Transparency, Child’s Voice and Continuing Seisin in High‑Conflict Access Disputes: Commentary on Y.Y. v Z.Z. [2025] IEHC 743

Transparency, Child’s Voice and Continuing Seisin in High‑Conflict Access Disputes: Commentary on Y.Y. v Z.Z. [2025] IEHC 743

Court: High Court (Circuit Appeal), Ireland
Judge: Jackson J
Date: 11 December 2025
Neutral citation: [2025] IEHC 743

1. Introduction

This judgment arises from a long‑running, high‑conflict family dispute between separated spouses, Y.Y. (father, the Appellant in the High Court) and Z.Z. (mother, the Respondent), concerning arrangements for their three children, now aged 16, 14 and 12. The parties married in 2008, separated in 2016, and have been engaged in what the Court described as “robust litigation” since.

The proceedings came before the High Court by way of a de novo appeal (full rehearing) from a Roscommon Circuit Family Court order of 13 November 2023, under section 38 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936. The sole issue for determination was the appropriate arrangements for the children in terms of contact with their father.

Both parents appeared as litigants in person. The Court had the benefit of multiple expert inputs, including section 32 reports from Ms Marie Louise McGovern, observation reports of supervised access, and a “voice of the child” report from Professor Sheehan. The judgment is firmly grounded in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (“the 1964 Act”) as amended, particularly:

  • section 3 – best interests of the child as the paramount consideration, and
  • section 31 – the structured “best interests” factors the Court must consider.

Beyond its specific factual outcome, the decision is legally significant for at least three reasons:

  • it offers a detailed, structured application of the section 31 best‑interests framework in a high‑conflict case;
  • it clarifies the approach to the voice of the child, drawing on DK v PIK [2023] IECA 7, and distinguishes between evidence and information obtained through judicial meetings with children; and
  • it affirms, relying on LT v JT [2012] IEHC 588, that in legally exceptional circumstances the High Court, on Circuit Family appeal, may retain seisin of the matter and list it for review, in order to respond dynamically to the evolving best interests of the children.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Family history and litigation context

The parties married in 2008 and separated in 2016. They have three children. The breakdown of the relationship was accompanied by significant acrimony. The mother described the father’s behaviour as “uncompromising” and “effectively abusive”, referring to volatility, verbal abuse, property damage and cannabis use. The father disputed much of this characterisation and asserted that he, rather than the mother, was the victim of abuse.

Following separation:

  • There were numerous court appearances in various fora.
  • Contact arrangements have repeatedly changed: access has been “ceased, curtailed and supervised” at different points.
  • At least three different expert assessors have been involved over time.
  • Supervised access services were at different times provided via Core Services and later by Ms McGovern.

The parents’ relationship has been characterised by what Jackson J describes as “years of acrimony and litigation fatigue”. A key feature of the case is the father’s persistent, wide‑ranging grievances against the mother, the Legal Aid Board, and the judiciary more generally, including a failed recusal application against Jackson J (based on her previous governance role with the Legal Aid Board and alleged systemic judicial bias).

2.2 Circuit Court proceedings and High Court appeal

The litigation pathway can be summarised as follows:

  • 2017 – The mother commenced judicial separation proceedings with ancillary reliefs in the Circuit Family Court.
  • 20 February 2020 – The Circuit Court granted a decree of judicial separation and ancillary orders. Importantly, it allowed the father to re‑enter a custody application in respect of the children, subject to specified experts attending the hearing.
  • The father appealed aspects of the 20 February 2020 orders to the High Court (O’Connor J).
  • 16 July 2021 – On appeal, O’Connor J made orders relating to supervised access (to be supervised by Core or another provider) with additional conditions, and granted leave to apply to the next sitting of Roscommon Circuit Court for more definitive access directions.
  • 20 December 2021 / 22 February 2022 – The High Court (O’Connor J) completed the substantive appeal in the judicial separation proceedings and delivered judgment.
  • Relying on the liberty to apply granted by O’Connor J, the matter was re‑entered in the Circuit Family Court in or about March 2023.
  • 13 November 2023 – The Circuit Family Court made fresh child‑related orders. It is these orders which are now under de novo appeal to the High Court (Jackson J).

Under section 38(2) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936, the High Court hears such appeals by way of rehearing – not limited to review of alleged legal error, but permitting a fresh examination of the issues and evidence.

