Section 21 of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019 Confined to Consumer Insurance Contracts: Commentary on M & Anor v Centric Health Primary Care Ltd & Anor [2025] IEHC 735

Section 21 of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019 Confined to Consumer Insurance Contracts:
Commentary on M & Anor v Centric Health Primary Care Ltd & Anor [2025] IEHC 735

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the ex tempore ruling of Coffey J in the High Court of Ireland in M and Anor v Centric Health Primary Care Ltd and Anor [2025] IEHC 735, delivered on 7 November 2025. The decision addresses the scope of section 21 of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019 (“CICA 2019” or “the Act”) and, in particular, whether that section creates a freestanding right of action for third parties against insurers in all insurance contracts, or whether its operation is confined to consumer insurance contracts as defined in the Act.

The judgment is of significant doctrinal and practical importance because it:

  • Clarifies that section 21 CICA 2019 is not a general third-party rights provision but is confined to consumer insurance contracts;
  • Confirms that section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 remains the principal mechanism for third-party direct actions in the non-consumer / commercial insurance sphere; and
  • Illustrates the court’s willingness to use its case management and inherent jurisdiction powers to secure the practical enforceability of judgments, especially where a plaintiff has a limited life expectancy.

Against that backdrop, this commentary analyses the judgment’s reasoning, the interpretative approach adopted, and its likely impact on insurance litigation, particularly clinical negligence and other professional liability claims involving large corporate defendants.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

The proceedings are a clinical negligence action. The details of the alleged negligence are not set out in the ruling, but the context is stark: the first-named plaintiff’s life expectancy had been estimated at twelve months from March, and the trial was scheduled to commence on 25 November, only eighteen days after the date of the ruling.

The key parties are:

  • First-named plaintiff (M): A seriously ill patient, facing a limited life expectancy;
  • Second-named plaintiff: Not central to this ruling (likely a dependent or associated claimant);
  • First-named defendant: Centric Health Primary Care Limited, a substantial corporate entity owning and operating over 70 GP clinics throughout Ireland;
  • Second-named defendant: Dr Carolina Grisales, a medical practitioner (not central to this motion);
  • Third Party: Marian Hayes as personal representative of the estate of Michael Hayes (again, not materially involved in this particular procedural application).

At a case management hearing, the plaintiff’s legal team sought a direction compelling the first-named defendant to disclose the name and address of its insurer. The express motivation was to allow the plaintiff to avail of what was asserted to be a statutory right of action against the insurer under section 21 CICA 2019.

Given the plaintiff’s prognosis and the imminent trial date, her lawyers sought to ensure that any judgment in her favour could be enforced during her lifetime. Their concern was heightened by the first-named defendant’s refusal to provide an assurance that it or its insurer would actually satisfy any judgment obtained, notwithstanding a general undertaking to seek indemnity from its insurer if the case was lost.

3. Legal Issues Before the Court

The Court had to resolve two related but distinct issues:

  1. Scope of section 21 CICA 2019
    Does section 21 operate as:
    • a freestanding statutory right that applies to all contracts of insurance (consumer and non-consumer alike), by virtue of its reference to a “person” (defined to include “any corporate body”); or
    • a provision that is confined to consumer insurance contracts falling within the general scope of the Act, such that it does not apply to the policy held by a large corporate entity such as Centric Health?
  2. Disclosure of insurer details outside section 21
    Even if section 21 does not apply, can the Court nonetheless direct the first-named defendant to disclose the name and address of its insurer to allow the plaintiff to prepare “oven‑ready” proceedings under section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 or otherwise?

The primary point of law – the interpretation of section 21 – is the core of the judgment and gives rise to the new precedent. The order ultimately made on disclosure reflects the Court’s exercise of procedural and case management powers in light of the plaintiff’s exceptional circumstances.

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Section 21 CICA 2019 applies only to consumer insurance contracts

Coffey J holds unequivocally that:

  • Section 21 is not a freestanding provision applicable to all insurance contracts;
  • Its operation is confined to “consumer insurance contracts” within the scope of CICA 2019; and
  • Because Centric Health is not a “consumer” under the Act, the policy between it and its insurer is not a consumer insurance contract. Section 21 therefore has no application to the insurance in this case.

Accordingly, the Court refuses the plaintiff’s application insofar as it was grounded on an intention to invoke section 21 to join or sue the insurer directly.

4.2 Section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 remains the route for non-consumer insurance

The Court emphasises that CICA 2019 did not repeal or amend section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, which continues to govern direct actions by third parties against insurers in non-consumer insurance cases. The coexistence of section 21 CICA 2019 and section 62 of the 1961 Act is treated as deliberate legislative design: section 21 supplements rather than replaces section 62, and only within the consumer insurance domain.

