Strangulation, Home Invasion and the Limits of Community Sentencing: Commentary on HM Advocate v Helen Heather Moran or Macdonald [2025] HCJAC 52

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the decision of the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary in HM Advocate v Helen Heather Moran or Macdonald [2025] HCJAC 52, a Crown appeal against sentence arising from serious offending involving forced entry to the complainer’s home, sustained assault with repeated strangulation, and intent to rob, all while on bail.

The case centres on whether a sheriff’s decision to impose exclusively community-based disposals for such conduct — in the shape of a Restriction of Liberty Order (ROLO) and a Community Payback Order (CPO) — was “unduly lenient” in terms of the test laid down in HM Advocate v Bell 1995 SCCR 244. The Appeal Court, delivering its opinion through Lord Matthews (with the Lord Justice Clerk and Lord Armstrong concurring), held that the sentence was indeed unduly lenient and substituted a substantial custodial sentence and a Supervised Release Order (SRO).

The judgment is particularly significant in three respects:

It reaffirms and applies the high but real threshold for Crown appeals against sentence on the ground of undue leniency.
It emphasises that personal trauma, mental health difficulties and apparent recent rehabilitative progress cannot ordinarily displace the need for custody where there is serious, repeated, home-invasion violence featuring strangulation.
It underlines that strangulation is to be treated as a gravely aggravating feature of an assault, requiring “appropriate penalties”, and highlights the aggravating force of re-offending against the same complainer while on bail.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties and procedural posture

The appeal was brought by His Majesty’s Advocate (the Lord Advocate) against the sentence imposed on the respondent, Helen Heather Moran or Macdonald, following her guilty pleas on an indictment containing, among others, charges 3 and 5. The sentencing sheriff imposed an 8‑month ROLO and an 18‑month CPO with supervision, together with a non-harassment order. The Crown did not challenge the non-harassment order but maintained that the ROLO and CPO taken together were unduly lenient in light of the gravity of the offences.

2.2 The relationship between complainer and respondent

The complainer and the respondent had known each other for a long time. Critically, after the respondent’s mother was murdered when the respondent was six years old, she was raised by the complainer’s family. This produced a complex, troubled relationship: the respondent harboured resentment and blamed the complainer for aspects of her life difficulties. This background provides important context for motive and personal mitigation but, as the Appeal Court stresses, cannot outweigh the seriousness of the offending.

2.3 Charge 3 – threatening or abusive behaviour in the complainer’s home

On 15 April 2024, having become angry with the complainer at a friend’s house on the preceding evening, the respondent went to the complainer’s address in Aberdeen. When the complainer returned home in the early hours, she found the respondent already inside. The respondent:

shouted at the complainer;
made vile accusations against her and her family;
entered and remained in her home without consent;
threw the complainer’s £1,800 laptop and other belongings onto the floor;
behaved in a manner likely to cause a reasonable person fear or alarm.

This conduct contravened section 38(1) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (threatening or abusive behaviour). Importantly, this offence was committed while the respondent was on bail granted on 4 April 2024. The complainer was “terrified” and contacted the police; the respondent was arrested and released on bail the next day.

2.4 Charge 5 – home invasion, strangulation and assault to danger of life with intent to rob

On 10 November 2024, the complainer was again at home. Around 19:30 the respondent appeared at her door demanding money. When the complainer tried to hold the door shut, the respondent kicked at it, tried to break a glass panel, left to look for a brick, then returned and successfully smashed the glass, climbing through into the complainer’s home.

Once inside, the respondent:

repeatedly shouted at the complainer and demanded money;
pushed the complainer onto a sofa;
seized her by the neck and compressed it repeatedly, restricting her breathing (twice);
sat on the complainer’s chest;
poured cola over the complainer’s head;
punched her repeatedly on the head and face to her injury and to the danger of her life;
threatened to kill her if she contacted the police;
restrained her, searched her pockets, prevented her leaving, and dragged her back into the room when she tried to escape;
made sexually humiliating comments, including a threat to “go up” her vagina to search for “banked” money;
acted throughout with intent to rob.

This offence was again committed while the respondent was on bail — not only the generic bail grants, but specifically while she was on bail for charge 3 involving the same complainer in her home.

The complainer suffered:

a small cut to her left eyebrow;
facial swelling;
red marks on her neck.