2.3 Issues before the High Court

Jackson J identifies a single operative issue:

“The issue before me is a single one – what are the appropriate arrangements for the children in terms of contact with the Appellant?”

The Court deliberately confines itself to the statutory child‑law issues and declines to engage with the father’s extensive complaints about third parties, the courts, and conduct not relevant to the children’s best interests. This demarcation itself is an important indication of judicial discipline in separating:

  • legally relevant matters under the 1964 Act, from
  • broad, non‑justiciable grievances and systemic allegations.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Key holdings

The High Court:

  • Re‑affirms that the best interests of the child, as defined in sections 3 and 31 of the 1964 Act, are the paramount consideration in determining custody and access.
  • Engages closely with the reports of the section 32 assessor (Ms McGovern) and the voice‑of‑the‑child assessor (Prof Sheehan), and supplements this with direct meetings and correspondence with the children, conducted pursuant to the principles set out in DK v PIK [2023] IECA 7.
  • Finds that, despite serious inter‑parental conflict and the father’s “unrelenting, obsessive and aggressive” litigation behaviour, there is no evidence of inappropriate behaviour towards the children during access, and that they would benefit from a relationship with him, subject to strict conditions.
  • Emphasises that secret or furtive contact (such as undisclosed email communications and unannounced physical approaches) is contrary to the children’s emotional security and must cease; all contact must be transparent and structured.
  • Orders a carefully calibrated regime of unsupervised but structured contact for the two younger children, including:
    • monthly in‑person access (winter: hotel meal; summer: sports activity plus meal);
    • weekly 30‑minute video calls; and
    • unrestricted email contact, provided the mother is copied on all emails.
  • Respects the eldest child’s clearly and consistently expressed wish not to have ordered access, making no order in respect of her, while leaving the door open for her to join access with her siblings if she wishes.
  • Imposes strict non‑disparagement obligations on both parents regarding each other and each other’s families, coupled with a prohibition on the father attending access while under the influence of intoxicants.
  • Affirms most of the Circuit Court’s orders but relaxes restrictions on written contact (letters/cards/parcels), provided such correspondence is sent by ordinary post and not delivered personally.
  • Retains seisin of the case, granting liberty to apply and listing the matter for mention and potential review on 21 March 2026, relying on LT v JT [2012] IEHC 588 to justify this exceptional retention of jurisdiction in an appellate family case.

3.2 Overall outcome on access

The access regime can be summarised as follows (in respect of the 16‑, 14‑, and 12‑year‑old children):

  • Eldest child (16): No access order is made, respecting her wishes and maturity. She may, however, join contact with her siblings if she chooses.
  • Middle child (14) and youngest child (12):
    • In‑person contact:
      • October–February: once per calendar month, on a Saturday nominated by the father, two‑hour visit in a hotel in Carrick‑on‑Shannon (meal plus games).
      • March–September: once per calendar month, on a Saturday nominated by the father, four‑hour visit split between a sports activity (child‑nominated) and a meal in a public restaurant.
      • Transport is provided by the mother (drop‑off and collection), and the father and children must remain within specified public venues during access.
    • Electronic contact:
      • Weekly 30‑minute video call on Sundays (ordered, not optional).
      • Unrestricted email contact of “reasonable volume”, but all emails must be copied to the mother.
  • Extended family: The Court expressly encourages the involvement of the paternal grandmother during video calls and in person, underscoring the importance of extended family relationships where safe and appropriate.

The Court declines to make any costs order.

4. Legal Framework

4.1 Guardianship of Infants Act 1964

The judgment is firmly and explicitly anchored in the 1964 Act, as amended, particularly:

4.1.1 Section 3 – best interests as the “paramount consideration”

Section 3(1) provides that where guardianship, custody, upbringing or access to a child is in question, the court “shall regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration”. Section 3(2) further requires that the Court determine best interests in accordance with Part V, which includes section 31’s structured factors.

4.1.2 Section 31 – detailed best‑interests factors

Section 31(1) requires the Court to have regard to all relevant circumstances. Section 31(2) lists specific factors, including:

  • benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with each parent and other involved relatives;
  • the views of the child (whether via section 32 or otherwise);
  • the child’s physical, psychological and emotional needs and the likely effect of changes;
  • history of upbringing and care, and the desirability of preserving and strengthening relationships;
  • social, intellectual and educational needs;
  • harm suffered or at risk of being suffered, including household violence;
  • proposals for custody/access and parental willingness to co‑operate; and
  • the capacity of each parent to care for the child and to communicate and co‑operate on child issues.

