The Eight‑Fold Test for Judicial Review in Irish Planning Law:
Commentary on Reilly & Ors v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659

1. Introduction

The judgment of Humphreys J in Reilly & Ors v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 is an important planning and administrative law decision for two distinct reasons:

It synthesises a large body of case law into a clear, “eight‑fold path” test for the grant of relief in judicial review (paras. 40–47, 125), which is expressly presented as a general framework for future cases.
It applies that framework in the concrete context of a planning challenge to a relatively modest housing scheme in Dublin and, in doing so, clarifies:
- how alleged defects in planning application documentation are to be treated,
- what the adoption of a new development plan during an appeal means for public participation and An Coimisiún Pleanála’s procedures, and
- how “material contravention” arguments based on development plan documentation requirements (notably Dublin City Development Plan 2022–2028, Table 15‑1) are to be analysed.

The case concerned a judicial review brought by local residents and a community group against a decision of An Coimisiún Pleanála (“the Commission”) granting permission for a 31‑unit apartment development at Blackhorse Avenue/Villa Park Road, Dublin 7. Dublin City Council had granted permission under the 2016–2022 Development Plan; on appeal, the Commission granted permission in 2024, by which time the Dublin City Development Plan 2022–2028 (“the 2022 CDP”) had come into effect.

The applicants advanced a range of technical and process‑based objections after their substantive planning objections had failed before both the Council and the Commission. Humphreys J explicitly characterises these as an attempt to identify technical legal flaws after a loss on the merits (para. 1), and he uses the case as “an opportune occasion” (para. 40) to state, in systematic form, what must be shown before a court will quash an administrative decision by way of judicial review.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Issues before the Court

Although the applicants initially pleaded multiple “core grounds” (para. 37), by the hearing three principal domestic‑law grounds remained:

Ground 2 (Application validity): The planning application was allegedly invalid because:
- the statutory application form incorrectly answered “No” to a question about proximity to a recorded monument;
- drawings allegedly omitted proper plans/elevations of the buildings to be demolished;
- no details of rooftop plant were included at application stage; and
- drawings allegedly did not indicate distances between the proposed building and site boundaries “in figures” as required by the Planning and Development Regulations 2001.
Ground 4 (Failure to use s.131 / s.137 powers & fair procedures): Once the 2022 CDP came into effect while the appeal was pending, the Commission was said to be obliged (under ss. 131 and/or 137 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 and fair procedures) to:
- re‑notify the public or consult further on the application of the new plan, and
- in particular, to give non‑appellant objectors (the 2nd, 3rd and 4th applicants) an opportunity to make submissions on the 2022 CDP.
Ground 5 (Material contravention of the 2022 CDP): The permission allegedly:
- materially contravened Table 15‑1 of the 2022 CDP, which sets documentation thresholds for various reports (e.g. Operational Management Statement, Construction Management Plan, Climate Action & Energy Statement) for schemes above certain sizes, and
- contravened heritage objectives BHA2 and BHA24 relating to protected structures, recorded monuments and historic buildings.

Core grounds framed in EU/environmental terms, including an Article 6 Habitats Directive/SPA screening challenge (Ground 6), had been abandoned (para. 38).

2.2 Outcome

The High Court dismissed the proceedings (para. 126(i)). On each surviving ground, Humphreys J held that:

the alleged legal errors were either not established on the facts, or
were not legally significant, or
had caused no material prejudice and were therefore harmless technicalities that did not justify certiorari, and
in any event, the court’s discretion and proportionality concerns militated strongly against quashing the permission.

The Court indicated a provisional “no order as to costs” position, subject to any written submissions (para. 126(ii)–(iii)).

3. The Eight‑Fold Test for Judicial Review Relief

The central doctrinal contribution of this judgment is the articulation of an eight‑part cumulative test for the grant of relief in judicial review (paras. 40–47, 125). Humphreys J encapsulates judicial review in a single sentence:

“Is there a legal problem with the decision that has been demonstrated to make a genuine difference to a meaningful objective interest that the applicant is entitled to advance?” (para. 41)

He then unpacks this into eight cumulative requirements (para. 43):

