Ryan v Twilio Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 748:
Equitable Limits on Solicitors’ Liens, Client Access to Files and GDPR Rights

1. Introduction

The High Court’s ex tempore judgment in Ryan v Twilio Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 748 (Emily Egan J, 8 December 2025) is an important decision at the intersection of solicitors’ common law liens, the transfer of client files, legal costs regulation, and data protection law.

Although the substantive proceedings concern alleged breach of contract and penalisation contrary to the Protected Disclosures Acts 2014–2022, the judgment itself is confined to a procedural yet practically crucial question: in what circumstances may the High Court interfere with a solicitor’s common law lien over a client’s file where the client has discharged the solicitor, especially in the context of:

an ongoing High Court employment/protected disclosure claim,
a pending redundancy process with potentially irreversible consequences,
a “no foal, no fee” arrangement that has been terminated,
a complaint to the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (LSRA), and
a GDPR data subject access request that has not yet been fulfilled.

The decision articulates and applies a nuanced equitable framework for balancing:

the client’s right of access to the courts and to effective representation, and
the solicitor’s legitimate expectation of being paid and the integrity of the common law lien.

The judgment also integrates, in a structured way, Law Society guidance on file transfers, GDPR access rights, and the obligation to furnish a bill of costs “without delay”. Its detailed practical orders (covering both the situation where new solicitors are instructed and where the client must act as a litigant in person) make it a likely reference point for future disputes over solicitors’ liens and client files.

2. Factual Background

2.1 The underlying employment dispute

The plaintiff, Catherine Ryan, sues her employer, Twilio Ireland Ltd, alleging:

breach of contract;
penalisation contrary to the Protected Disclosures Acts 2014–2022; and
associated wrongs.

The proceedings were commenced by plenary summons on 22 December 2023. Liability has not been admitted by the employer. The underlying case appears to be at least partly entwined with an ongoing redundancy process. The plaintiff is the sole breadwinner for two teenagers, which significantly heightens the practical and constitutional stakes.

2.2 The first retainer and its breakdown

Ms Ryan originally instructed Lalloo & Company Solicitors (“the former solicitors”) on a “no foal, no fee” basis to prosecute her High Court claim. For reasons the court considered inappropriate to explore (because they are now the subject of an LSRA complaint), the solicitor–client relationship broke down. Ms Ryan discharged her solicitors on 12 August 2025.

By letter of 21 August 2025 the former solicitors:

accepted that they would apply to come off record, but noted this could not be done until after the court vacation (October/November 2025); and
informed the plaintiff that:
- termination of the retainer also terminated the “no foal, no fee” arrangement, and
- they were entitled to be paid for work done up to termination before releasing the file.

They accordingly sent the file to legal costs accountants to draw a bill of costs. At the time of the motion, no bill had yet issued to the plaintiff.

2.3 Assertion of the common law lien

The former solicitors resisted the plaintiff’s application for delivery of the file, relying on their common law lien over the client’s papers as security for unpaid fees. In response, Ms Ryan contended that:

the lien is not enforceable because no valid s.150 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 costs notice had been given; and
the services rendered had been unsatisfactory.

These complaints have been made the subject of an LSRA complaint, which the Authority is treating as:

a complaint of inadequate services and/or
alleged misconduct by the former solicitors.

The LSRA investigation is ongoing, as are the underlying High Court proceedings. The judge therefore explicitly declined to detail or comment on:

the substantive merits of the High Court claim;
the reasons for the breakdown in the solicitor–client relationship; or
the substance of the LSRA complaint.

2.4 Attempts to obtain new representation

Ms Ryan consulted a new firm (“the proposed new solicitors”), who were willing in principle to act but indicated, correctly, that they could not properly advise her without access to the existing litigation file.

Meanwhile, a letter dated 28 October 2025 from the employer invited Ms Ryan to attend a medical examination to determine:

whether she was medically fit to re-engage with a redundancy consultation process; or
what reasonable accommodations could be made to facilitate such re-engagement.

Ms Ryan informed the court (albeit only orally) that she had very recently been notified that the redundancy process would be progressed on 12 December 2025. The judge accepted this oral update without insisting on a further affidavit, in light of the urgency and the plaintiff’s personal circumstances.

