Sentencing for Failure to Disclose Terrorist Financing in the Regulated Sector: Commentary on R v Ojiri [2025] EWCA Crim 1489

1. Introduction

The decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Ojiri [2025] EWCA Crim 1489 is the first appellate authority on sentencing for offences under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“TACT 2000”) – failure to disclose information relating to terrorist financing by those operating in the “regulated sector”.

The appellant, a 53‑year‑old art gallery owner, pleaded guilty to eight counts under section 21A arising from art sales to a wealthy collector, Nazeem Ahmad, whom the appellant believed to be involved in funding Hezbollah, a proscribed terrorist organisation. The case is particularly significant because:

it concerns the newly regulated art market (brought within the anti‑money laundering and counter‑terrorist financing regime in January 2020);
there were no Sentencing Council guidelines specific to section 21A; and
this was, as far as the court could ascertain, the first sentencing for this offence.

The Court of Appeal was therefore required to set an initial framework for sentencing under section 21A, using the Sentencing Council’s general guideline for offences without specific guidance and by reference to broader terrorism and money‑laundering principles. The judgment confirms that deliberate, informed non‑disclosure in the terrorism context will almost invariably attract an immediate custodial sentence, with a starting point of at least two years’ custody for a single high‑culpability offence – before uplifts for multiplicity, duration, and concealment.

2. Case Overview and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties and Procedural History

The appellant, Mr Ojiri, was an art gallery owner who had previously worked in media and other businesses (including vintage clothing). Having moved into the art market late in life, he ran a gallery selling artworks on an international basis.

On 9 May 2025, he pleaded guilty in the magistrates’ court to eight offences contrary to section 21A TACT 2000. Because confiscation proceedings were contemplated, he was committed to the Crown Court for sentence under section 70 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the magistrates indicated that, even without that power, they would have committed him for sentence under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (“SA 2020”), thus giving the Crown Court the full sentencing powers up to the statutory maximum of five years’ imprisonment.

On 6 June 2025, at the Central Criminal Court, Cheema‑Grubb J sentenced him as an “offender of particular concern” under section 278 SA 2020, imposing a Special Custodial Sentence of:

Custodial term: 2 years and 6 months; and
Extended licence: 12 months,

all counts concurrent, giving a total special custodial sentence of 3 years and 6 months.

The appellant applied for leave to appeal against sentence. The Registrar referred the matter to the full court because of the novelty of sentencing under section 21A and the absence of sentencing guidelines. The Court (Edis LJ giving the judgment) granted leave on that basis but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

2.2 Factual Background

The offending period ran from October 2020 to December 2021. The essential features were:

On eight occasions, between 24 October 2020 and 18 December 2021, the appellant failed to disclose to the authorities information obtained in the course of his business in the regulated sector.
He believed that his customer, Nazeem Ahmad, was engaged in, or attempting to commit, offences under sections 15–18 TACT 2000 (terrorist fundraising and related conduct).
Ahmad was designated in December 2019 by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control as a financier of Hezbollah and subject to US sanctions. This designation received considerable publicity in the art world.
Evidence from the appellant’s phone showed he accessed a New York Times article about Ahmad’s designation in December 2019 and engaged in detailed discussions about the art market’s inclusion within the Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering Regulations 2017.
Despite this, the appellant conducted eight art sales to Ahmad totalling about £140,000 after the art market became part of the regulated sector on 10 January 2020.
He took active steps to conceal Ahmad’s identity in his internal records and discussed with Ahmad methods of concealment.
On two occasions (November 2020 and March 2021) he sought identification documents; he knew the documents provided were false but nonetheless used them to purport compliance, and invoices omitted Ahmad’s true name.

When first interviewed in April 2023, the appellant provided a dishonest prepared statement claiming he had not known Ahmad’s identity or terrorist connections. In a later interview (July 2023) he withdrew that account, made significant admissions, and subsequently tendered early guilty pleas, thereby obtaining full one‑third credit.

2.3 The Grounds of Appeal

The principal grounds advanced on appeal were:

The sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant’s naivety and lack of experience in the regulated sector.
Insufficient regard was had to other mitigating factors: previous good character, genuine remorse, severe depressive disorder, impact on family, and novelty of the regulatory regime.
The judge erred in not drawing appropriate assistance from R v Swan [2011] EWCA Crim 2275, a case concerning failure to disclose money‑laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”).

