Unlawful Act Manslaughter as a Substitute Verdict Where Murder is Quashed but Conspiracy to Rob Remains: Commentary on Gordon v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1611

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Gordon v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1611, delivered on 11 December 2025. The judgment forms the second stage of appellate proceedings arising from the fatal attack on Mr Vishal Gohel. In its earlier judgment ([2025] EWCA Crim 1045) the Court had already quashed Mr Sakeem Gordon’s conviction for murder. The present judgment explains:

Why the Court declined to quash Mr Gordon’s conviction for conspiracy to rob; and
Why, instead of ordering a retrial on the murder count, it exercised its power under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to substitute a conviction for manslaughter.

The case is important for two main reasons:

It clarifies how a conspiracy conviction can remain “safe” even where an associated murder conviction is quashed due to concerns about a key eyewitness.
It confirms the Court of Appeal’s willingness to substitute a verdict of unlawful act manslaughter when a murder conviction is overturned, but a conviction for an underlying unlawful act (here, conspiracy to rob) survives and death occurred during the execution of that crime.

The judgment also illustrates how modern digital evidence (phone records, “airplane mode”, internet searches) and post-offence conduct are deployed to prove participation in serious group criminality.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The underlying events and participants

Although this judgment is not a full narrative of events, it identifies the key actors:

The appellant: Sakeem Gordon
The deceased: Mr Vishal Gohel
Co-conspirators:
- Tevin Leslie – cousin of Gordon, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rob.
- Georgia Bruce‑Annan – pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rob.
- Brandon Browne – convicted by the jury of conspiracy to rob and manslaughter.
- Faith Hoppie – convicted by the jury of conspiracy to rob and manslaughter.
- Tianna Edwards‑Hancock – a key prosecution witness whose evidence placed certain defendants, including Gordon, in the bedroom where Mr Gohel was fatally attacked.

The central criminal allegation was that a group travelled to Mr Gohel’s home to commit a high‑value robbery. During the course of that criminal enterprise, Mr Gohel was killed. The precise identity of those actually in the bedroom at the moment of the fatal assault was a key factual dispute.

2.2 The trial and original convictions

At trial, Gordon was convicted of:

Murder; and
Conspiracy to rob.

Other participants either pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rob (Leslie and Bruce‑Annan) or were convicted at trial of conspiracy to rob and manslaughter (Browne and Hoppie). Critically, the jury:

Convicted Browne and Hoppie of conspiracy to rob, but
Acquitted them of murder – indicating the jury did not find them to be among those present in the bedroom at the point of fatal violence.

2.3 The first appeal: murder conviction quashed

On 31 July 2025, the Court of Appeal allowed Gordon’s appeal against his murder conviction ([2025] EWCA Crim 1045). The Court concluded that it was a reasonable interpretation of the jury’s verdict that:

The jury convicted of murder only those defendants whom they were sure had been in the bedroom when the fatal attack occurred; and
The only direct evidence putting Gordon in that bedroom came from the witness Tianna Edwards‑Hancock; her credibility was thus “fundamental” to that issue.

Whatever concerns the Court had about the reliability or sufficiency of that evidence were sufficient to render the murder conviction unsafe. However, the Court did not at that stage determine whether the conspiracy to rob conviction should also be quashed or whether a retrial should be ordered. Those issues were deferred.

2.4 The present judgment

At a further hearing on 17 October 2025, the Court:

Declined to quash Gordon’s conviction for conspiracy to rob; and
Substituted a conviction for manslaughter in place of the quashed murder conviction, invoking section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

The judgment of 11 December 2025 provides the Court’s detailed reasons on those two matters. Sentencing was to follow in a separate exercise, after the delivery of this judgment.