Test	Content	In Reilly
I. Jurisdiction	Time limits, standing, capacity, exhaustion of alternative remedies, and compliance with procedural pre‑conditions (e.g. s.50 P&D Act).	Not contentious; applicants were within time, had general standing, and JR was the proper route.
II. Workability	Interpret laws and obligations so as to be workable and coherent; avoid interpretations that render schemes unworkable or impossibly onerous (paras. 49, 90–102).	Used to reject the argument that every new development plan during an appeal triggers mandatory re‑consultation with the public.
III. Proper pleadings	Grounds must be pleaded with specificity (O.84 r.20(3)); applicants are confined to their grounds; complex EU points must be articulated clearly (paras. 50–50(viii)).	Applicants’ pleading on material contravention/ Table 15‑1 was close to the line, but the Court addressed the merits and found no evidential substantiation.
IV. Standing to raise the specific point	Beyond general standing, the applicant must be entitled to raise each particular issue; cannot rely on ius tertii (rights of third parties) or hypothetical rights not actually denied (paras. 51–62).	Applicants could not complain on behalf of “the public” about alleged consultation defects when they themselves had opportunities to participate.
V. Material must have been before the decision‑maker	Save for defined exceptions, legality is assessed by reference to the material before the decision‑maker at the time (paras. 67–68). Points not raised below and not subject to an autonomous duty are generally not a basis for quashing.	Applicants did not put alleged differences between the 2016 and 2022 CDPs to the Commission; could not later say the Commission erred for not addressing them.
VI. Onus of proof	There is a presumption of validity; the applicant bears the evidential burden to prove all facts necessary to show an unlawful decision, subject only to narrow shifts of burden (e.g. harmless error once an error is shown) (paras. 69–69(viii)).	Applicants failed to prove any substantive deficiency in the information before the Commission, or any real defect flowing from alleged documentation gaps.
VII. Error must be more than harmless/technical	Even if error is shown, relief is not granted for harmless, non‑material, purely technical departures; the court considers whether there is a real‑world consequence (paras. 70–70(ix)).	Any arguable mis‑answer on the application form, or lack of numeric boundary distances, was at most a minor technicality in a context where information on archaeology and layout was readily available and considered.
VIII. Discretion	Judicial review remedies are discretionary; the court weighs delay, prejudice, proportionality, historicity, the importance of the breached provision, and other case‑specific factors (paras. 71–71(iv)).	Even assuming error, the absence of prejudice, the applicants’ failure to raise points in the process, and the modest scale of any defect would lead the court to refuse certiorari.

Humphreys J emphasises that all eight elements are cumulative: failure on any one is sufficient to refuse relief. In this case, much of the analysis focuses on workability, standing, the burden of proof, harmless error, and discretion (para. 44).

4. Analysis of the Specific Grounds

4.1 Ground 2 – Allegedly Defective Application Documents

(a) Alleged mis‑answer about proximity to a recorded monument

The application form asked whether the development “affects or is close to a monument or place recorded under s.12 of the National Monuments (Amendment) Act 1994”. The developers answered “No”. The applicants said this was wrong because of the nearby recorded monument DU018‑021 “Poor Man’s Well”.

The Court rejected this for several reasons:

Factual context: The developer’s archaeologist, Jacqui Anderson, explained that archaeological investigations in 2015 had pinpointed the exact location of the well and revised the earlier, broader “zone of potential”. The more precise “zone of notification” shown on archaeology.ie no longer extended to the development site (paras. 74–75).
Full archaeological information was before the authorities: The application documentation clearly identified the recorded monument and contained an archaeological assessment; the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage was notified, and Condition 10 imposed archaeological monitoring (paras. 72, 82).
No statutory requirement to mention monuments in public notices: The applicants tried to bootstrap the alleged mis‑answer into a defect in public notices. But Art. 18(3)(d) of the 2001 Regulations requires newspaper notices to mention works to a protected structure, not a nearby monument; and there is no equivalent requirement for site notices (paras. 80–81).

Against that background, the judge held that:

it was not incorrect, given the refined mapping and expert evidence, to say the development was not “close to” the monument (para. 74); and
even if one assumed a technical error, any defect was immaterial and caused no prejudice: the monument’s existence and proximity were transparently described in the documentation, had been actively assessed, and had in fact been the subject of the applicants’ own submissions (paras. 82, 86).

This is a concrete application of the “substantial compliance” principle derived from Monaghan UDC v Alf‑a‑Bet Promotions [1980] I.L.R.M. 64 (Henchy J.) (para. 78): only defects that undermine the statutory purpose of public notification and participation, and are more than trivial or technical, will vitiate a permission.

