“Payment Triggers Contribution” – The Supreme Court on Accrual of Contribution Claims and the Limits of Building Safety Act Retrospection

Commentary on URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd ([2025] UKSC 21)

1. Introduction

Following the Grenfell Tower disaster, Parliament enacted the Building Safety Act 2022 (“BSA”) and radically altered the limitation landscape for building-defect claims. URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd is the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to consider (a) exactly when a right to contribution under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (“Contribution Act”) arises and (b) how far, in law and in practice, the BSA’s retrospective extension of limitation periods reaches.

The case arises from two high-rise residential developments (constructed 2005-2012) designed by URS (consulting engineers) and developed by BDW. Negligent structural designs allegedly rendered the buildings unsafe. BDW discovered the defects in 2019 and, beginning 2020, remedied them at its own expense before any homeowner sued. Proceedings were launched in tort and later amended to add claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (“DPA”) and for contribution.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Issue 1 – Negligence: Expenditure voluntarily incurred can, depending on factual causation/mitigation analysis, be recoverable; absence of a current legal obligation is not an automatic bar. Whether BDW’s spending was “voluntary” is fact-sensitive and for trial.
Issue 3 – DPA Duty: Section 1(1)(a) extends the duty to any “person to whose order” the dwelling is provided, and this includes commercial developers. URS therefore owed BDW a statutory duty; losses flowing from liability to homeowners are recoverable.
Issue 4 – Contribution (leading precedent): A cause of action for contribution arises when the claimant pays or agrees to pay compensation (including payment in kind) in respect of the common damage, regardless of judgment, admission, or settlement. The two-year limitation under Limitation Act 1980 s 10 starts on that payment/agreement date.
Issue 2 – Retrospective reach of BSA s 135: The 30-year limitation must be treated as always in force for DPA actions and for related contribution claims, but not so far as to rewrite historical facts relevant to causation/mitigation in negligence or DPA damages claims for pre-2022 remedial works.
Outcome: URS’s appeal dismissed; BDW may pursue tort, DPA and contribution claims, subject to factual findings at trial on voluntariness/causation for pre-2022 expenditure.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Mitigation & Voluntariness
- British Westinghouse (1912) – “reasonable and prudent person” test for mitigation.
- The Elena d’Amico [1980] – mitigation as causation.
- Bunge v Nidera [2015] – market-entry example; Lord Toulson quoted extensively on free choice.
- Banco de Portugal [1932] & James Finlay [1929] – payments made without legal obligation may still be recoverable when commercially necessary (protecting reputation).
- Admiralty Comrs v SS Amerika [1917] & Anglian Water [2001] – instances where “voluntary” payments were not recoverable; used by URS but distinguished.
Contribution Accrual
- Littlewood v Wimpey (CA & HL 1953-55), Stott [1971] – ambiguity under the 1935 Act; requirement (or not) of judgment/admission.
- Aer Lingus [2006] – dicta that liability to contribute “appears to arise at the same time as the primary liability”.
- Co-operative Retail Services v Taylor Young [2002] – Section 1 Contribution Act focuses on liability at time contribution is sought.
- Dubai Aluminium v Salaam [2002] – role of s 1(4) bona fide settlements.
Retrospective Legislation
- Yew Bon Tew [1983] – presumption against reviving expired rights.
- Arnold v CEGB [1988]; Reid v Reid (1886) – limit retrospective reach to that “plainly necessary”.