2.5 The GDPR data access request

On 30 September 2025 Ms Ryan sent a formal data subject access request (DSAR) under Article 15 GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018, seeking:

“access to all personal data concerning me that your firm holds or has held, in any format.”

The former solicitors replied on 3 October 2025, stating:

that due to “volume and complexity” more time was needed; and
that a response, including copies of personal records, would be provided by 30 December 2025.

No such response had been provided by the time of the hearing. This delay in complying with the DSAR becomes one of the significant factual factors in the court’s equitable assessment.

3. Issues Before the Court

The motion came before the High Court primarily on the following questions:

Can the court, in the exercise of its supervisory and equitable jurisdiction over solicitors as officers of the court, interfere with the enforcement of a solicitor’s common law lien over a client’s file where the client has discharged the solicitor?
If so, in what circumstances and on what terms should the court order the release of the file? In particular:
- How does the court balance the client’s need for the file to pursue ongoing litigation and respond to an imminent redundancy process, against the solicitor’s right to be paid?
- What role is played by allegations of misconduct (albeit unresolved and the subject of an LSRA complaint)?
What is the interaction between the common law lien and statutory/Regulatory obligations, notably:
- the duty to furnish a bill of costs (including s.150 LSRA issues);
- Law Society guidance on transferring files and giving/accepting undertakings; and
- GDPR Article 15 data access rights and the obligation to respond within one month (or, exceptionally, three months)?
What practical orders should be made to allow:

transfer of the file to any new solicitor who may be instructed, and/or

direct access by the plaintiff herself if she must act as a litigant in person,

while preserving appropriate security for the former solicitors’ costs?

4. Summary of the Judgment

The court held, in essence:

As a matter of principle, the solicitor’s file is the property of the client, but the solicitor enjoys a common law lien allowing them to retain the file as security for unpaid costs.
Where a “no foal, no fee” arrangement is in place, termination of the retainer by the client terminates the contingency arrangement; the solicitor then becomes entitled to payment for work done to the date of termination.
Ordinarily, when the client terminates the retainer, the court is slow to interfere with the lien. By contrast, if the solicitor terminates the retainer, the court will usually order release of the file to the new solicitor on terms preserving the lien.
Nonetheless, even when the client terminates the retainer, the court retains, on equitable principles, a discretion to interfere with enforcement of the lien in “appropriate circumstances”, particularly where:
- misconduct or inadequate service is alleged, and
- enforcement of the lien risks effectively driving the client “from the judgment seat”.
In exercising this discretion the court must balance:
- the risk that sustaining the lien will deprive the client of essential material and effective access to the courts, against
- the legitimate interests of solicitors (as officers of the court) in being paid what is properly due.
Here, the balance of hardship favoured ordering limited interference with the lien, because:
- the plaintiff faced an imminent redundancy process and potential termination of her employment;
- the non-release of the file threatened her constitutional right to earn a livelihood and to access the courts to challenge the redundancy process; and
- there had been unjustified delay in furnishing a bill of costs and in responding to the GDPR data access request.
The court ordered a structured regime consisting of two main scenarios:
1. Scenario 1 – New solicitors instructed: the file is to be delivered to the new solicitors on the basis of:
  - an undertaking by the new solicitors to hold the file subject to the former solicitors’ lien and to return it at the conclusion of the proceedings;
  - an undertaking to discharge the former solicitors’ properly determined fees out of any recovery, subject to:
    - agreement/assessment/adjudication of those fees,
    - apportionment between former and new solicitors, and
    - any LSRA ruling; and
  - a condition that the undertaking is dependent on:
    - the new solicitors not being discharged, and
    - sufficient funds coming into their control to pay the costs;
  - the plaintiff paying €1,500 + VAT to the new solicitors as a provisional fund for outlays only.
2. Scenario 2 – Plaintiff acts as litigant in person: the file is to be released directly to the plaintiff if she:
  - sends an appropriately framed letter authorising payment of the former solicitors’ fees directly from any recovery by the employer’s solicitors;
  - acknowledges that apportionment between former and any future new solicitors will be determined at the end of the case;
  - pays a provisional €1,500 + VAT to the former solicitors towards outlays; and
  - undertakes to return the file at the conclusion of the litigation if requested.
The court emphasised that:
- any interference with the lien does not extinguish the client’s substantive liability for costs, which remains a matter of contract (subject to statute and LSRA powers);
- a solicitor’s lien cannot override GDPR rights of access to personal data;
- it is good practice, and in effect a professional obligation, to:
  - furnish a bill of costs “without delay” upon termination of a retainer; and
  - respond to a DSAR within one month (or in exceptional cases within three months), even if a lien is being exercised.