4.3 Disclosure of insurer details ordered on other grounds

Despite rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on section 21, the Court is acutely conscious of the plaintiff’s prognosis and the need to make any judgment practically enforceable. Coffey J:

  • notes that the plaintiff’s concerns are “entirely worthy” and shares the view that “everything possible should be done” to secure satisfaction of any judgment; and
  • directs the first-named defendant to disclose the name and address of its insurer by close of business that day.

The purpose is to allow the plaintiff to prepare “oven-ready” proceedings against the insurer under section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, to be issued promptly if necessary once any judgment is obtained. Senior counsel for the defendant “properly acknowledges” that he cannot resist this order.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 The statutory framework

5.1.1 Scope of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019

The long title of CICA 2019 states that it is:

“An Act to reform the law of consumer insurance contracts and to provide for related matters.”

Section 2(1) of the Act governs its scope and provides:

“Except where otherwise provided, each provision of this Act applies to life and non-life contracts of insurance entered into, and variations to such contracts of insurance agreed, between an insurer and a consumer after the commencement of the provision concerned.”

Two features of this provision are crucial:

  • It contains the phrase “each provision of this Act”, suggesting that every operative section – including section 21 – is presumptively confined to insurance contracts between an insurer and a consumer.
  • It is subject to the caveat “except where otherwise provided”, leaving open the possibility that particular sections might expressly or implicitly extend beyond consumer contracts.

The definition of “consumer” is imported from section 2(1) of the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman Act 2017. Crucially, as Coffey J notes, that definition excludes incorporated bodies whose annual turnover exceeded €3 million in the previous financial year. A large corporate entity such as Centric Health, operating more than 70 GP clinics, falls outside the definition of “consumer”.

5.1.2 Section 21 of CICA 2019

Section 21 creates a statutory right of action for third parties against insurers where:

  • a person is insured under a contract of insurance against a liability to a third party;
  • that liability is incurred; and
  • either:
    • the insured has died, cannot be found, or is insolvent; or
    • “for any other reason it appears to a court to be just and equitable to so order”.

In those circumstances:

  • the rights of the insured under the contract of insurance transfer to and vest in the third party (s. 21(1));
  • the third party gains a direct right to recover from the insurer “in accordance with the contract” (s. 21(2)); and
  • the third party acquires a statutory right to information from the insured or the insurer about:
    • whether a relevant contract of insurance exists;
    • the identity of the insurer;
    • the terms of the contract; and
    • whether the insurer has indicated an intention to refuse liability (s. 21(3)).

Section 21(14) defines “the person” as including:

“an individual, a partnership, or any corporate body.”

It was on this last point that the plaintiff’s argument principally rested.

5.1.3 Section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961

Section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 is the traditional Irish mechanism by which third parties may obtain rights directly against an insurer. While its detailed text is not reproduced in the judgment, Coffey J summarises its effect: it “continues to govern the circumstances in which a third party may sue an insurer directly in respect of non-consumer insurance.”

Broadly, section 62 is engaged where:

  • an insured is covered against liability to third parties; and
  • specified events such as insolvency, bankruptcy or winding-up occur, causing rights under the policy to be effectively redirected for the benefit of the third party.

Unlike section 21 CICA 2019, section 62:

  • is not limited to consumer insurance; but
  • does not offer a broad “just and equitable” trigger or an explicit statutory right to insurance information.

Thus, CICA 2019’s section 21 can be viewed as a consumer-focused enhancement of third-party rights that would otherwise be governed by section 62 alone.

5.2 The plaintiff’s argument: section 21 as a freestanding provision

Senior counsel for the first-named plaintiff advanced an argument built on the language of section 21 itself, in particular subsection (14):

  • Section 21(14) defines “the person” to include “any corporate body”.
  • On a prima facie reading, “any corporate body” is not limited to small, consumer‑type entities; it could include large corporations with turnovers exceeding €3 million.
  • Thus, counsel contended, section 21 should be understood as a freestanding provision that applies to all contracts of insurance, rather than only to consumer policies.

In effect, the argument sought to use the internal definition in section 21(14) as the kind of “otherwise provided” exception contemplated by section 2(1) of the Act. If successful, this would have had a far‑reaching effect, converting section 21 into a general third-party rights provision for the entire insurance market.

5.3 The Court’s interpretative methodology: Heather Hill and statutory text

Coffey J approaches the interpretative question through the lens of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2022] 2 ILRM 313. In that case, Murray C.J. emphasised:

  • the primacy of the statutory text; and
  • that context and purpose can be used to depart from apparently clear language only where they are “decisively probative of an alternative construction that is itself capable of being accommodated within the statutory language”.