(b) Alleged absence of proper demolition drawings

The applicants claimed that no adequate drawings of the buildings to be demolished were provided.

The Court found this was “substantially factually incorrect” (para. 83):

Existing Site Plan, Elevations and Sections (drawings XX180–182) clearly showed the houses proposed for demolition at 1:200 scale, with heights; and
the application form itself specified that habitable houses were to be demolished and gave floor area figures.

Again, even assuming some deficiency, the issue was fully ventilated through the request for further information (RFI) and response, and no prejudice was shown. The harmless error and discretion tests pointed firmly away from relief (paras. 83, 86).

(c) Mechanical plant details and RFIs

The applicants argued that rooftop plant had not been properly described at application stage, in breach of Articles 22–23. The Court held:

Article 22(4)(a) requires “such plans and particulars as are necessary to describe the works” at application stage, but envisages that further detail can be sought by further information; the 2001 Regulations are designed around an iterative process (para. 77).
Details of plant, including a supplementary noise impact assessment, were supplied at RFI stage and reviewed by the planning authority; the Commission had that information before it.

Therefore, even if the initial documentation could have been more detailed, this was remedied in the course of the process. Citing cases like Balscadden Road SAA Residents Association v An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 586, the judge distinguishes genuinely fundamental documentation defects (e.g. absence of statutorily required information throughout the process) from correctable inadequacies that are in fact corrected (para. 85).

(d) Boundary distances “in figures”

Article 23(1)(f) requires site layout plans to show the “distance of the structure from any site boundaries in figures”. The applicants alleged non‑compliance, as the drawings relied on scale rather than explicit numeric annotations.

Again, the Court found this was “substantially factually incorrect” (para. 84): the Site Layout Plan and Landscape Plan at 1:200 made the distances evident and enabled precise measurement. The failure to express them as written numbers, if it occurred at all, was:

a “purely formal technicality” (para. 84), and
demonstrably non‑prejudicial, since the first‑named applicant successfully quoted exact distances in his appeal to the Commission based on those plans.

(e) Application of the eight‑fold test on Ground 2

On this ground, several legs of the eight‑fold test were fatal to the applicants:

Onus of proof (Test VI): The applicants had not proved, with evidence, that any real informational gap existed, nor that such a gap misled them or the public (paras. 83–84).
Harmless error (Test VII): Even if technical defects were assumed, they had “no objective reason” to be seen as risking harm to archaeological heritage or public participation (paras. 82, 86).
Discretion (Test VIII): Any errors were minor, were remedied within the process, and caused no prejudice; quashing would be disproportionate (paras. 86, 125(ix)–(x)).

Ground 2 was therefore rejected in full (para. 87).

4.2 Ground 4 – Sections 131/137, New Development Plan and Fair Procedures

(a) The complaint

Dublin City Council decided the application under the 2016–2022 CDP. The 2022 CDP was adopted on 2 November 2022 and came into effect on 14 December 2022, while the Commission’s appeal was pending. The applicants argued:

the Commission was obliged, under s.131 (power to request submissions) and/or s.137 (procedural directions) P&D Act 2000, to invite fresh submissions from the public specifically on the 2022 CDP; and
failure to do so, especially as regards the non‑appellant second, third and fourth applicants, breached fair procedures and natural justice.

(b) Notice of the new plan and deemed knowledge of law

Two key points undercut this complaint:

The developer’s appeal response (Dec 2022) explicitly referred to the forthcoming 2022 CDP and stated that:
- the zoning remained Z1,
- the development was consistent with the 2022 CDP, and
- relevant policies from the new plan were addressed in the response (para. 10).
The Commission’s letter of 2 December 2022 invited the first applicant and the Council to make submissions on this response (paras. 13, 98).
Statutory public notice of the new plan: Under s. 12(12) P&D Act 2000, the adoption of a development plan is notified in a local newspaper and copies are made available. Humphreys J stresses that such publication operates as effective notice “urbi et orbi” (para. 95) and engages the maxim ignorantia iuris neminem excusat (ignorance of the law is no excuse) (paras. 95–96).

The Court holds that participants in the planning system are deemed to know the applicable law, including which plan is in force (paras. 90–92, 96, 100).