The Crown, represented by Mr Harris, submitted that:

there was no error of principle in the judge’s approach;
the findings of fact on culpability and concealment were plainly open to her; and
the final sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the seriousness of terrorist‑linked non‑disclosure, the multiple counts, and the deliberate deceit.

3. Summary of the Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal:

Granted leave (due to the novelty and absence of guidance for section 21A), but
Dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

Key points from the judgment include:

For a single offence of the kind committed by the appellant – a gallery owner, in the regulated sector, selling art to an international customer he believed to be engaged in funding Hezbollah and deliberately failing to report – the starting point after trial should be at least two years’ custody for the custodial term (before considering aggravation, mitigation and guilty plea).
The sentencing judge was right to find high culpability and a moderate to high degree of harm, and to characterise the terrorism context as central to seriousness.
The judge was entitled to increase the notional two‑year term substantially to reflect:
- the number of offences (eight transactions);
- the duration (over more than a year); and
- the active deceit and concealment of the customer’s identity and use of false documents.
Naivety in the sense relied upon by the defence was rejected. The appellant was inexperienced as an art dealer but fully aware of both Ahmad’s terrorism‑related designation and the regulatory obligations; his offending was a calculated choice to secure financial gain.
R v Swan was of very limited assistance. Money‑laundering sentencing has evolved since 2011 and the results in Swan should not be transplanted into terrorism‑related non‑disclosure under section 21A.
The judge properly followed the Sentencing Council’s general guideline (overarching principles) for offences without a specific guideline, as well as the guidelines on totality, guilty plea reduction, and the imposition of custodial sentences.
The structure of the Special Custodial Sentence under section 278 SA 2020 for an offender of particular concern was correctly applied, and there was no arguable basis for a sentence that could lawfully be suspended.

4. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

4.1 Section 21A Terrorism Act 2000 – Failure to Disclose in the Regulated Sector

Section 21A TACT 2000 creates an offence of failure to disclose information relating to terrorist financing when the defendant:

works in the regulated sector and receives information in the course of that business; and
knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that another person is engaged in terrorist financing (offences under sections 15–18 TACT 2000); yet
fails to make a mandated disclosure to the authorities as soon as reasonably practicable.

The maximum penalty is 5 years’ imprisonment. The case confirms that “belief” that terrorist offences are being committed is close to “knowledge” and sits at the upper end of the mental element required under section 21A.

4.2 The Regulated Sector and the 2017 Regulations

Until 10 January 2020, the art market was not part of the regulated sector for the purposes of the Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering Regulations 2017. On that date, it was brought within scope. From then on, art market participants had to comply with:

customer due diligence and “know your customer” obligations;
record‑keeping duties; and
requirements to file suspicious activity reports where relevant.

The appellant’s offending occurred entirely after the art market was brought within the regulated sector, and the evidence showed he was aware of this change and had discussed it in some detail.

4.3 Offenders of Particular Concern and Section 278 Sentencing Act 2020

Because section 21A offences are “scheduled offences”, the appellant fell to be sentenced as an offender of particular concern (“OPC”). Under section 278 SA 2020, the court must impose a Special Custodial Sentence, which consists of:

a custodial term; and
an additional period of licence (extended supervision in the community).

In this case, Cheema‑Grubb J imposed 2 years 6 months’ custody plus 1 year’s extended licence. The Court of Appeal confirmed that, following Attorney General’s Reference (R v John) [2022] EWCA Crim 54, such a sentence can in law be suspended, but only where the total term (custodial plus extended licence) does not exceed two years. Realistically, therefore, an OPC sentence will only be suspendable if the custodial term is no more than 12 months.

Given the seriousness of the present offences, any sentence low enough to permit suspension would have been wholly inappropriate.

5. Detailed Analysis of the Judgment

5.1 Application of the General Guideline: Culpability and Harm

In the absence of offence‑specific guidelines, the judge (and the Court of Appeal) applied the Sentencing Council’s General guideline: overarching principles. This requires the court to:

Assess culpability (the blameworthiness of the offender’s conduct);
Assess harm (actual or potential harm caused or risked);
Identify a starting point sentence for a single offence after a notional trial; and
Adjust for aggravating and mitigating factors, totality, and any guilty plea.

