“Occupation Is Not a Shield”: Planetwhite Ltd v Hogan & Anor and the Limits of Section 72(1)(j) of the Registration of Title Act 1964

1. Introduction

Planetwhite Ltd v Hogan & Anor ([2025] IEHC 378) is a High Court on Circuit appeal in which Mr Justice Oisín Quinn clarified the relationship between Sections 31, 52 and 72(1)(j) of the Registration of Title Act 1964 (“the 1964 Act”) and the statutory power of sale under the Conveyancing Act 1881.

The plaintiff, Planetwhite Limited, a special-purpose vehicle owned by the Duffy family, had bought a 5.4-acre plot at Rosshill, Galway (“the Lands”) for €700,000 from Promontoria (Aran) Limited (“PAL”), the transferee of an Ulster Bank mortgage. Eamon and Deirdre Hogan (“the Hogans”) continued to keep horses on the Lands and refused to vacate. When the Circuit Court struck out Planetwhite’s possessory claim, the company appealed.

The appeal squarely raised four issues:

Whether a registered owner who is not in physical possession may rely on Section 31(1) as “conclusive evidence” of title;
Whether the Hogans’ physical occupation constitutes a “burden” protected by Section 72(1)(j);
Whether defects (actual or alleged) in the mortgagee’s appointment of a receiver or in the transfer from Ulster Bank to PAL can be raised against the subsequent purchaser, Planetwhite;
The evidential value of the Land Registry folio versus underlying transfer documents in light of Fannon v Ulster Bank.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Quinn allowed the appeal and granted (i) a declaration of Planetwhite’s entitlement to peaceful and uninterrupted enjoyment of the Lands, (ii) an injunction restraining the Hogans from trespassing, and (iii) a mandatory order to remove their horses. His Lordship held that:

Registration gives Planetwhite an “iron curtain” title under Section 31(1);
Section 72(1)(j) protects existing legal or equitable rights of persons in occupation, but does not create such rights out of mere physical presence;
PAL had a valid statutory power of sale under the 1881 Act; any irregularity by the receiver is cured by the deed of transfer and, in any event, gives the mortgagor only a damages remedy – not a defence against the purchaser;
Fannon does not undermine reliance on Section 31 where (as here) the fact of ownership, rather than the terms of an assignment, is at issue.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Tanager DAC v Kane [2018] IECA 352 – Authorities described Section 31(1) as an “iron curtain” preventing challenges to registered title save for fraud or mistake. Justice Quinn relied heavily on Baker J’s language to emphasise the statutory finality of Planetwhite’s registration.
Fannon v Ulster Bank [2024] IECA 51 – Barniville P stated that Section 31(1) is not conclusive of the terms of an underlying transfer. The defendants invoked this dictum to argue that Planetwhite had to establish the validity of each prior assignment. Justice Quinn distinguished Fannon because Planetwhite was not asserting benefit under the charge but was relying on fee simple ownership reflected on the folio.
Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248 – The Privy Council decision, cited in Tanager and re-quoted here, articulates the policy of the Torrens system: purchasers should not “go behind the register”.

3.2 Legislative Framework and Legal Reasoning

Section 31(1) of the 1964 Act Provides that the register is conclusive evidence of ownership. Because no fraud or mistake was pleaded, the Court held that Planetwhite’s title could not be impeached.
Sections 52 & 72(1)(j) of the 1964 Act The defense argued that an owner takes subject to “the rights of every person in actual occupation”. The Court held that those “rights” must have an independent legal source (e.g. lease, licence, equity). Mere physical occupation is insufficient. This is the new clarifying principle the case establishes.
Section 19(1)(i) & Section 21 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 Confirm the mortgagee’s statutory power of sale and protect purchasers acting in good faith. Even if a receiver exceeded his authority, the remedy lies in damages against the mortgagee, not in setting aside the purchaser’s title.
Effect of Receivership While the sale contract was executed by a receiver, any potential irregularity was cured by a direct deed of transfer from PAL. Planetwhite therefore obtained an unassailable legal estate.

3.3 Potential Impact on Irish Property & Banking Law

Occupiers’ Litigation Strategy – The decision signals that litigants cannot mount a possession defence solely on Section 72(1)(j) where they have no underlying interest.
Bulk Loan Sales & SPV Purchasers – Purchasers from loan-work-out entities (e.g. Promontoria) can take comfort that challenges to earlier loan transfers will not readily defeat their title once registered.
Receiver-based Sales – Even if the receiver’s authority is imperfect, Section 21 of the 1881 Act will protect the purchaser’s title. Mortgagors must sue for damages rather than resist ejectment.
Streamlining Possession Proceedings – Plaintiffs can now cite Planetwhite to argue that “occupation alone” is not a burden unless coupled with a recognisable legal right.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Registered Title (Torrens system) Ireland operates a system where the Land Registry folio is definitive proof of ownership. Unlike unregistered conveyancing, purchasers need not examine the historical chain of deeds.
Overriding Interest (Section 72) Certain rights bind land even if not on the register (e.g. short leases, easements). Section 72(1)(j) covers occupiers’ rights if they already possess a legal basis (lease, equitable interest). It does not grant squatters or mortgagors a new right.
Power of Sale Under Section 19 of the 1881 Act, once the mortgagor is in default, the mortgagee may sell the secured land without a court order, unless the mortgage deed excludes that right (it rarely does). Section 21 protects buyers acting under such a sale.
Receiver A receiver is appointed by a mortgagee to manage or sell the secured asset. Even if the receiver’s appointment is defective, the deed executed by the mortgagee itself validates the transfer.
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) A company formed for a single transaction or project. Here, Planetwhite was created to acquire and develop the Lands.

5. Conclusion

Planetwhite Ltd v Hogan & Anor fortifies the primacy of the land register and clarifies that Section 72(1)(j) is protective, not creative; it shields bona fide occupiers who already hold rights, but cannot be wielded as a sword by mortgagors or squatters to defeat a registered owner. The judgment also underscores the statutory insulation given to purchasers from mortgagees exercising a power of sale, reducing transactional risk in Ireland’s post-crisis loan sale market. In practice, the decision should expedite possession claims by registered owners and curb interlocutory skirmishes over historical banking documentation. The “iron curtain” remains firmly drawn, and mere occupation—without more—cannot pull it back.