3. Summary of the Judgment

In essence, the Court held:

There was overwhelming evidence that Gordon knowingly participated in a conspiracy to rob Mr Gohel. That evidence was “extensive, wide ranging and independent” of the testimony of Tianna Edwards‑Hancock. The conspiracy conviction was therefore safe.
Actual use of force by Gordon did not need to be proved. For conspiracy to rob, it was sufficient that he agreed to participate in a robbery (an offence that inherently contemplates force or threat of force) and joined the criminal venture.
The Court relied heavily on:
- The guilty pleas of Leslie and Bruce‑Annan to conspiracy to rob.
- Phone communication patterns between Gordon and his co‑conspirators.
- Gordon’s close relationship with Leslie and prior acquaintance with Hoppie.
- His presence at the scene with his face covered and his conduct inside the flat.
- His attempts to avoid detection (use of “airplane mode” and refusal to provide his phone PIN).
Given that the conspiracy to rob conviction stands, it was “common ground” that Mr Gohel died in the course of an unlawful act (the robbery). Thus a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter would have been open to the jury, just as it was in relation to Browne and Hoppie.
In these circumstances, and at the joint invitation of the Crown and the defence, the Court exercised its power under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to substitute a verdict of manslaughter for murder, rather than order a retrial on the murder count.
The Court confirmed that it retained the statutory power to substitute the verdict because the appeal proceedings were still ongoing and no final order had yet been recorded in the Crown Court.
There would be no retrial in the case, and a reporting restriction previously imposed on 31 July 2025 would now lapse.

4. Analysis of the Conspiracy to Rob Conviction

4.1 Legal framework: conspiracy to rob

Conspiracy is an “inchoate” offence: it criminalises the agreement to commit a crime, rather than the completed crime itself. A conspiracy to rob is committed where:

Two or more people agree that a robbery (or series of robberies) shall be committed; and
Each conspirator intends that the robbery will be carried out in accordance with the agreement.

Robbery, in turn, involves theft accompanied by the use or threat of force. However, to prove a conspiracy to rob, the prosecution need not prove that force was ultimately used, or that each conspirator personally wielded or threatened force. It is enough that the agreement encompassed a robbery – an inherently force‑based offence.

This distinction between the substantive offence (robbery) and the inchoate offence (conspiracy to rob) is central to the Court’s rejection of the argument that Gordon’s conviction on the conspiracy count stood or fell with the evidence of him using force.

4.2 Independence from the contested eyewitness evidence

The defence argued that if the evidence of Tianna Edwards‑Hancock was insufficiently reliable to sustain a murder conviction (because it was the only direct evidence putting Gordon in the bedroom at the critical time), it must also undermine the conspiracy conviction. The Court firmly rejected this submission:

“As we describe below, the evidence in support of the count of conspiracy to rob was in a wholly different category. It was extensive, wide ranging and independent of the evidence of Tianna Edwards‑Hancock.”

The Court highlighted that:

The evidence necessary to establish presence in the bedroom during the fatal attack is substantially different from the evidence required to establish agreement to rob.
The conspiracy case turned on:
- Patterns of communication;
- Prior relationships;
- Conduct before, during and after the incident; and
- Admissions and guilty pleas of co‑conspirators.
None of these depended on accepting Edwards‑Hancock’s account of events in the bedroom.
Importantly, the jury had already demonstrated their ability to distinguish between murder and conspiracy by convicting Browne and Hoppie of conspiracy to rob, while acquitting them of murder. That pattern itself supports the Court’s interpretation that the conspiracy verdicts did not rest on the contested bedroom‑presence evidence.

The Court’s reasoning underlines a doctrinally important point: different counts on the indictment may rest on distinct evidential foundations. The unsafety of one conviction does not mechanically taint the others where the evidence bases are genuinely independent.

4.3 The cumulative circumstantial and digital evidence

The Court catalogues a powerful series of factors supporting the conspiracy conviction. None, taken alone, is conclusive; together they form what the Court describes as “overwhelming evidence”.

4.3.1 Existence of the conspiracy

First, the Court emphasised that the existence of a conspiracy to rob was not in doubt:

Both Leslie and Bruce‑Annan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rob.
Those pleas are formal admissions that they agreed to commit a robbery of Mr Gohel.

The issue, therefore, was not whether there was a conspiracy, but whether Gordon was party to it.

