Section 20C Juries Act 1974: Judicial Warnings on “Jury Equity” Placards Do Not Render Convictions Unsafe
1) Introduction
This appeal arose from a climate-protest prosecution in which five defendants (Pamela Claire Bellinger, Amy Pritchard, Stephanie Aylett, Adelheid Russenberger, and Rosemary Webster) were jointly tried at Inner London Crown Court before HHJ Reid. The sole count alleged criminal damage contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, relating to the destruction of glazed windows and panels belonging to JP Morgan Chase Bank on 1 September 2021.
The actus reus and mens rea for criminal damage were effectively undisputed: extensive CCTV showed the defendants damaging the property, and they admitted doing so. The trial therefore turned on a single issue: whether each defendant had a “lawful excuse” under section 5(2)(a) of the 1971 Act—namely an honest belief that persons entitled to consent (said by them to be shareholders) would have consented to the damage had they known of it and its circumstances.
On appeal, the principal ground was not directed to the lawful-excuse directions, but to trial management: posters and placards outside the court asserted that jurors had an “absolute right” to acquit according to conscience. The trial judge warned the jury that this was a misstatement of law and referred to criminal offences relating to juror decision-making not based on the evidence (section 20C of the Juries Act 1974) and to arrest/imprisonment of those who might seek to influence jurors. The appellants contended that these remarks misdirected the jury and improperly pressured them towards conviction.
Procedurally, the Court of Appeal regularised the position so all appellants could advance the common ground (including an extension of time and permission to vary the notice for the 1st appellant), but ultimately dismissed the appeals.
2) Summary of the Judgment
The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals, holding that:
- The judge’s explanation of section 20C of the Juries Act 1974—warning jurors against conduct indicating an intent to try the case otherwise than on the evidence— was “substantially accurate” and not a misdirection.
- Although the judge’s characterisation of the posters/placards as “misstating the law” and involving criminality was “more questionable” at points, it did not render the convictions unsafe when assessed in context.
- The directions did not amount to a threat that jurors would be imprisoned if they acquitted, and the summing-up repeatedly reaffirmed that verdicts were for the jury.
- Any supposed “loss of a chance” of a “perverse acquittal” is speculative and could not, on these facts, make convictions unsafe.
- The evidence that the defendants held (independently) an honest belief in shareholder consent was treated as highly implausible; the trial was fair and the verdicts safe.
The Court also corrected a victim surcharge amount for the 3rd appellant (a variation from £156 to £149).
3) Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Influence)
Bushell's Case (1670) 124 ER 1006
The Court treated Bushell's Case as the historical anchor for the proposition that jurors may not be punished for their verdicts (an “immunity from punishment” for the decision reached). The judgment carefully distinguished this from a supposed affirmative “right” to disregard evidence or directions: it read Bushell's Case as protecting jurors from sanction, rather than endorsing lawlessness. This matters because the appeal attempted to convert the no-sanction principle into a platform for “jury equity” messaging.
[2024] EWHC 918 (KB) ("Warner")
The appellants relied heavily on Warner, where Saini J refused leave to bring committal proceedings against Trudi Anne Warner for displaying a placard stating: “JURORS YOU HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO ACQUIT A DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO YOUR CONSCIENCE”.
The Court of Appeal did not treat Warner as a “sound guide” for the present issues, emphasising:
- Warner was not binding (High Court, committal-leave context).
- The analysis in Warner did not engage with section 20C of the Juries Act 1974.
- The Court doubted whether Warner satisfactorily resolved the tension between juror oaths/directions and “jury equity”.
In effect, the Court repositioned Warner as addressing contempt-leave and free-speech questions in a narrow setting, not as determining the meaning and operational impact of section 20C in a criminal trial.
R v Shipley (1784) 4 Doug KB 73 (Dean of St Asaph)
This case appeared as part of the historical debate about whether juries are bound to apply the law. The Court quoted Lord Mansfield’s warning against a system where “the law shall be, in every particular cause, what any twelve men...shall be inclined to think”. The Court used this to reinforce its scepticism about treating “jury equity” as an openly actionable entitlement compatible with juror oaths.
