“Any Person” May Request a Highway Crossover – The New Rule in Anwar v London Borough of Ealing Council [2025] EWCA Civ 813

Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Anwar v London Borough of Ealing Council establishes a clear and far-reaching principle on the scope of section 184(11) of the Highways Act 1980. Mrs Anwar, a long-standing resident of Southall, challenged Ealing’s refusal to remove a “shared” vehicular crossover constructed in 2015 at her neighbour Mr Johal’s request. Her principal public-law argument was that the Council had acted ultra vires because it lacked the consent of the adjoining owner/occupier before lowering the kerb across the frontages of both properties. After a failed judicial-review challenge, she appealed on pure questions of statutory construction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that:

Section 184(11) entitles any person—not merely the owners or occupiers of premises abutting the highway—to request the highway authority to construct a vehicular crossover, and there is no legal duty to consult or obtain consent from adjoining landowners before acceding to that request.

Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdictional point: The only live ground in the judicial review (that the original crossover was “unlawful”) was doomed—the 2015 decision had never been quashed and was therefore valid per Smith v East Elloe RDC.
Statutory construction: The words “any person” in s.184(11) must be given their ordinary, unrestricted meaning. Parliament intentionally used broader language than in subsections (1) and (3) where notice is served compulsorily on “the owner and the occupier.”
No neighbour veto: Subsection (11) contains no mechanism for serving notice on third-party neighbours or giving them a Schedule 14 right to object; the Council’s informal practice of seeking neighbour approval is good practice, but not a legal requirement.
Human rights: The works affected only the public highway. Therefore A1P1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions) was not engaged, and no Convention-compatible reinterpretation was required.
Outcome: Appeal dismissed; the crossover remains lawful and the Chief Executive’s 2021 decision stands.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Smith v East Elloe RDC [1956] AC 736 – Confirmed that an administrative act remains lawful until set aside by a court; therefore the 2015 crossover construction carried a cloak of validity.
R (Noble) v Thanet DC [2005] EWCA Civ 782 – Reaffirmed the “presumption of validity,” reinforcing why historic decisions cannot be collaterally attacked outside judicial-review time limits.
Marshall v Blackpool Corp [1945] AC 16 and Ching Garage Ltd v Chingford Corp [1961] 1 WLR 470 – Cited to outline common-law and statutory facets of highway access rights, illustrating Parliament’s intention that highway authorities may enhance access even where it interferes with individual preferences.
R v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea ex p Eminian (19 July 2000) – The sole prior authority on s.184(11); affirmed the highway authority’s broad discretion when assessing requests, especially the traffic/parking impacts in subsection (5).
R (O) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 3 and For Women Scotland [2025] UKSC 16 – Modern restatements of purposive statutory interpretation, steering the Court away from literalism towards Parliament’s objectives.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual distinction: Parliament consciously juxtaposed “any person” (s.184(11)) with “owner/occupier” (s.184(1) & (3)). Where Parliament intended to limit beneficiaries it said so.
Context & purpose: Section 184 as a whole seeks safe crossings and protection of highway fabric; that purpose is advanced, not hindered, by allowing the widest category of applicants to trigger works at their expense.
Absence of compulsory levy: Subsection (11) contains no power to compel payment from anyone other than the requester. Because no one else’s purse is affected, Parliament dispensed with the Schedule 14 notice/objection machinery.
Absurd-consequence canon rejected: The hypothetical “vindictive neighbour” willing to pay £500 merely to annoy another was viewed as fanciful and, in any event, controllable by the authority’s discretionary power to refuse.
Human-rights compatibility: The works occurred wholly within the public highway, caused no deprivation of private possessions, and left intact all private-law remedies for trespass; A1P1, therefore, offered no foothold for reinterpretation.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

National guidance for highway authorities: They may confidently process s.184(11) applications without fear of judicial review if neighbouring consent is absent, provided the statutory factors in subsection (5) are addressed.
Private-law/neighbour disputes: Disgruntled neighbours must pursue trespass or nuisance claims in private law rather than repackaging grievances as public-law challenges.
Judicial-review practice: Litigants cannot circumvent the three-month deadline for challenging an historic highways decision by inviting the authority to revoke it and then reviewing the refusal.
Planning & development: Developers, residents’ groups and other stakeholders now have explicit confirmation that “any person” can seek a crossover, offering a route to mitigate safety concerns even where occupiers are indifferent or hostile.
Human Rights Act interface: The case exemplifies the threshold for A1P1 engagement when works are confined to the publicly-maintained highway.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Highway Authority: The public body responsible for maintaining roads, footways and verges at public expense (here, Ealing Council).
Vehicle Crossover (“Dropped Kerb”): A section of lowered kerb and constructed ramp allowing vehicles to drive over the pavement into private land.
Section 184(1)/(3) vs. 184(11): (1) & (3) – Authority-initiated schemes where owners/occupiers can be forced to pay; statutory notice and Schedule 14 objection rights apply.
(11) – Applicant-initiated; the requester funds the works; no statutory notice to neighbours; authority has unfettered discretion.
Schedule 14 Objection: A formal process (available only if subsection (1) or (3) notice is served) enabling recipients to challenge the proposal on prescribed grounds within 28 days.
Presumption of Validity: Administrative acts remain valid and effective unless and until quashed by a court; late challenges are generally barred.
A1P1 (Article 1, Protocol 1): European Convention right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It is engaged only when state action interferes with private property rights, not where works are carried out solely on public highway land.

Conclusion

Anwar provides a definitive, Court-of-Appeal level construction of section 184(11). The judgment clarifies that:

The statutory phrase “any person” means what it says—there is no implied restriction to neighbouring owners or occupiers.
Highway authorities owe no legal duty of consultation or consent towards neighbours when acting on such a request, although good-practice engagement is encouraged.
Where the financial burden does not fall on third parties, Parliament deliberately omitted the Schedule 14 objection machinery.
Private-law remedies (trespass, nuisance, injunction) remain the proper avenue for boundary and parking disputes; public-law procedures should not be used as a proxy.

By drawing a bright line between compulsory and voluntary crossover regimes, the Court has removed uncertainty for local authorities, applicants and neighbouring landowners alike. The decision is likely to streamline dropped-kerb applications nationwide, reduce satellite litigation, and reinforce the principle that the public highway is managed for the wider public interest, not at the discretion of individual frontagers.