Sladden [2025] EWCA Crim 1410: High Threshold for Unduly Lenient Sentence References and Permissibility of Suspension in Category A1 Coercive Control Cases (Including Strangulation)

Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Sladden, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1410 (16 October 2025), an Attorney General’s (Solicitor General’s) reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The respondent, David Sladden, pleaded guilty—on the first day of trial following a properly sought Goodyear indication—to one count of controlling and coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to sections 76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.

The sentencing judge imposed an 18-month custodial term, suspended for 24 months, coupled with 100 hours’ unpaid work, a rehabilitation activity requirement, a ten-year restraining order, and the victim surcharge. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient on two bases: (i) the custodial term was too low for Category A1 (culpability A, harm 1); and (ii) the sentence should not have been suspended—particularly given the presence of strangulation incidents within the pattern of coercive control.

The Court of Appeal refused leave and the reference, holding that although the sentence was lenient, it was not unduly lenient; and that the suspension decision fell within the first-instance judge’s proper sentencing discretion. The case clarifies that even where coercive and controlling behaviour falls within Category A1 and includes episodes of strangulation, a suspended sentence can remain within the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge, and that the appellate test for undue leniency remains a high one, especially where the judge has demonstrably considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating features and anchored their approach to the guidelines.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court accepted the categorisation of the offence as Category A1 under the controlling or coercive behaviour guideline, with the guideline starting point of 30 months’ custody (range one to four years).
• The judge’s Goodyear indication and subsequent sentence (20 months after trial, reduced to 18 months for a first-day guilty plea) were acknowledged to be on the lenient side, but within the range of reasonable sentences. No relevant factor had been overlooked.
• Suspension of the 18-month term was also within the judge’s discretion in light of rehabilitation prospects, impact on others (including children), lack of previous convictions, compliance with bail, and the structure imposed by the restraining order.
• The Court emphasised the high threshold for Attorney General’s references: sentences are only unduly lenient where they fall outside the range reasonably open to the first-instance judge; borderline cases should not attract intervention; section 36 addresses “gross error.”
• While decisions such as Cook and Borsodi indicate that a single strangulation offence might typically attract around 18 months’ immediate imprisonment, the Court reiterated that each case is fact-sensitive; the presence of strangulation as part of a coercive control count does not mechanically mandate immediate custody.
• Post-sentence progress (significant completion of unpaid work and engagement with probation) underscored that the suspended sentence was operating as intended, although the Court did not rely on post-sentence conduct to redefine the leniency analysis.
• Leave to refer was refused and, consequently, the reference failed.

Factual Background

The offending occurred during an on-and-off relationship spanning approximately seven years, during which the couple had three children. The relationship ended in May 2022. The pattern of behaviour included:

• Two incidents of strangulation (March 2018 and February 2022). The latter occurred in the presence of children and resulted in the victim falling backward onto a child, who sustained neck bruising.
• Threats, property damage with an axe, and explicit threats to kill any new partner (April 2022).
• Belittling and denigration regarding parenting and work; financial control disputes.
• Isolation from friends and family; monitoring communications; accusations of infidelity; enforced deletion of social media contacts.
• Intrusive surveillance and control of daily routines and privacy (including surveillance outside a bathroom and requiring proof of whereabouts).
• Requests for sex contrary to medical advice post-surgery, followed by accusations when refused.

After separation, the respondent entered the victim’s home, monitored her from outside, and parked nearby—a course of conduct not itself part of the section 76 offence (as the relationship had ended), but treated by the Court as aggravating the earlier offending’s impact.