Section 31(4) is also important: a parent’s conduct may be considered only to the extent that it is relevant to the child’s welfare and best interests. Jackson J expressly applies this constraint, declining to adjudicate on adult grievances beyond their impact on the children.

4.1.3 Section 32 – reports on the child’s views and welfare

Under section 32(1), the Court may appoint an expert to:

  • ascertain and report on the child’s views (s.32(1)(a)); and/or
  • advise on the child’s welfare and best interests (s.32(1)(b)).

Ms McGovern’s reports of July 2023 and June 2025 were prepared under section 32(1)(a)–(b), covering both the children’s expressed wishes and broader welfare analysis. The mother questioned whether Prof Sheehan, instructed as a voice‑of‑the‑child expert, had exceeded a strict section 32(1)(b) mandate by making recommendations. Jackson J nonetheless found his contribution helpful and consistent with the constitutional imperative to hear the child’s voice.

4.1.4 Section 11 – orders for custody & access

The specific access directions are made pursuant to section 11 of the 1964 Act, which empowers the Court to make orders as to custody and access in accordance with the child’s best interests.

4.2 Courts of Justice Act 1936 – de novo High Court appeal

Section 38 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 governs appeals from the Circuit Court to the High Court. Section 38(2) provides that such an appeal is to be heard by way of a rehearing of the action or matter. This authorises the High Court to:

  • receive fresh evidence (including updated expert reports and direct communications from the children),
  • reassess credibility and weight, and
  • substitute its own decision for that of the Circuit Court, guided only by the statutory and constitutional principles applicable in first instance.

4.3 Constitutional background

While not analysed in detail, the judgment is clearly informed by:

  • Article 41 – protection of the family as a fundamental unit in society;
  • Article 42A – the child’s rights, including:
    • the best interests of the child being of paramount consideration in specified proceedings; and
    • the child’s right to have his or her views heard and given due weight.

Jackson J’s decision to commission an up‑to‑date voice‑of‑the‑child report and then to personally meet with the children (under the framework endorsed in DK v PIK), as well as her recognition that the children did not wish to be burdened with making the final decision on contact, reflect a careful constitutional balancing:

  • hearing the child and respecting maturity and autonomy, but
  • avoiding the abdication of judicial responsibility to the children.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Expert evidence and the voice of the child

5.1.1 The role of Ms McGovern (section 32 assessor and access supervisor)

Ms Marie Louise McGovern served in a dual role:

  • as a section 32 assessor, reporting on the children’s views and welfare; and
  • as a supervised access facilitator, observing and recording the father–child interactions.

Her July 2023 report recommended:

  • supervised contact with the two younger children;
  • leaving access for the eldest child entirely to her own wishes;
  • conditions requiring the father to refrain from speaking negatively about the mother and the children’s support network in their presence;
  • cessation of unmonitored online contact; and
  • therapeutic interventions for both parents.

Her later report of 30 June 2025, informed by several supervised access sessions in early 2025, was more optimistic:

  • the eldest child continued to decline contact;
  • the middle child reported that access was going “pretty fine”, would prefer longer and more frequent unsupervised visits, and particularly wished for her father’s involvement in sport, without inter‑parental engagement; and
  • the youngest child expressed curiosity and a desire to “get to know his father”, describing him as “funny” but acknowledging some discomfort when conversation turned to the past.

Access observation reports were particularly important. They described:

  • “relaxed” visits with a “natural flow of reciprocated conversation”;
  • increasing comfort of the children in the father’s presence over time; and
  • no inappropriate behaviour or conversation from the father.

Crucially, Ms McGovern concluded that the father was capable of providing a “safe, warm atmosphere” for the children, though recommending a continued period of supervised “testing”. This finding weighed heavily in the Court’s decision not to suspend access altogether, but instead to move to structured unsupervised contact with safeguards.

5.1.2 The role of Prof Sheehan (voice‑of‑the‑child expert)

Given that the first McGovern report was over a year old by the time the High Court heard the appeal, and mindful of the children’s ages, Jackson J directed a fresh voice‑of‑the‑child assessment by Prof Sheehan. His report of 2 December 2024 largely corroborated the children’s positions previously captured by Ms McGovern:

  • the eldest child did not wish to have contact;
  • the middle child wanted a relationship with her father but was sensitive to loyalty tensions; and
  • the youngest child was curious and open to structured, limited engagement.