5. Legal Framework and Precedents

5.1 The common law lien over client papers

The court adopted and applied the orthodox position on solicitors’ liens:

Client’s property: The file belongs to the client (para 8A).
Possessory lien: Nonetheless, “subject to any agreement to the contrary”, a solicitor has a general lien over property belonging to the client which comes into the solicitor’s possession in that capacity (para 8B).

The judge quoted Moore-Bick J in Ismail v Richards Butler (A Firm) [1996] 2 All ER 506:

“It has long since been recognised that, subject to any agreement to the contrary, a solicitor is entitled to exercise a general lien in respect of his costs on any property belonging to his client, which property comes into his possession in his capacity as solicitor.”

This is a classic possessory lien: it allows the solicitor to retain possession of the file until paid, but does not confer any power of sale. As Laffoy J stated in Treacy v Roche [2009] IEHC 103 (cited at para 8D–G), the “basic rule” quoted from Ismail is that the solicitor may in effect “embarrass” the client to secure payment by withholding the papers, and the court will not ordinarily compel delivery at the client’s instance.

5.2 Termination of “no foal, no fee” retainers

The court relied on Cadden v Vesey and Kent Carty Solicitors [2016] IESC 75, where McKechnie J endorsed the Law Society’s guidance that:

“no foal, no fee” arrangements are impliedly conditional on the solicitor continuing to have carriage of the case; and
if the client moves to another solicitor, the contingency arrangement is determined and the first solicitor becomes entitled to fees for work done to that point.

Justice Egan reaffirmed this, noting that the current (4th, 2022) edition of the Solicitor’s Guide to Professional Conduct reiterates that:

termination of a contingency retainer triggers an entitlement to interim payment for work done; and
the solicitor may exercise a lien pending such payment.

Thus, although the plaintiff argued that the absence of a valid s.150 notice undermined the lien, the judge treated the solicitor’s entitlement to be paid for work done as established “in principle” (paras 19–20), leaving detailed disputes about adequacy of service and costs – including any s.150 issues – to be resolved elsewhere (e.g. fees assessment, LSRA).

5.3 Distinguishing solicitor-terminated and client-terminated retainers

A central plank of the judgment is the distinction between cases where:

the solicitor terminates the retainer; and
the client terminates the retainer.

Where the solicitor terminates, Irish case law has repeatedly ordered that the file be delivered to the new solicitor, subject to an undertaking to preserve the lien:

Treacy v Roche [2009] IEHC 103 (Laffoy J);
Ahern v Minister for Agriculture [2008] IEHC 286 (Laffoy J);
Mulheir v Gannon [2006] IEHC 274 (Laffoy J).

In those situations, the court’s concern is that a solicitor who chooses to disengage should not, by doing so, thwart the client’s ability to pursue his or her case. The lien is preserved conceptually, but, practically, may be of little subsequent value because the original solicitor no longer controls the litigation.

By contrast, where the client terminates, the client has chosen to break the relationship, with the consequence that:

the court is generally more reluctant to interfere with the lien; and
the solicitor may insist on payment or security before delivering the file.

Nonetheless, as the judgment stresses, these are not rigid categories that entirely exclude equitable intervention in client-terminated cases.

5.4 Equitable jurisdiction to interfere with the lien

The High Court aligns itself with the reasoning of McBride J in Donaghy v JJ Haughey Solicitors Ltd [2019] NICh 1 (paras 8I, 8L, 17). McBride J held that even where the client terminates the retainer (other than for misconduct), the court may:

“interfere in the enforcement of a common law lien on equitable principles”

in “appropriate circumstances”, having regard to the “overall interests of justice”.