4.3.2 Nature of the planned robbery: “muscle” and home invasion

The Court highlighted the character of the planned crime:

It was “a high value robbery of a man in his own home”.
Such an enterprise, as a matter of common sense, “required additional ‘muscle’” so that at least a threat of force could readily be made.

From that, the Court concluded that:

“It follows that the jury could properly conclude this was the reason for the Appellant being present (indeed it is hard to see any other reason for his presence).”

This is a typical use of inferential reasoning: Gordon’s presence at a late‑night home invasion, alongside co‑conspirators who had already agreed to rob the occupant, is itself probative of his knowledge and agreement, particularly given the absence of any plausible innocent explanation.

4.3.3 Prior associations and communication patterns

The Court relied heavily on pre‑existing relationships and phone data:

Leslie and Bruce‑Annan clearly knew each other before the conspiracy, as indicated by their guilty pleas.
Gordon’s prior connection to Faith Hoppie was proved by phone records:
- Her phone contained his number under his nickname.
- They had been in contact since at least 18–19 November 2021.
- Gordon accepted they had a short‑lived sexual relationship.

As to communications on the day:

On 22 January 2022 at 20:31:15, Gordon and Leslie were in a 3 minute 51 second call while Leslie was simultaneously in a conference call with Bruce‑Annan and Browne.
The Court considered that by this stage “the agreement to rob… was well advanced” and that the pattern of calls “between 4 individuals who were all to attend the property” was in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Further overlapping calls between Gordon, Leslie and Bruce‑Annan occurred at 23:19:30.

The Court drew a further inference from family ties:

Gordon and Leslie are cousins with a close relationship.
It was “unlikely that Leslie would have tricked his cousin into attending” the scene of a planned robbery without informing him, particularly as Gordon, due to his previous robbery convictions, was acutely vulnerable to the consequences.
Instead, his previous robbery convictions (admitted at trial) rendered him an “obvious candidate” to be recruited as “muscle” for a high‑risk robbery.

These strands of evidence – prior relationships, overlapping calls among those who attended the scene, and the improbability of innocent attendance – collectively support the inference that Gordon knowingly joined the robbery plan, rather than stumbling into it.

4.3.4 Gordon’s own account: “licking the place”

Gordon’s own testimony provided further incriminating context. He admitted that, once in the car and en route to the address, he realised Leslie and Browne were discussing “licking” the place, a slang term which he accepted meant “stealing or burgling”.

Even on his account, therefore, he:

Became aware of a planned theft or burglary before arrival; and
Nevertheless proceeded with the group to the victim’s flat.

The Court was entitled to treat that admission as highly probative of his knowledge of the criminal purpose and his continued participation in it.

4.3.5 Conduct at the scene: face coverings and searching

The Court placed significant weight on Gordon’s conduct at the scene:

Leslie’s evidence was that he:
- Brought gloves and a bag; and
- Provided balaclavas for those in the car, which were put on and kept on.
Gordon claimed he merely covered part of his face with a snood because he expected to go to a party “with girls” and wanted to look a certain way.
Whichever account was accepted, it was Gordon’s own evidence that he entered the flat with his face covered to such an extent that Hoppie – who knew him – did not recognise him.

The Court also preferred Browne’s evidence that Gordon was seen searching the living room/kitchen area of the flat, in contrast to Gordon’s claim that he “did nothing” inside. Even if the jury did not accept Browne’s evidence as literal truth, they were entitled to treat it as rendering Gordon’s account “incredible”.

Entering a stranger’s flat in the early hours, face covered, in concert with others engaged in a robbery, and then searching the premises, is entirely consistent with knowing participation in a robbery and wholly inconsistent with the “innocent dupe going to a party” narrative.