The mother criticised Professor Sheehan for allegedly overstepping his remit under section 32(1)(b) by making recommendations, but Jackson J clearly valued his input, particularly on the children’s emotional ambivalence and loyalty conflicts.

5.1.3 Direct judicial engagement with the children – DK v PIK

When undisclosed email contact between the father and the middle child emerged late in the hearing, and given the evolving nature of the children’s wishes, the Court determined to offer each child an opportunity to communicate directly:

  • the eldest child chose to write a letter but not to meet the judge;
  • the two younger children chose to meet with the judge.

Jackson J notes that these meetings were conducted “in accordance with the principles expressed by Collins J in DK v PIK [2023] IECA 7”. In that case, the Court of Appeal set out guidance on:

  • how and when judges may meet children directly;
  • the importance of clarity that such meetings are not an evidential process but a means of informing the Court’s understanding; and
  • the need to protect children from inappropriate pressure or responsibility.

Consistent with that guidance, Jackson J emphasises:

  • the information obtained in such meetings is “not evidence” but a “circumstance” the Court may consider;
  • the meetings confirmed that the children are “lovely”, thoughtful and moderate;
  • one child was clearly struggling with loyalty to both parents and wanted the Court, rather than herself, to make the decisions about contact; and
  • the father maintained a positive presence in their minds despite the long interruption in contact.

This nuanced handling of the children’s participation exemplifies the balance between:

  • listening to children and accurately reporting their views; and
  • not delegating the parental contact decision to them or burdening them with the responsibility for outcomes.

5.2 Application of the section 31 best‑interests test

A central strength of the judgment is its explicit, factor‑by‑factor engagement with section 31(2). Key aspects include:

5.2.1 Meaningful relationship with each parent and relatives (s.31(2)(a))

The Court finds that the children wish to have and will benefit from a relationship with their father and paternal family, subject to appropriate conditions. The middle child “misses him”; the youngest is “curious” and wants to get to know him better. The Court also highlights the importance of:

  • relationships with the paternal grandmother and aunt; and
  • preserving and strengthening these extended family ties, as far as compatible with the children’s welfare.

In this respect, the Court’s encouragement of the grandmother’s involvement on video calls and at access visits is a practical application of section 31(2)(a) and (d).

5.2.2 The children’s views (s.31(2)(b))

The Court carefully evaluates:

  • the children’s expressed wishes as reported by assessors;
  • the eldest child’s letter;
  • the younger children’s in‑person meetings with the judge; and
  • their indirect expressions of loyalty conflict and anxiety.

Jackson J concludes that:

  • The eldest child’s consistent and mature wish not to have ordered contact should be respected.
  • The middle child wants a relationship but feels torn by perceived disloyalty to her mother if she openly expresses this.
  • The youngest child wants “some limited and appropriate contact” and shares sporting interests with his father.
  • All three children prefer that responsible adults make the decisions rather than repeatedly exposing them to assessments and forcing them to choose.

The judgment thus illustrates a layered approach: ascertain and respect the children’s views, but assess those views in context, including loyalty pressures and parental conflict, rather than treating them as determinative.

5.2.3 Physical, psychological and emotional needs; harm and safety (s.31(2)(c) and (h))

No evidence of physical risk to the children from the father is found. The harm identified is mainly:

  • emotional harm from protracted litigation and high‑conflict interactions;
  • the destabilising effect of secret contact and “surprise” approaches (such as the father turning up during an outing with one child’s friends); and
  • exposure to verbal hostility between adults, including at a school event where an incident between the father and maternal grandfather led to a public order prosecution (later dismissed).

The Court explicitly holds that contact must not be:

  • secretive or furtive; or
  • unannounced in public settings.

These are described as “unfair, disruptive and discombobulating” for the children. The Court is “fearful” that secrecy will be encouraged if clear arrangements are not made. This leads directly to the insistence on:

  • copying the mother into all emails; and
  • banning surprise meetings.

By contrast, supervised access observations provided reassurances about the children’s emotional safety in the father’s presence when the context is structured and boundaries are clear.