McBride J, drawing on Leggatt J in A v B [1984] 1 All ER 265, identified two competing considerations:

that a litigant should not be deprived of material relevant to conduct of his case and “driven from the judgment seat”, and
that the litigation system must respect the interests of solicitors as officers of the court who should not be left unpaid for what is properly due.

McBride J offered a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors in exercising this discretion (quoted at para 8L of Egan J’s judgment), including:

who ended the relationship and why;
the nature of the case;
the stage of the proceedings;
the conduct of the solicitor and client;
the balance of hardship; and
the likely loss of value of the lien if the papers are handed over.

Justice Egan expressly adopts this multi-factorial approach and confirms that the Irish High Court:

retains “full supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors as officers of the court”; and
may, in appropriate cases, order delivery up of files on terms even where the client ended the retainer and even before costs have been agreed or adjudicated.

The judgment notes Ellis v John Hodge Solicitors [2022] EWHC 2284 (Comm), where the English High Court expressed doubt as to the breadth of McBride J’s statement in Donaghy, suggesting that it might be too broad if applied where no misconduct is alleged. Justice Egan acknowledges that a distinction may need to be drawn between client-terminated retainers with and without allegations of misconduct (para 8J), but finds it unnecessary to resolve that doctrinal debate in the abstract because allegations of misconduct/inadequate service do arise in the present case (albeit unresolved and before the LSRA).

5.5 The “security not inconsistent with the progress of the cause” principle

A further foundational authority is Heslop v Metcalfe (1837) 3 My & G 183, in which Lord Cottenham LC held that a solicitor claiming a lien:

“should have every security not inconsistent with the progress of the cause.”

This statement has been cited in Irish cases including Ahern v Minister for Agriculture and Cadden v Vesey. Justice Egan uses this principle to conceptualise the task: the solicitor is entitled to effective security, but only to the point that it does not stifle or unduly impede the litigation, or more broadly, the client’s substantive rights.

5.6 Law Society guidance on file transfer and undertakings

The judgment gives considerable weight to non-statutory, but influential, Law Society materials:

Solicitor’s Guide to Professional Conduct (4th ed., 2022); and
Practice Note (August 2020), “Transferring Files Between Solicitors”.

Key points extracted include:

The first solicitor may elect to accept an undertaking from the new solicitor as alternative security for costs, but has no obligation to do so (para 9).
Any such undertaking should ideally be:
- conditional on the second solicitor not being discharged; and
- conditional on sufficient monies coming into the second solicitor’s control to discharge the first solicitor’s costs.
Upon file transfer, any outlays paid by the first solicitor should be reimbursed immediately (para 9).
A bill of costs should be furnished “without delay” upon termination of a retainer; failure to do so may attract judicial criticism and hinder a smooth transfer (para 11).
Delays in sending a bill of costs have been judicially criticised in earlier cases, even while upholding a lien.

5.7 GDPR and data protection obligations

The Practice Note also addresses the interaction between lien and GDPR:

A lien cannot override a client’s Article 15 GDPR right to access personal data held by the solicitor as controller (para 12).
Compliance with a DSAR does not necessarily involve handing over the entire file; only personal data relating to the requester must be provided. Material relating purely to third parties or that is not personal data (e.g. company information) can be excluded.
Response should be within one month, with a possible extension to three months in “very limited circumstances” (para 13).

Justice Egan endorses this analysis and emphasises that a solicitor relying on a lien is still bound to comply with GDPR requests within these time limits (para 18).

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Summary of principles: solicitor- vs client-terminated retainers

At paras 14–18 the court synthesises the case law and Law Society guidance into a coherent statement of principle:

Where the solicitor terminates a retainer:
- The court is “more protective” of the client and the litigation.
- The “usual approach” is to order delivery of the file to the new solicitors, subject to preservation of the lien (even if, practically, the lien is of limited value at the end of the case).
Where the client terminates a retainer:
- The court is “less inclined” to interfere with the lien.
- The original solicitor is free to decide whether to accept an undertaking from the new solicitor as alternative security. There is no obligation to accept one, still less a conditional undertaking.
- Even if an undertaking is offered, an undertaking heavily conditioned on events and receipt of funds may not provide adequate security where liability and quantum remain uncertain.
Notwithstanding this, the court retains a discretionary equitable power to interfere with the lien even in client-terminated cases, especially:
- where the termination is for alleged misconduct or inadequate service; and
- where strict enforcement of the lien would effectively deprive the client of a real opportunity to litigate.
The exercise of this discretion requires a holistic consideration of the factual matrix, including the Donaghy factors (para 17).