In other words:

  • Courts must begin with the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used;
  • Context and purpose are important, but they cannot be used to rewrite clear statutory language under the guise of purposive interpretation;
  • Any alternative reading must not only be strongly supported by context and purpose, but must also remain textually plausible.

Coffey J applies this structured interpretative approach to the interaction between:

  • the long title of CICA 2019;
  • section 2(1) (scope of the Act); and
  • section 21 and its internal definition of “the person” in subsection (14).

5.4 Why section 21 is confined to consumer insurance contracts

5.4.1 The significance of the long title and section 2(1)

Coffey J places considerable weight on the combined effect of:

  • the long title (“to reform the law of consumer insurance contracts”); and
  • the explicit statement in section 2(1) that “each provision of this Act” applies only to contracts between an insurer and a consumer, subject to express exceptions.

The phrase “each provision of this Act” is described as logically implying that every subsequent operative section (including section 21) is presumptively confined to consumer insurance contracts, unless the Act clearly provides otherwise.

This is a textual starting point: unless there is clear legislative language extending the reach of a particular section beyond consumer contracts, the court must treat that section as operating only within the consumer insurance framework.

5.4.2 No express extension of section 21 beyond consumer insurance

Coffey J then examines section 21 itself and observes that:

  • There is no language in section 21 that expressly extends its application to non-consumer or commercial insurance contracts.
  • In particular, the section does not redefine “contract of insurance” for the purposes of that section in a way that would break free from the limitation in section 2(1).
  • The Act does not contain a general extension clause stating that section 21 applies to “all contracts of insurance” or that it is to operate “notwithstanding” section 2(1).

Thus, the Court concludes that section 21 must be “interpreted as operating solely within the framework of the Act, namely in relation to consumer insurance contracts.”

5.4.3 The role of section 21(14): “the person” including corporate bodies

What, then, is the role of section 21(14), which provides that “the person” includes a corporate body?

On the plaintiff’s argument, this was the crucial foothold for treating section 21 as a universal provision. However, Coffey J treats it instead as an internal definitional clause that:

  • operates within the scope of section 2(1), rather than displacing it; and
  • ensures that corporate consumers (e.g. incorporated entities that nonetheless fall within the statutory turnover threshold and so qualify as “consumers”) are explicitly included among those who may be “the person” in section 21.

Properly understood, section 21(14) simply clarifies that:

  • the insured person whose rights may transfer to a third party under section 21 can be:
    • an individual;
    • a partnership; or
    • a corporate body;
  • but the contract of insurance in question must still be a contract between an insurer and a consumer, within the meaning of section 2(1) and the cross-referenced definition from the FSPO legislation.

In other words, section 21(14) addresses “what type of legal person” the insured can be, not “what type of contract” is governed by the section. It does not amount to the kind of “decisively probative” language that, under Heather Hill, would justify displacing the clear textual limitation in section 2(1).

5.4.4 The continued existence of section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961

A further plank in the Court’s reasoning is that the Oireachtas, when enacting CICA 2019, chose not to amend or repeal section 62 of the 1961 Act. Section 62 therefore:

  • continues to provide the primary route for third parties to obtain rights against insurers in the non-consumer context; and
  • operates in parallel with section 21, which is confined to consumer insurance.

The Court treats this legislative coexistence as a strong indicator of legislative intent:

  • Had the Oireachtas wished section 21 to be a universal replacement for section 62, it could have:
    • expressly repealed or limited section 62; or
    • stated clearly that section 21 applies to all contracts of insurance.
  • Its failure to do so supports the conclusion that section 21 is a targeted reform of consumer insurance law, not a restructuring of the entire third-party rights regime.

This is a classic example of using the legislative context and continuity as interpretative aids.

5.5 The outcome: no section 21 action, but disclosure ordered

5.5.1 Refusal of the application based on section 21

On the basis of the textual analysis and legislative context, Coffey J concludes that:

  • Centric Health is not a “consumer” within the meaning of the Act;
  • the insurance contract between Centric Health and its insurer is not a consumer insurance contract;
  • section 21 CICA 2019 therefore does not apply; and
  • the plaintiff’s application to obtain insurer details for the purpose of joining or suing the insurer under section 21 must be refused.

This component of the ruling establishes the central precedent: section 21 CICA 2019 is confined to consumer insurance contracts and does not create a general third-party right of action against insurers in commercial insurance cases.