5.2.4 History of care and relationships (s.31(2)(d))

The Court recognises:

  • that the mother has been the children’s primary caregiver for many years;
  • that she has managed work and parenting responsibilities appropriately; and
  • that the father’s contact has been significantly interrupted over time, due to both conflict and access breakdown incidents.

The children’s positive recollections and curiosity about their father, despite the hiatus in contact, support the view that retrieval and strengthening of relationships is both possible and desirable, provided emotional safety is safeguarded.

5.2.5 Social, intellectual and educational needs (s.31(2)(f))

The children are engaged in school and extracurricular activities, particularly sport. The father was a “keen and successful sportsman” in his youth; the children wish to share sporting activities with him. The Court perceptively identifies this as a potential positive shared domain, and structures summer access specifically around sports plus a meal, thereby using their social and recreative needs as a constructive access platform.

5.2.6 Parents’ capacity and willingness to facilitate relationships (s.31(2)(j)–(k))

The Court finds:

  • both parents love the children deeply;
  • the mother has been an effective day‑to‑day carer but is “exhausted” by litigation and may find ongoing encouragement of a relationship with the father difficult, though she has expressly assured the Court that she will facilitate contact;
  • the father’s court conduct is “aggressive” and “lacking insight”, with an “unrelenting, obsessive and aggressive” focus on grievances, but his conduct with the children in supervised settings has been appropriate, warm and safe; and
  • both parents are capable of placing the children’s welfare first if they engage in appropriate therapeutic support and self‑reflection.

Crucially, although the Court “strongly” recommends that the father seek counselling or support to address his grievances, it does not make this a condition of access. Instead, it crafts an access structure that:

  • limits risk by clear conditions and venues;
  • promotes transparency (no secret contact);
  • prohibits disparagement or toxic adult narratives in front of the children; and
  • reserves the Court’s power to review the arrangements if necessary.

5.3 Parental conduct, domestic conflict and relevance to access

A sensitive aspect of the judgment is how it deals with allegations of “abuse” and domestic turmoil. The mother alleges:

  • verbal abuse of herself and family members;
  • breaking of items by the father;
  • cannabis use; and
  • a particularly regrettable confrontation at a school event involving the father and maternal grandfather, witnessed by other children.

The father:

  • rejects use of the label “abusive”; and
  • counter‑alleges that he was physically abused by the mother (which she denies).

Rather than making definitive factual findings on each historic allegation, Jackson J:

  • acknowledges that the end of the relationship “involved negative behaviours”; and
  • evaluates this through the “lens of child welfare and children’s best interests”, consistent with s.31(4).

The conclusion is nuanced:

  • The father’s litigation behaviour and anger are concerning and “lacking insight”.
  • However, there is no evidence that these behaviours, as manifested towards the children, necessitate a complete suspension of contact.
  • What they do require is limited and conditional access, with mechanisms to protect the children’s emotional security.

The decision therefore reflects a clear distinction between:

  • adult‑to‑adult conflict and potential domestic abuse issues (serious but not automatically disqualifying a parent from contact), and
  • parent‑to‑child risk, where evidence from supervised visits indicates safety, warmth and appropriate boundaries.

This approach resonates with the modern understanding that exposure to high‑conflict parental dynamics can itself be harmful, but that carefully managed contact may still be in a child’s best interests absent evidence of direct abuse or neglect.

5.4 From supervised to unsupervised but structured contact

Previously, access had often been supervised due to concerns arising from inter‑parental conflict and the father’s behaviour with third parties (including service providers). However, by the time of the High Court appeal:

  • recent supervised visits showed positive, age‑appropriate interaction;
  • no inappropriate conversations or behaviours were reported; and
  • the children reported feeling increasingly comfortable.

Notably, by mid‑2025 the middle child expressed the view that supervision was not necessary and that unsupervised visits might feel “less formal”. This, coupled with the absence of concerning behaviours during access, led the Court to transition to unsupervised, structured contact, rather than indefinite supervision.

The access structure reflects several principles:

  • Predictability – fixed monthly pattern, advance notice and set venues.
  • Public, neutral settings – hotel restaurants and sports venues, reducing the scope for conflict or inappropriate behaviour.
  • Limited duration – two hours in winter; four hours in summer, balancing relationship building with the need not to overwhelm children who are rebuilding contact after long gaps.
  • Activity‑based engagement – prioritising normal, positive shared experiences (meals, games, sport) over heavy or conflict‑laden discussions.
  • No intoxication – explicit prohibition on attending access under the influence of intoxicants.

