Introduction

The case of Fylde Coast Farms Ltd v Fylde Borough Council ([2021] UKSC 18) has emerged as a pivotal decision in the realm of urban planning and public law in the United Kingdom. This case addressed the intricate interplay between statutory time limits for judicial reviews and the procedural steps involved in the creation of neighbourhood development plans under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA). The key issue revolved around the interpretation of section 61N of the TCPA, which stipulates the conditions under which legal challenges to neighbourhood development orders and plans can be entertained by the courts.

The appellant, Fylde Coast Farms Ltd (Oyston Estates Ltd), contested the decision of Fylde Borough Council to reject an amendment to the draft St Anne's on the Sea Neighbourhood Development Plan. Specifically, Oyston challenged the council's refusal to include their land within the settlement boundary, a recommendation made by the independent examiner. The crux of the dispute was whether Oyston’s challenge, filed within six weeks of the plan's enactment but beyond the six-week limit for challenging the examiner's report at step 5, could be entertained under section 61N(1) of the TCPA.

Summary of the Judgment

The United Kingdom Supreme Court upheld the decisions of both the Court of Appeal and the lower courts, ruling in favor of Fylde Borough Council. The Court interpreted section 61N of the TCPA as being entirely restrictive rather than permissive, meaning that it does not create new rights for judicial review but instead imposes strict conditions on existing rights. Consequently, Oyston’s claim to challenge the neighbourhood plan based on an earlier step in the process was deemed out of time under subsection (2) of section 61N, which pertains to challenges at step 5.

The Supreme Court emphasized that section 61N does not abrogate existing general public law rights but sets specific procedural conditions for challenges related to steps 5, 6, and 7 of the neighbourhood plan-making process. As such, Oyston’s attempt to utilize section 61N(1) to challenge the final plan, despite the basis of the claim relating to an earlier step, was not permissible within the stipulated time frame. The appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the mandatory adherence to the six-week filing period for judicial reviews in this context.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment extensively referenced key precedents to elucidate the interpretation of section 61N. Notably, it cited:

• R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13; emphasizing the purposive approach to statutory interpretation.
• R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex p Greenpeace Ltd [1998] Env LR 415; highlighting the necessity for prompt judicial challenges.
• R (Burkett) v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [2002] UKHL 23; supporting the "wait to the end" approach for multi-step administrative processes.
• R (Catt) v Brighton and Hove City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 298; which reiterated the principles established in Burkett.
• R (Champion) v North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52; questioning the future of the "wait to the end" doctrine.
• Islington London Borough Council v Uckac [2006] EWCA Civ 340; reaffirming that statutes do not abolish common law rights unless explicitly stated.
• R (Edwards) v Environment Agency (No 2) [2013] UKSC 78; focusing on procedural fairness in judicial reviews.

These precedents collectively informed the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 61N, particularly its restrictive nature concerning procedural requirements for judicial reviews.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s legal reasoning hinged on the distinction between permissive and restrictive statutory provisions. It scrutinized whether section 61N was intended to expand (permissive) or limit (restrictive) the scope of judicial review rights.

The Court concluded that section 61N is restrictive. It does not create new grounds for challenges but rather imposes stringent conditions on the existing rights to judicial review. Specifically, any challenge related to steps 5, 6, or 7 must meet the criteria of being a judicial review and being filed within six weeks of the relevant decision or referendum result.

Furthermore, the Court emphasized the principle that unless Parliament explicitly intends to abrogate common law rights, such rights remain intact. In this case, section 61N was found to apply specifically to the stages it enumerates without negating the broader public law rights applicable to other stages of the neighbourhood plan process.

The ordering of the subsections in section 61N was addressed but deemed irrelevant to its restrictive interpretation. The Court maintained that the legislative intent behind the statute should not be overshadowed by the superficial arrangement of its provisions.

Impact

The decision sets a clear precedent for the interpretation of section 61N, reinforcing the strictly time-bound and procedural nature of judicial reviews in the context of neighbourhood development plans. It underscores the necessity for appellants to act within the specified time frames when challenging decisions at various stages of the planning process.

This ruling has broader implications for local authorities and developers alike. For local authorities, it provides a firm legal foundation for adhering to procedural timelines without fear of post hoc challenges undermining the legitimacy of neighbourhood plans. For developers and other stakeholders, it emphasizes the importance of vigilant and timely legal actions if they intend to challenge planning decisions.

Additionally, the Judgment may influence future legislative drafting concerning judicial review provisions, highlighting the importance of clear and unambiguous language when delineating the scope of public law challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Judicial Review

Judicial review is a legal mechanism allowing individuals or entities to challenge the legality of decisions or actions made by public authorities. It ensures that such authorities act within their legal powers and adhere to principles of fairness and reasonableness.

Section 61N of the TCPA

This section specifically governs the conditions under which legal challenges can be made against neighbourhood development orders and plans. It delineates the procedural requirements, such as the necessity for the challenge to be a judicial review and adherence to strict filing deadlines.

Permitive vs. Restrictive Provisions

- Permissive: Grants new rights or broadened scopes for action.
- Restrictive: Imposes limitations or conditions on existing rights.

Neighbourhood Development Plan

A neighbourhood development plan is a statutory plan prepared by a local community group, such as a parish council, outlining the community’s vision for the area’s future. Once approved through a referendum, it becomes part of the broader development plan influencing planning decisions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Fylde Coast Farms Ltd v Fylde Borough Council is a landmark in clarifying the procedural boundaries for judicial reviews in the creation of neighbourhood development plans. By affirming a restrictive interpretation of section 61N, the Court has reinforced the importance of adhering to statutory time limits and procedural requirements. This ensures that the planning process remains orderly and that decisions made through community referendums are safeguarded against untimely legal challenges that could undermine public trust and administrative efficiency.

For practitioners and stakeholders in urban planning and public law, this Judgment underscores the critical need for timely legal actions and a thorough understanding of statutory provisions governing judicial reviews. It also highlights the judiciary’s role in upholding legislative intent, ensuring that statutes are applied as intended to balance administrative efficiency with the protection of public and private interests.