Robinson v R – A New Emphasis on Corroborated Excuses and Material Relevance in Late Criminal Appeals

Introduction

In Robinson, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 689) the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was invited to consider (i) whether a 10-month late renewal of an application for leave to appeal should be entertained and (ii) whether the applicant’s criminal damage and witness-intimidation convictions were “unsafe”. The Applicant, Mr Robinson, had been acquitted of rape and assault by penetration but convicted on three lesser counts arising out of the same matrix of facts. Acting in person, he blamed his mental-health crises and purported “new evidence” for the delays. The Court refused to extend time and, in doing so, delivered a tightly reasoned judgment that crystallises two related but distinct principles:

Excuses for delay must be corroborated by objective evidence; and
“New evidence” must be demonstrably relevant to the convictions under challenge.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court (Bryan J sitting as the single judge and then the full court) rejected the application for an extension of time, emphasising:

The absence of medical or other corroboration for Mr Robinson’s mental-health explanation.
The lack of any causal link between the alleged “fresh evidence” and the counts for which he was actually convicted.

2. Independently of the delay issue, the Court held that none of the grounds advanced cast any real doubt on the safety of the convictions: the jury had heard all probative material and was correctly directed on the law.

3. Allegations that trial counsel had “conspired” with the prosecution were described as “baseless”, and the court underlined the ethical protection given to trial counsel by the waiver of privilege procedure.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited or Applied

Although the judgment itself is fact-heavy and precedent-light, the Court implicitly applied well-established authorities and statutory provisions, most notably:

Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.18(3) – time limits for applications and the power to extend “in the interests of justice”.
R v Thorsby (1966) 50 Cr App R 200 – the Court’s discretion to extend only where both good reason for delay and arguable merits exist.
R v McCormick [1999] 1 Cr App R 409 – importance of corroboration when mental health is invoked to explain procedural default.
R v Weston [2021] EWCA Crim 906 – the need to demonstrate materiality of “new” or “fresh” evidence.
R (Nunn) v Chief Constable of Suffolk [2014] UKSC 37 – duty of disclosure post-conviction is limited to material that could render the conviction unsafe.

By synthesising these strands, the Court reconfirmed and arguably sharpened the twin requirements of corroborated justification and material relevance when time extensions are sought long after the statutory limit.

2. Legal Reasoning

2.1 Extension of Time

Uncorroborated Mental Health Assertions: The Applicant’s reliance on “severe bouts of depression” was unsupported by medical records or expert reports. The Court held that bare assertion – however earnest – is insufficient. Objective evidence is required to cross the threshold of “good reason”.
No Nexus Between Delay and Evidence: Even assuming arguable merit, the Applicant had to show that the newly-discovered documents could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained earlier. He failed to establish this, as the material pre-dated the trial and related mainly to counts on which he had been acquitted.
Composite Approach; the Court assessed both reason for delay and prospects of success together, as required by Thorsby. Because neither limb was satisfied, the application was doomed.

2.2 Safety of the Convictions

Minimal Factual Dispute: The Applicant accepted he broke C’s window, shouted abuse, climbed the tower with a rope and later posted incendiary comments online.
Mens Rea Evaluated by Jury: The only live dispute was his intention—to intimidate or to kill himself. The judge’s streamlined “route to verdict” questions properly isolated that issue. The Court of Appeal observed that the jury had the full evidential picture—including the Applicant’s suicidal ideation—yet still convicted.
“Hidden” Evidence Irrelevant: Documents about C’s employment, prior complaints or relation to counts 1-3 could not rationally undermine verdicts on criminal damage and intimidation. Likewise, an officer’s comment that the Facebook post “might” not be intimidation only reaffirmed that the jury had to decide intention, which it did.
Counsel Conduct: Because privilege was waived, trial counsel’s notes were before the court. They showed diligent representation and strategic advice. The sweeping allegation of collusion was thus dismissed as devoid of factual footing.

3. Impact of the Judgment

While fact-specific, Robinson v R is likely to be cited for the following propositions:

Threshold for Corroborated Excuses: Applicants citing mental-health crises must supply objective evidence (e.g. GP letters, psychiatric reports) or risk summary refusal.
Materiality Filter for “New Evidence”: Evidence that does not relate directly to the live counts or that merely impeaches complainants on acquitted matters will seldom be “fresh” or “decisive”.
Separating Acquitted and Convicted Counts: The Court draws a firm procedural line: allegations underpinning acquittals are not a springboard for attacking unrelated convictions.
Re-affirmation of Counsel Immunity Principles: Bald allegations against trial counsel will attract short shrift absent documentary support, especially where the client was acquitted on the more serious counts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unsafe Conviction: A conviction is “unsafe” if, on reviewing all the circumstances, the Court of Appeal thinks it might reasonably be wrong. It is not enough that the appellant disagrees with the verdict.
Single Judge v Full Court: Applications for leave to appeal are first screened by a single judge. If refused, the applicant has 14 days to “renew” before the full court. That renewal can itself be out of time—requiring a second extension (as here).
Witness Intimidation (s.51(1) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994): Requires proof that the defendant intended to intimidate a witness (or potential witness) and that the intimidation was designed to hinder the criminal process.
Route to Verdict: A method used by trial judges to pose a series of yes/no questions so the jury focuses on the essential elements of each offence.

Conclusion

Robinson v R does not break radically new theoretical ground but it does recalibrate two practical elements of criminal‐appellate procedure: (1) excuses for lateness require objective corroboration, and (2) “new evidence” must be materially connected to the convictions under scrutiny. In an era of rising litigants-in-person and increased reliance on mental-health explanations, the case provides a crisp reminder that the Court’s indulgence is not limitless. It also underscores that juries are trusted fact-finders whose verdicts will stand unless fresh material plainly undermines them. Practitioners can cite Robinson both to advise would-be appellants on the evidential rigour required and to resist speculative or delayed assaults on otherwise sound convictions.