Moreover, recognising that digital contact had previously occurred in secret and in breach of orders, the Court converts digital contact into an ordered, transparent and regular feature of the children’s lives, thereby:

  • removing the need for furtive communication; and
  • reducing the perceived risk to children if such contact is discovered.

5.5 Retaining seisin and appellate review – LT v JT

Perhaps the most doctrinally significant aspect of the judgment is the High Court’s decision to retain seisin (continuing control of the case) after determining the appeal, and to list the matter for mention and possible review on 21 March 2026, with liberty to apply for six months.

Jackson J explicitly addresses the limits of an appellate High Court’s jurisdiction to continue involvement once an appeal from the Circuit Court has been determined. She cites White J’s judgment in LT v JT [2012] IEHC 588, where the Court held:

“21. A discretion always rests with the court dealing with custody and access disputes pursuant to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, to retain seisin of a case for the purposes of reviewing orders already made, once it reserves its position by either granting liberty to apply, indicating that it will retain seisin or indicating that it will review certain matters or deal with certain matters in default of agreement.

22. Any court however in exercising its jurisdiction to consider an application to vary a custody or access order, at all times having the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration must be careful to ensure that fair procedures are followed, and the jurisdiction of the court is not abused.

23. Where possible a party dissatisfied by an order of substance, should have a right of appeal.

24. Discretion must rest with the court of final appeal, in this case the High Court on appeal from the Circuit Court, to accept jurisdiction to re-open matters it has recently decided.”

Building on LT v JT, Jackson J states that the circumstances in which an appellate High Court should retain seisin are “strictly limited in nature”, and that the “legally exceptional circumstances” of this case justify doing so, namely:

  • the extreme and long‑running litigation history;
  • multiple breakdowns in access despite prior orders;
  • the father’s entrenched grievances and poor insight;
  • the sensitivity and evolving nature of the children’s positions; and
  • the need for a flexible, responsive approach to access arrangements as they bed in.

The Court therefore:

  • makes a detailed access regime as a final order on appeal but
  • reserves jurisdiction to review and modify it, in line with the children’s best interests, at the listed mention date or upon liberty to apply being invoked.

This underscores that, in child‑law matters, the concept of “finality” is qualitatively different to that in ordinary civil litigation. Orders are always made pro tempore, subject to variation where the welfare of the child requires it. The judgment thus reinforces that this flexibility extends, in exceptional circumstances, even at appellate level.

5.6 Precedents cited and their influence

5.6.1 DK v PIK [2023] IECA 7 – hearing the child’s voice

While the judgment does not quote directly from DK v PIK, it follows its spirit by:

  • ensuring the children were offered, but not forced into, direct communication with the judge;
  • clarifying that information gained from such meetings is not “evidence” in the narrow forensic sense, but is a contextual factor to which the Court can have regard; and
  • avoiding putting the children in the position of decision‑makers; instead, the Court listens and then decides.

The adherence to DK v PIK demonstrates how appellate guidance on child participation is being integrated into High Court practice, particularly on Circuit appeals where up‑to‑date child input is vital.

5.6.2 LT v JT [2012] IEHC 588 – retention of seisin by the appellate High Court

As analysed above, LT v JT provides the doctrinal foundation for the High Court’s power to retain seisin in custody and access disputes where:

  • the Court expressly reserves its position; and
  • doing so is necessary to protect the child’s welfare while respecting appeal rights and fair procedures.

In Y.Y. v Z.Z., Jackson J explicitly situates her approach within this jurisprudence, emphasising both:

  • the exceptional nature of retaining seisin on appeal; and
  • the justification for it on “extreme facts”.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 “Best interests of the child” and “paramount consideration”

When the law says the child’s best interests are the “paramount consideration”, it means:

  • the child’s welfare and needs come first;
  • adult grievances, preferences and rights are secondary in these proceedings; and
  • if there is a conflict between what is good for the adults and what is good for the child, the child’s interests must prevail.

6.2 Section 32 reports and the “voice of the child”

A section 32 report:

  • is prepared by an expert appointed by the Court;
  • may focus on hearing and recording the child’s views, or may go further to analyse their welfare;
  • helps the Court understand what the child thinks and feels, in a child‑appropriate way;
  • does not mean children decide the outcome; they inform, the judge decides.

