Introduction

The case of Gourlay, R (on the application of) v. Parole Board ([2020] UKSC 50) addresses a pivotal question regarding the awarding of costs in judicial review proceedings. Mr. Gourlay, a life prisoner, challenged the Parole Board's decision not to recommend his transfer to open conditions. Following the initial judicial review where one aspect of the decision was quashed, Mr. Gourlay sought to hold the Parole Board liable for his legal costs. This appeal centered on whether the established practice, as outlined in the precedent case R (Davies) v Birmingham Deputy Coroner [2004] EWCA Civ 207, applies to the Parole Board, an executive non-departmental public body.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Gourlay's appeal, thereby affirming the Court of Appeal's decision that the Parole Board should not be treated as a court or tribunal for the purposes of awarding costs in this context. The Court upheld the principles established in Davies, which generally prevent costs from being awarded against courts or tribunals that maintain a neutral stance in judicial review proceedings, barring exceptional circumstances. The Supreme Court emphasized the discretion afforded to lower courts in handling costs and reaffirmed the role of appellate courts in guiding practice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several key precedents:

• Davies v Birmingham Deputy Coroner [2004]: Established that courts should not award costs against tribunals or inferior courts adopting a neutral stance, except in cases of improper behavior.
• Bahta v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011]: Reinforced the application of general cost rules in judicial reviews involving government departments.
• R (M) v Croydon London Borough Council [2012]: Discussed the evolution of cost practices in public law to encourage settlement and compromise.
• R (Gudanaviciene) v First-tier Tribunal [2017]: Confirmed that developments in cost practices do not undermine established principles from Davies.
• Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: Clarified that legal aid status does not influence cost awards in judicial reviews.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's analysis centered on whether the Parole Board should be categorized similarly to courts or tribunals under Davies. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the Parole Board acted in a quasi-judicial capacity, thus aligning with the established practice of not awarding costs against neutral bodies. The Court highlighted that the delegation of cost-awarding discretion lies primarily with appellate courts, not the Supreme Court, ensuring flexibility and adaptability in judicial practices.

Impact

This judgment reaffirms the stability and resilience of the Davies principles in the face of evolving legal landscapes. It underscores the importance of appellate courts in shaping cost practices and limits the Supreme Court's role to overseeing significant legal errors rather than intervening in matters of procedural practice. Consequently, lower courts retain broad discretion in awarding costs, ensuring that established practices adapt to contemporary needs without unnecessary interference.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Gourlay v Parole Board solidifies the established approach to awarding costs in judicial review cases involving neutral public bodies. By upholding the principles set out in Davies, the Court ensures consistency and fairness in cost awards, preserving judicial independence and the impartial operation of tribunals. This judgment emphasizes the judiciary's respect for established practices while allowing flexibility for exceptional circumstances, thereby reinforcing the integrity of the legal process in the United Kingdom.