“Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department” — Consolidating Judicial Deference in Interim Relief Applications Challenging Terrorism Proscription Orders

Introduction

In Ammori, R. (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2025] EWCA Civ 848), the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) revisited the circumstances in which interim relief will be granted to suspend a terrorism proscription order made under the Terrorism Act 2000. Huda Ammori, a founder of “Palestine Action”, sought an injunction to delay the coming into force of an Order that would add the organisation to Schedule 2 of the Act—an Order already approved by both Houses of Parliament.

The key issue was whether the High Court had erred in refusing interim relief, and specifically whether the balance of convenience should tilt towards protecting the claimant’s Article 10 and 11 ECHR rights (freedom of expression and assembly) or towards the public interest in national security as asserted by the Secretary of State (“SSHD”). The Court of Appeal dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal, thereby letting the Order take effect.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellate court, comprised of three Lords/Lady Justices, held:

• The judge at first instance applied the correct American Cyanamid tri-partite test for interim injunctions: serious issue, adequacy of damages, and balance of convenience.
• National security considerations are entitled to “great respect” and will ordinarily outweigh competing factors absent something “very compelling”.
• No legal error or irrationality tainted the judge’s evaluation of the balance of convenience; therefore, appellate intervention was unwarranted under CPR 52.21.
• The claimant’s grounds—largely centred on ECHR rights, alleged procedural unfairness, and delay by the SSHD—had insufficient prospects of success to justify permission to appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
   The foundational authority on interim injunctions. It supplies the three-stage test adopted by the judge and endorsed by the Court of Appeal.
2. R (PCS Union) v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 840 (“PCSU”)
   Re-affirmed that in public-law cases the court first examines arguable unlawfulness and then moves to the balance of convenience, paying heed to the wider public interest. Ammori imports this framework into the proscription context.
3. AG v BBC [2022] EWHC 826 (QB) and FTDI Holding Ltd v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster [2025] EWHC 241 (Admin)
   These cases articulate the special respect courts must afford to the executive’s national-security assessments when weighing interim relief.
4. R (Governing Body of X School) v Ofsted [2020] EWCA Civ 594
   Quoted for the notion that a “strong prima facie case” may be required where injunctive relief would hinder an important public function.
5. Christian Democratic People’s Party v Moldova (2007) 45 EHRR 13
   Relied on by the claimant for the proposition that even short-lived infringements of political-speech rights can breach the Convention, but distinguished by the Court as factually remote.

Legal Reasoning

1. Serious Issue to be Tried
The Court accepted that at least one ground (proportionality under Articles 10 and 11) was arguable; therefore, stage (1) of American Cyanamid was satisfied. This finding did not, however, dictate the grant of interim relief.

2. Adequacy of Damages
As is typical in public-law/equality challenges, damages were not an adequate remedy for either side; the case thus proceeded swiftly to the decisive stage—balance of convenience.

3. Balance of Convenience
The Court underscored a “hierarchy of interests” in national-security disputes: (a) protection of the public, (b) Parliamentary approval of executive action, and only thereafter (c) private or organisational freedoms that may be curtailed. Key strands of the reasoning include:

• Suspending the Order would deny the public the protective effect of proscription, even for a short period, a factor to which the courts must attach “great weight”.
• Any chilling effect on speech was confined to expressions of support for Palestine Action as an organisation; individuals could still criticise Israel or campaign on Palestinian rights generally.
• Potential criminal liability would arise only if people “deliberately chose” to break the law after proscription. Harm flowing from conscious defiance carries little weight in the equitable balancing exercise.
• Alleged delay by the SSHD (March–July 2025) was given “some weight” but was eclipsed by the immediate trigger incident of 20 June 2025 (damage to RAF aircraft) and by Parliament’s swift approval of the Order.
• The availability of the statutory de-proscription route via POAC was not decisive but underlined that the Order was not irreversible.

Impact on the Law

The judgment solidifies three important propositions:

1. Elevated Deference in National-Security Proscription Cases.
   Where Parliament has approved a proscription order, courts will start from a position of substantial deference, making interim relief a remote possibility unless the claimant shows powerful countervailing considerations.
2. Limited Weight to “Self-Inflicted” Harm.
   Prospective criminality resulting from a conscious decision to ignore a statutory prohibition is accorded minimal weight in the balance of convenience.
3. Continued Viability of Article 10/11 Challenges.
   The Court acknowledged that serious issues may arise on ECHR grounds, but their mere existence is insufficient to displace the public-interest calculus favouring national security.

Future claimants seeking to restrain national-security measures—be it proscription, asset-freezing, or exclusion orders—now face a reinforced burden at the interim stage. Conversely, the executive gains clearer guidance that, once Parliament endorses a measure, the courts will not lightly intervene before the full claim is heard.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Proscription Order: A statutory instrument that adds an organisation to Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000, rendering membership or support a criminal offence.
• Interim Relief: Temporary court orders (e.g., injunctions or declarations) designed to preserve the status quo until the final determination of a case.
• American Cyanamid Test: (1) Serious issue to be tried; (2) Adequacy of damages; (3) Balance of convenience (including public interest).
• Balance of Convenience: A weighing exercise of potential harms to each side (and the public) if relief is granted or refused.
• POAC: The Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission—an independent tribunal that hears statutory appeals against the refusal to de-proscribe an organisation.
• Open vs Closed Evidence: In national-security litigation, some material is disclosed only to the court and “special advocates”, not to the claimant, to protect sensitive information.

Conclusion

Ammori v SSHD does not blaze an entirely new trail but crystallises existing jurisprudence into a coherent rule: where interim relief would suspend a terrorism proscription order already endorsed by Parliament, the applicant must demonstrate exceptionally compelling reasons to override the executive’s national-security assessment.

The Court’s reasoning emphasises (i) respect for democratic accountability, (ii) the primacy of public protection, and (iii) the relative paucity of weight given to harms that arise from a fortiori decision to breach the law. While substantive challenges to proscription remain possible—and may yet succeed at the full judicial-review stage or before POAC—the window for obtaining temporary protection has become decisively narrower.

Legal practitioners should therefore:

• Prepare extensive prima facie evidence on urgency and disproportionality if interim relief is sought;
• Address national-security justifications head-on, possibly with expert testimony; and
• Be ready to outline precise, alternative remedies that mitigate security concerns without wholesale suspension of the order.

In the broader landscape, the decision signals to activist groups, human-rights NGOs, and government alike that the judiciary will preserve a strict, high bar before restraining executive measures designed—on the face of it—to safeguard national security.