Risk of Loss, Intended Loss and Emotional Harm in Fraud Sentencing: Commentary on R v Blaauw [2025] EWCA Crim 1508

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Blaauw [2025] EWCA Crim 1508, a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence arising from a series of frauds committed by a 76‑year‑old mother against her adult daughter over more than twelve years.

The case is significant not because it radically changes the law, but because it offers a clear and practical application of the Sentencing Council’s Fraud Guideline in a particularly sensitive context: long‑running, intra‑familial identity‑based fraud where much of the eventual financial loss has been repaid, but the emotional and practical impact on the victim is severe.

The Court of Appeal’s judgment clarifies and reinforces several important points:

When assessing harm in fraud, courts must look not only at the actual loss, but also at intended loss and the risk of loss.
Where the victim has suffered serious personal distress and wider impact, the offence may properly remain in a higher harm category even if the net financial loss has been reduced by later repayments.
Long‑term, planned and sophisticated identity fraud against a close family member will generally justify a high culpability (Category A) finding under the guideline.
Age, ill‑health, repayment and lack of previous convictions, whilst important mitigating factors, do not necessarily justify a suspended sentence where the offending is serious, prolonged and devoid of real remorse.
A technical error in the order in which a judge applies mitigation and credit for a guilty plea will not warrant intervention where it has in fact benefitted the defendant.

The Court ultimately refused the renewed application for leave to appeal, upholding a sentence of 26 months’ immediate imprisonment.

2. Factual Background

2.1 Parties and Procedural Posture

The applicant, a 76‑year‑old woman with no previous convictions, had pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Isleworth to four counts of fraud. The complainant was her daughter, Ms Feyona Mass (also known as Feyona Mass‑Basford). On 11 July 2025 she was sentenced to 26 months’ imprisonment.

Her initial application for leave to appeal the sentence was refused by the single judge. She then renewed the application before the full Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which handed down the judgment under comment.

2.2 Overview of the Fraudulent Conduct

The offending was not a single episode of dishonesty but a series of interlocking frauds stretching over more than 12 years. All of them involved the applicant misusing her daughter’s identity and financial position. The four relevant counts were as follows.

2.2.1 Count 3 – Bank Accounts in the Daughter’s Name

Under count 3, the applicant:

Operated two sets of bank accounts:
- NatWest accounts in her own name; and
- Lloyds Bank accounts in the name of her daughter, Ms Mass‑Basford.
The Lloyds accounts included:
- a current account,
- a cash ISA,
- a credit card, and
- personal loans.
In 2008, the applicant took out a personal loan of about £5,000 in the daughter’s name; some £2,000 remained outstanding four years later.
By April 2011, the current account was overdrawn by about £1,500 and remained substantially overdrawn between 2016 and 2020.
The ISA account was overdrawn for the whole period 2016–2020, ending at £187 overdrawn in January 2021.
By contrast, the applicant’s own account was largely kept in credit, often via transfers from other accounts.

In effect, the applicant opened and ran accounts in her daughter’s name to fund her own expenditure, leaving the daughter with the corresponding debts and financial liabilities. The value of the fraud on this count was put at around £5,000.

2.2.2 Count 4 – Nemo Finance Loan Secured on the Daughter’s Property

Count 4 concerned a more substantial, structured fraud involving a finance company, Nemo:

The applicant obtained a £35,000 loan from Nemo in the name of her daughter, purportedly to consolidate and pay off various other debts that she had already run up in the daughter’s name (Lloyds loans, credit cards, car finance).
The application was made in the name of “Feyona Mass‑Basford”.
Security for the loan was provided by a charge over a property in Roehampton Vale owned by the daughter.
The property had previously been transferred from the applicant to the daughter to protect it from the applicant’s creditors when the applicant faced bankruptcy.
To obtain the loan, the applicant:
- used her daughter’s driving licence, and
- provided employment payslips belonging to her daughter,
- and consented to a legal charge over the daughter’s property.
If the loan had not been repaid, Nemo could have enforced the charge against the daughter’s property.

Although this Nemo loan and the related debts were apparently later paid off (by the complainant or others), the value of the fraud for sentencing purposes was assessed at £35,000.