Procedurally, the case saw a delay between arrest (April 2023) and charge (July 2024) following initial NFA, and a defence denial of acts until the day of trial, when a Goodyear indication was sought and a guilty plea entered on the full prosecution facts.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Guidelines Cited

The Court referred to both case law and definitive guidelines to frame its analysis:

• R v Alfie Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452 and R v Borsodi [2023] EWCA Crim 899 (para 17):
  • These cases were cited to signal that a standalone offence of strangulation often attracts a starting point of around 18 months’ custody and will typically result in immediate imprisonment.
  • However, Borsodi emphasises that “each case will have to turn on its own facts.” Sladden applies that warning directly: strangulation within a wider coercive control count is a powerful aggravating feature but does not rigidly compel immediate custody; the sentencing court must evaluate the totality in context of the correct guideline.
• Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 1989 (Court of Appeal, at p. 371):
  • Reaffirmed principles relevant to unduly lenient references: the appellate court intervenes only when the sentence falls outside the range reasonably available to the sentencing judge; leave should not be granted in borderline cases; and even where a sentence is found to be unduly lenient, the Court retains a discretion whether to increase it.
• Sentencing Guidelines:
  • Offence-specific guideline for controlling or coercive behaviour (Serious Crime Act 2015, s. 76): Category A1 was accepted by all parties—culpability A due to persistence and multiple methods of control; harm 1 due to fear of violence on many occasions and very serious alarm/distress.
  • Domestic Abuse: Overarching Principles (Definitive Guideline): presence of children during offending aggravates seriousness.
  • Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences; and the guideline on Suspended Sentence Orders: guidance on when suspension is permissible (e.g., realistic prospect of rehabilitation, strong personal mitigation, and palpable impact on dependants), and when it is not (e.g., public protection concerns, where only immediate custody meets punishment aims, or poor compliance history).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two essential stages: the custodial term length; and the decision to suspend.

1. Length of the custodial term:
   • The judge and the parties agreed that the proper categorisation was Category A1, with a starting point of 30 months’ custody (range: 1–4 years). The judge indicated that, after trial, a sentence of 20 months would be appropriate. This already reflected a downward movement from the starting point, taking account of mitigation (including good character and lack of further harassment, bail compliance, and the prospect of rehabilitation) against significant aggravation (persistence, multiple control methods, threats, physical assaults including strangulation, and the presence of children).
   • A 10% credit for a first-day guilty plea led to the 18-month term. The Court characterised that as “lenient” but emphasised that the unduly lenient test is not whether the appellate court would have imposed a higher sentence, but whether the sentence falls outside the bracket reasonably available to the judge. Given the judge’s explicit engagement with the guideline structure and the full suite of aggravating/mitigating factors, there was no error of principle or omission. The sentence, though lenient, remained within the permissible range.
2. Suspension of the sentence:
   • The Court recognised the particular seriousness introduced by strangulation—a feature that, in isolation, often leads to immediate custody. Nevertheless, the decision to suspend required a broader evaluation: the offender’s lack of previous convictions, compliance on bail, absence of subsequent harassment, realistic prospect of rehabilitation, and cogent impact on dependants. The judge also imposed a long restraining order to protect the victim and reinforce the rehabilitative and protective framework.
   • The Court accepted that some appellate judges might have refused to suspend on these facts. Yet the test is entitlement to suspend, not appellate preference. Because the judge’s decision demonstrably weighed the correct considerations and did not disregard material aggravation, it could not be branded as outside the reasonable range. In short, suspension was within the judge’s lawful discretion.

Alongside these conclusions, the Court underscored key section 36 principles: the sentencing judge’s privileged position to assess the case’s granular features; a strong reluctance to interfere in borderline situations; and the exceptional nature of the Attorney General’s unduly lenient jurisdiction, which is designed to address clear or “gross” errors, not reasonable leniency.

Finally, although not decisive to whether the sentence was unduly lenient, the Court noted that the suspended sentence order appeared to be operating as intended: the respondent had completed the majority of his unpaid work, engaged with probation, and begun to show some insight, albeit with residual victim-blaming to confront. This tended to reinforce, in the background, the propriety and utility of suspension on these facts.