(c) Participation opportunities actually afforded

Factually, the Court emphasises:

Only the first applicant (or, arguably, the residents’ group for whom he claimed to appeal) was an appellant to the Commission; there is no concept of a single appeal “on behalf of” other individuals without each paying their own fee (paras. 8–9).
On 2 December 2022, the Commission wrote under s.131 inviting the first applicant to make submissions on the developer’s response that expressly raised the 2022 CDP (paras. 13, 98).
The first applicant did, in fact, lodge a further submission on 16 December 2022, after the 2022 CDP had come into force (paras. 15, 98).
He did not raise any arguments about the 2022 CDP in that submission (para. 99).

In light of this, the claim that the applicants had “no opportunity” to deal with the 2022 CDP is described as “ring[ing] hollow” (para. 101).

(d) Standing and ius tertii

Humphreys J applies standing principles (Test IV) to reject the attempt to frame the case as one about the rights of “the public”:

Applicants cannot, save perhaps in cases of fundamental breakdowns, argue on behalf of unidentified members of the public that their participation rights were infringed (paras. 60–62, 97).
The first applicant cannot contend that he lacked an opportunity to make submissions on the 2022 CDP when he clearly did (paras. 98, 125(ii)(b)).

(e) Workability and infinite regress

The judgment is particularly clear on the need for a workable interpretation of the legislation (Test II). To treat the adoption of a new development plan as triggering a mandatory duty to:

re‑advertise the appeal, and/or
invite fresh submissions from the wider public about the new plan,

would, in the Court’s view, risk “endless procedural regress” (para. 100) and is inconsistent with the need for an administratively workable system (paras. 49, 90–102).

In essence:

Sections 131 and 137 confer discretionary powers on the Commission; they are not hard‑edged duties that are automatically triggered by every change in the planning policy framework (para. 89, Developer’s summary).
The reasonable expectation is that participants in the process:
- inform themselves of applicable plans (which are the subject of their own extensive public participation process), and
- use opportunities actually offered by the Commission to raise any plan‑based objections.

(f) Application of the eight‑fold test on Ground 4

On this ground, several aspects of the eight‑fold test are determinative:

Standing (Test IV): the applicants cannot complain about alleged procedural unfairness to others; they themselves had an opportunity to participate and, in the first applicant’s case, did so (paras. 97–101, 125(i)–(ii)).
Lens of material before the decision‑maker (Test V): no material was put to the Commission asserting that the 2022 CDP changed the outcome or identifying relevant differences from the 2016–2022 plan (para. 99). It is inappropriate to mount such a complaint for the first time in judicial review (paras. 99–101).
Workability (Test II): the applicants’ implied duty to halt or reopen the process whenever a new policy is adopted is unworkable (paras. 90–102).

Ground 4 therefore fails (para. 103).

4.3 Ground 5 – Material Contravention, Table 15‑1 and Heritage Objectives

(a) Table 15‑1 – is it mandatory or advisory?

Table 15‑1 of the 2022 CDP sets out “thresholds for planning applications” and, under Chapter 15.2.3 (“Planning Application Documentation – Planning Thresholds”), links particular scales and types of development to specific supporting documents (e.g. Operational Management Statement, Construction/Demolition Waste Management Plan, Climate Action & Energy Statement).

The introductory text is mixed:

It speaks of “further guidance and specific requirements” on “necessary components” of applications (para. 106, emphasis added).
It says Table 15‑1 “sets out the development thresholds for some of the documentation” and that “Applicants are advised to consult this table” (para. 106).

Humphreys J acknowledges that this language is “a classic political fudge” (para. 107), but concludes that, taken as a whole, Table 15‑1 is best read as setting specific requirements for documentation, not merely non‑binding advice (paras. 107–110). He further holds that:

where a new development plan comes into force while an application is pending, the default position is that the new plan applies to any decision taken thereafter (para. 110); and
documentation requirements in a development plan can, at least in principle, form part of the “material contravention” analysis, because they are process elements that can potentially affect outcomes (para. 113).

Thus, Table 15‑1 is treated as part of the binding policy context, rather than purely aspirational text.

(b) However: applicants did not prove any substantive non‑compliance

The applicants pleaded that the development (31 units) exceeded the threshold but was not accompanied by the specific documents named in Table 15‑1: an Operational Management Statement, Engineering Services Report, Construction Management Plan, Operational Waste Management Plan, Climate Action & Energy Statement, etc. (para. 116).