The judge found – and the Court agreed – that:

The appellant’s state of mind was one of belief that Ahmad was involved in terrorist financing for Hezbollah; this is very close to knowledge and thus represents a high level of culpability.
The harm was moderate to high:
- The appellant’s conduct undermined the regulatory system designed to identify and disrupt terrorist financing.
- His actions risked facilitating financial flows to Hezbollah, a proscribed and dangerous terrorist organisation, by shielding suspicious transactions from detection.
- Crucially, the offence lies in the failure to disclose, not in any transfer of the appellant’s own funds to terrorists; nonetheless, the risk created and the systemic harm are serious.

On this analysis, the Court held that a custodial sentence is inevitable for a single section 21A offence of this seriousness and that the starting point after trial should be at least two years’ custody for the custodial element.

5.2 The Central Role of Terrorism in Assessing Seriousness

Defence counsel argued that because all section 21A offences are terrorism‑related by definition, the involvement of terrorism could not, by itself, significantly elevate seriousness in any individual case. The Court accepted that terrorism is an inherent feature of section 21A but firmly rejected the suggestion that it was therefore neutral.

Edis LJ stressed:

Section 21A exists precisely to prevent and detect terrorism financing.
Where commercial activity is conducted for substantial gain, in a way that actively circumvents disclosure obligations, for the benefit of a terrorist organisation, the offending is intrinsically serious.
Hezbollah was, at all material times, a proscribed organisation because of its involvement in cross‑border armed terrorist acts and its status as a powerful and dangerous group.
Non‑disclosure that may assist others to finance Hezbollah without detection constitutes serious criminal conduct, even if the appellant did not himself transfer money to the organisation.

Thus, the Court treats terrorism as more than background context; it is a central aggravating characteristic that shapes the assessment of harm and the baseline from which sentencing must begin.

5.3 Multiplicity of Offences, Duration, and Concealment

A critical part of the Court’s reasoning concerned the pattern and persistence of the offending:

The eight counts spanned more than a year.
Each transaction represented a fresh occasion on which the duty to disclose arose and was consciously ignored.
The appellant engaged in active concealment:
- altering internal records to hide Ahmad’s identity;
- discussing concealment strategies directly with Ahmad;
- knowingly accepting false identification documents and using them to purport compliance.

The Court was explicit:

“Not every offence of failure to disclose involves deceit and concealment in addition to that failure to disclose. Those offences of failure to disclose which do involve deceit are considerably more serious than those which do not.”

Accordingly, the judge was right to treat:

the number of offences;
their duration; and
the acts of concealment

as major aggravating factors justifying a substantial uplift above the two‑year starting point for a single, high‑culpability offence.

5.4 Naivety, Inexperience, and Professional Responsibility

The defence advanced “naivety” and limited experience in the regulated sector as reasons for substantially reducing culpability. The Court of Appeal was uncompromising in its rejection of this characterisation.

The Court accepted that the appellant:

was a relatively new entrant to the art market; and
had not long been operating in the regulated sector when the conduct began.

However, those factors were far outweighed by the evidence that:

He had read detailed press coverage of Ahmad’s designation as a Hezbollah financier shortly after it occurred.
He had engaged in discussions about the extension of the 2017 regulations to the art market, during which the regulatory position was explained “in some detail” and to which he replied, “Yeah, I know”.
He subsequently took deliberate steps to evade those very obligations by concealing Ahmad’s identity and using false documents.

The Court drew a clear distinction between:

Naivety about how likely it is that one will be caught, which may explain clumsy concealment; and
Naivety about the existence or importance of one’s legal obligations, which was not present here, given the appellant’s demonstrated awareness.

Edis LJ concluded:

“He may have been naïve in believing that by making changes to invoices on his laptop computer he could avoid detection for his offending, but that is not the same thing as to say that the offending itself arose out of naivety. He knew what he was doing and he committed these offences in order to make a very substantial sum of money. There is nothing naïve about that.”

