The BXQ Framework: Clarifying Joint-Enterprise Liability for Continuing Assaults After Initial Grievous Injury

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision in R v BXQ ([2025] EWCA Crim 1088) addresses a recurrent but previously unsettled question: When, if ever, can a defendant who joins an assault after the gravest injury has already been inflicted still be tried for causing or inflicting grievous bodily harm (GBH)?

The case arose from a violent episode in September 2022 in which the complainant (“A”) suffered, among other injuries, a double leg fracture caused by an unknown co-assailant (“C”) wielding a golf club. The respondent BXQ allegedly joined the attack moments later by kicking and encouraging C, shouting “kill him.” At the close of the prosecution case the trial judge upheld a defence submission of “no case to answer,” reasoning that the grievous harm (the broken leg) had occurred before BXQ’s involvement and that the later injuries were comparatively minor. Exercising its power under section 58 Criminal Justice Act 2003, the prosecution appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the ruling, and ordered a retrial. In doing so it distilled a three-stage test (the “BXQ Framework”) that future courts must apply when faced with “no case” submissions in joint-enterprise GBH prosecutions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court confirmed that a trial judge must ask whether a reasonable jury, properly directed and taking the prosecution case at its highest, could infer joint participation and requisite intent. (Turnbull; G & F).
Applying this approach, the Court listed seven evidential features that could allow a jury to find that BXQ and C had planned or jointly executed a single continuing attack culminating in GBH.
Building on R v Grundy and R v P, the Court formulated a new structured test (para 25) for “late-joiner” liability in GBH cases:
1. Where joint participation throughout can be inferred, both defendants have a case to answer.
2. If evidence compels the conclusion that D1 alone inflicted GBH in an entirely separate incident, D2 bears no liability for the grievous harm.
3. Where the evidence permits a finding of a single continuing attack to which D2 subsequently contributed, D2 does bear responsibility for the aggregate harm—even if D1 inflicted the most serious injury before D2 joined.
Because scenarios (1) or (3) were realistically open on the facts, the judge’s ruling was held to be an error of law or principle under section 67 CJA 2003.
The ruling was reversed; a retrial was ordered before a different judge.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

R v Jogee [2016] UKSC – Modern cornerstone on secondary liability. Although cited by the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that Jogee does not prevent inferring participation from circumstantial evidence such as speed of joint action.
R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 & R v G & F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756 – Provide the general test for “no case” submissions: could a reasonable jury convict on one view of the evidence?
R v Grundy (1989) 89 Cr App R 333 – Established that a defendant who joins a group assault can be convicted of GBH if the victim’s total injuries amount to GBH, even when the severest blow pre-dated their involvement.
R v P [2003] EWCA Crim 1561 – Clarified that Grundy’s principle applies squarely to GBH cases, whereas “wounding” offences may sometimes differ.

The Court synthesised Grundy and P to craft a clearer, scenario-based guidance that trial courts had been lacking, thereby converting persuasive precedent into a binding, more readily applicable rule—the BXQ Framework.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three layers:

Evidential Layer – It itemises seven factual inferences (para 19) which, if accepted by a jury, point towards a pre-arranged or at least joint continuing assault.
Normative Layer – By recasting the Grundy line of authority into a structured test, the Court articulates when secondary participation “attaches” to an already-inflicted GBH.
Procedural Layer – It re-emphasises the limited function of the judge at halfway stage: not to weigh probabilities but to decide possibilities in favour of the prosecution where a reasonable jury could convict.

Through this tripartite analysis, the Court concluded that the trial judge imported a premature “surety” standard into what should have been a “could” assessment and thereby misapplied both evidential and legal principles.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Cases

Higher Threshold for Defence “No Case” Submissions – Defendants who “join late” in violent incidents will find it harder to secure acquittals mid-trial; judges must now navigate the BXQ Framework before withdrawing GBH counts.
Prosecution Strategy – Prosecutors may confidently frame indictments on the basis of continuing assault, relying on aggregate harm, even where medical evidence pinpoints a catastrophic injury to an earlier moment.
Judicial Directions – Trial judges will need to formulate jury directions that mirror the three scenarios in BXQ, distinguishing carefully between separate assaults and a continuous violent episode.
Joint-Enterprise Doctrine – The decision harmonises Jogee with older GBH authorities, ensuring that secondary liability remains robust in group-violence contexts without over-extending to purely sequential, separate incidents.
Policy Considerations – The ruling addresses public perception that late-joiners might otherwise escape liability for life-changing injuries, thereby bolstering confidence in the criminal justice system’s capacity to deal with group violence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 18 vs Section 20 OAPA 1861 – Section 18 requires intent to cause GBH; section 20 only requires foresight of some harm. Both, however, are satisfied if overall injuries amount to GBH.
Joint Enterprise – Liability arising where two or more people assist or encourage one another in committing an offence, even if roles differ.
Principal vs Secondary Offender – The principal physically commits the act; a secondary encourages or assists. Under joint enterprise both are equally liable if the necessary mental element is proved.
“No Case to Answer” (CrimPR 25.14; Galbraith) – Halfway-stage defence application arguing that evidence is insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to convict.
Section 58 Appeal – Unique prosecution right to appeal a terminating ruling (e.g., a successful “no case” submission) before jeopardy attaches; retrial is possible if appeal succeeds.
Totality of Injuries – Concept from Grundy that the sum of injuries, rather than an isolated wound, determines whether GBH is made out.
Continuing Assault – One violent episode that flows without a significant pause; contrast with “separate” assaults requiring distinct intentions and opportunities for disengagement.

5. Conclusion

R v BXQ crystallises a pragmatic yet principled approach to late-joiner liability in serious violence cases. By crafting the BXQ Framework, the Court of Appeal has resolved an area where first-instance judges delivered divergent rulings, sometimes withdrawing GBH counts too readily. The decision harmonises key authorities—Jogee, Grundy, P—and re-iterates the cautious stance a judge must adopt at the close of the prosecution case: if conviction is a reasonable possibility on one view of the evidence, the matter belongs to the jury.

Looking forward, BXQ is likely to be cited ubiquitously in Crown Courts whenever submissions of no case to answer are made in group-violence prosecutions. It enhances prosecutorial certainty, guides judicial directions, and clarifies defendants’ exposure to liability where grievous harm precedes their participation but forms part of a single, continuing assault.