Humphreys J makes two key points:

Pleading versus proof: Even if the pleadings are taken as sufficiently clear, the applicants provided no evidence that the substance of what Table 15‑1 requires was missing. They merely demonstrated that not every report carried the precise label used in the table (para. 117).
Substance over titles: The developers, in fact, had lodged:
- a Drainage and Engineering Services Report;
- a Preliminary Construction and Demolition Waste Management Plan;
- a Construction Traffic Management Plan;
- a Building Lifecycle Report and Energy Statement; and
- other technical and design documentation (Developer’s summary, para. 105).
The applicants never identified what concrete informational or analytic gap existed in this material relative to what Table 15‑1 sought to achieve.

Therefore, on Test VI (onus of proof), they failed to show any real process defect, let alone a “material contravention”.

(c) “BHA2” and “BHA24” – heritage objectives

The applicants also alleged material contravention of:

Objective BHA2 (development affecting protected structures, their curtilage and setting); and
Objective BHA24 (reuse and refurbishment of historic buildings and streetscapes).

The Court’s reasoning can be summarised as:

BHA24 is about encouraging refurbishment and sustainable reuse of genuinely “historic” buildings. It does not amount to a blanket veto on demolition of any older building; it is aimed at fabric worthy of preservation in its own right (para. 120).
BHA2 is largely focused on protected structures and their curtilage; in this case there was no work to any protected structure, only a modest impact on the setting of a recorded monument separated from the site by a road (para. 120).
The developers’ archaeological and architectural heritage assessments addressed the monument and nearby heritage; the Inspector considered these and recommended appropriate mitigation (Condition 10) (paras. 72, 83, 118–119).

On this basis, there was no obvious conflict between the permission and BHA2/BHA24. Given the evaluative nature of such objectives, the Commission was not required to spell out an extended discussion of them where no significant issue of contravention arose (para. 121).

The applicants’ failure to raise any such “material contravention” arguments during the administrative process was also relevant to discretion and to the assessment of whether any substantial heritage impact existed (paras. 122–123).

(d) Application of the eight‑fold test on Ground 5

This ground fails primarily on:

Onus of proof (Test VI): No evidence was produced to show that, in substance, the documentation was deficient relative to Table 15‑1 (para. 117) or that any tangible adverse impact on heritage arose from alleged non‑compliance with BHA2/BHA24 (paras. 120–123, 125(vi)(c)).
Lens of material before the decision‑maker (Test V): The applicants never raised such documentation/heritage “contravention” points before the Commission; they cannot complain now that the Commission failed to address an argument that was never put to it (paras. 99, 122–123).
Harmless error & discretion (Tests VII–VIII): Even if one posited some technical lack of perfectly labelled reports, it had no demonstrated impact on heritage protection, public participation, or the substantive planning balance. Quashing would therefore be disproportionate (paras. 123–124, 125(vii)–(x)).

Ground 5 was therefore rejected (para. 124).

5. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shape the Decision

The judgment draws extensively on prior Irish and EU case law, but most of it is used to support the general eight‑fold framework rather than to decide a novel point of substantive planning law. Some of the main strands are:

5.1 Nature and limits of judicial review

Judicial review is not an appeal on the merits:
- Sweeney v Fahy [2014] IESC 50 – distinction between legality and correctness (para. 46(i)).
- State (Keegan) v Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 – no substitution of the court’s view for that of the decision‑maker (para. 46(i)).
- R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 – dangers of dressing up factual disagreements as points of law (para. 46(i)).
Not “politics by another means”:
- R (Hoareau & Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 221 – warning against using judicial review as a vehicle for political disagreement (para. 46(ii)).
Decisions read sensibly and “in the round”:
- Irish and UK authorities (e.g. Blewett, M.R. (Bangladesh), St Margaret’s Recycling) emphasise that courts must avoid hyper‑literal, atomistic parsing of reasons; decisions are to be read as a whole, seeking a valid interpretation if fairly available (paras. 46(iv)–(vii)).

5.2 Pleading standards

Authorities such as A.P. v DPP, Casey v Minister for Housing, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v ABP [2024] IESC 28 are canvassed to underscore:

Applicants are “confined to their pleadings”,
Order 84 r.20(3) requires precise grounds and particulars, and
scattergun or “witch’s brew” pleadings (a phrase from Hellfire Massy Residents’ Association v ABP [2022] IESC 38) are to be discouraged (para. 50(v)).