Although the physical injuries were relatively minor, she was described as petrified, crying hysterically and begging the respondent to stop. She remains fearful of the respondent. The assault involved strangulation not once but twice, against a victim with a pre-existing lung condition, and was prolonged and controlling in nature.

2.5 The Justice Social Work Report (JSWR)

The JSWR painted a picture of extremely adverse life circumstances:

The respondent, aged 43, witnessed her mother’s murdered body at age 6, leading to long-term mental health sequelae.
She was raised by the complainer’s family and had a difficult relationship with the complainer, whom she partially blamed for later life difficulties.
All five of her children had been removed from her care, compounding psychological trauma.
She suffers from diagnosed depression and anxiety, and uses alcohol, zopiclone and pregabalin as “self-medication”.
She reports PTSD-like symptoms, especially after being seriously assaulted in November 2023, which triggered flashbacks to her mother’s murder.
She has been referred to adult psychiatry, but treatment is contingent on addressing substance misuse.
She claimed little memory of the offences due to intoxication/self-medication.

Initially, victim empathy was limited and she sought to rationalise her behaviour as provoked by childhood issues involving the complainer. Through social work engagement she began to acknowledge her behaviour as “stupid” and expressed guilt, with some insight that her offending was linked to mental health and substance misuse. Social work assessed her offending as “reckless”.

Her prior record was relatively limited, largely involving dishonesty and road traffic matters, though there were summary-level assaults and breaches of community orders for which she had served four months’ imprisonment. She had demonstrated a five-year period of desistance (2013–2018). However, the current offences represented a serious escalation, both in gravity and effect.

She was assessed as suitable for a ROLO or CPO and had already been placed on a CPO with supervision on 4 December 2024 for other offending. She was said to have been engaging well and expressed a desire to use the supports offered.

2.6 The sheriff’s original sentencing decision

The sheriff accepted that both charges crossed the “custody threshold”, particularly in light of:

the forcible entry to the complainer’s home;
the intrusive circumstances in which the complainer was entitled to feel safe;
a degree of planning;
the prolonged, dangerous nature of the assault in charge 5, including strangulation and threats to kill;
bail aggravations on both charges.

She assessed the respondent’s culpability as “high”. However, she was strongly influenced by mitigation:

significant and enduring trauma throughout childhood and adulthood;
mental health difficulties and self-medication;
limited prior violence (only a minor assault);
apparently good current engagement with mental health, social work and addiction services;
reduced alcohol and drugs use since the offences;
perception that the complainer had not been targeted because of any inherent vulnerability.

The sheriff concluded that:

the sentencing purposes, including public protection, could be achieved through a non-custodial sentence;
imprisonment would likely disrupt the fragile rehabilitative progress and damage the respondent’s mental health;
public and victim protection were better secured through continued, structured community intervention.

Accordingly, she imposed:

a Community Payback Order with 18 months’ supervision;
a Restriction of Liberty Order for 8 months (reduced from 9 months for the guilty pleas);
a non-harassment order (unchallenged on appeal).

The ROLO was in effect a way of “marking disapproval” of the serious offending without resort to custody.

2.7 Subsequent breaches and further alleged offending

Shortly after sentence, the respondent repeatedly breached the ROLO. Four breach reports were lodged in early and mid‑August 2025. She admitted the breaches on 27 August 2025. However, because the ROLO had been suspended ad interim on 21 August 2025 pending this appeal, the sheriff could not then deal with them. In her report, the sheriff stated that, had she been free to do so at that time, it was “highly likely” that she would have revoked the CPO and ROLO and imposed a custodial sentence.

Separately, on 15 August 2025 the respondent appeared on petition from custody on one charge of assault and robbery, two shopliftings and one further assault, all alleged to have occurred the previous day. She was remanded and remained in custody at the time of the appeal hearing.

The Appeal Court treated these later events as not decisive but of some relevance “with the benefit of hindsight” to the overall view of the appropriateness of the sheriff’s original optimism about community-based disposal.

3. Summary of the Appeal Court’s Judgment

3.1 The legal test for undue leniency

At paragraph [24], the court reaffirmed the orthodox test from HM Advocate v Bell 1995 SCCR 244. A Crown appeal cannot succeed merely because the appeal court would have passed a more severe sentence. The question is whether the sentence:

“must fall outside the range of sentences which the judge at first instance, applying [their] mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably have considered appropriate.”

Only if the disposal lies outside that range — so as to be “unduly lenient” rather than merely lenient — is the appeal court entitled to interfere.