6.3 “Supervised” vs “unsupervised” access

  • Supervised access: contact takes place in the presence of a neutral adult (e.g. a social worker or specialist supervisor) who monitors and reports on behaviour. It may be used at the start of rebuilding contact or where there are safety concerns.
  • Unsupervised access: the parent and child spend time together without a supervisor present. The Court may still set conditions (time, place, no intoxicants, etc.) to keep it safe and child‑centred.

6.4 “Retaining seisin” and “liberty to apply”

  • Retaining seisin: means the judge keeps legal control of the case, even after making an order, so that it can be revisited if necessary without starting from scratch.
  • Liberty to apply: means that, within certain limits, either party can come back to the same court to ask for adjustments (for example, if access is not working as hoped), again without issuing entirely new proceedings.

6.5 “De novo” appeal

A de novo appeal is a complete rehearing. The High Court is not confined to checking whether the Circuit Court made a legal error; it can:

  • hear fresh evidence;
  • reassess all issues; and
  • make its own independent decision, as if hearing the case for the first time.

6.6 Non‑disparagement orders

A non‑disparagement order requires parents not to:

  • criticise, belittle, or speak negatively about the other parent or their family in front of the child; or
  • undermine the child’s relationship with the other parent or grandparents through negative comments.

Such orders seek to protect children from being drawn into adult conflicts and from feeling that they must take sides.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 For Irish child‑arrangements jurisprudence

The judgment reinforces and develops several important themes in Irish family law:

  • Structured application of section 31: The methodical way in which the Court works through each relevant factor provides a model for future child‑arrangement decisions, particularly where parents are unrepresented and the factual matrix is complex.
  • Emphasis on transparency of contact: The clear rejection of secret or surprise contact, not because contact itself is harmful but because secrecy destabilises children and undermines co‑parenting, is likely to influence how courts address similar issues in future.
  • Balanced approach to conflict and alleged abuse: The Court resists simplistic binaries (good parent/bad parent, access/no access). Instead, it recognises that significant adult conflict can coexist with the possibility of safe, child‑centred contact, provided robust conditions are set.

7.2 For practice in high‑conflict cases and with litigants in person

The judgment:

  • demonstrates judicial management of hearings where both parties are self‑represented and one party repeatedly raises extraneous grievances;
  • shows how a judge can maintain focus on the statutory framework rather than becoming entangled in collateral disputes; and
  • models courteous but firm boundary‑setting: issues not relevant to the children’s best interests are not adjudicated in a child‑arrangements appeal.

7.3 For appellate practice and ongoing oversight

By formally retaining seisin and listing the matter for mention in 2026, Y.Y. v Z.Z. illustrates:

  • how the High Court can, in exceptional cases, retain an ongoing supervisory role over contact arrangements even after determining a Circuit appeal; and
  • how this can be done without undermining appellate rights or due process, in line with LT v JT.

This flexible, child‑centred approach may be particularly valuable in complex, entrenched disputes where one‑off orders have repeatedly failed to secure sustainable arrangements.

7.4 For the treatment of the child’s voice

The case exemplifies an integrated model of child participation:

  • initial section 32 assessments;
  • a fresh voice‑of‑the‑child report when time has passed and children’s views may evolve;
  • direct but carefully managed judicial engagement (letters and meetings); and
  • explicit recognition that children want and deserve to be heard, but do not want – and should not be asked – to carry adult decision‑making burdens.

8. Conclusion

Y.Y. v Z.Z. [2025] IEHC 743 is a careful, structured and humane application of the Irish best‑interests framework to a deeply conflicted family situation. It:

  • centres the children’s welfare, separating their needs from their parents’ grievances;
  • respects the eldest child’s mature choice, while supporting the younger children’s wish to know their father in a safe, bounded way;
  • moves from supervision to structured unsupervised contact based on positive evidence, not abstract suspicion;
  • stresses transparency and bans secret or surprise contact as harmful to emotional security; and
  • accepts, in exceptional circumstances, the need for the appellate High Court to retain seisin so that contact arrangements can be reviewed in light of the children’s evolving best interests.

Above all, the judgment illustrates that, even in the most acrimonious and litigious of separations, courts will continue to seek practical, child‑centred solutions which preserve and rebuild relationships where possible, while shielding children from the corrosive effects of adult conflict.

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