In Reilly, Humphreys J implicitly applies these principles to insist that a complaint such as “the development contravenes Table 15‑1” must be backed by a clear route‑map: what exactly is missing, why it matters, and how it could have influenced the decision (paras. 116–117).

5.3 Standing, Aarhus and EU environmental law

The judgment gives a rich survey of Court of Justice case law on access to justice and participation under the Aarhus Convention:

Djurgården-Lilla Värtans (C‑263/08); Commission v Germany (C‑137/14); Stichting Varkens in Nood (C‑826/18); Protect (C‑664/15); and North East Pylon Pressure Campaign (C‑470/16) (paras. 54–56, 66).

From these, Humphreys J takes:

For environmental NGOs falling under Article 9(2) Aarhus, standing and access to court cannot be conditioned on prior participation in the administrative process.
For members of “the public” under Article 9(3), national law may impose reasonable conditions, including prior participation, provided they are proportionate and do not undermine the essence of the right of access to justice.
However, none of this allows an applicant to raise issues that are purely ius tertii or based on hypothetical harms to others rather than their own legitimate interests (paras. 60–62, 97).

5.4 Harmless error (Altrip line of authority)

The decision strongly affirms the “harmless error” doctrine as applicable to both domestic and EU‑law errors:

Gemeinde Altrip (C‑72/12) – not every “procedural defect” in EIA context requires annulment; the court may rely on developer evidence to conclude the outcome would not have been different (para. 70(i), (iii), (v)).
UK authorities such as Champion and other domestic Irish cases (e.g. Carrownagowan Concern Group v ABP, Massey v ABP) are cited to similar effect (paras. 70(i)–(iv)).

In Reilly, this doctrine underpins the refusal to quash for:

any arguable mis‑answer on the monument question (paras. 82, 86);
any purely formal failure to express distances “in figures”; and
any alleged labelling defect in documentation vis‑à‑vis Table 15‑1 (para. 117).

5.5 Workability and evolution of projects

Drawing on Waltham Abbey; Pembroke Road Association v ABP [2022] IESC 30 and similar cases, the Court emphasises that:

statutory and policy regimes must be interpreted so as to be practicable,
planning applications can and do evolve through RFIs and amendments, and
the law does not require freezing the process or restarting public consultation every time a new plan or guideline is adopted (paras. 49, 77, 90–103).

6. Simplifying Key Concepts

6.1 Judicial review vs. appeal on the merits

An appeal asks whether the decision was right or wrong on the substance.
Judicial review asks whether:
- the correct legal procedures were followed,
- the decision‑maker stayed within their powers,
- relevant matters were considered (and irrelevant matters were not), and
- the decision is reasonably open on the evidence, not irrational.

Even a decision many might think “bad” on planning merits will stand unless there is a proven legal flaw that meets all eight components of the test in para. 43.

6.2 Standing and ius tertii

Standing means having a sufficient interest to bring the case and raise particular issues.
Ius tertii means arguing someone else’s legal rights. In general, a litigant:
- cannot challenge a planning decision solely because it might have infringed the rights of some other, unidentified third party; and
- cannot complain of being denied a participation right that they in fact enjoyed and exercised (paras. 60–62, 97, 125(i)–(ii)).

6.3 Harmless error / non‑material defect

A harmless error is a legal or procedural misstep that would not have changed the outcome and did not meaningfully impair public participation or environmental protection. Courts do not quash for such defects, particularly where:

all relevant information was in fact available,
objectors were not misled or disadvantaged, and
the alleged defect is purely formal (e.g. numbering style, document labels).

In Reilly, the alleged errors (application form answer, drawing formats, report titles) fell squarely into this category (paras. 82–86, 117, 123, 125(vii)).

6.4 Material contravention

A material contravention of a development plan is a significant departure from a policy or objective that the plan makes binding for development control purposes. It is not:

a minor technical departure, or
a failure to tick every procedural box where the underlying objectives have in substance been met.

Humphreys J treats documentation requirements in Table 15‑1 as capable of forming part of the material contravention analysis (para. 113), but insists that an applicant must:

identify a real and substantive shortfall in information, and
demonstrate how that could have affected the assessment or decision.