4.3.6 Phone in “airplane mode” and attempts to avoid tracking

A particularly modern evidential feature concerns Gordon’s phone:

At 02:49 on 23 January, during a 6‑minute call from Bruce‑Annan to Leslie, Gordon put his phone into “airplane mode” and did not turn it back on until fleeing the scene.
The Court found the natural inference to be that this was done because he had agreed to be party to a robbery that was about to occur and wished to avoid cell‑site tracking.
This inference was fortified by later evidence:
- Once police began arresting co‑defendants, Gordon repeatedly kept his phone on airplane mode.
- He had searched the internet for “how does cell site work”.
- On arrest he refused to provide the PIN for his phone, which was only accessed by police during the trial.

These post‑offence acts demonstrate consciousness of guilt and an appreciation that phone data could implicate him in the conspiracy. The Court explicitly accepted that this behaviour was inconsistent with the claim of an unwitting party‑goer.

4.3.7 Continued concerted action after the offence

Following the events in the flat:

Gordon left the property at the same time as Leslie and travelled away in the same car with Leslie and Browne.
After turning his phone back on, Gordon made three attempts to call Bruce‑Annan during the return journey.
Upon arriving home, he then used his girlfriend Ashante’s phone to call Bruce‑Annan for 1 minute and 24 seconds.

The Court saw these calls as part of an ongoing pattern of acting in concert with co‑defendants, still inconsistent with any suggestion that he had been an unknowing bystander.

4.4 The role of prior convictions as propensity evidence

The Court also referred to Gordon’s previous convictions for robbery, which had been before the jury “as evidence of a propensity to rob”. This is a straightforward application of the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, under which prior similar offending can be admitted when it is directly probative of a current allegation of similar kind.

Here, the Court saw those convictions as giving a rational explanation for why Gordon was an “obvious candidate to be recruited to the conspiracy by Leslie”. They reinforced the implausibility of Leslie “tricking” him into attending an armed home invasion without disclosure of its criminal purpose.

4.5 Post-offence conduct and “consciousness of guilt”

Post‑offence conduct – particularly attempts to conceal involvement – can be powerful corroborative evidence of guilt. The Court relied on:

Use of airplane mode;
Internet searches regarding cell‑site analysis;
Refusal to provide a phone PIN; and
Dubious explanations for later contact with Hoppie and others.

The Court emphasised, for example, that Gordon’s story that Hoppie phoned him on 1 February 2022 to tell him she had been present at the incident (even though, on his account, nobody could have recognised him at the time) was “remarkable” and the jury were entitled to reject it.

4.6 Application of the “unsafe conviction” test

Under section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the Court of Appeal must allow an appeal against conviction if it considers the conviction “unsafe”. The Court concluded:

“In light of the evidence, we have summarised there was overwhelming evidence that the Appellant was guilty of conspiracy to rob, irrespective of the evidence given by Tianna Edwards. That conviction is not unsafe.”

Thus, even setting aside entirely the contested eyewitness evidence, the combination of:

Guilty pleas of co‑conspirators;
Phone and association evidence;
Conduct before, during, and after the incident;
Prior convictions for robbery; and
Efforts to frustrate investigation;

was more than enough to sustain the conspiracy conviction. The decision implicitly demonstrates that the Court will scrutinise carefully whether the evidential basis for multiple counts is overlapping or discrete when determining the knock‑on effects of quashing one conviction.

5. Substitution of Manslaughter for Murder

5.1 The statutory power under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968

Section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 empowers the Court of Appeal, in broad terms, to substitute a conviction for a different offence where:

The jury could properly have convicted the appellant of that other offence on the indictment, and
The substituted offence is supported by the facts as found at trial.

In this case, both the Crown and the defence accepted that, if the conspiracy to rob conviction stood, it would be open to the Court to substitute a verdict of manslaughter for the now‑quashed murder conviction. The Court also confirmed that it retained the power to do so because:

The appeal proceedings were ongoing; and
No order had yet been recorded in the Crown Court.

The Court had deliberately left open, after its earlier judgment, what further orders – including a possible retrial – might be necessary. The statutory precondition for exercising section 3 was therefore satisfied.

