intentional omission of exculpatory evidence).
• Clark v. Abdallah: “probable cause…is not supported by fabricated evidence,” anchoring the conclusion that a bindover based solely on fabricated testimony is legally deficient.

F. Appellate forfeiture and briefing obligations

• United States v. Shultz: addresses forfeiture of forfeiture arguments (if a party fails to raise forfeiture, the forfeiture point may be forfeited).
• Howard v. Collins and Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't: perfunctory treatment on appeal is insufficient; developed argument is required. This underpins the court’s conclusion that defendants forfeited a meaningful challenge to “favorable termination” where they devoted only two sentences without analysis.
• Mills v. Cvitkovich: referenced on whether defendants preserved “clearly established” arguments, though the panel sidestepped the issue because the law was clearly established anyway.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. No Heck review on this interlocutory appeal

The defendants sought to bar Hamilton’s suit under Heck v. Humphrey. The Sixth Circuit refused to reach the issue because, under Chaney-Snell v. Young, it lacks pendent appellate jurisdiction to decide Heck questions in a qualified-immunity interlocutory appeal. This is a structural holding about appellate power: qualified immunity opens a limited interlocutory path; it does not pull unrelated defenses along for review.

B. Vacatur defeats collateral estoppel

The defendants’ alternative “issue preclusion” theory failed because the conviction was vacated. Under Peterson v. Heymes, vacated rulings have no preclusive effect in Michigan. The court treated vacatur as wiping the slate clean for preclusion purposes, removing any argument that Hamilton was bound by facts implied by the former conviction.

C. Brady claim: “crumbs” are not compliance

On the “clearly established” prong, the panel relied on Sixth Circuit authority recognizing that police have long had a Fourteenth Amendment duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence, including evidence that a witness statement was coerced or fabricated. The court located that clarity well before 1994 (the conduct at issue).

On the merits, the defendants argued the undisclosed information was merely cumulative because the defense already suspected Cowan received “perks.” The panel rejected that framing: suspicion or insinuation does not equal disclosure of the “true nature” of a police-informant relationship, especially where the alleged suppression includes (i) that testimony was false as part of a scheme, (ii) that officers knowingly induced the falsehood, and (iii) the full scope of inducements and leverage. The opinion’s key move is distinguishing vague awareness of a deal from concrete proof of police-orchestrated fabrication—evidence that could transform cross-examination from speculative to devastating.

On prejudice, the court stressed that where the prosecution’s case “hinges on the testimony of one witness,” withholding impeachment evidence can readily satisfy materiality. Because Cowan’s preliminary exam testimony was the sole link at bindover and was read into the trial record after Cowan died, the credibility stakes were unusually high.

D. Fabrication-of-evidence: direct and circumstantial routes to knowledge

For Fleming, the court emphasized evidence of direct orchestration: removing Hamilton to an interrogation room; returning to the ninth floor; asking an informant if he was “ready to earn his keep”; soliciting who “wanted” the case; providing a pre-written statement to sign and memorize for the preliminary examination. These facts, if believed, support knowing fabrication.

For Rice, the panel accepted that his involvement could be proved circumstantially: he was deeply knowledgeable about investigations, allegedly integral to the informant-favor system, present shortly before Fleming obtained the statement, and then used an embellished version of the statement (adding drug-money motive not found in the original) to secure charges without corroboration. Drawing on Jackson v. City of Cleveland, the court treated coordinated timing and subsequent use/ratification of a suspect statement as enough for a reasonable jury to infer knowing participation.

E. Malicious prosecution: prosecution probable cause is evaluated at the preliminary exam

A subtle but significant aspect of the opinion is methodological: the district court framed probable cause as a jury question. The Sixth Circuit corrected that—under Gerics v. Trevino, with disputed facts resolved in plaintiff’s favor, probable cause is a legal question for the court.

Applying that approach, the court separated (i) probable cause to arrest from (ii) probable cause to prosecute. Even if police had other evidence in the file (including alleged circumstantial evidence and a friend’s statement), the court focused on what actually supported the formal Michigan bindover decision: the evidence presented at the preliminary exam. Citing Sykes v. Anderson and Peet v. City of Detroit, the court treated the preliminary exam as the decisive probable-cause event for prosecution.