6.2 Application of the Donaghy factors to the facts

Justice Egan acknowledges (para 21) that some of the Donaghy factors cannot be fairly assessed at this interlocutory stage:

The court cannot properly determine:
- who is at fault in the breakdown of the relationship; or
- whether the former solicitors’ conduct was deficient.
Those questions fall squarely within the remit of the LSRA complaint and have not been fully aired in evidence.

However, other factors are capable of objective assessment and are given substantial weight:

The nature of the case:
- An employment dispute involving alleged penalisation for protected disclosures is inherently serious.
- The case is entwined with the plaintiff’s ongoing employment, income, and redundancy status.
The stage of litigation and imminence of critical events:
- Although the precise procedural stage is unclear, the court accepts that a redundancy process is imminent (12 December 2025).
- Failure to have legal representation or access to the file now may irreversibly prejudice the plaintiff’s rights – not merely “delay” the litigation.
Risk of depriving the plaintiff of meaningful litigation and constitutional rights:
- Without the file, Ms Ryan might effectively be prevented from:
  - challenging the redundancy process;
  - participating in the process on an informed basis; or
  - negotiating a termination package.
- This threatens her constitutional right to earn a livelihood and her right of access to the courts.
- The case is distinguished from situations where withholding the file merely causes some delay but does not “nullify” the underlying cause of action.
Delay in furnishing a bill of costs:
- Almost four months had elapsed since the retainer was terminated, without a bill of costs being furnished.
- This was not viewed as “attended to with sufficient urgency” (para 22).
- This delay sits uneasily with the Law Society’s admonition to furnish a bill of costs “without delay” upon termination.
Delay in responding to the GDPR data access request:
- More than two months had passed without a substantive DSAR response.
- Although the firm had claimed “volume and complexity” and invoked a three-month extension, the court noted the lack of any specific explanation or justification for such exceptionality in the circumstances.
- In the face of urgent employment events, this delay weighed in favour of equitable intervention.

On the basis of these factors, the court found that “the balance of hardship” favoured the plaintiff (para 22), even though it recognised that the value of the lien might be “considerably diminished” if the file was released.

6.3 Interaction with undertakings and practical impediments

The court recorded (paras 23–26) that:

The former solicitors were, to their credit, willing in principle to accept an undertaking from any new solicitor on terms that:
- they would be paid their outstanding fees in the event of a successful conclusion of the proceedings by:
  - settlement;
  - agreed termination; or
  - court award accompanied by an order for costs; and
- apportionment between former and new solicitors would be determined at the conclusion of the case and, in default of agreement, by a costs accountant whose own costs would be shared accordingly.
There was insufficient time prior to the judgment to confirm whether the proposed new solicitors would accept such an undertaking.
New solicitors, as a matter of prudence, are likely to insist on conditioning their undertaking on:
- not being discharged; and
- the arrival of sufficient funds into their hands.

Justice Egan recognised that without some conditionality of this sort, new solicitors might reasonably refuse to act, potentially making it practically impossible for the plaintiff to continue the litigation at all – a result contrary both to the interests of justice and, pragmatically, to the former solicitors’ prospects of recovering fees (para 24).

The court therefore sought to design an order that:

preserved meaningful security for the former solicitors;
facilitated the instruction of new solicitors if possible; but
ensured the plaintiff could, if necessary, act as a litigant in person with direct access to her file for the impending redundancy process.