5.2 When is manslaughter an available substitute for murder?

Manslaughter is frequently a legally proper alternative to murder, particularly where:

The defendant participated in an unlawful and dangerous act (such as robbery) that caused death; but
The evidence falls short of proving the intent to kill or cause really serious harm required for murder, or is otherwise insufficient to support murder.

Here, the Court reasoned that, given the surviving conspiracy conviction:

“It is common ground that if we did not quash the conviction for conspiracy to rob, the consequence would be that Mr. [Gohel] died during the commission of an unlawful act. It follows that, as with Brandon Browne and Faith Hoppie, a conviction for manslaughter would have been available to the jury.”

The “unlawful act” in question is the robbery (or attempted robbery) arising out of the conspiracy. Unlawful act manslaughter requires:

An unlawful act which is a crime (e.g. robbery);
The act must be dangerous in the sense that all sober and reasonable people would recognise it as exposing another to the risk of some harm; and
The act must cause the victim’s death.

A planned home invasion robbery plainly qualifies as a dangerous unlawful act. Since Gordon’s participation in the robbery plan was now definitively established by the conspiracy conviction, it logically followed that manslaughter was a verdict open to the jury on the facts.

5.3 Why manslaughter remained available despite the murder conviction being unsafe

An important conceptual point is that the quashing of the murder conviction did not mean the jury’s factual findings could not support any homicide offence. The Court had set aside the murder verdict because:

The jury might have limited murder liability to those they were sure had been in the bedroom at the fatal moment; and
The only direct evidence placing Gordon there was the contested testimony of Edwards‑Hancock.

That reasoning undermined the specific route to a murder verdict, but it did not negate the evidence that:

Gordon was part of the robbery venture;
The robbery was in progress when Mr Gohel was killed; and
That killing was at least a foreseeable consequence of such a dangerous enterprise.

For unlawful act manslaughter, the prosecution is not required to prove that the offender intended to kill or cause really serious bodily harm, nor that they were present at the exact location of the fatal blow. It is sufficient that:

They participated in the unlawful act; and
The death resulted from that act.

Thus, even if the jury had doubts about whether Gordon was inside the bedroom during the killing, they could still have properly convicted him of manslaughter on a joint enterprise/unlawful act basis, as they did with Browne and Hoppie.

5.4 Avoiding a retrial: efficiency and fairness

Instead of directing a retrial on the murder count, the Court accepted the joint invitation of the parties to substitute manslaughter. Several considerations underpin this choice:

Fairness to the appellant: A retrial on a more serious charge (murder) would have prolonged uncertainty and stress, despite the Court’s recognition that the evidence for manslaughter was, in effect, incontrovertible if the conspiracy conviction stood.
Judicial economy: A full retrial would consume significant court time and public resources, to no obvious benefit, where the outcome on any properly directed trial would almost inevitably include a conviction for manslaughter.
Symmetry with co‑defendants: Browne and Hoppie had already been convicted of manslaughter in connection with the same robbery. Substituting manslaughter for Gordon aligns his legal liability with theirs, based on the same underlying facts.

The result is that Gordon’s criminal responsibility accurately reflects the reality that he was a participant in the unlawful and dangerous robbery during which Mr Gohel lost his life, even if he cannot safely be identified as one of those physically delivering the fatal attack in the bedroom.

5.5 Procedural consequences: no retrial and reporting restrictions

The Court expressly stated:

There will be no retrial in this case.
The reporting restriction imposed on 31 July 2025 now lapses.

The lapse of reporting restrictions generally signals that:

All material issues of guilt have been resolved;
No further jury will be empanelled in relation to these events; and
The usual open justice principle resumes unqualified force.

6. Precedents, Statutory Framework and Doctrinal Context

6.1 Authorities expressly mentioned in this excerpt

The excerpt of the judgment provided does not cite external case authorities by name. It does, however, refer to:

Section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 – the statutory basis for substituting manslaughter for murder.
The Court’s own earlier judgment in this appeal, [2025] EWCA Crim 1045 – which had already quashed the murder conviction.

Within this extract, the Court’s approach to conspiracy, manslaughter, and substitution of verdicts rests squarely on the statutory framework and on uncontroversial principles of criminal law and appellate practice, rather than on disputed or novel doctrinal developments.