3.2 Assessment of the sheriff’s sentence

The court expressed sympathy for the respondent’s tragic background but nonetheless held that the sentence was unduly lenient. Key features included:

The presence of a course of conduct (charge 3 forming the background to charge 5) showing sustained targeting of the complainer in her own home.
The fact that charge 5 was committed while the respondent was on bail for charge 3, making it an aggravation “over and above” the general aggravation of offending on bail.
The respondent’s determination to force entry to the complainer’s home and perpetrate a sustained and controlling attack in pursuit of money.
The sheriff’s own findings of high culpability and the clear intent to cause serious physical and psychological harm.
The potential, given the repeated strangulation, for the complainer’s death (para [31]).

While acknowledging that the sheriff properly identified many of these factors, the Appeal Court held that she had given too much weight to:

the respondent’s personal mitigation;
her limited previous record;
her apparent post-offence progress on supervision.

Conversely, she had given insufficient weight to:

the gravity and sustained nature of the offending;
the bail aggravations and repetition against the same complainer in her home;
the central role of strangulation and its life-threatening implications;
the need to mark society’s condemnation and protect the public.

3.3 The substituted sentence

Allowing the appeal, the court quashed the sheriff’s community-based disposal and imposed:

Imprisonment for 3 years and 8 months, “reduced from 4 years” to reflect the timing of the guilty plea at a second trial diet, of which 4 months were expressly attributable to the bail aggravations; and
a Supervised Release Order (SRO) for 12 months after release, with the special condition that the respondent attend drug and alcohol counselling as directed by the supervising officer.

The SRO was justified in light of the JSWR and the need “to protect the public from serious harm on the respondent’s release” (para [33]).

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 The governing precedent: HM Advocate v Bell

The sole authority explicitly cited in the judgment is HM Advocate v Bell 1995 SCCR 244. Lord Hope’s passage, quoted in full at para [24], has long been the canonical statement of the test for Crown appeals against unduly lenient sentences.

Key elements of the Bell test, as reaffirmed here, are:

Deference to the trial judge – The sentencing judge has seen and heard the accused and the evidence, and is normally best placed to assess credibility, nuance and mitigation. The appeal court does not simply substitute its own view.
A “range” of reasonable sentences – Sentencing is not a single-point exercise. For any set of facts, there will usually be a spectrum of disposals open to a reasonable sentencer. Leniency within that range is not appealable.
Undue, not mere, leniency – Only where the original sentence falls outside that range, i.e. is so lenient that no reasonable sentencer properly directing themselves could have imposed it, is intervention justified.
Risk of increase – Because a successful Crown appeal results in a harsher sentence, the threshold is deliberately set high.

In this case, the Appeal Court explicitly accepts that the sheriff conscientiously engaged with the relevant factors and that her sympathy for the respondent’s background was understandable. However, it concludes that, even giving her view due respect, the disposal she selected lay beyond the limits of reasonable disagreement, especially once the full seriousness and context of charge 5 and the bail aggravations are appreciated.

4.2 Seriousness of the offences and “course of conduct”

The court’s reasoning is anchored in the seriousness of the offending and the pattern it reveals.

4.2.1 Charge 3 as context

The Appeal Court at para [24] is explicit that, if charge 3 stood alone, the sheriff’s sentence would not have triggered its jurisdiction; a non-custodial disposal here might reasonably be within the sentencing range. However, charge 3 is significant in two ways:

It forms the background to charge 5, showing that the respondent had already invaded the complainer’s home, behaved abusively and caused fear and damage.
It reveals a course of conduct targeting the same complainer in the one place she should feel safest – her home.

Thus, charge 3 is not treated as independently requiring custody, but it materially aggravates charge 5 by showing escalation and persistence.

4.2.2 Bail aggravation “over and above” the norm

At para [25] the court points out that committing charge 5 while on bail for charge 3 is an “aggravating feature over and above the aggravation inherent in offending while on bail.” In Scots law, offending while on bail is statutorily aggravating in any event, but here the specific circumstance — re-offending against the same complainer in her home — greatly heightens culpability and risk. It signals defiance of court orders and deliberate continuation of a pattern of abusive behaviour towards a known victim.

4.3 Culpability, harm and potential harm

The sheriff had assessed culpability as high and recognised that there was potential for very serious harm (para [14], [28]). The Appeal Court agrees with that assessment but finds that the disposal imposed did not adequately reflect it.