2.2.3 Count 5 – Benefits Fraud in the Daughter’s Name

Count 5 involved abuse of the social security system using the daughter’s identity:

The applicant claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance from March to September 2010 in her daughter's name.
She continued to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance for a year up to April 2013 in the name of Ms Mass.
This was at a time when the real Ms Mass was out of the country; on her return she could not claim benefits in her own name because they were already being claimed fraudulently.
After the daughter returned and found employment at John Lewis, the applicant still continued to claim income support in her daughter’s name even though the applicant knew the daughter was now working.
In 2014, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) wrote to the daughter demanding repayment of £4,754.54 in overpaid benefits.
Some of this has since been paid off by the daughter herself; about £2,400 remained outstanding.

In addition, DWP records showed the applicant was also making claims in the daughter’s name for housing costs (mortgage interest) around 2010–2011, at a time when the mortgage was in arrears. A letter in 2012 claimed that the applicant was travelling and only in London occasionally, apparently confusing or swapping the identities of mother and daughter.

The value of the fraud for count 5 was set at £4,754.

2.2.4 Count 7 – Private School Fees and Charging Order

Count 7 concerned the applicant’s other daughter (the complainant’s sister) who attended DLD College, a fee‑paying school:

Contracts for school fees were entered into in the name of the complainant, Ms Feyona Basford.
By 2011, fees of over £4,325 were outstanding.
The school pursued the debt, and in 2014 obtained a charging order against the complainant’s property.
That charge was eventually discharged in November 2019 once the debt was paid.

The fraud value for this count was recorded as £4,325.

2.3 Overall Financial Picture

Aggregating the amounts for the four counts, the sentencing judge took the total value of the fraud to be “just under £50,000”. This is crucial because:

For sentencing guideline purposes, that figure placed the offending in Category 3 harm (covering loss in the range £20,000–£100,000).
Much of the debt was ultimately paid off — but not by the applicant herself, and often only after the fraud had come to light.

The Court of Appeal later emphasised that, while the ultimate financial loss was limited, the guideline requires regard to the intended loss and the risk of loss, as well as the broader impact on the victim.

3. Sentencing at First Instance

3.1 Application of the Fraud Sentencing Guideline

The sentencing judge correctly identified the applicable Sentencing Council guideline for fraud. He assessed:

Culpability as high, based on:
- the sophisticated nature of the offending,
- significant planning, and
- a sustained course of conduct over more than a decade.
Harm as Category 3, since the total value was just under £50,000, within the £20,000–£100,000 range for that category.

Under the guideline, a Category A (high culpability), Category 3 (medium‑range harm) fraud has:

a starting point of 3 years’ (36 months’) custody; and
a sentencing range of 18 months to 4 years’ custody.

3.2 Lead Offence and Starting Point

The judge treated count 4 (the Nemo loan secured on the complainant’s property) as the lead offence. He:

Identified the guideline starting point as 36 months for a Category A3 case.
Increased this to 40 months to reflect:
- the totality of the offending across all four counts, and
- the presence of multiple high‑culpability features (length, planning, sophistication).

The 40‑month term was therefore not a pure guideline starting point, but an uplifted figure designed to capture the seriousness of the whole course of conduct in a single, concurrent sentence structure.

3.3 Credit for Guilty Plea and Mitigation

The judge then reduced the sentence as follows:

Guilty plea: A discount of 10% was applied to the 40‑month figure, producing 36 months. (A 10% reduction indicates a late plea, most likely at or shortly before trial.)
Mitigation: A further reduction of 10 months was made to reflect:
- the applicant’s age (76),
- the absence of previous convictions,
- various health conditions, and
- the fact that most of the financial loss had been repaid, albeit largely by others.

This led to a final sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment.

As the Court of Appeal later observed (at [17]), strictly speaking the judge ought to have applied mitigation before applying the plea discount. However, the method he actually used resulted in a more generous overall reduction than would have been achieved if the sequence had been technically correct.

4. The Appeal: Grounds and Submissions

4.1 Grounds of Appeal

On the renewed application, counsel for the applicant, Mr Rimmer, advanced three main points (see [14]–[15]):

The 40‑month starting figure (before plea and mitigation) was too high, even allowing for the totality of the offending.
Insufficient weight was given to mitigation, in particular:
- age (76),
- health problems,
- absence of previous convictions, and
- the fact that most of the financial losses had ultimately been repaid.
If a more moderate sentence had been imposed at first instance, it could and should have been suspended rather than imposed immediately, especially given the applicant’s age and medical condition.

There had been a written suggestion that the victim personal statement contained material inaccuracies, but that line of argument was not pursued orally, and the Court noted this was “perhaps wisely” not pressed ([14]).