6.5 Development plans and mid‑stream changes

Development plans are periodically updated. When a new plan comes into effect while an application or appeal is pending:

the default rule is that the decision should comply with the new plan (para. 110);
participants are deemed to know that plan once validly adopted and advertised (paras. 95–96); and
there is no absolute duty to re‑advertise or re‑open participation every time a plan or policy changes (paras. 90–103).

The key is whether, on the actual facts, people had a fair opportunity to make submissions and whether the decision‑maker had the relevant policies in mind. In Reilly, both conditions were satisfied.

7. Impact and Implications

7.1 Consolidation of the “eight‑fold path” as a general template

The most enduring legacy of this judgment is likely to be the eight‑fold test for relief in judicial review. By synthesising strands from Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court case law (as well as EU law), Humphreys J provides a structured checklist that:

judges can use to organise their analysis;
lawyers can use to frame and test their cases; and
litigants can use to understand why even a plausible “legal point” may not yield a quashing order (para. 42).

In planning and environmental cases in particular, this framework reinforces:

the primacy of materiality and prejudice,
the centrality of properly pleaded, evidence‑backed arguments, and
the court’s discretion to refuse relief where quashing would be disproportionate or futile.

7.2 For local objectors and community groups

The judgment sends several clear signals:

Participate early and fully: Points not raised in the administrative phase, especially where there is no autonomous duty on the decision‑maker, will be hard to rely on later (paras. 64–66, 99–101, 125(vi)(b)).
Substance beats form: Courts are unlikely to quash permissions for purely formal irregularities in application forms or drawing notation where:
- you in fact understood the proposal,
- you made detailed submissions, and
- no one was misled.
Do not rely on speculative public rights: You cannot generally mount a challenge solely on the basis that someone else might have been deterred from participating (paras. 60–62, 97).

7.3 For developers and planning authorities

The case offers reassurance on several fronts:

RFIs as a valid corrective mechanism: Deficiencies in initial documents can be cured by further information, provided the process as a whole gives a fair opportunity for participation and assessment (para. 77, 83–84).
No automatic re‑opening on new plans: The adoption of a new development plan mid‑process does not, of itself, oblige the Commission to re‑advertise or widen participation, assuming parties are on notice and have opportunities to be heard (paras. 90–103).
Documentation requirements in plans matter, but titles are not everything: Authorities should aim to comply expressly with tables like Table 15‑1, but the decisive question is whether the substance of the required analysis is present, not whether each report bears a precise label (paras. 107–117).

7.4 For the Commission and future litigation strategy

The judgment fits into a broader trajectory of Irish case law narrowing the scope for successful challenges based on:

overly technical documentation complaints,
scattergun pleadings, and
micro‑analysis of reasons.

At the same time, it underlines the importance for the Commission of:

making sure that, when a new development plan comes into effect, its decisions explicitly refer to that plan (as happened here), and
ensuring that key statutory consultees (e.g. in archaeology) are notified and their comments addressed, so that harmless error arguments are well‑founded.

8. Conclusion

Reilly & Ors v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 is more than a routine dismissal of a planning judicial review. It is a doctrinal consolidation exercise in which Humphreys J:

distils Irish and EU case law into a clear, eight‑part cumulative test that must be met before relief in judicial review will be granted;
re‑affirms the principles of:
- substantial rather than hyper‑technical compliance,
- workability of statutory schemes, and
- harmless error and proportionality;
clarifies that mid‑process changes in development plans do not automatically trigger an obligation to reopen public participation, especially where parties are on notice and opportunities to comment are provided; and
treats development plan documentation thresholds (such as Table 15‑1 of the 2022 CDP) as potentially binding “requirements”, while insisting that applicants who allege material contravention must prove substantive informational gaps, not just mismatched report titles.

In practical terms, the case makes it significantly harder to overturn planning permissions solely on minor technical defects in application forms, drawings or document labelling, particularly where objectors:

were fully able to participate,
understood the development, and
failed to raise the very points they later seek to rely upon.

As Irish planning law continues to evolve under the twin pressures of housing demand and environmental protection, this judgment will stand as a leading authority on when and how judicial review will intervene: only where a demonstrable legal error makes a genuine difference to an objective interest that the applicant is entitled to advance, and where the court is satisfied that quashing is a necessary and proportionate remedy.

The Eight‑Fold Test for Judicial Review in Irish Planning Law: Commentary on Reilly & Ors v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659