The judgment therefore signals that claims of “naivety” will attract limited sympathy where the offender is consciously choosing profit over clear regulatory duties, particularly in the terrorism context.

5.5 Use and Rejection of Precedents: R v Swan and AG Ref (R v John)

5.5.1 R v Swan [2011] EWCA Crim 2275

The defence relied on Swan, a case involving failure to disclose money‑laundering under POCA, arguing that the sums and manipulative conduct were broadly comparable, but that Swan did not involve terrorism, so the sentence in Ojiri should not significantly exceed that in Swan.

The Court of Appeal held that Swan offered “very limited assistance”, for three reasons:

It is a decision of antiquity (2011) and sentencing practice for money‑laundering has evolved since.
It dealt with different legislation (POCA rather than TACT 2000) and a different context (money‑laundering rather than terrorism financing).
Most importantly, it would be an error to “carry across the result in Swan into offences committed contrary to section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000” – the terrorism dimension fundamentally changes the seriousness analysis.

The Court is signalling that counsel should be cautious about relying on historic money‑laundering authorities to benchmark sentences for terrorism‑related financial offences.

5.5.2 Attorney General’s Reference (R v John) [2022] EWCA Crim 54

The appeal also prompted commentary on John, where the Court of Appeal had held that a special custodial sentence for an offender of particular concern can lawfully be suspended, provided the total term (custody + extended licence) does not exceed two years.

In Ojiri, counsel sought a sentence sufficiently low to be capable of suspension. The Court described this as a “high hurdle”, both because:

The custodial term would need to be 12 months or less; and
Given the seriousness of deliberate terrorist‑related non‑disclosure, such a low sentence would not be proportionate.

While John is reaffirmed as a matter of legal possibility, Ojiri demonstrates that, in practice, OPC sentences will often be well above the threshold where suspension could be contemplated, particularly in terrorism‑related financial crimes.

5.6 Sentencing Methodology in Ojiri

The Court reconstructed and endorsed the sentencing judge’s method, even though the precise uplifts and reductions were not numerically itemised in the remarks:

Baseline for a single offence:
- For a single offence of the type described (gallery owner, belief in terrorist financing for Hezbollah, deliberate non‑disclosure), the appropriate sentence after trial would be at least two years’ custody for the custodial portion of the OPC sentence.
Aggravation – multiple offences and concealment:
- The judge identified and the Court endorsed the following aggravating factors:
  - knowledge that Ahmad was subject to US sanctions as a Hezbollah financier;
  - active, sophisticated steps to conceal Ahmad’s identity, motivated by financial and reputational gain;
  - eight separate offences over more than a year.
- These factors justified a “very significant” increase above the two‑year baseline.
Mitigation:
- Previous good character and high reputation;
- genuine remorse;
- severe depressive disorder (though largely a consequence of detection and conviction);
- impact on his family; and
- relative novelty of working in the regulated sector.
- The judge recognised these and adjusted the sentence downward to an extent, but not enough to displace the need for a substantial custodial term.
Totality:
- All eight counts ran concurrently, ensuring that the overall sentence reflected the totality of criminality rather than mechanically stacking sentences.
- Nonetheless, the multiplicity and duration of offending were reflected in the length of the single overall custodial term.
Guilty plea reduction:
- The judge started with a pre‑plea term (which the Court estimates at around 3 years 9 months) and then applied a one‑third reduction for early guilty pleas, arriving at a custodial term of 2 years 6 months.
- An extended licence of 12 months was then added as required for OPCs, giving a total special custodial sentence of 3 years 6 months.

The Court concluded that this methodology was entirely consistent with the general guideline, the totality guideline, and the guideline on guilty plea reductions.

5.7 Appellate Review: Manifest Excess and Error of Principle

The Court emphasised the familiar constraints on appellate intervention in sentencing:

It will interfere only where the sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.
Here, the judge’s findings of fact on the appellant’s belief, knowledge, concealment, and motivation were plainly available on the evidence.
The sentencing process – identifying a starting point, adjusting for aggravation and mitigation, and applying totality – was sound.

On that basis, the Court found no error of principle and held that a special custodial sentence of 3 years 6 months was not manifestly excessive given the seriousness of the conduct.