Impact and Practical Implications

Sladden has several important forward-looking implications:

• High bar for ULS references in coercive control cases:
  Even where a Category A1 coercive control offence features strangulation and child exposure, a sentence will not be treated as unduly lenient merely because it is on the lower side of the guideline range or is suspended. Appellate intervention requires a sentence to be outside the scope of reasonable first-instance discretion.
• Strangulation as aggravation within coercive control does not mandate immediate custody:
  While Cook and Borsodi indicate immediate custody is typical for standalone strangulation, Sladden clarifies that, when strangulation is one element within a broader coercive control count, the guideline anchor remains the coercive control guideline. Strangulation is a powerful aggravating feature, but it does not mechanically compel immediate custody in the composite offence.
• Proper use of suspension in serious domestic abuse:
  Sentencers retain the discretion to suspend in serious domestic abuse cases—provided they rigorously weigh public protection, punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation; consider the presence of children; impose protective orders; and ensure robust community requirements. Sladden emphasises the structured, guideline-led use of suspension rather than any blanket rule.
• Goodyear context and reliance interests:
  A properly sought Goodyear indication, on the full prosecution facts and with explicit acknowledgment of possible AG reference, situates the appellate review in a framework where the judge’s structured approach is transparent. While a Goodyear indication does not insulate a sentence from an unduly lenient reference, it may accentuate the absence of error and the propriety of the judge’s evaluative balance.
• Prosecutorial decision-making on references:
  The decision acts as a caution against advancing ULS references in borderline scenarios—particularly where the judge has correctly applied the guideline structure, articulated the aggravating and mitigating features, and reached a sentence that is lenient but defensible within the range. It reaffirms the constitutional modesty of the ULS jurisdiction.
• Post-sentence progress:
  Although post-sentence conduct cannot cure an unduly lenient sentence, where the appellate court concludes the sentence is not unduly lenient, demonstrable rehabilitative progress will underscore the appropriateness of suspension and the public interest in leaving the sentence undisturbed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Controlling or coercive behaviour (Serious Crime Act 2015, s. 76):
  A pattern of behaviour in an intimate/family relationship designed to dominate, isolate, monitor, intimidate, or otherwise control the victim, causing fear of violence or serious alarm/distress and substantially affecting day-to-day life. The guideline assesses culpability (A–C) and harm (1–3).
• Category A1:
  The highest bracket under the guideline: culpability A (e.g., persistent behaviour over a prolonged period, multiple methods) and harm 1 (e.g., fear of violence on many occasions or very serious alarm/distress with substantial adverse effects).
• Goodyear indication:
  A formal indication from the judge, usually requested by the defence, of the maximum sentence that would be imposed on a guilty plea at that stage. It allows a defendant to plead with informed expectations. It must be grounded in the accepted factual basis and does not prevent an Attorney General’s reference if the sentence later passed is considered unduly lenient.
• Unduly lenient sentence (ULS) reference (Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 36):
  Enables the Law Officers to refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal if it is unduly lenient. The test is stringent: the sentence must fall outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge. Borderline leniency is not enough. Even if unduly lenient, the Court may decline to increase the sentence.
• Suspended sentence order (SSO):
  A custodial sentence that is not activated immediately. The offender must comply with requirements (e.g., unpaid work, rehabilitation activity) and refrain from further offending. Breach can trigger activation. Suspension is guided by factors such as rehabilitation prospects and impact on dependants, counterbalanced by seriousness and public protection.
• Domestic Abuse Overarching Principles:
  A guideline emphasising the seriousness and prevalence of domestic abuse, the significance of offending in the presence of children, and the need for protection and deterrence in sentencing.

Conclusion

Sladden is a clear reaffirmation of two core propositions. First, the section 36 undue leniency jurisdiction is reserved for clear error: where a sentencing judge has conscientiously applied the applicable guideline, balanced aggravation (including strangulation and the presence of children) and mitigation (good character, rehabilitation prospects, compliance, impact on dependants), and articulated their reasoning, the Court of Appeal will be slow to intervene—especially in borderline cases. Second, even Category A1 coercive control cases that feature strangulation do not automatically require immediate custody: suspension remains available where the sentencing judge can justify that course within the guideline framework and the totality principle.

The decision provides pragmatic guidance for prosecutors contemplating references and for sentencers grappling with the interface between the coercive control guideline and the gravity of strangulation within a composite pattern of abuse. It also underscores the importance of protective ancillary orders and structured community requirements when suspension is chosen. Ultimately, Sladden emphasises principled discretion at first instance and appellate restraint—a combination aimed at delivering sentences that are both just and effective in addressing domestic abuse.