6.4 Orders where new solicitors are instructed (Scenario 1)

In the first scenario (para 29), where a new solicitor is retained:

Delivery of the file:
- The former solicitors are directed to deliver the file to the new solicitors, “without prejudice to their lien”.
- The new solicitors must undertake to hold the file subject to that lien and to return it at the conclusion of the proceedings.
Undertaking to pay former solicitors’ fees:
- The new solicitors must undertake to discharge the former solicitors’ fees on the conclusion of the litigation, in the event of:
  - settlement;
  - agreed termination; or
  - a court award with an order for costs.
- Payment is subject to:
  - the fees being agreed, assessed, or adjudicated;
  - apportionment as between former and new solicitors; and
  - any LSRA ruling arising from the plaintiff’s complaint.
Apportionment of costs between firms:
- Apportionment is to be determined at the end of the proceedings.
- In default of agreement, it is to be adjudicated by an agreed costs accountant, whose fees are to be split in accordance with the apportionment decision.
Conditional nature of the undertaking:
- In line with Law Society guidance, the undertaking is to be conditional on:
  - the new solicitor not being discharged by the plaintiff; and
  - sufficient monies coming into their control to pay the former solicitors’ costs.
Provisional outlays fund:
- The plaintiff must put the new solicitor in funds in the provisional amount of €1,500 + VAT (not assessed, but nominated for convenience) to cover properly drawn outlays of the former solicitors.
- This sum is to be paid out only to discharge outlays once agreed, assessed or adjudicated, with:
  - any deficit in outlays to be paid by the plaintiff at the conclusion of the litigation; and
  - any surplus to be returned to the plaintiff at the conclusion.

The judge directs the plaintiff to provide irrevocable instructions to any new solicitor she retains to furnish this undertaking. It is then up to that solicitor to decide whether to act on such terms (para 29(e)).

6.5 Orders where the plaintiff acts as litigant in person (Scenario 2)

Recognising that time pressure might prevent agreement between firms or the instruction of new solicitors, Justice Egan devises a second scenario (paras 31–32):

Written request by the plaintiff:
- By close of business on 9 December 2025, the plaintiff must write to the former solicitors requesting release of her file “subject to their lien”.
Authority to employer’s solicitors:
- In that letter, Ms Ryan must:
  - authorise the former solicitors to write to the employer’s solicitors directing that, at the conclusion of the litigation (by settlement, agreed termination, or award with costs), such fees of the former solicitors as are agreed, assessed, or adjudicated (and apportioned) be paid directly to the former solicitors;
  - acknowledge that apportionment between former and any future new solicitors will be decided at the end of the case or by a costs accountant; and
  - accept that this direction to pay the former solicitors applies irrespective of whether she continues as a litigant in person or instructs new solicitors, subject to a later revocation if all parties consent (see para 32(e)).
Obligations of the former solicitors:
- Upon receipt of this letter, the former solicitors must immediately (and in any event by close of business on 10 December 2025) write to the employer’s solicitors:
  - requesting payment of their fees directly at the conclusion of the litigation in the manner described; and
  - confirming that the letter is sent in compliance with the court’s order and copying it to the plaintiff.
Provisional outlays fund:
- Before release of the file, Ms Ryan must pay €1,500 + VAT (again a provisional, not adjudicated, figure) to the former solicitors towards outlays.
- The former solicitors must hold this sum until the conclusion of the case, at which point it can be applied to agreed/assessed/adjudicated outlays, with any deficit to be paid by Ms Ryan and any surplus repaid to her.
Release of the file and future return:
- The former solicitors must release the file within 48 hours of receiving the outlays sum.
- The plaintiff must undertake to return the file to the former solicitors at the end of the litigation if requested.

This mechanism effectively:

provides the plaintiff with timely access to her file so that she can take urgent steps regarding redundancy and litigation; while
shifting the former solicitors’ security interest from possession of the file to a combination of:
- an authority in relation to future costs recovery; and
- a ring-fenced provisional sum in respect of outlays.

6.6 Hybrid scenario and flexibility

The court anticipates a hybrid outcome (para 33), where:

Ms Ryan initially acts as a litigant in person to meet immediate deadlines; and
later succeeds in instructing new solicitors.

In that event, the existing direction for payment of the former solicitors’ fees directly from the employer’s solicitors may, with the written consent of all relevant parties, be revoked and replaced by an undertaking of the sort described under Scenario 1 or some other mutually agreed form of security.

This emphasises the court’s preference for pragmatic, consent-driven solutions where possible, while maintaining a clear judicial framework as a backstop.