4.2 The “Risk of Loss” Argument

A crucial element of the defence submissions concerned the assessment of harm under the guideline. Mr Rimmer accepted that actual financial loss was limited because monies had been repaid, but sought to argue:

In truth, the harm was largely the risk of loss rather than actual or intended loss.
Under the guideline, where harm consists of risk of loss (rather than loss itself), the sentencing court may consider reducing the harm category (for example from Category 3 to Category 4).
On that basis, this case might properly fall into a lower harm category, which would in turn reduce the custodial starting point.

If the court accepted that the case should be categorised as Category A4 rather than A3, the starting point (and upper end of the range) would be appreciably lower. That, Mr Rimmer argued, would then make a suspended sentence

5. Summary of the Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal refused the renewed application for leave to appeal, effectively upholding the 26‑month sentence as neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

In doing so, the Court held in particular that:

The categorisation of the offence as Category A3 under the Fraud Guideline was unimpeachable ([16]).
The sentencing judge was entitled to increase the guideline starting point of 36 months to 40 months to reflect the high culpability features and the totality of the offending ([16]).
The technical error in sequencing mitigation and plea discount had in fact favoured the applicant, so it could not form any basis for complaint ([17]).
Given the nature, scale and duration of the fraud, and the limited remorse shown, a total sentence of 26 months’ immediate custody was within the proper range and not susceptible to appellate interference ([18]).

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the applicant had shown no arguable basis upon which the sentence could be said to be manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, and the renewed application was dismissed ([19]).

6. Detailed Legal Analysis

6.1 Use of the Fraud Sentencing Guideline

The judgment is an instructive example of the Court of Appeal applying the Sentencing Council’s Fraud Guideline in a relatively straightforward but factually sensitive case. No earlier authorities are expressly cited in the judgment, but the Court’s approach mirrors well‑established sentencing principles for fraud:

Determine culpability (A–C) based on factors such as planning, sophistication, abuse of trust, and length of offending.
Determine harm (by category) based on:
- the likely or actual financial loss (or gain),
- any intended loss, and
- the wider impact on the victim, including emotional distress and practical consequences.
Identify the starting point and range from the guideline table for the relevant culpability and harm combination (here A3: starting point 36 months, range 18–48 months).
Adjust within the range, taking account of aggravating and mitigating factors (beyond those already inherent in the categorisation).
Apply:
- mitigation (personal factors, remorse, repayment, etc.), and
- credit for a guilty plea under the separate guideline on reductions in sentence for a guilty plea.
Apply the totality principle, ensuring the overall sentence properly reflects the combined criminality across all counts.

This structure is visible throughout the sentencing reasoning adopted by both the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal.

6.2 Harm: Actual Loss, Intended Loss and Risk of Loss

The most legally interesting aspect of the case is the discussion at [16] about the nature of “harm” for guideline purposes.

6.2.1 The Defence Position

The defence argument exploited a feature of fraud sentencing: the guideline allows courts to recognise when the harm consists largely of a risk of loss, as opposed to an actual or fully realised loss. In some cases, that can justify placing the offence in a lower harm category.

Given that:

many of the debts had ultimately been repaid; and
the complainant had, in financial terms, not been left with the full burden of the fraud,

counsel contended that:

the guideline allowed this to be treated as a lesser harm case (Category 4); and
accordingly, a lower custodial range should have been adopted.

6.2.2 The Court’s Response

The Court accepted in principle that the guidelines permit a reduction in harm category where the harm is only a risk of loss ([16]). However, two points were fatal to the argument in this case:

Intended loss vs actual loss
The Court reiterated that the guidelines require regard to be had to “what was intended” as well as to actual loss ([16]). Here, the applicant:
- took out loans and incurred liabilities in her daughter’s name,
- secured a £35,000 loan against her daughter’s property, and
- claimed benefits in the daughter’s name even when the daughter was working.
This conduct clearly involved an intention to expose the daughter to substantial and long‑term liability, irrespective of whether third parties later assisted with repayment.
Emotional and practical impact on the victim
The Court emphasised the victim personal statement, which revealed “considerable personal distress and other impact to the complainant” ([16]). This included:
- the stress of discovering debts, overpayments and benefit claims in her name,
- the consequences of having a charge registered over her property, and
- the disruption and direct financial burden of repaying liabilities she had not incurred.
The Court treated these as genuine and serious harm, fully consistent with Category 3 (and indeed on the more serious end of the harm spectrum).

