“Sun Clarification”: Judicial Latitude in Expanding Self-Defence Directions to Juries

1. Introduction

Case: R v Sun ([2025] EWCA Crim 422)
Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Judgment date: 6 March 2025
Panel: Goose J (giving the judgment of the Court)

The Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether additional, explanatory remarks by a trial judge—specifically references to the possibility of calling police in an unfolding confrontation—rendered directions on self-defence unsafe and thereby vitiated Pengqi Sun’s convictions for murder, wounding with intent, and possession of bladed articles. The applicant contended that the jury might have been misled into thinking that self-defence is unavailable whenever an accused could instead have sought police assistance.

The appeal thus raised a discrete but important issue: how far may a trial judge elaborate on orthodox legal directions without risking confusion or misdirection? The Court seized the opportunity to clarify that so long as the core elements are accurately set out, supplementary contextual guidance—even if stylistically imperfect or based on higher-court dicta—will not necessarily amount to misdirection.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The single judge had refused leave to appeal; the applicant renewed the application.
• Central complaint: paragraph 11(xiii) of the written jury directions, adapted from R v Jones & Ors [2006] UKHL 16 (Lord Hoffmann), allegedly “over-complicated” self-defence by implying a citizen must first summon police.
• The Court held that the judge’s primary directions (paragraph 11(b) & (iii)) correctly stated the law on self-defence:
  • Honest belief in necessity of force, and
  • Objective reasonableness of that force.
• While the quotation from Jones “might not… have been necessary,” it did not confuse the jury or misstate the law.
• Accordingly, the applicant’s convictions were held safe; leave to appeal against conviction was refused.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• R v Jones & Ors [2006] UKHL 16
  Lord Hoffmann’s remarks on citizens’ resort to force in the context of preventing state action (Iraq war protests) were borrowed. The Court explained that although the factual matrix differed markedly from an ordinary street fight, the passage merely illustrated that self-help is circumscribed when lawful authorities are readily available.
• Core self-defence authorities (not explicitly named in the judgment but forming the legal backdrop):
  • Palmer v R [1971] AC 814 – foundational test: necessary and reasonable force judged in the heat of the moment.
  • R v Owino (1995) 2 Cr App R 128 – dual inquiry: defendant’s honest belief in necessity + objective reasonableness.
  • R v Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377 – retreat and pre-arming do not automatically negate self-defence but are highly probative.
  Goose J’s judgment is consistent with these strands, emphasising honest belief, imminence, and proportionality.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeded in four logical stages:

1. Identify the orthodox rule: The judge set out the two-limbed test (honest belief + reasonable force) and properly located the burden of disproving self-defence on the prosecution.
2. Scrutinise the contested passage: Paragraph 11(xiii) added colour by referencing the role of police. The Court acknowledged that full quotation from Jones was “perhaps unnecessary” and could have been paraphrased.
3. Apply the test for misdirection: Would the jury, reading the directions as a whole, likely be misled? The Court held “No”—the critical questions remained clear in the Route to Verdicts.
4. Synthesise with facts: The 14-minute hiatus, change of clothing, and re-arming pointed compellingly away from imminent danger, further reducing any realistic prospect that the contested wording swayed the verdict.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• For Trial Judges: Gives reassurance that tailored comments addressing evidential nuances (e.g., why defendant failed to call police) are permissible. However, caution is urged—quotations should be contextualised and shorn of extraneous doctrinal references.
• For Appellate Advocates: Raises the bar for appeals grounded solely on stylistic or peripheral defects in directions. Counsel must show material confusion or misstatement, not mere inelegance.
• For Criminal Law: Aligns with the move toward flexible, jury-friendly directions (see the Judicial College Crown Court Compendium) while resisting arguments that every surplus sentence is potentially fatal.
• Possible Ripple Effects: In looming cases involving pre-arming, “home invasions,” or vigilantism, prosecutors may invoke Sun to argue that judges can remind juries about lawful alternatives (e.g., calling police), without jeopardising verdicts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Self-defence / Defence of Another
  Two-stage test:
  1. Necessity – Did the defendant honestly (even if mistakenly) believe force was necessary against an imminent or ongoing threat?
  2. Reasonableness/Proportionality – Was the amount of force used objectively reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be?
• Misdirection
  An error in the judge’s legal directions making the conviction unsafe. The appellate court assesses directions as a whole; trivial or collateral mistakes rarely suffice.
• Route to Verdict
  A written “question trail” supplied to jurors, steering them step-by-step through legal elements—now standard practice to promote clarity and mitigate misdirection claims.
• Section 4(2) Contempt of Court Act 1981 Order
  A statutory power enabling courts to postpone publication of a judgment where immediate reporting poses a substantial risk of prejudice to connected proceedings (e.g., a retrial).

5. Conclusion

R v Sun reinforces that appellate scrutiny of jury directions focuses on substance, not stylistic perfection. Provided the essentials of self-defence are correctly put and the burden rests firmly on the prosecution, judicial “colour commentary” aimed at connecting legal principles to the evidential narrative will not, without more, render a conviction unsafe.

Practitioners should nevertheless remain vigilant: quotations from higher-court speeches must be carefully contextualised; judges must avoid importing doctrinal passages that risk misinterpretation. In striking this balance, Sun offers both guidance and a salutary warning—precision matters, but perfection is not the yardstick.