7. Complex Concepts Explained

7.1 Solicitor’s common law lien

A common law lien is a right to retain possession of a client’s property (including files and papers) until payment of outstanding fees and outlays. It is:

possessory – it depends on the solicitor physically holding the file; once the solicitor voluntarily hands over the papers without preserving the lien, the lien may be lost;
security-only – it does not allow the solicitor to sell the file or use it for any other purpose; it is merely a form of leverage to encourage payment;
subject to the court’s supervisory jurisdiction – the court can, in exceptional cases, order delivery of the file notwithstanding the lien, usually substituting alternative security (e.g. undertakings, charging orders, authority to receive costs directly).

7.2 “No foal, no fee” arrangements

A “no foal, no fee” (contingency) arrangement typically means that:

the solicitor will not charge fees unless the case is successful (or some other defined outcome is achieved);
outlays (e.g. court fees, experts) may still be payable; and
if the client changes solicitors, the contingency is usually treated as having come to an end, and the first solicitor is entitled to payment for work already done (assessed in the ordinary way).

7.3 The LSRA complaint

The Legal Services Regulatory Authority (LSRA) is the independent regulator of legal practitioners in Ireland. A client can complain about:

inadequate services; and/or
misconduct (e.g. overcharging, failure to communicate, other professional failures).

The LSRA can investigate, seek explanations, and in serious cases bring matters before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. It is a central forum for resolving disputes about quality of service and costs, separate from (but interacting with) the courts’ authority in particular cases.

7.4 GDPR data subject access requests (DSAR)

Under Article 15 of the GDPR, any individual has the right to:

know whether a controller (such as a law firm) is processing their personal data; and
obtain a copy of that personal data, with certain limited exemptions.

Key features:

The controller must normally respond within one month.
This may be extended by up to two further months where the request is “complex” or numerous, but:
- the controller must give reasons; and
- the extension is exceptional, not routine.
A solicitor’s lien over a file does not cancel these statutory obligations.
Not every document on the file is “personal data”: material about other persons or purely about companies may be excluded.

7.5 Plenary summons and redundancy consultation

A plenary summons is the originating High Court document commencing ordinary civil proceedings where oral evidence may be required (as opposed to summary or special summons procedures).

A redundancy consultation process is the employer’s procedure for consulting with an employee about a proposed redundancy, exploring alternatives, and considering representations. In Irish law, it is closely linked to fair procedures and can be challenged (e.g. under unfair dismissal, equality, or protected disclosures legislation) if conducted in a procedurally or substantively unfair way.

8. Significance and Potential Impact

8.1 Clarifying the Irish approach to equitable interference with liens

The judgment is significant in solidifying the Irish High Court’s stance that:

even where the client terminates the retainer,
and even where the solicitor is prima facie entitled to a lien and interim fees,

the court may nonetheless, in exceptional and fact-sensitive circumstances, interfere with enforcement of that lien on equitable principles.

While earlier Irish authority had clearly recognised this power in solicitor-terminated retainers, Ryan v Twilio explicitly applies it in a client-terminated context, aligned with Donaghy but cognisant of the concerns raised in Ellis v John Hodge Solicitors.

In practical terms, this decision will likely be cited to:

support applications by clients in urgent or high-stakes litigation where lien enforcement would otherwise effectively extinguish their claim or defence;
justify orders for conditional release of files backed by undertakings, directions to pay fees out of future recoveries, and provisional outlays funds;
remind solicitors of the risk that:
- long delays in issuing a bill of costs; and/or
- slow responses to DSARs
may tip the equitable balance against them.

8.2 Integration of data protection law and professional practice

The judgment clearly states that:

a solicitor’s lien does not override GDPR obligations;
solicitors must factor GDPR response times into their management of file transfers and terminations; and
Law Society practice guidance on DSARs and liens reflects binding statutory law and must be taken seriously.

This bridges an important gap between:

traditional common law doctrines focused on the solicitor–client relationship; and
modern data protection law focused on data subjects’ rights.

Future disputes over access to legal files are likely to be framed not only in terms of lien and contract, but also GDPR compliance. Courts may increasingly consider:

whether DSAR obligations have been met; and
whether delays in fulfilling data rights indicate a broader failure of professional diligence that justifies equitable relief.