4.3.1 High culpability

The court notes, in line with the sheriff’s own view, that:

The respondent intended to cause both physical and psychological harm (para [27]).
She persisted in a prolonged and controlling assault, thwarting the complainer’s attempts to escape (para [26]).
Her conduct was in pursuit of money, not a momentary loss of temper.

Even allowing for underlying trauma and self-medication, the respondent’s moral blameworthiness was high. The court does not explicitly adopt the Crown’s argument that voluntary intoxication was improperly treated as mitigating, but its conclusion that too much weight was placed on personal circumstances (para [29]) strongly implies that any purported mitigation flowing from self‑inflicted intoxication must be treated cautiously.

4.3.2 Actual vs potential harm

The sheriff emphasised that the complainer’s physical injuries were “at the lower end of the spectrum” (para [28]). The Appeal Court accepts this but stresses that:

The key is not only the actual harm suffered, but the potential for far more serious harm, particularly given the repeated strangulation, the complainer’s lung condition, and the threats to kill.
The charge itself was libelled as “to the danger of life”, reflecting that the life‑threatening element was inherent in the conduct, even if death or more serious physical injuries fortunately did not ensue.

This aspect of the judgment is important: it confirms that sentencing for serious assaults involving strangulation cannot be overly anchored to the level of visible injury. The dangerous method of assault is itself gravely aggravating, and courts must sentence on the basis of both actual and potential harm.

4.4 Strangulation as an all-too common and grave feature

The court’s remarks at para [31] are amongst the most significant in the judgment:

“That offence, with its repeated feature of strangulation, could easily have resulted in the complainer’s death. Strangulation is an all-too common feature of assaults in modern times and the court must visit it with appropriate penalties.”

Two points stand out:

Recognition of strangulation’s lethality – The court explicitly notes that the assault “could easily” have been fatal. This aligns with the growing recognition, in Scotland and elsewhere, of strangulation as a red-flag behaviour strongly associated with domestic homicide and severe abuse.
Guidance to sentencers – The court moves beyond this individual case, referring to strangulation as an “all-too common feature” and stating that it “must” attract appropriate (i.e. robust) penalties. This is guidance of general application. Sheriffs and judges are being told that an assault involving strangulation, especially repeated strangulation, will ordinarily require a stern custodial response.

In practice, this statement is likely to be cited in future as authority that strangulation substantially aggravates serious assault and that community-based disposals will rarely be appropriate where it forms a central feature, particularly in a domestic, quasi-domestic, or home-invasion context.

4.5 Rehabilitation vs punishment, denunciation and protection

The sheriff applied the Scottish Sentencing Council’s Principles and Purposes of Sentencing Guideline, which requires sentencers to balance:

punishment (including marking societal disapproval);
protection of the public;
rehabilitation of the offender;
reparation (where appropriate);
expressing condemnation and supporting public confidence.

The Appeal Court accepts that rehabilitation is an important purpose and that the sheriff had a reasoned basis for being optimistic about the respondent’s engagement. However, at paras [29]–[30] the court concludes that rehabilitation was given disproportionate weight:

The respondent had committed two serious offences against the same complainer in a matter of months, in her own home.
Both offences were aggravated by bail.
The second offence was of truly serious character, involving life‑endangering strangulation, humiliation, and controlling behaviour.

Against that background, the court’s message is that while rehabilitation and personal tragedy may temper the length of custody or justify structured post-release supervision, they cannot, in cases of this gravity, justify avoiding custody altogether. Public protection and societal denunciation required imprisonment.

4.6 The role of post-sentence breaches

At para [32] the court is careful to note that the ROLO breaches and further alleged offending are “not… decisive” in the appeal. The key question in a Crown appeal is whether the sentence was unduly lenient when imposed, based on information before the sheriff. That said, the breaches and new allegations are “with the benefit of hindsight… of some relevance” because they show that the sheriff’s expectation that a community disposal would protect the public and support desistance was over‑optimistic.

The careful phrasing avoids retroactively “punishing” the respondent for later conduct via a Crown appeal. Rather, the court treats the breaches as illustrating that the underlying risk was high and that the original sentence, even at the time, failed adequately to address that risk once the full gravity of the offending is considered.

4.7 The substituted custodial and supervisory sentence

The Appeal Court imposed a sentence constructed to reflect:

the gravity of the offending (headline 4 years);
the bail aggravations (4 months of the total explicitly attributable to this factor);
the timing of the plea (discount to 3 years and 8 months);
the need for structured post-release supervision (12‑month SRO with drug and alcohol counselling).