6.2 Unsafe convictions and appellate standards

While not naming specific authorities, the Court’s reasoning reflects the settled approach that:

The Court of Appeal must consider the overall safety of each conviction in light of the evidence as a whole.
A conviction can be safe even if some parts of the prosecution case were defective, provided the remaining evidence is sufficiently strong.
Different counts can be treated differently if their evidential foundations do not wholly overlap.

By distinguishing the evidential base of the conspiracy count from that of the murder count, the Court illustrates how the “unsafe” test operates on a count‑by‑count, evidence‑specific basis.

6.3 Conspiracy to rob and the irrelevance of actual force

The Court’s rejection of the argument that only Gordon’s alleged use of force (as described by Edwards‑Hancock) could explain his conviction for conspiracy is an application of orthodox conspiracy doctrine:

Conspiracy punishes agreement, not execution.
In a conspiracy to rob, formulation of a plan that contemplates the use or threat of force suffices, regardless of whether force is actually deployed by any particular conspirator.

The reference to the “safe conviction of Faith Hoppie … when there was no evidence … that she actually used/participated in the use of force” underlines this doctrinal point: her liability rested on agreement to rob, not on her personally manhandling the victim.

6.4 Joint liability and unlawful act manslaughter

The Court’s acceptance that manslaughter was available to the jury for Gordon, as it was for Browne and Hoppie, aligns with principles of joint enterprise and unlawful act manslaughter:

Where several people embark on a joint enterprise to commit a dangerous unlawful act (such as robbery), all participants are potentially liable for manslaughter if death results during the execution of that enterprise.
This is so even if a particular participant did not inflict the fatal blow or was not in the exact room at the moment of the killing.

The Court’s approach ensures that Gordon’s liability reflects his participation in the overall robbery venture, rather than a narrow focus on his precise physical location at the instant of death.

6.5 Digital evidence, inferences and consciousness of guilt

The judgment is also emblematic of modern trends in criminal adjudication:

Heavy reliance on telecommunications evidence (duration, timing and pattern of calls; conference calls).
Use of “airplane mode” and related behaviour as circumstantial evidence of conscious attempts to avoid detection.
Inference from internet searches (here, about cell‑site analysis) as indicative of an awareness of investigative techniques and a desire to frustrate them.

This reflects the broader judicial acceptance that seemingly mundane digital actions can, when placed in context, powerfully evidence criminal intent and agreement.

7. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

7.1 Conspiracy

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a criminal offence. Key points:

The crime is the agreement itself; the planned offence need not be carried out.
Everyone who intentionally agrees to join the plan is a conspirator, whether or not they later take active steps to carry it out.
In a conspiracy to rob, it is not necessary to show that each conspirator used or intended to use force personally; it is enough that they intended that a robbery, which inherently involves force or threat of force, be committed.

7.2 Robbery and “muscle”

Robbery is essentially theft with force. The prosecution must show:

A theft (dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving them of it); and
The use or threat of force, immediately before or at the time of the theft, in order to steal.

When the Court refers to the need for extra “muscle”, it means that the nature of the intended robbery (a high‑value theft in a person’s own home) made it likely that additional people would be brought along to impose, or threaten, physical force if required.

7.3 Unlawful act manslaughter

Unlawful act manslaughter occurs where:

The defendant commits an unlawful act which is itself a crime (not merely a civil wrong);
The act is dangerous – meaning that all sober and reasonable people would foresee the risk of some physical harm, not necessarily serious harm; and
The act causes the victim’s death.

In this case, the unlawful act is the robbery (or attempted robbery) pursuant to the conspiracy. A violent home invasion plainly carries a risk of harm, and the death of Mr Gohel occurred in the course of that enterprise.

7.4 Substituted verdicts under section 3 Criminal Appeal Act 1968

Under section 3, the Court of Appeal may:

Quash a conviction for one offence (e.g. murder); and
Substitute a conviction for a different offence (e.g. manslaughter) if:
- The jury could have convicted of that alternative offence on the same indictment and evidence; and
- The substitution would not create unfairness.