Accordingly, the Court held that:

“The categorisation of the offence as falling into Category A3 in all of the circumstances of this case cannot properly be criticised.” ([16])

That passage is an important reaffirmation that:

Repayment (especially when funded by third parties) does not erase or fully mitigate the harm caused by fraud, particularly where:
the intended exposure was large, and
the victim experienced extensive personal distress and other non‑financial harm.

6.3 Culpability: Long‑Term, Sophisticated, Identity‑Based Fraud

On culpability, the Court affirmed the judge’s assessment of “high culpability” ([12], [16]), which aligns with Category A in the guideline.

Key factors supporting this categorisation included:

Length and persistence: Over 12 years of repeated frauds, across different institutions.
Planning and sophistication:
- systematic use of two sets of bank accounts,
- use of identity documents and payslips in the daughter’s name,
- complex financial arrangements such as secured loans and charging orders.
Abuse of identity: Repeated impersonation of the daughter in dealings with banks, a finance provider and the DWP.
Intra‑familial breach of trust: Although the guideline does not formally list “intra‑familial” offending as a separate category, the abuse of a close family relationship is well understood as an aggravating feature in sentencing.
Benefit fraud knowing the daughter was working: Even after the daughter obtained employment, the applicant continued to make claims, fully aware that the claims were dishonest ([8]).

The Court described the offending as having “a number of features of high culpability” ([16]) and noted the “extraordinary length of time during which this fraud was perpetrated” as the “Achilles heel of the defence” ([16]).

This reasoning underlines that:

Fraud is not judged only by the quantum of money involved.
The pattern, duration and method of the offending, and the exploitation of trust and identity, are central to culpability.

6.4 Mitigation: Age, Health, No Previous Convictions, Repayment and Remorse

The Court carefully considered whether the mitigation had been adequately reflected ([13], [18]). The relevant factors were:

Age (76): Advanced age is normally a significant mitigating factor. It affects both the impact of custody and prospects of rehabilitation.
Health issues: The applicant had “various health conditions”, which the judge explicitly recognised ([13]).
No previous convictions: On the face of the record, the applicant was of good character.
Repayment of most of the money: The judge “took specific account” of the fact that “the majority of the money had been paid back” ([13]).
Lack of remorse: The judge found that the applicant had displayed “minimal, if any, remorse” ([18]).

Balancing these factors, the sentencing judge gave a 10‑month reduction for mitigation alone (after the 10% plea discount had already been applied to the uplifted 40‑month figure). The Court of Appeal stated that:

“The 10 month reduction for mitigation was reasonable. This was particularly so in circumstances where he found, as he was entitled to, the applicant had displayed minimal, if any, remorse.” ([18])

The limited remorse is particularly significant. Where a defendant:

pleads guilty late,
denies or minimises responsibility, or
shows little understanding of the harm caused,

courts give less or no weight to supposed “remorse” in mitigation, even where other personal factors might pull in favour of leniency.

It is also worth noting that, in cases like this, “no previous convictions” can be a somewhat ambiguous factor: the offending extended over many years; the absence of earlier convictions may simply reflect that the fraud went undetected for a long period. While that does not extinguish the value of good character, it can reduce its weight compared to a single, isolated lapse in an otherwise blameless life.

6.5 The Order of Mitigation and Plea Reduction

At [17], the Court identified a technical error in the sentencing methodology:

The judge applied the guilty plea discount first (10% off 40 months = 36 months).
He then applied a 10‑month reduction for mitigation, arriving at 26 months.

Strictly speaking, best practice is to:

Determine the appropriate sentence, including both aggravating and mitigating factors (but excluding the plea), and only then
Apply the appropriate percentage reduction for the guilty plea to that figure.

The Court noted that this incorrect ordering actually favoured the applicant. To illustrate:

If one starts from 40 months:
- Apply mitigation (–10 months) → 30 months.
- Apply 10% plea reduction to 30 months → 27 months.
By contrast, the judge’s method produced 26 months:
- 40 months – 10% plea (4 months) = 36 months.
- 36 months – 10 months mitigation = 26 months.

Thus, by reversing the correct order, the judge effectively granted the applicant an extra month of leniency. The Court therefore concluded that this error could not possibly form the basis of a valid complaint.

This part of the judgment reinforces two broader points:

The Court of Appeal will not interfere where an error is beneficial to the defendant and does not render the sentence unlawful.
Sentencing is not a mathematical exercise to be recalculated from scratch if a defendant seeks to “re‑engineer” the process in the hope of extracting further small reductions.

6.6 Suspension of Sentence and Elderly Defendants

Although the judgment does not explicitly set out the statutory and guideline framework for suspended sentences, it is clear that the Court rejected the suggestion that the sentence should have been suspended ([15], [18]).