5.5.2 Case management, compassion and practical enforceability

However, Coffey J does not leave the matter there. He emphasises:

  • the limited life expectancy of the plaintiff, estimated at twelve months from March;
  • the imminent trial date (eighteen days away);
  • the plaintiff’s entirely reasonable desire to ensure that any judgment is enforceable during her lifetime; and
  • the first-named defendant’s refusal to provide an assurance that it or its insurer will satisfy any judgment.

The Court explicitly states that it shares the plaintiff’s concern and that “everything possible should be done” to ensure that any judgment against the first-named defendant would be satisfied.

5.5.3 Direction to disclose insurer details for potential section 62 proceedings

To that end, Coffey J directs Centric Health to:

“disclose the name and address of its insurer by close of business today so that the first-named plaintiff will be in a position to launch ‘oven-ready’ proceedings against the first-named defendant’s insurer, pursuant to section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, on foot of any judgment she may obtain.”

The order:

  • is not made under section 21 (which has been found inapplicable);
  • is grounded instead in the Court’s case management / inherent jurisdiction to make directions necessary to secure the just and efficient resolution of proceedings; and
  • is facilitated by the fact that the first-named defendant’s senior counsel does not (and cannot) resist the making of the order.

The reference to the proceedings as “oven-ready” is telling. It reflects a practical strategy:

  • the plaintiff cannot yet sue the insurer directly under section 62 – that right generally crystallises in specific circumstances (e.g. insolvency) or in conjunction with a judgment; but
  • by knowing the identity and address of the insurer, her legal team can have a fully drafted claim ready to file immediately if and when the conditions for a direct action are met and a judgment is obtained.

In this way, the Court balances:

  • strict adherence to the statutory limits of section 21; with
  • a flexible, humane use of procedural powers to safeguard the plaintiff’s ability to realise the fruits of any successful judgment in the limited time she has.

5.6 Precedent considered: Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála

Although only one external case is expressly cited, it is central to the Court’s reasoning: Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2022] 2 ILRM 313.

In Heather Hill, the Supreme Court (Murray C.J.) articulated a refined approach to statutory interpretation in Irish law:

  • Start with the ordinary meaning of the statutory words;
  • Take into account context, structure and purpose of the legislation;
  • Allow context and purpose to override the apparent literal meaning only where they are “decisively probative” of an alternative interpretation; and
  • Ensure any alternative construction remains compatible with the statutory language.

Coffey J’s application of this framework in M v Centric Health is textbook:

  1. He begins with the text of the long title and section 2(1), which clearly point to a consumer-focused statute.
  2. He then scrutinises the internal wording of section 21 to see whether it expressly or impliedly “otherwise provides” for a wider scope. Finding no such clear indication, he holds that the presumption in section 2(1) remains intact.
  3. He reinforces this conclusion by reference to the legislative context, particularly the survival of section 62 of the 1961 Act.

The result is a disciplined adherence to statutory text, resisting the temptation to expand a remedial consumer provision into a general reform of commercial insurance law.

5.7 Impact and implications

5.7.1 For the law of insurance and third-party rights

The ruling has important implications for the structure of third-party rights against insurers in Ireland:

  • Clear demarcation between consumer and non-consumer insurance Section 21 CICA 2019:
    • applies only where the insured is a consumer (including qualifying small corporate consumers within the turnover threshold); and
    • does not apply where the insured is a large commercial or corporate entity like Centric Health.
  • Continued centrality of section 62 Civil Liability Act 1961 For non-consumer insurance:
    • section 62 of the 1961 Act remains the primary statutory route for third parties to obtain rights against insurers; and
    • third parties do not benefit from section 21’s additional features (e.g. the “just and equitable” ground or the statutory information rights).
  • Limited universalisation of consumer protections The decision resists any drift towards treating consumer-focused reforms as general principles applicable to all insurance contracts. This preserves a distinction between:
    • insurance for individuals and small-scale entities (where consumer protection rationales dominate); and
    • insurance for large corporate entities (where freedom of contract and commercial risk allocation remain paramount).

5.7.2 For litigation strategy in clinical negligence and other large-scale claims

For practitioners, especially in clinical negligence or professional liability claims involving hospital groups, corporate clinics, or other large institutions, the case signals that:

  • It will not be possible to rely on section 21 CICA 2019 to bring a direct action against an insurer where the insured defendant is a large incorporated entity outside the consumer definition.
  • Claimants must instead consider:
    • traditional execution and enforcement against the defendant’s assets;
    • the possibility of a section 62 action if the insured becomes insolvent or otherwise meets its conditions;
    • case management applications (akin to this one) to secure disclosure of insurer details in appropriate circumstances.

