Supreme Court Endorses Local Authority Power to Restrict Voting in Planning Decisions

1. Introduction

In The Spitalfields Historic Building Trust, R. (on the application of) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets & Anor ([2025] UKSC 11), the United Kingdom Supreme Court considered whether a local authority’s standing orders could validly restrict how its councillors vote on a planning application. Specifically, the controversy arose when members who had not attended an earlier meeting on a deferred planning application were effectively barred from casting a vote when the application resumed at a subsequent meeting.

The claimants argued that this "restrictive voting rule" unlawfully excluded some councillors from participating and, accordingly, that the planning permission was granted without proper authority. The Supreme Court, upholding lower court decisions, found that local authorities have the power under the Local Government Act 1972 (“the LGA 1972”) to make such standing orders, so long as they are rational and serve a proper purpose. The Court’s ruling cements an important precedent on the limits and lawfulness of local authority authority to manage its own voting procedures.

2. Overview of the Case

The background to this case emerged from a planning application by Old Truman Brewery Ltd to develop a disused brewery site in Spitalfields, London. The developer sought permission to convert the Old Truman Brewery into offices, with retail and restaurant units. The Spitalfields Historic Building Trust (the appellant) opposed this development and argued that had the entire development committee been entitled to vote—including members who were not present at an earlier meeting—the application may have been refused.

However, the Council’s standing orders provided that only councillors present at all prior considerations of a deferred item could vote at the later meeting. Because of that rule, only three councillors attended the final meeting; two voted to grant permission, one dissented. The objectors claimed the rule unlawfully prevented other councillors from casting votes and therefore invalidly skewed the outcome.

After reviewing multiple layers of legislative provisions under the LGA 1972 and the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (“the 1989 Act”), the Supreme Court concluded that paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 and section 106 of the LGA 1972 were sufficiently broad to enable local authorities to set reasonable parameters for voting in order to safeguard fair and consistent decision-making.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lord Sales, delivering the leading opinion and with whom Lord Reed, Lord Hamblen, Lady Rose, and Lord Richards agreed, held that the contested standing orders were valid. The following points were made:

1. Power to regulate proceedings: Paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 in the LGA 1972 gives local authorities the power to make standing orders for the regulation of their “proceedings and business.” This phrase, in its ordinary meaning, embraces the ability to impose conditions on voting in committee meetings.
2. Statutory context confirms permissibility: Although paragraph 39 of Schedule 12 establishes that matters are decided by majority of members present and voting, it does not confer an absolute right to vote. Rather, it assumes councillors may be subject to lawful procedures or disqualifications.
3. Consistency with the 1989 Act: The Court rejected the argument that the 1989 Act’s political balance rules and the definition of “seat” meant that every committee member must be entitled to vote. Nothing in that legislation invalidated narrower, procedurally fair restrictions that exclude a councillor who was absent from earlier deliberations.
4. Rationality of the rule: The Court found that limiting voting to members who heard all relevant debate firsthand protected decision-making integrity. Such restrictions ensure councillors vote only after fully considering relevant information and public representations, thereby promoting fairness and public confidence.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

The Supreme Court examined how case law has treated the scope of local authorities’ standing orders, with references to:

• R v Flintshire County Council, ex p Armstrong-Braun: This Court of Appeal decision confirmed that paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 authorized provisions regulating how a councillor could propose or raise motions in meetings. The court stated that while authorities must respect the principle of democracy, they remain empowered to enact rational standing orders that restrict participation for procedural integrity.
• In re Hartlands (NI) Ltd [2021] NIQB 94: Although cited by the appellant as supporting a robust right to vote, the Supreme Court clarified that this Northern Ireland case focused on provisions in a different legislative context (section 30(2) of the Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011). In Hartlands, the key question concerned “procedures” for a pre-determination hearing, construed more narrowly than “proceedings” and “business” under the English LGA 1972.
• Other Common Law Cases: The Court noted various authorities relating to bias, pre-determination, and disqualifications for pecuniary interest. These fundamentally illustrate that a member’s vote is not absolute; certain circumstances properly prevent voting to maintain lawful and robust decision-making.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court emphasized that local authorities’ powers in paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 and section 106 of the LGA 1972 should be given their natural and wide meaning, subject to proper public law safeguards (rationality and legitimate purpose). The Court reasoned:

1. Voting under the statutory regime: Councillors do not have a free-standing, inalienable “right” to vote. Rather, the right to vote is implied in the statutory regime but always subject to conditions consistent with fairness and good governance.
2. Scope of “proceedings and business”: Enacting standing orders that restrict certain voting practices falls well within the broad language “for the regulation of their proceedings and business.” In the planning context, requiring a councillor to have been present for the entire debate ensures they cast an informed vote and do not undermine public confidence by missing crucial presentations or objections.
3. Democratic scrutiny: The Court recognized that any measure that curtails a councillor’s vote must be scrutinized carefully. Nonetheless, such scrutiny does not impossibly narrow local authorities’ authority; instead, it demands reasonableness and alignment with legislative intent.
4. Consistency with political balance rules: Although the 1989 Act protects proportional representation of political groups on committees, that protection extends only so far. The Court saw no contradiction in upholding standing orders that require continuous attendance at meetings, even if that means fewer councillors actually vote. There is no guarantee that every committee seat-holder must be free of voting limitations, especially where deferrals occur.

4.3 Impact

The decision in this case sets a clear precedent that local councils across England and Wales may adopt restrictive voting provisions, provided:

• They have a solid legal basis (i.e., within the scope of LGA 1972 powers and consistent with public law principles).
• The measure pursues a rational and legitimate goal: ensuring members base their votes on full and fair consideration of the issues.
• They do not conflict with overriding statutory provisions or improperly exclude councillors on arbitrary or partisan grounds.

Going forward, local authorities may consider adopting similar standing orders to guard against legal challenges tied to allegations of unfair or poorly informed votes, particularly in complex or contentious applications like major planning developments.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

To better understand the judgment, readers should note:

1. “Standing Orders” are formal procedural rules an authority voluntarily puts in place to govern meetings, debate, and decision-making. They must be consistent with primary legislation but can address local needs and priorities.
2. “Para 39/Para 42 of Schedule 12 (LGA 1972)” outline how a council or committee’s vote is taken, as well as powers to create additional procedural rules. They imply that rules cannot entirely disregard democracy but may refine how decisions are reached.
3. “Political Balance” refers to the statutory requirement under the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 that committees reflect the overall political composition of the authority. Although committees must be proportionate, the law does not guarantee each individual committee member an unfettered vote in all circumstances.
4. “Rationality and Proper Purpose” are core public law tests. Even if a council has the legal power to do something, its particular exercise of that power must not be arbitrary, capricious, or aimed at an improper end. Well-justified restrictions, like ensuring a councillor reviews all evidence, are permissible.

6. Conclusion

In affirming that local authorities can adopt standing orders restricting voting rights to only those members who attend all discussions of a planning application, the Supreme Court underscores a crucial principle of local democracy: balancing the representative role of elected councillors with the need to safeguard informed and fair decision-making.

The judgment highlights that councils must adopt such measures cautiously, ensuring they are proportionate, serve a legitimate aim, and consider the broader democratic interest. Nonetheless, if these requirements are satisfied, restrictive voting rules promote consistency, reduce the risk of bias or flawed decision-making, and enhance the public's confidence that a planning committee's ultimate vote has been fairly reached.

This ruling will shape future local government procedures, as authorities now have explicit Supreme Court endorsement for standing orders that prioritize fully informed voting, provided they are exercised properly and rationally. In short, the decision clarifies that procedural innovation in the service of fairness is not only possible but also permissible under the statutory framework for local authority governance.