Because the prosecutor presented only Cowan’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, and because fabricated evidence cannot establish probable cause (citing Clark v. Abdallah), the existence of probable cause rose or fell with whether Cowan’s testimony was fabricated. That, in turn, depended on the same disputed facts that supported the fabrication claim—precluding qualified immunity at summary judgment.

F. Civil conspiracy: a coordinated plan inferred from the “ninth-floor” pattern

The conspiracy analysis was straightforward: the court held the evidence could support an inference of a concerted plan to exchange favors for false statements and deploy those statements to deprive criminal defendants of constitutional rights, with steps taken in furtherance and Hamilton allegedly harmed as a target of that plan.

3.3 Impact

• Reinforced liability exposure for “informant pipelines”: The opinion underscores that when police cultivate informants with benefits and then conceal the full nature of the inducements—especially where statements are pre-scripted—Brady and fabrication claims can survive qualified immunity even decades later when convictions are vacated.
• Practical rule for malicious-prosecution proof in Michigan cases: By centering the prosecution probable-cause inquiry on the preliminary exam record (bindover evidence), the decision signals to litigants that the “file” may matter less than what the state actually used to clear the probable-cause threshold for trial. Where bindover rests on a single witness, impeachment/fabrication evidence becomes dispositive.
• Supervisory and ratification liability via circumstantial evidence: The court’s willingness to infer a supervisor’s knowing participation from timing, scheme knowledge, and use/embellishment of a statement is important for cases involving layered police hierarchies where direct “smoking gun” proof is rare.
• Appellate-strategy consequences: Defendants cannot use qualified-immunity interlocutory appeals to secure review of Heck defenses in the Sixth Circuit (per Chaney-Snell v. Young), and perfunctory briefing (e.g., on favorable termination) risks forfeiture.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding officials from civil damages unless (1) they violated a federal right and (2) the right was “clearly established” at the time—meaning a reasonable official would have understood the conduct was unlawful.
• Brady / Giglio material: Evidence favorable to the defense that the government must disclose. Brady v. Maryland covers exculpatory evidence; Giglio v. United States confirms impeachment evidence (like benefits given to a witness) also must be disclosed.
• Fabrication of evidence: Knowingly creating or manufacturing false evidence (e.g., scripting a confession and having an informant adopt it). If the false evidence could reasonably affect the outcome, it supports a constitutional claim.
• Malicious prosecution (under § 1983): A claim that officials caused a prosecution without probable cause, leading to liberty deprivation, and the proceeding ended favorably for the accused. It is distinct from false arrest: it targets the prosecution decision and ensuing detention/constraints.
• Preliminary examination / bindover (Michigan): A hearing where the prosecutor must show probable cause to “bind over” the defendant for trial. The Sixth Circuit treated the evidence actually presented there as the key probable-cause basis for the prosecution.
• Heck bar: A rule preventing § 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction. Here, the court did not decide Heck because it lacked jurisdiction to do so in this interlocutory posture.
• Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): A doctrine preventing relitigation of issues already decided. The court held vacated convictions and rulings carry no preclusive effect under Michigan law.
• Absolute prosecutorial immunity: Prosecutors are generally immune from damages for advocacy functions (e.g., initiating and presenting the state’s case). The trial prosecutor (Ruth Carter) received summary judgment on this basis; the appeal focused on police defendants.

5. Conclusion

Lacino Hamilton v. James Fleming affirms that police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity where a reasonable jury could find they orchestrated and concealed a jailhouse-informant fabrication scheme, suppressed consequential impeachment evidence, and thereby influenced a prosecution that—at the formal probable-cause stage—rested solely on the allegedly fabricated testimony.

The opinion’s most practically important clarification is its prosecution-focused probable-cause lens: when assessing § 1983 malicious prosecution in a Michigan case, courts may look to the evidence actually used at the preliminary examination to bind a defendant over for trial. If that evidence is fabricated, probable cause fails—opening a direct path to liability for officers who manufacture or knowingly deploy false testimony.