“Peace of mind” is not enough: Necessity and future-risk as the touchstones for restraining orders under s.360 Sentencing Act 2020 — R v Amri [2025] EWCA Crim 1314

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Judgment date: 25 September 2025

Judge: Martin Spencer J (giving the judgment of the Court)

Introduction

This appeal concerned the lawfulness and necessity of a post-conviction restraining order imposed alongside a suspended sentence for assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH). The appellant, Mr Amri, had participated in an assault on a bus driver (Mr Jablonski) during an isolated confrontation at Guildford Bus Station on 4 September 2023. The Crown Court imposed a three-year restraining order prohibiting the appellant from contacting the complainant and from attending Guildford Bus Station.

The central issue on appeal was whether, on the facts of an isolated incident between strangers with no subsequent contact or ongoing relationship, a restraining order under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 was “necessary” for the statutory purpose of protecting the victim from future “harassment” or “fear of violence.” The Court of Appeal quashed the restraining order, clarifying the boundaries of the jurisdiction and re-emphasising the need for evidence of prospective risk rather than a desire to provide reassurance.

Summary of the Judgment

• The statutory gateway for restraining orders (Sentencing Act 2020, s.360) requires that any order be made for the purpose of protecting a victim (or named person) from conduct that amounts to harassment or causes fear of violence, and only “in addition to” sentencing for the index offence.
• Building on the guidance in R v Khellaf [2016] EWCA Crim 1297, the Court restated that the victim’s views should ordinarily be obtained (by the prosecution) and that any order must be both necessary and proportionate to prevent future harm.
• On the facts, this was an isolated encounter between strangers; the appellant had been on bail for over a year with no conditions restricting contact and no further contact or intimidation occurred in that period. A victim personal statement (VPS) demonstrated harm but did not evidence a risk of future harassment or violence.
• The Court held that providing the victim “peace of mind” is not a statutory purpose under s.360, and that mere chance encounters in public spaces or when using public services (such as catching a bus the complainant happens to be driving) are not, without more, conduct amounting to harassment or giving rise to a reasonable fear of violence (para 19).
• Result: Appeal allowed; the restraining order was quashed in its entirety. The suspended sentence and other ancillary orders remained undisturbed (para 20).

Detailed Analysis

Statutory Framework: Section 360, Sentencing Act 2020

Section 360 SA 2020 permits a court “dealing with an offender for an offence” to make a restraining order to protect a victim (or specified person) from conduct which:

• amounts to harassment; or
• will cause a fear of violence.

Two structural features of the provision are critical:

• The order is protective, not punitive. Its aim is to mitigate future risk, not to augment sentence or to provide reassurance in the abstract.
• The order must be made “in addition to” dealing with the offence — i.e., it is an ancillary protective measure anchored to the index offence and justified only if there is a forward-looking risk the order will address.

Precedent Considered: R v Khellaf [2016] EWCA Crim 1297

In Khellaf (a domestic context involving breaches of a non-molestation order and assault), the Court distilled four propositions governing restraining orders (para 17):

• The victim’s views should ordinarily be obtained; it is the prosecution’s responsibility to make the necessary enquiries. Those views are relevant but not determinative.
• An order should not be made unless the judge concludes it is necessary to protect the victim.
• The terms must be proportionate to the harm sought to be prevented.
• When children are involved, particular care is required to avoid frustrating appropriate contact.

Amri applied these principles outside the domestic sphere, in the paradigm of a one-off public assault between strangers, and refined how “necessity” should be approached in such circumstances.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Amri

1) Necessity is a forward-looking risk question

The Court emphasised that “necessity” under s.360 requires evidence of a future risk of conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence. The VPS demonstrated substantial harm and ongoing psychological impact on the victim (para 8), but such evidence of harm does not, without more, establish future risk. The absence of any contact for over a year while on unrestricted bail weighed heavily against a finding of ongoing risk (paras 12, 18–19).

2) “Peace of mind” is not a statutory purpose

In a pivotal clarification, the Court held that using a restraining order to provide the victim “peace of mind” falls outside s.360’s purpose (para 19). The jurisdiction is confined to preventing conduct that amounts to harassment or will cause fear of violence. This is a substantive constraint on the power and is central to the case’s significance.

3) Public-space and public-service restrictions demand strict justification

The Crown Court’s order included a three-year ban on attending Guildford Bus Station. The Court of Appeal held that “to put it bluntly, for the appellant to catch a bus which happens to be driven by the victim is not per se conduct amounting to harassment or causing a fear of violence” (para 19). This statement provides concrete guidance: restrictions that functionally bar access to public spaces or services will not be justified unless there is a clear, evidence-based nexus to preventing harassment/fear of violence.