The argument for suspension rested on:

the applicant’s age and health; and
the proposition that, with a somewhat lower starting point, the final term might have fallen within a range where a suspended sentence could reasonably be considered.

However, in order to suspend a term of imprisonment, a sentencing court must be satisfied both that:

The custody threshold has been passed (i.e. the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence is justified), and
It is appropriate to suspend that custodial term in the particular circumstances.

Here:

There was no dispute that the custody threshold was comfortably exceeded, given:
- the scale of the fraud,
- its duration and planning, and
- the breach of trust involved in defrauding a close family member and exposing her property to risk.
Once the Court determined that 26 months’ immediate custody was within the proper range, a suspension became unrealistic, especially when the judge had already taken full account of age, health and repayment via the 10‑month mitigation.

The Court’s silence on suspension beyond rejecting the argument implicitly underscores a familiar principle: strong personal mitigation, including advanced age and ill‑health, cannot override the need for immediate custody when the offending is serious, prolonged and marked by a lack of genuine remorse.

6.7 Appellate Restraint: “Manifestly Excessive” or “Wrong in Principle”

The Court’s conclusion at [18]–[19] reflects the classic appellate test in sentence appeals:

The Court will intervene only if the sentence is:
- wrong in principle (for example, because the court applied the wrong guideline, miscategorised the offence, or took into account irrelevant factors); or
- manifestly excessive (i.e. outside the range of sentences that a reasonable judge could properly have imposed).

Here, the Court held that:

“Overall, a sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment for the totality of the offending cannot in our judgment be said to be either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.” ([18])

That statement is not mere formula. It signals that:

The sentencing judge:
- applied the correct guideline,
- placed the case in the right culpability and harm categories,
- appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and
- reasonably adjusted the sentence to reflect totality.
Even if another judge might have imposed a somewhat lower term (for example 24 or 25 months), that would simply reflect the inherent discretion in sentencing, not any legal error.

Appellate courts will not substitute their own view merely because they might have calibrated the sentence slightly differently.

7. Precedents and Wider Framework

The judgment itself cites no earlier case law by name. Instead, it proceeds on the basis of the established sentencing framework provided by:

The Sentencing Council Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences Definitive Guideline, which sets out the culpability/harm matrix used in this case.
The general principles governing appeals against sentence, requiring a showing that the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

Although not explicitly referenced, the Court’s approach is consistent with a long line of Court of Appeal authorities which emphasise that:

Guidelines are to be followed unless it is in the interests of justice to depart from them.
Reparation or repayment, especially where it occurs only after detection, is often limited in its mitigating effect.
In cases of serious and prolonged dishonesty, especially involving abuse of trust or close relationships, immediate custody is ordinarily required, even for older or vulnerable offenders.

R v Blaauw therefore sits squarely within, rather than against, existing appellate practice. Its value lies less in establishing a brand‑new legal principle and more in applying the existing framework to a modern pattern of offending (long‑term identity and benefit fraud against a family member).

8. Impact and Practical Significance

Though concise, the judgment has several practical implications for future cases involving fraud, especially intra‑familial fraud and identity misuse.

8.1 Intra‑Familial Identity Fraud

The case reinforces the message that fraud against family members:

is regarded as highly serious, not as something to be treated more leniently because it occurs within a family; and
will often involve a substantial emotional and psychological impact on the victim, which is properly treated as “harm” for guideline purposes.

Practitioners should expect courts to take a firm approach where:

a defendant has abused access to a relative’s personal information, documents or property;
the offending is prolonged and concealed; and
the victim is left dealing with long‑term financial and reputational consequences.

8.2 Repayment and “Net Loss” Arguments

The judgment is a useful reminder that later repayment, especially when funded by third parties:

does not normally reduce the guideline harm category if:
- the intended financial exposure was substantial, or
- the victim has suffered serious non‑financial harm.
may be recognised as mitigation, but only to a limited extent, particularly where:
- repayment was not prompt or voluntary, or
- the defendant has not shown genuine remorse.

Defence practitioners should be cautious about framing such cases as “low harm” simply because the victim eventually recovered much of the money. The Court will focus on:

the original scale and risk of the fraud; and
the lived experience and emotional reality of the victim.