3.2 Legal Reasoning in Depth

a) Negligence & “Voluntary” Payments

Lord Leggatt accepts a general principle that self-incurred losses may be non-recoverable, but characterises voluntariness as essentially a causation/mitigation question. The engineer’s negligence placed BDW in a predicament; whether BDW’s remedial spend is attributable to that predicament or to independent choice turns on fact-specific “reasonably expected” behaviour. Crucially, absence of a strict legal liability is not conclusive.

b) Duty under the DPA

The Court reads s 1(1)(a) literally—developers commissioning work are persons “to whose order” the dwellings are provided. Arguments from consumer-protection purpose, freedom of contract, and mutual exclusivity of duty-bearer/beneficiary are rejected as contrary to statutory text. Contributory negligence and s 1(2) defences remain to prevent conceptual impossibilities.

c) Accrual of Contribution Claims (Key Holding)

Section 1 Contribution Act contemplates money recovery; therefore, a contribution cause of action cannot exist until there is a definable sum. Section 1(2) points directly to the trigger: the moment D1 “made or was ordered or agreed to make the payment in respect of which the contribution is sought.” Section 10 Limitation Act 1980 aligns with that trigger and confirms the two-year countdown. No requirement for prior judgment, admission, or settlement survives the 1978 Act’s wording.

This overruns URS’s reliance on pre-1978 authorities and fits Parliament’s intention to streamline apportionment while avoiding defendants’ procedural limbo.

d) Retrospective Reach of BSA s 135

Applying Lindley LJ’s principle, the Court looks for a balance: recognise Parliament’s clear wish to revive DPA claims, yet avoid “rewriting history” beyond what the BSA demands.

Applies to: (i) DPA actions themselves; (ii) contribution claims needing to know whether a DPA claim was time-barred; (iii) limitation-based defences generally.
Does not apply to: factual assessments (causation, mitigation, reasonableness) made at the time remedial action occurred; professional-negligence scenarios hinging on what the law was when advice was given.

Thus BDW may rely on the 30-year period in its contribution claim, but cannot retro-justify pre-2022 spending on the sole basis that, ex post facto, it turned out to be legally liable.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Litigation

Contribution Litigation: Litigants must now issue within two years of payment, not judgment; expect earlier third-party claims and increased CPR Part 20 activity.
Construction & Building Safety: Professionals and insurers face revived DPA exposure for up to 30 years and contribution exposure even where no homeowner has sued.
Professional Negligence Advice: While the decision spares historic advice, lawyers must reassess advice strategies post-BSA, particularly on limitation and remediation timing.
Policy Clarity: Legislators, regulators and industry now have judicial guidance limiting unintended chain-reaction liabilities while honouring the BSA’s consumer-protection intent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Contribution: The statutory right for one liable party (D1) who has paid compensation to recover a “fair share” from another liable party (D2).
Mitigation: An injured party must act reasonably to limit its loss; unreasonable “voluntary” actions are not recoverable.
Defective Premises Act 1972 s 1: Creates a duty on those involved in building new dwellings to ensure they are fit for habitation, owed to initial and subsequent owners (now confirmed to include developers themselves).
Building Safety Act 2022 s 135: Extended limitation to 15 years (prospective) and 30 years (retrospective) for DPA claims; expressly retroactive.
Retrospective vs Retroactive: Retrospective: applies to past facts/events; Retroactive: treats new rule as always having been the law.
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978: Codifies contribution rights; entitlement hinges on shared liability for the “same damage”.
Limitation Act 1980 s 10: Sets a 2-year window for bringing contribution actions starting when payment/judgment is made, per today’s ruling.

5. Conclusion

URS v BDW is a landmark in three respects: it confirms that payments, not judgments, trigger contribution claims; it clarifies that the BSA’s 30-year limitation revival extends to contribution proceedings but not to every historical fact; and it recognises developers as beneficiaries of the DPA duty. The Court’s meticulous dissection of pre-1978 case law, statutory wording and policy ensures coherence between limitation policy and fair apportionment. Going forward, parties involved in construction defects must act swiftly once any remediation payment is mooted, while courts retain flexibility to examine whether earlier self-funded works were truly “voluntary” or a reasonable response to risk. The judgment strikes a calibrated balance between remedial justice for homeowners and certainty for professionals, offering the industry a clear, if demanding, roadmap.

“Payment Triggers Contribution” – The Supreme Court on Accrual of Contribution Claims and the Limits of Building Safety Act Retrospection (URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2025] UKSC 21)