The Court’s willingness to order insurer disclosure – even without section 21 – suggests that:

  • In cases of urgency or vulnerability (e.g. terminal illness, imminent trial), the courts may be receptive to practical measures that facilitate prompt enforcement; and
  • Defendants and their insurers should expect that basic information about insurance cover may be compelled where fairness so demands, even in the absence of a direct statutory right to that information for non-consumer insurance.

5.7.3 For statutory interpretation more generally

The decision reinforces several broader interpretative themes:

  • Respect for scope clauses Where an Act contains an express scope provision (like section 2(1) of CICA 2019), courts will treat this as a strong boundary, not easily displaced by inference or general remedial purpose.
  • Use of long titles and legislative continuity The long title and the survival of earlier statutory regimes (e.g. section 62) are treated as meaningful indicators of legislative design, rather than mere background noise.
  • Caution with internal definitional expansions A section’s decision to define terms like “person” expansively (to include corporate bodies) will not be read as silently overturning the Act’s general scope provisions, unless the language is unmistakably clear.

6. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

For clarity, some of the key legal concepts in the judgment can be summarised as follows:

6.1 Consumer insurance contract

A consumer insurance contract is one where:

  • the insured is a “consumer” under the Act (including certain small businesses and individuals); and
  • the contract is for life or non-life insurance (i.e. everything from life insurance to motor, home, or liability insurance).

Large incorporated bodies with annual turnover above €3 million are generally not consumers and so their insurance policies are not consumer insurance contracts under CICA 2019.

6.2 Statutory right of action against an insurer

Normally, under the doctrine of privity of contract, only the parties to a contract can sue on it. A person injured by someone else’s negligence cannot, as a rule, sue that person’s insurer directly; they must first sue the wrongdoer and then hope the insurer indemnifies that wrongdoer.

A statutory right of action (like that created by section 21 or section 62) is a law that overrides this general principle by allowing an injured third party to:

  • step into the shoes of the insured wrongdoer; and
  • sue the insurer directly for the amount of their loss, subject to the policy’s terms.

6.3 “Just and equitable” grounds under section 21

Section 21 CICA 2019 includes a broad discretionary ground: a court can transfer rights under the policy to a third party where “for any other reason it appears to a court to be just and equitable to so order”.

This:

  • gives courts a flexible tool to ensure fairness where strict conditions (like insolvency) are not met; but
  • is only available in the consumer insurance context, not in commercial policies like that of Centric Health.

6.4 Ex tempore ruling

An ex tempore ruling is a decision delivered orally by the judge at the end of a hearing, rather than being reserved and issued later in written form. It is often:

  • produced in urgent or case-management contexts; and
  • later transcribed and, if appropriate, “approved” for publication, as in this case.

6.5 Case management hearing

A case management hearing is a procedural hearing at which the court:

  • monitors the progress of the case;
  • gives directions about evidence, timetables, and trial arrangements; and
  • may make orders designed to ensure that the eventual trial and any subsequent enforcement are effective and efficient.

The order in this case (disclosing insurer details) was made in such a case management context, highlighting the court’s readiness to use procedural tools to secure practical justice.

7. Conclusion

The decision in M and Anor v Centric Health Primary Care Ltd and Anor [2025] IEHC 735 provides a clear and authoritative statement on the scope of section 21 of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019:

  • Section 21 is not a freestanding, general third-party rights provision applicable to all insurance contracts;
  • It operates only within the consumer insurance sphere defined by section 2(1) and the imported definition of “consumer”;
  • Large corporate insureds such as Centric Health cannot be brought within section 21 simply because section 21(14) defines “the person” to include corporate bodies;
  • For non-consumer insurance, section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 continues to provide the principal statutory framework for third-party actions against insurers.

At the same time, the ruling illustrates a nuanced judicial response to the realities of serious illness and limited life expectancy. While firmly respecting the limits of section 21, Coffey J uses the Court’s procedural powers to order disclosure of insurer details, enabling the plaintiff to prepare “oven-ready” proceedings under section 62 in the event they become necessary.

In doctrinal terms, the case:

  • reaffirms the primacy of statutory text as emphasised in Heather Hill;
  • confirms the consumer-specific nature of CICA 2019 reforms; and
  • ensures that the existing architecture of commercial insurance law, particularly section 62 of the 1961 Act, remains intact.

In practical terms, it sends a clear signal to litigants, insurers, and practitioners that:

  • section 21 CICA 2019 is a powerful but carefully circumscribed tool for third-party protection in consumer insurance; and
  • in large-scale commercial and clinical negligence litigation, strategic reliance must still be placed on the traditional mechanisms of enforcement and section 62, albeit supported where necessary by robust case management directions from the court.

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