8.3 Elderly and Unwell Defendants

The decision underlines that advanced age and health problems, though important, do not confer a de facto immunity from custody. Where:

offending is serious and persists over many years,
there is a significant breach of trust, and
remorse is minimal,

the courts will still regard an immediate custodial sentence as appropriate, even for a defendant in their 70s with medical issues. This reflects the principle that public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined if serious frauds could be committed with impunity by those whose personal circumstances might evoke sympathy.

8.4 Sentencing Structure and “Totality”

The judgment illustrates how courts may:

select a lead count (here, count 4) that best reflects the core criminality; and
uplift that sentence within the guideline range to reflect the additional harm and culpability represented by other counts, rather than imposing consecutive sentences.

This method is particularly suitable where the various counts are:

part of a single course of conduct, and
directed at the same victim over a long period.

9. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

For ease of reference, several legal and sentencing concepts appearing in the judgment are explained in simpler terms below.

9.1 Category A3 Fraud

Category A (High culpability): The offender’s blameworthiness is high, for reasons such as:
- significant planning and sophistication,
- use of another’s identity or abuse of trust, and
- a sustained pattern of offending.
Category 3 (Harm): The financial loss or intended loss falls within a mid‑range bracket (here £20,000–£100,000), and/or there is significant non‑financial harm such as emotional distress and disruption to the victim’s life.
Starting point: 3 years’ (36 months’) custody.
Range: 18 months to 4 years’ custody.

9.2 “Risk of Loss” vs Actual or Intended Loss

Actual loss: The money or value that the victim actually loses and does not get back.
Intended loss: The amount the offender meant the victim to lose, even if it was ultimately recovered or never fully realised.
Risk of loss: Where the fraud exposed the victim to a significant risk of losing money or property, even if, by good fortune or external help, the loss did not ultimately occur.

The guideline allows courts, in some cases, to treat pure “risk of loss” as less serious than “actual or intended loss”. But in R v Blaauw, the Court held that the exposure and intended loss, combined with the serious emotional and practical harm, justified treating the case as Category 3.

9.3 “Starting Point” and “Range”

The starting point is the sentence a judge might impose for a typical case in that category after a trial (no guilty plea) and without significant aggravating or mitigating factors.
The range is the band within which the sentence can move up or down depending on such factors.

9.4 “Totality” Principle

Where a defendant is sentenced for multiple offences, the court must ensure that the combined sentence:

reflects the overall seriousness of the offending, but
is not “crushing” or disproportionate.

This can be done either by:

making sentences on different counts partly or wholly consecutive; or
selecting a lead count and uplifting the sentence on that count to reflect the additional offending, as happened here.

9.5 “Single Judge” and “Renewed Application”

In criminal appeals, applications for leave to appeal are first considered by a single judge.
If the single judge refuses leave, the applicant can make a renewed application before the full Court of Appeal.
In Blaauw, the single judge refused leave on the papers; the full court then considered and dismissed the renewed application.

9.6 “Manifestly Excessive” and “Wrong in Principle”

Wrong in principle: The sentencing judge has made a distinct legal or guideline error, such as miscategorising the offence or relying on impermissible factors.
Manifestly excessive: Even if all the correct principles were applied, the sentence is so far outside the reasonable range that it appears plainly too harsh.

Unless one of these thresholds is met, the Court of Appeal will not interfere.

10. Conclusion

R v Blaauw [2025] EWCA Crim 1508 is a clear, compact example of the principled application of the Fraud Sentencing Guideline to a long‑running, intra‑familial fraud involving identity misuse, secured lending and benefit fraud.

The key takeaways are:

Harm assessment is not confined to net financial loss. Intended loss, exposure to risk, and the emotional and practical harm suffered by the victim are central to categorisation.
Later repayment, particularly by third parties, carries limited weight. It does not usually justify downgrading the harm category, though it can be recognised in mitigation.
Long‑term, sophisticated fraud against a close family member will ordinarily be Category A. The abuse of identity and trust significantly elevates culpability.
Personal mitigation has real but bounded force. Age, health and lack of previous convictions do not override the need for immediate custody where offending is serious, prolonged and shows little remorse.
Appellate intervention is limited. Where the sentencing judge has applied the correct guideline and arrived at a sentence within the permissible range, the Court of Appeal will not recalibrate the term merely because an alternative, slightly lower sentence could also have been justified.

Taken together, these points reinforce a robust and coherent approach to sentencing fraud, especially where the offender has exploited family ties and personal identities over an extended period. While not a radical departure from existing law, R v Blaauw provides a useful and accessible precedent on how courts will evaluate harm, culpability and mitigation in such cases, and the limited scope for challenging a carefully crafted sentence on appeal.