This allows the Court to adjust the legal label attached to a defendant’s conduct (e.g. downgrading from murder to manslaughter) without requiring the ordeal and expense of a full retrial, where the underlying facts are already settled.

7.5 Safe vs unsafe convictions

A conviction is unsafe if the Court of Appeal thinks, in light of all the evidence and any new material, that the verdict cannot be trusted as a proper outcome. The Court does not simply re‑try the case, but asks whether:

The conviction may reasonably be regarded as secure; or
There is enough doubt – arising from errors, misdirections, fresh evidence, or weaknesses in the original case – that it should not stand.

In Gordon, the murder conviction was unsafe due to concerns linked to a single key witness about presence in the bedroom. The conspiracy conviction was considered safe because it rested on a wide and independent evidential base.

8. Impact and Future Significance

8.1 Independence of counts and resilience of inchoate convictions

The judgment sends a clear signal that:

Inchoate offences such as conspiracy can stand even where convictions for associated “completed” offences (such as murder) are overturned; and
Counsel must carefully analyse the evidential foundation of each count rather than assuming that the failure of one necessarily drags down the others.

This is particularly important in multi‑handed, multi‑count indictments involving complex joint enterprises.

8.2 Digital evidence as core proof of criminal agreement

The case exemplifies how:

Phone logs, conference calls, and timing data can substantially prove the existence and scope of a conspiracy;
Behaviour such as using “airplane mode” at crucial times can be interpreted as conscious steps to impede cell‑site tracking; and
Internet searches about investigative techniques can powerfully corroborate an inference of guilty knowledge.

For investigators and prosecutors, Gordon underlines the value of meticulous analysis of telecommunications and digital behaviour in building conspiracy and joint enterprise cases.

8.3 Clearer articulation of the scope of section 3 substitution powers

By explicitly recording that:

The Court still had power to substitute a manslaughter conviction given that the appeal proceedings were ongoing and no order had yet been drawn up in the Crown Court; and
Both parties invited the Court to exercise that power;

the judgment offers practical guidance on the timing and use of section 3 powers. It reassures that the Court can correct the legal characterisation of a defendant’s liability (from murder to manslaughter) without multiple trials, where the underlying facts and lesser offence are crystal clear.

8.4 Alignment of liability among co-defendants

Finally, the decision helps maintain rational consistency in group criminal liability:

Browne and Hoppie remained convicted of manslaughter and conspiracy to rob.
Gordon, whose participation in the same robbery was now beyond doubt, likewise stands convicted of conspiracy to rob and manslaughter.

This alignment preserves public confidence that all those who joined in a dangerous robbery where a man was killed are held appropriately accountable, even if not all can safely be labelled “murderers”.

9. Conclusion

Gordon v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1611 is a significant illustration of the modern criminal appellate court’s role in:

Separating out the evidential bases of different counts, ensuring that only those convictions truly undermined by identified weaknesses are quashed;
Upholding inchoate offences like conspiracy to rob where there is a robust, circumstantial and digital evidential foundation, independent of contested eyewitness testimony; and
Using statutory powers under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to substitute manslaughter for murder where participation in an unlawful and dangerous act that caused death is clear, but the specific murder verdict cannot safely stand.

The case particularly highlights:

The evidential power of telecommunications and digital behaviour (airplane mode, internet searches) in conspiracy cases;
The doctrinal reality that agreement to rob does not depend on proof that a given conspirator personally used violence; and
The flexibility of the appellate process in re‑labelling liability (from murder to unlawful act manslaughter) without unnecessary retrials, when justice and fairness so require.

In the broader legal landscape, Gordon reinforces that defendants who join dangerous group criminal ventures will remain liable for the fatal consequences of those ventures, even when evidential uncertainties prevent the ultimate label of murder, and that conspiracy convictions anchored in robust digital and circumstantial evidence will be closely guarded by the appellate courts.