R v Wang [2005] UKHL 9; [2005] 2 Cr App R 8
R v Wang was the Court’s key modern authority. It supplies the “authoritative formulation” that a judge cannot direct a jury to convict in any circumstances. The Court used Wang to define the legitimate boundaries of jury autonomy: the judge may give legal directions and even strongly expressed views, but must leave the verdict to the jury. This undercut the appellants’ attempt to recast the judge’s warning as an impermissible direction to convict.
DPP v Stonehouse (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 192, [1978] A.C. 55
Cited via Wang, Stonehouse supported the constitutional position that juries alone decide guilt. The quotation from Lord Salmon also assisted the Court in illustrating the asymmetry: judges can stop unsafe prosecutions (direction of acquittal), but cannot compel conviction.
R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124
Galbraith was invoked to show the converse rule: a judge can withdraw a case and effectively direct a not-guilty outcome where the evidence is insufficient. The Court used this to clarify that “jury equity” cannot operate as a general licence in both directions, and that the system’s special concern is wrongful conviction, not ensuring conviction.
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (1962) 46 Cr.App.R. 347, [1964] AC 763
Quoted with approval (via Wang), Chandler supplied the constitutional language: “It is the conscience of the jury and not the power of the judge that provides the constitutional safeguard against perverse acquittal...”. The Court used this not to validate external campaigning, but to distinguish permissible judicial comment from impermissible judicial direction.
Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593
Mentioned in passing to explain why Parliamentary material (Hansard extract) about the origins of section 20C could not assist here. The Court made clear that—even if Pepper v Hart permitted limited use—the proffered material was not of the kind that could be relied upon.
AG v Davey; AG v Beard [2013] EWHC 2317 (Admin); [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. 1
This was central to the Court’s understanding of the mischief addressed by modern juror-control regimes. The “Davey” example (Facebook post indicating intent to “fuck up a paedophile”) illustrated how a juror’s expressed predisposition can undermine fairness. The Court treated that conduct as the type now likely captured by section 20C (even though the case pre-dated the 2015 enactment), and used it to justify the legitimacy of warning jurors about offences connected to deciding cases on something other than the evidence.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(a) Reframing the “jury equity” complaint
The appellants sought to convert “jury equity” into a protected trial entitlement: the jury should be free to acquit “according to conscience,” and therefore external messaging to jurors was said not to be unlawful—and the judge’s criticism of that messaging was said to be a misdirection.
The Court narrowed the legally relevant question. Even if juries can acquit perversely (a by-product of the rule against directed convictions and the prohibition on punishing jurors for verdicts), it does not follow that:
- jurors are entitled to be invited to do so during a live trial;
- it is proper for outsiders to attempt to influence jurors to disregard evidence and directions; or
- a conviction is unsafe merely because a jury might otherwise have delivered a perverse acquittal.
The Court’s observation at paragraph 71 was pivotal: it is “very hard to see” how a conviction could be unsafe because of “the speculative loss of a chance of a perverse acquittal.” That is an important appellate-restraint principle: the criminal appeal process protects against wrongful conviction, not against the absence of jury nullification.
(b) Section 20C and what the judge did (and did not) say
The heart of the appeal was the phrase in the written direction:
“It is a criminal offence for a juror to do anything from which it can be concluded that a decision will be made on anything other than the evidence in the case. It is a criminal offence for people to encourage jurors to do so.”
The Court held this was “substantially accurate” as a paraphrase of section 20C (offence where conduct permits a reasonable conclusion that the juror intends to try the issue otherwise than on the evidence). Critically, the Court emphasised what would have been the true misdirection—but which did not occur: the judge did not say that returning a not-guilty verdict is itself prohibited conduct. Section 20C targets how the juror intends to try the case, not the mere outcome of deliberations.
The Court also upheld the judge’s reference to encouragement as reflecting ordinary secondary liability principles (encouraging prohibited conduct may attract criminal liability).
(c) Context and “pressure” on the jury
The appellants argued that references to arrest and prison (directed at protesters or employers) could have been understood as implying that jurors might be punished unless they convicted. The Court rejected this interpretation:
- Modern practice routinely warns jurors about offences and custody risks (supported by CrimPD 8.3 and the standard juror notice).