6. Complex Concepts and Terminology Explained

6.1 The “Regulated Sector” and Art Market Participants

The “regulated sector” is a statutory term covering businesses subject to enhanced anti‑money‑laundering and counter‑terrorist financing obligations – such as banks, financial institutions, accountants, and (since 2020) many art market participants.

Once a business falls within the regulated sector, it must:

conduct customer due diligence and identity checks;
monitor transactions for suspicious activity; and
report suspicions relating to money‑laundering or terrorist financing to the relevant authority (often the National Crime Agency).

In Ojiri, the appellant’s gallery became subject to these rules when the art market was brought into scope. His failure to report suspicions about Ahmad therefore engaged section 21A.

6.2 Failure to Disclose under Section 21A TACT 2000

Section 21A does not require the defendant to have funded terrorism personally. Rather, it criminalises the failure to report when, in the course of regulated business, one:

obtains information giving rise to:
- knowledge,
- suspicion, or
- reasonable grounds for suspicion
that another is committing terrorist financing offences; and
fails to disclose this as soon as reasonably practicable.

The mental states form a spectrum, from the lowest (having reasonable grounds for suspicion even if one does not consciously suspect) to suspicion, to belief and then knowledge. In Ojiri, the judge found, and the Court accepted, that the appellant believed Ahmad was engaged in terrorist fundraising for Hezbollah – placing him at the high end of culpability.

6.3 Offenders of Particular Concern and Special Custodial Sentences

Certain terrorism and serious sexual offences trigger a distinct sentencing regime where the defendant is categorised as an offender of particular concern. For such offenders, section 278 SA 2020 mandates a Special Custodial Sentence, comprising:

a custodial term (time to be spent in prison); and
an extended period of licence (additional time under supervision in the community).

This is designed to manage ongoing risk posed by those convicted of serious or terrorism‑linked offences. In Ojiri, the special custodial sentence was 3 years 6 months in total, comprised of 2 years 6 months custody and 1 year extended licence.

6.4 The Totality Principle and Concurrent Sentences

Where an offender is sentenced for multiple offences, courts must apply the totality principle, ensuring the overall sentence is just and proportionate to the combined seriousness of all offending.

This may involve:

running sentences concurrently (at the same time), where offences are closely connected; or
running some or all sentences consecutively (one after another), if they are distinct and cumulatively increase the criminality.

In Ojiri, all eight counts were made concurrent. However, the judge increased the length of the custodial term beyond what would have been imposed for a single count to reflect the repeated, sustained nature of the offending. This is a standard application of totality: the offender does not simply receive the sentence for the most serious single count, but nor is he punished as if each count were entirely separate and unrelated.

6.5 Mitigation, Mental Health, and the Limits of Excuse

Mitigation refers to factors that may reduce the severity of sentence, such as:

previous good character;
genuine remorse;
mental health difficulties; and
personal or family hardship.

In Ojiri, the appellant’s severe depressive disorder and his previously positive reputation were recognised as mitigating. However, the Court noted that his psychiatric condition largely arose from the detection, prosecution, and conviction – consequences that would usually follow from criminal behaviour of this type, regardless of the precise sentence. In such circumstances, mental health issues may justify some reduction, but will rarely trump the need for a substantial custodial term in serious terrorism‑related cases.

7. Implications and Future Impact

7.1 A Sentencing Benchmark for Section 21A

Ojiri is the first appellate decision to articulate a clear sentencing benchmark for section 21A offences. While not a formal guideline, it will be treated as authoritative guidance by Crown Courts and magistrates.

Key benchmarks include:

For a single, high‑culpability offence of non‑disclosure by a regulated‑sector professional who believes they are dealing with a terrorist financier and deliberately fails to disclose, the starting point after trial is at least two years’ custody (custodial term for an OPC sentence).
Where there are multiple offences, a prolonged course of conduct, and active deceit or concealment, a “very significant” uplift above that baseline is warranted, subject to totality.
Mitigation may temper but will rarely eliminate the need for a substantial custodial term in such cases.

