Section 18 OAPA 1861: Clarifying the Use of Vehicles as Weapons and Sentencing Guidelines

Introduction

R v Weston ([2024] EWCA Crim 1658) was heard by the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on 5 December 2024. The applicant, Mr Weston, appealed against a 12-year custodial sentence for wounding with intent to resist lawful apprehension (section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861). The appeal raised two questions: first, whether the sentencing judge misapplied the section 18 Guideline by treating a motor vehicle used in flight from police as a weapon; and second, whether the total sentence properly reflected his overall criminality, including multiple drug-supply offences. The court also considered whether disqualification from driving had been correctly imposed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal the 12-year sentence for the section 18 offence. It held that (a) the vehicle, being deliberately accelerated while a pedestrian lay trapped beneath it, was properly characterised as a weapon; (b) the sentencing judge’s finding of intent to cause grievous bodily harm (or, at minimum, gross recklessness) was unassailable; and (c) multiple aggravating factors, including high-speed flight, children present, and Class A drug-supply offences, justified the notional uplift above the Guideline starting point. However, the court granted leave to correct an oversight in the driving disqualification periods under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 and varied the disqualification accordingly.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Although no specific reported cases were named in the judgment, the court relied heavily on:

• The Court of Appeal’s own Sentencing Guidelines for section 18 OAPA offences, which categorise “use of a vehicle as a weapon” under Category 1A (starting point 12 years, range 10–16 years).
• Prior appellate authority on the principle of totality, ensuring that concurrent and consecutive sentences fairly reflect overall criminality.
• Established sentencing practice on aggravating and mitigating factors, particularly high-speed pursuits, presence of vulnerable victims, and drug-related offending.

Legal Reasoning

1. Vehicle as a Weapon: The court affirmed that when a driver deliberately accelerates while knowing a person is trapped beneath the vehicle, the car is properly regarded as a weapon under section 18. The sentencing judge’s conclusion that Mr Weston intended grievous bodily harm—or at the very least acted with gross recklessness—could not be impugned.

2. Application of the Guideline: The Recorder placed the offence in Category 1A, adopted a 12-year starting point, uplifted the notional sentence above that point for drug-supply aggravation and high-speed flight, and then applied credit for a late guilty plea and some mitigation. The court held that even if the judge had taken an alternative route—selecting a lower starting point and adding separate uplifts for related offences—the end result would have been the same.

3. Totality and Overall Criminality: The appeal court endorsed the single judge’s observation that Mr Weston’s aggregate conduct—serious injury to three individuals (one life-changing), intoxicated high-speed pursuit, use of a stolen car with false plates, and large-scale Class A drug supply—amply supported the overall sentence.

4. Driving Disqualification: The court identified an administrative oversight: no disqualification had been imposed for the aggravated vehicle-taking offence (minimum 12 months). It imposed a concurrent 12-month disqualification and calculated extension periods under sections 35A and 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, resulting in an effective total disqualification period unchanged in length but corrected in statutory form.

Impact

This decision reinforces four key principles for future cases:

• Vehicles used deliberately to harm or evade arrest will be treated under section 18 as weapons, attracting Category 1A sentencing.
• Court of Appeal guidance on totality remains binding: concurrent and consecutive sentences must fully reflect aggregate criminality.
• Gross recklessness after knowingly injuring a victim under a vehicle suffices for the higher intent bracket.
• Sentencing courts must ensure statutory disqualification provisions are applied in accordance with the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 or risk appellate correction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 18 OAPA 1861: The offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, punishable by up to life imprisonment.
• Category 1A (Section 18 Guideline): The most serious bracket, reserved for deliberate, life-threatening uses of lethal means—including vehicles.
• Totality Principle: A rule requiring the court to ensure that the overall sentence is fair in light of all offences taken together.
• Driving Disqualification Extensions: Under sections 35A and 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, custodial sentences for specified offences trigger mandatory additional periods of disqualification.

Conclusion

R v Weston crystallises the law on vehicles as weapons under section 18 OAPA 1861 and clarifies the proper application of sentencing guidelines and the totality principle. The Court of Appeal’s refusal to disturb the 12-year sentence underscores its commitment to robust sentencing in cases involving deliberate high-speed endangerment and grievous injury. The decision also serves as a reminder to sentencing judges to apply statutory driving disqualifications precisely. This precedent will guide lower courts in assessing intent, recklessness, and cumulative criminality in future cases involving vehicles used to resist arrest or inflict harm.