The Ahmed Principle: Extending the “Actual-Harm” Test to Firearms Offences within the Sentencing Guidelines

1. Introduction

Ahmed, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 943) concerns an application for leave to appeal against a 24-year extended sentence (20 years’ custody plus a 4-year licence extension) imposed on a 20-year-old offender for:

Possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life (s.16 Firearms Act 1968);
Wounding with intent (s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861); and
Possession of an offensive weapon in a private place.

The central issues before the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) were:

Whether the trial judge mis-categorised “harm” as Category 1 (the highest) under the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines for both the firearm and the s.18 offence;
Whether the judge wrongly aggravated the starting points and failed to give sufficient credit for mitigation; and
Whether the judge erred in finding the appellant “dangerous” and therefore imposing an Extended Sentence under the Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020).

While the appeal was ultimately dismissed, the Court accepted that the judge had erred in the original harm categorisation. Crucially, the Court held that the R v O’Bryan guidance, previously limited to s.18 offences, equally governs categorisation in firearms cases under s.16. This extension of O’Bryan creates what may be labelled the “Ahmed Principle”.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Mrs Justice Cutts, giving the sole judgment, granted leave to appeal because the harm-category issue was “arguable”. The Court concluded:

Harm Re-categorised: Harm in both offences should have been placed in Category 2A, not 1A, because—despite the high risk—actual harm was neither “particularly grave” nor “life-threatening”.
No Reduction in Sentence: Even after correct categorisation, a custodial term of 20 years remained “entirely justified”, especially given the disposability of the weapon and the extreme risk created.
Dangerousness Upheld: The appellant’s procurement, carriage and discharge of a loaded firearm warranted an Extended Sentence; the judge’s reasoning, while brief, was adequate.
Consequently, the application succeeded on the point of principle but failed on practical outcome; the appeal was dismissed and the sentence affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R v O’Bryan [2021] EWCA Crim 1472
- Held that Category 1 harm in the s.18 guideline is reserved for “exceptional seriousness” and depends on actual injury, not merely potential.
- Ahmed extends this reasoning to the firearm guideline, marking the key doctrinal development.
Statutory Framework – Sentencing Act 2020 ss.63 & 279
- s.63 obliges courts to consider harm that was caused, intended or might foreseeably have been caused.
- Part 3, Ch.6 sets out the “dangerousness” provisions for life and extended sentences.
General Guideline: Overarching Principles (Sentencing Council)
- Provides that “risk of harm” includes assessing both likelihood and potential gravity.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a) Harm Categorisation

The firearm guideline (Possession with intent to endanger life) defines Category 1Harm as “severe physical or psychological harm”.
Drawing on O’Bryan, the Court insisted that courts must focus on the actual outcome rather than the conceivable consequence. The bullet, while lodged near the spine, did not in fact inflict life-threatening harm.
Therefore, Category 2 (“serious physical harm OR high risk of death or severe harm”) applied.

b) Aggravating/Mitigating Factors

The disposal of the firearm after the shooting was a material aggravating factor.
Minor traffic-related previous convictions and cannabis intoxication lacked appreciable aggravating weight.
Mitigation included youth (20), immaturity, ASD traits, depressive state, and a deprived background.
Nevertheless, given the “substantially high risk of death”, a sentence at the top of the Category 2 range—or even above—was justified.

c) Dangerousness & Extended Sentence

To impose an Extended Sentence, the court must find a “significant risk of serious harm” (SA 2020, ss.266–279).
The Court emphasised the appellant’s willingness to obtain, carry and deploy a loaded weapon during a peer dispute.
Although the judge’s explanation was brief, evidence from the pre-sentence report and the facts met the statutory test.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Doctrinal: The Ahmed Principle formally transplants the O’Bryan actual-harm threshold into firearms sentencing, thereby harmonising interpretative practice across guidelines.
Sentencing Practice: Trial judges must carefully distinguish between risk and actual injury when selecting harm categories, even in inherently lethal scenarios such as gun crime.
Appellate Strategy: Defence advocates can now invoke O’Bryan in firearm cases to argue against automatic Category 1 placement where injuries are fortuitously minor.
Policy: Although the categorisation may shift downward, courts retain flexibility—via s.63 SA 2020—to move toward the top (or beyond) of the Category 2 range when the “foreseeable risk” was catastrophic.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Category 1 vs. Category 2 Harm
- Category 1: Injuries that are actually life-threatening, permanently debilitating, or exceptionally serious.
- Category 2: Serious injuries or situations with a high risk of extreme harm, but where such harm did not in fact materialise.
Extended Sentence (SA 2020, s.279)
- Comprises (i) a custodial term set by the court plus (ii) an extension period on licence (up to 8 years for violent offences).
- Requires a finding that the offender is dangerous (significant risk of serious harm) and that a life sentence is not justified.
Dangerousness Test
- Involves forward-looking assessment: pattern of behaviour, nature of offence, expert reports.
- Not limited to previous convictions; conduct underpinning the index offence is pivotal.
Totality Principle
- Courts must ensure the aggregate sentence for multiple offences is “just and proportionate”.
- Here, 20 years’ custody reflected all offending, with concurrent terms for lesser counts.

5. Conclusion

Ahmed, R. v stands as an important clarification of harm categorisation under the Sentencing Council guidelines. While it did not secure a sentence reduction for the appellant, it establishes that the O’Bryan “actual-harm” approach applies equally to s.16 Firearms Act offences. This doctrinal refinement—dubbed here the “Ahmed Principle”—guards against over-inflation of harm bands where severe injury is only hypothetical. Nevertheless, the case also illustrates the judiciary’s latitude to impose lengthy sentences within (or even beyond) Category 2 when the foreseeable risk of death is extreme. Going forward, counsel must calibrate submissions on harm categorisation with an appreciation that risk remains relevant at the sentencing-range stage, and that findings of dangerousness will continue to justify extended licences where firearm use evidences a propensity for serious violence.