Two structural points are noteworthy:

Recognition of bail aggravation in quantum – By specifically allocating “4 months of the sentence… attributable to the breaches of bail” the court transparently identifies the punitive uplift for offending while on bail. This practice promotes clarity and deterrence.
Use of a Supervised Release Order – The SRO acknowledges the respondent’s complex needs and the risk of serious harm on release. Instead of relying solely on incarceration, the court ensures there will be a structured period of statutory supervision focused on addiction treatment and public protection. This aligns punishment with targeted rehabilitation, but only after a custodial term commensurate with the seriousness of the crime.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 Crown appeal against sentence

In Scots criminal procedure, the Lord Advocate may appeal to the High Court where a sentence imposed by a sheriff or judge is alleged to be unduly lenient. The aim is not to punish the individual afresh, but to correct sentences which, in the public interest, fail properly to reflect the gravity of the crime and the purposes of sentencing. Because a successful appeal increases the sentence, the threshold for success is deliberately high.

5.2 “Unduly lenient” vs “lenient”

Many sentences are, in the ordinary sense, lenient — they are at the lower end of the appropriate range. That alone is not enough. A sentence is unduly lenient only where it falls outside the broad range of dispositions that any reasonable, properly informed judge could have chosen. The question is not “could another judge have gone higher?” but “could a reasonable judge have gone this low?” If the answer to the latter is “no”, the sentence is unduly lenient.

5.3 Bail aggravation

If an offence is committed while an accused person is on bail for earlier alleged misconduct, Scots law treats that as an aggravating factor. It must be explicitly stated in the charge (“aggravation by bail”) and, if proved or admitted, should result in an uplift in sentence. The rationale is that the offender has breached the trust placed in them by the court and shown disregard for the law and for court orders.

In this case, both charges 3 and 5 were aggravated by bail. Charge 5 was aggravated in an especially serious way because it was committed:

while the respondent was on bail;
in respect of the same complainer as charge 3;
and in the same domestic setting (her home).

5.4 Course of conduct

A “course of conduct” refers to repeated or continuous behaviour, rather than a single isolated act. Here, the respondent’s two episodes of invading the complainer’s home and subjecting her to abuse formed a pattern: returning to the same victim and location within months, escalating behaviour from verbal abuse and damage to a life‑endangering, robbery-motivated assault.

5.5 Custody threshold

The “custody threshold” is a shorthand for the point at which offending becomes so serious that a community-based sentence is no longer sufficient to meet the purposes of sentencing. Once that threshold is crossed, the starting point is that a custodial sentence is required, though its length may still be influenced by mitigation and discount for plea.

The sheriff accepted that both charges crossed this threshold, especially charge 5. The Appeal Court held that, having accepted that, the sheriff erred in concluding that a non-custodial sentence was nonetheless sufficient.

5.6 Community Payback Order (CPO)

A CPO is a flexible community-based sentence that can include requirements such as unpaid work, offender supervision, programme participation, and treatment for mental health or substance misuse. It is designed both to punish and to rehabilitate, but its adequacy is constrained where the offence is very serious or involves a high risk of harm.

5.7 Restriction of Liberty Order (ROLO)

A ROLO is a form of electronic monitoring (“tagging”), typically confining the offender to (or excluding them from) certain places for specified hours. It is a significant restriction of liberty but remains a non-custodial measure. In this case, the ROLO was intended to mark the court’s disapproval of serious offences without imposing imprisonment. The quick succession of breaches illustrated its limitations for a high-risk, chaotic offender.

5.8 Supervised Release Order (SRO)

An SRO is a post-release supervision order that can be made when a person receives a custodial sentence of between one and four years for sexual or violent offences and is assessed as posing a risk of serious harm. It requires the person to comply with directions from a supervising officer, and it can include special conditions (such as mandatory attendance at treatment services). Non-compliance can lead to recall to prison.

Here, the SRO serves two purposes:

to manage the respondent’s risk to the public on her release;
to support her rehabilitation by mandating engagement with drug and alcohol counselling.