8.3 Reinforcing professional obligations on billing and file transfer

By highlighting the Law Society’s guidance and criticising the four-month delay in furnishing a bill of costs, the judgment reinforces:

the practical importance of issuing a bill “without delay” upon termination;
the expectation that solicitors will move promptly to refer files to costs accountants where necessary; and
the courts’ willingness to take delay into account when balancing interests between solicitor and client.

It also endorses the standard Law Society model whereby:

new solicitors’ undertakings should be carefully qualified; but
first solicitors should be prepared, in appropriate cases, to accept such undertakings as adequate alternative security.

8.4 Emphasis on constitutional rights and access to justice

A notable feature of the reasoning is its framing of the lien issue in constitutional terms:

The court links the imminent redundancy process to Ms Ryan’s constitutional right to earn a livelihood, and
emphasises her right of access to the courts to challenge that process.

This constitutional lens magnifies the gravity of the consequences of enforcing the lien in a rigid manner. It signals that where:

the enforcement of a lien risks permanently undermining a litigant’s ability to vindicate fundamental rights,
courts will be more inclined to exercise equitable powers to mitigate the impact of the lien,

particularly by substituting other forms of security rather than leaving the solicitor unprotected.

8.5 Practical template for future cases

Finally, the very detailed orders crafted in paras 29–33 provide a practical template that parties and judges can adapt in future cases. They show:

how to structure:
- conditional undertakings;
- provisions on apportionment between successive solicitors; and
- provisional outlays funds;
how to cater for both:
- a represented client; and
- a litigant in person;
how to preserve the solicitor’s security interest even after the physical file leaves their possession (e.g. through directions to pay fees directly from settlement or costs).

Given the frequency of disputes over file transfer and unpaid fees in practice, Ryan v Twilio is likely to become a cited authority not only in High Court applications but also in Law Society and LSRA guidance updates.

9. Key Takeaways

A solicitor’s file belongs to the client, but the solicitor has a strong common law lien allowing them to hold the file as security for unpaid costs.
“No foal, no fee” arrangements are terminated when the client changes solicitors; the first solicitor is entitled to payment for work done to that point.
When a solicitor terminates a retainer, courts will usually order release of the file to new solicitors on terms preserving the lien.
When the client terminates the retainer, courts are less inclined to interfere with the lien, but retain an equitable discretion to do so in appropriate, especially urgent or rights-sensitive, circumstances.
In exercising that discretion, courts balance:
- the risk of depriving the client of effective litigation and access to the courts; against
- the need to respect the solicitor’s legitimate right to be paid.
Law Society guidance on:
- prompt bills of costs;
- qualified undertakings; and
- DSAR compliance;
is given substantial persuasive weight.
A solicitor’s lien does not override GDPR Article 15 rights; failure to respond to a DSAR within one month (absent real complexity) may count against the solicitor when equity is balanced.
Court orders can—and should—be carefully structured to:
- preserve or substitute adequate security for the solicitor’s fees; and
- ensure that the client has timely access to essential documents, whether through new representation or as a litigant in person.
Where enforcement of a lien threatens to undermine constitutional rights (such as the right to earn a livelihood or to access the courts), the equitable case for limited interference with the lien is significantly strengthened.

10. Conclusion

Ryan v Twilio Ireland Ltd is a well-structured and pragmatic exploration of the limits of solicitors’ common law liens in modern Irish legal practice. It confirms that while the lien remains a potent and generally respected form of security for unpaid fees, it is not absolute. The High Court will, in appropriate circumstances, intervene to ensure that:

clients are not effectively deprived of their right to litigate or to defend their livelihoods; and
solicitors’ legitimate financial interests are protected through alternative, tailored forms of security.

By integrating:

traditional equitable principles,
up-to-date Law Society practice guidance, and
European data protection law,

the judgment provides a contemporary and practical framework for resolving disputes over file release and costs. It will likely influence how solicitors manage terminations, respond to DSARs, and negotiate undertakings with successor firms, and offers a blueprint for courts balancing access to justice against professional entitlements in future cases.

Ryan v Twilio Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 748: Equitable Limits on Solicitors’ Liens, Client Access to Files and GDPR Rights