4) Prosecution obligations and timing

The application for a restraining order was uploaded on the day of sentence (para 10), and the officer in the case had been unable to obtain the victim’s views (para 7). While the Court did not rest its decision on procedural default, it reminded practitioners (following Khellaf) that the prosecution must obtain and put before the court the victim’s views and the evidential basis for future risk. Late, bare applications invite heightened scrutiny and are unlikely to meet the necessity threshold absent clear risk evidence.

Position in the Law: What Amri Adds

• In “strangers/isolated incident” cases, the default position is that a restraining order will not be necessary unless there is cogent evidence of a risk of future harassment or fear of violence. The mere seriousness of the harm or the victim’s ongoing distress does not establish prospective risk.
• “Peace of mind” or general reassurance is not a permissible basis for a s.360 order. Orders must be anchored to anticipated conduct amounting to harassment or fear of violence.
• Restrictions excluding an offender from public spaces or services (e.g., bus stations, transport networks) are not per se proportionate or necessary; they require compelling evidence of a targeted risk that the specific restriction will mitigate.
• Judges must give reasons that engage expressly with the forward-looking necessity test, not merely state a conclusion; reliance on the site of the offence (e.g., the bus station) without evidence of future risk will not suffice.
• The prosecution bears the onus of obtaining and presenting the victim’s views and the risk evidence in advance of sentencing; failure to do so may be determinative where risk is otherwise speculative.

Impact and Practical Implications

For sentencing practice

• Expect a more restrained approach to restraining orders after one-off public assaults between strangers, especially where the intervening period shows no further contact or intimidation.
• Sentencing remarks must articulate why an order is necessary to avert a real risk of qualifying conduct. A recital that the order is “proportionate” or “for the victim’s peace of mind” will be insufficient.

For prosecutors

• Collate and serve, in good time, victim views, any antecedents evidencing continuing interest in the victim, evidence of attempts at contact, social media activity, proximity risks, and any pattern suggesting future harassment or intimidation.
• Craft narrow, risk-targeted terms with a clear duration; avoid blanket public-space exclusions absent compelling, specific risk.

For the defence

• Highlight any lack of ongoing relationship, absence of contact on bail, geographical or practical separation, and positive steps taken by the defendant.
• Challenge overbroad terms that burden ordinary life (e.g., reliance on public transport) where the evidential link to preventing harassment is missing.

For victims and agencies

• Understand that the restraining order jurisdiction is risk-based. Victim impact is relevant to sentence, but orders require a demonstrable forward risk.
• Where risk is low, operational measures (e.g., rostering adjustments by employers) may be more appropriate than court-ordered public-access bans.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH): An assault causing injuries more than transient or trifling (e.g., a broken nose, cuts, swelling). It is more serious than common assault but less than grievous bodily harm.
• Restraining order (s.360 SA 2020): A protective order made alongside sentence to prevent future conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence. It is not a punishment; it targets future risk.
• Harassment/fear of violence: In plain terms, persistent or targeted conduct causing alarm/distress, or conduct that makes someone reasonably fear violence. The focus is on preventing such conduct in the future.
• “Direct or indirect contact”: Direct contact includes in-person encounters, calls, texts, messages. Indirect contact includes messages via third parties, posts or tags on social media, or any communication intended to reach the person.
• Necessity vs proportionality: Necessity asks “Is an order genuinely needed to prevent qualifying harm?” Proportionality asks “Are the terms no more restrictive than required to achieve that protection?” Both must be satisfied.
• Suspended sentence: A term of imprisonment that does not take immediate effect; the offender must comply with conditions (e.g., rehabilitation activity days, unpaid work) during the operational period, or risk activation.
• Compensation order: A financial order requiring the offender to compensate the victim for loss, injury, or damage arising from the offence.

Key Passages and Their Significance

• Para 17 (via Khellaf): Sets out the core principles — obtain victim’s views, ensure necessity, ensure proportionality, and take especial care where children are involved.
• Para 19: “It appears to us that the order in the present case was made more in order to give the victim peace of mind but in our view that does not qualify within the terms of the statute…” This is the judgment’s central clarification of purpose.
• Para 19: “To put it bluntly, for the appellant to catch a bus which happens to be driven by the victim is not per se conduct amounting to harassment or causing a fear of violence.” This is practical guidance on public-space/public-service restrictions.

Conclusion

R v Amri is an important refinement of the restraining order jurisdiction under s.360 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The Court of Appeal reaffirms that such orders are tightly confined to preventing future harassment or fear of violence and cannot be used simply to provide victims with peace of mind. In the common scenario of a one-off confrontation between strangers, absent evidence of ongoing risk, a restraining order will not be “necessary.”

The judgment also cautions against overbroad terms — especially restrictions on access to public spaces or services — unless there is a clear, evidence-based rationale linking the restriction to the prevention of qualifying harm. Prosecutors must obtain and present victim views and risk evidence in good time; judges must articulate reasons showing the necessity and proportionality of any order imposed. The decision will shape everyday sentencing practice, ensuring restraining orders remain a targeted, risk-based protective tool and not a general vehicle for reassurance or punitive restriction.