5.9 Strangulation and “to the danger of life”

When an indictment describes an assault as “to the danger of life”, it signifies that the conduct created a real, not merely theoretical, risk of death. Strangulation (especially repeated strangulation) is recognised as a method of assault that can rapidly lead to loss of consciousness, brain damage or death, even if external injuries are modest. The court’s warning that strangulation must attract “appropriate penalties” signals that this feature will significantly aggravate sentence.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Clarifying the limits of community disposals for serious violence

The judgment sends a clear message: in cases involving:

forced entry into the victim’s home;
a sustained, controlling and terrorising assault;
repeated strangulation, to the danger of life;
robbery or intent to rob;
and bail aggravations, especially where the same victim is targeted again;

a wholly community-based sentence will virtually always fall outside the reasonable range of sentencing options, notwithstanding compelling personal mitigation and apparent recent engagement with services. Imprisonment is the presumptive response, with community measures playing a supporting role via post-release supervision rather than replacing custody.

6.2 Emphasis on strangulation as a central aggravation

By expressly identifying strangulation as “all-too common” and insisting that the court “must” apply appropriate penalties, the Appeal Court is aligning sentencing practice with contemporary understanding of its lethality and role in coercive violence, especially in domestic and quasi-domestic contexts. Future sentencers can be expected to:

take strangulation as a major aggravating feature, even where visible injury is limited;
give less weight to arguments that a non-custodial sentence suffices where strangulation has been employed;
view repeated strangulation as moving the case towards the upper end of the serious assault spectrum, bordering on attempted murder in some factual circumstances.

6.3 Balancing rehabilitation with denunciation and protection

The case does not reject rehabilitation; indeed, the imposition of an SRO with treatment conditions underscores the court’s acceptance that structured support is needed. But it clarifies that:

rehabilitation cannot be allowed to eclipse the need to protect the public and to mark society’s condemnation in cases of grave violence;
even exceptional personal hardship and trauma are not, of themselves, sufficient to avoid imprisonment for life-endangering assaults;
evidence of compliance with one community order (or recent engagement) must be weighed against a history of breach and escalation.

For defence practitioners, the judgment underscores the importance of advising clients realistically about the likelihood of custody in such cases, even where their life histories are deeply sympathetic and their engagement with services is genuine.

6.4 Guidance on the use of post-release supervision tools

The combined use of a significant custodial term and an SRO illustrates a sentencing structure that:

punishes proportionately and deters by way of imprisonment;
manages risk across the transition back to the community;
builds in mandatory engagement with addiction treatment.

Sheriffs and judges in future may look to Moran or Macdonald as an example of how to integrate community-based support mechanisms into the tail end of a sentence, rather than using them to replace custody where public protection demands incarceration.

6.5 Reinforcing the high threshold but real bite of Crown sentence appeals

The case shows that, although the Bell test sets a high bar for the Crown, it is not illusory. The Appeal Court emphasised its deference to the sheriff’s position and expressed sympathy for her approach. Nevertheless, it found that, in the particular combination of:

home invasion;
repeated strangulation to danger of life;
intent to rob;
two bail aggravations with re-victimisation of the same complainer;
a prior pattern of community order breaches;

the disposal of ROLO plus CPO simply fell below the bottom of the reasonable range. This case will likely be cited in future Crown appeals to illustrate the type of scenario in which the court will intervene in what might otherwise be viewed as an exercise of compassionate sentencing discretion.

7. Conclusion

HM Advocate v Moran or Macdonald [2025] HCJAC 52 is a significant modern illustration of the law on unduly lenient sentences in Scotland, applied to a grievous pattern of home-invasion violence featuring strangulation. While deeply sympathetic to the respondent’s traumatic life history and acknowledging the importance of rehabilitation, the Appeal Court held that public protection, denunciation and the gravity of the offending required a substantial custodial sentence.

The key takeaways are:

The Bell test for undue leniency remains the touchstone, but will be robustly applied where serious violent offending is met with overly community-based disposals.
Repeated strangulation to danger of life, especially within the home and in pursuit of robbery, demands “appropriate penalties” — typically substantial custody — even where personal mitigation is powerful.
Re-offending against the same complainer while on bail, in the same setting, is an aggravation “over and above” the ordinary bail aggravation and must be given real weight.
Rehabilitation should be pursued, but in such cases primarily through structured post-release mechanisms (like an SRO), not as a substitute for imprisonment.

The decision therefore not only corrects what was found to be an unduly lenient sentence in a particular case, but also offers clear and authoritative guidance for future sentencing in strangulation-based assaults and serious home invasions, sharpening the boundary between permissible leniency and error.