- The judge’s remarks about arrest/prison were directed at third parties attempting to influence jurors (and, separately, employers interfering with jury service), and were framed as reassurance, not threats.
- The summing up repeatedly reiterated that the verdict was for the jury and must be based on the evidence, with no hint that jurors faced sanction for acquittal.
(d) Safety of the conviction on the facts
Although the Court insisted the appeal was decided on fairness and context, it did not ignore the evidential reality: the lawful excuse defence was described as “wholly implausible” in its asserted form (independent, genuine belief that shareholders would have consented at the time). The Court’s analysis highlighted the internal logic problem: much of the evidence suggested the appellants hoped the damage would cause a change of mind, which is not the same as believing there would have been consent at the time of damage.
The Court therefore treated the convictions as resting on “overwhelming evidence” after a “fair trial,” making it particularly difficult to establish that the complained-of directions caused any unfairness producing unsafe verdicts.
3.3 Impact
(a) Trial management in protest cases
The decision gives appellate support to firm judicial responses where activist messaging targets jurors at court entrances—especially messaging that invites jurors to decide cases by conscience rather than evidence. While the Court acknowledged that calling such messaging criminal was “more questionable” in some respects, it nevertheless validated the core judicial objective: protecting the integrity of the trial and keeping jurors focused on evidence and judicial directions.
(b) Clarification of section 20C’s practical role
The judgment effectively confirms section 20C as part of the modern architecture enforcing evidence-based adjudication by juries. It supports the practice of warning jurors about criminal liability for conduct that signals an intent to decide otherwise than on the evidence, and positions such warnings as consistent with fairness rather than inherently coercive.
(c) Appellate approach to “lost chance of nullification” arguments
By treating the claimed deprivation of “jury equity” as speculative and not a proper basis for undermining convictions, the Court discourages a line of appeal that would reframe nullification as a defendant entitlement. Future appellants are unlikely to succeed by arguing that jurors were discouraged from acquitting in defiance of the evidence.
(d) Relationship with "Warner"
Without overruling Warner (which it could not, and did not need to), the Court signalled that Warner should not be treated as determinative on: (i) the meaning and effect of section 20C; or (ii) what a criminal trial judge may properly say to neutralise external influence. This reduces the operational reach of Warner as a shield against robust trial directions.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
“Lawful excuse” (Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 5(2)(a))
A defendant can avoid liability for criminal damage if, at the time of damaging property, they honestly believed that the person entitled to consent either did consent or would have consented if they had known about the damage and its circumstances. The belief need not be reasonable—only honest. But a jury may still reject a claimed belief as not genuinely held.
“Jury equity” / “jury nullification”
This refers to the practical reality that juries sometimes acquit even where the evidence and law point to guilt. In England and Wales, this is not treated as a formal “right” to disregard the judge’s directions; rather, it flows from core constitutional features (no directed convictions; no punishment of jurors for verdicts).
“Perverse acquittal”
In this judgment, it means an acquittal where the law applied to undisputed facts would normally require conviction—yet the jury returns “not guilty.” The Court treated appeals based on a “lost chance” of such an outcome as inherently speculative.
Section 20C Juries Act 1974
Section 20C criminalises juror conduct during the trial from which it may reasonably be concluded that the juror intends to try the case otherwise than on the evidence presented. It targets the integrity of the decision-making process (e.g., declared bias, prejudgment, or other conduct showing intent to ignore evidence), not the bare fact that a jury acquits.
Contempt of court and jurors
Contempt can arise where conduct interferes with the administration of justice (e.g., discussing the case improperly, disobeying directions). The judgment situates modern juror instructions (CrimPD 8.3 and the standard juror notice) within a system that increasingly uses explicit criminal offences (like section 20C) to police trial fairness.
5) Conclusion
Webster & Ors v The King confirms that judicial warnings designed to neutralise external “jury conscience” campaigning—grounded in section 20C of the Juries Act 1974 and modern juror-direction practice—will not, without more, render convictions unsafe. The Court rejects the notion that defendants can complain on appeal that jurors were discouraged from delivering a perverse acquittal, and it reinforces a central constitutional balance: juries retain the final say on guilt, but trials must be decided on evidence and lawful directions, protected from improper outside influence.
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