Other section 21A cases will of course vary:

At the lower end, a single, promptly remedied failure, arising from confusion rather than conscious concealment, with only weak grounds for suspicion, may attract markedly lower sentences.
At the higher end, systemic, sophisticated non‑disclosure in high‑value, multi‑jurisdictional schemes could justify sentences approaching the 5‑year statutory maximum.

7.2 Terrorism‑Linked Financial Non‑Compliance as Intrinsically Serious

The judgment underscores that breaches of counter‑terrorist financing obligations are to be treated as intrinsically serious, not as mere technical regulatory infractions. The Court’s rejection of analogies with older money‑laundering cases like Swan highlights a clear trajectory: terrorism‑linked financial crimes attract more stringent sentencing attitudes than comparable non‑terrorism financial offences.

7.3 Compliance in Newly Regulated Sectors – The Art Market and Beyond

The case has particular resonance for:

art dealers and galleries (brought into the AML/CTF regime in 2020);
other sectors more recently added to or tightened within the regulated sector (e.g. certain crypto‑asset businesses); and
professionals dealing with high‑net‑worth or politically exposed clients, especially where foreign sanctions are in play.

The message is that:

the relative novelty of regulation offers limited mitigation once the individual is on notice of their obligations; and
knowledge of foreign sanctions (e.g. US OFAC designations) can be aggravating, especially if the professional then facilitates transactions while actively concealing the sanctioned person’s involvement.

7.4 The Limited Role of “Naivety” and the Problem of Wilful Blindness

The Court’s robust dismissal of “naivety” as a core mitigating theme has broader implications. Professionals in the regulated sector cannot expect substantial leniency where:

they have been informed of their obligations;
they are aware of red flags (such as sanctions or widely publicised reports of terrorist financing); yet
they nonetheless engage in conduct that appears designed to evade detection (e.g., using false names, falsified documents, or opaque corporate vehicles).

In effect, the Court treats such behaviour as conscious, profit‑driven wrongdoing rather than unsophisticated misunderstanding. “Naivety” about being caught is no substitute for compliance with clear legal duties.

7.5 Interaction with Money‑Laundering Jurisprudence

Ojiri marks an explicit divergence from relying heavily on historic money‑laundering sentencing precedents when dealing with terrorism‑related financial offences. It confirms:

that sentencing practice for money‑laundering has become more robust since 2011; and
that terrorism‑linked offences sit in a distinct and more serious category.

Future sentencing submissions in section 21A or analogous terrorism‑finance cases will need to engage directly with the terrorism dimension and cannot simply transpose sentencing ranges from POCA cases.

7.6 Prospects of Formal Sentencing Guidelines

While outside the scope of the judgment itself, Ojiri may act as a catalyst for the Sentencing Council to consider developing offence‑specific guidelines for:

section 21A TACT 2000; and/or
terrorism‑related financial and regulatory offences more broadly.

Pending any such development, Ojiri will likely serve as the principal authority setting the framework for these offences.

8. Conclusion

R v Ojiri [2025] EWCA Crim 1489 is a landmark in the sentencing of terrorism‑related financial offences. It:

Establishes that for deliberate, informed failures to disclose suspected terrorist financing by regulated‑sector professionals, an immediate custodial sentence is effectively inevitable.
Sets a clear starting point of at least two years’ custody for a single high‑culpability section 21A offence of the kind seen here, before adjustments.
Emphasises that:
- the terrorism context is central, not incidental, to seriousness;
- multiple offences, prolonged conduct, and active deceit substantially aggravate sentence; and
- “naivety” and sectoral inexperience carry limited weight where the offender knowingly chooses profit over compliance.
Confirms that older money‑laundering authorities like Swan provide little guidance for terrorism‑focused offences and that sentencing for terrorist financing‑related misconduct demands a distinct and more severe approach.
Clarifies the interaction between section 21A, the regulated sector, and the OPC regime under section 278 SA 2020, including the practical rarity of suspended special custodial sentences in terrorism cases.

In the broader legal context, Ojiri strengthens the message that those in the regulated sector who knowingly undermine counter‑terrorist financing controls, particularly in high‑value markets like art, should expect substantial custodial penalties. It marks a clear shift away from viewing such failures as regulatory lapses and firmly categorises them as serious criminal wrongdoing with potentially grave consequences for public safety.