Remorse, Electronic Monitoring Credit and Undue Leniency: Commentary on HM Advocate v STP [2025] HCJAC 51

1. Introduction

The decision of the Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary in HM Advocate v STP [2025] HCJAC 51 is a significant sentencing judgment in Scots criminal law. It arises from a Crown appeal against an “unduly lenient” extended sentence imposed for a series of domestic abuse offences culminating in the attempted murder of a mother and her two young children by causing their car to leave the road and roll over.

The judgment is important in three main respects:

It restates and applies the test for Crown appeals on grounds of undue leniency, particularly in the context of domestic attempted murder involving multiple child victims and the use of a motor vehicle.
It provides authoritative clarification on the role of remorse as a mitigating factor in sentencing, holding that a denial of guilt cannot coexist with genuine remorse and that social work characterisations of "remorse" must be scrutinised carefully.
It gives clear guidance on the treatment of time on remand interrupted by bail and the proper application of section 210ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 regarding credit for time spent on electronically monitored bail.

The case therefore has implications both for sentencing practice in serious domestic abuse and attempted murder cases, and for the technical operation of time-credit mechanisms in sentencing.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The offences

The respondent, STP, was convicted after trial of four charges committed on 11 June 2023 in Moray:

Charge 1 – Domestically aggravated assault on AA (his ex-partner): struggling with her, pulling at clothing, punching her to the head causing her to fall, repeatedly punching her on the head on the ground, and stamping on her wrist, all to her injury. The offence was aggravated under section 1 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 (abuse of a partner/ex-partner).
Charge 2 – Assault on BB, AA’s 9‑year‑old son: pushing or throwing him to the ground.
Charge 3 – Abduction and domestic abuse of AA, BB and CC (a 3‑year‑old girl, STP’s daughter): locking the door and removing the key, concealing CC’s clothing and AA’s phone, preventing BB from accessing his phone and threatening to destroy it, and placing a blanket over CC and pinning her to the bed to prevent her moving, detaining all three against their will. Again, the offence was aggravated under section 1 of the 2016 Act.
Charge 4 – Attempted murder of AA, BB and CC: during the journey home on the A941, while AA was driving with BB and CC (and a dog) in the rear seats, the respondent repeatedly grabbed the steering wheel and then leaned across AA and pulled the handbrake fully on. This caused the vehicle to veer off the road and roll over, coming to rest upright. Other vehicles were on the road. The charge libelled assault to injury and to the danger of life and attempted murder of all three occupants.

AA and CC sustained cuts and bruises. The trial judge considered that the occupants of the car “could have died”. The respondent also threw AA’s mobile phone away after the accident, frustrating her ability to seek help.

2.2 Personal circumstances and record

STP was 34 at sentence. He had a difficult upbringing, mental health difficulties and limited educational attainment. He had worked intermittently. However, he also had a substantial criminal record, including:

Multiple assaults, including serious assault to the danger of life (21 months’ detention in 2009).
Repeated domestically aggravated offences, including assaults and statutory breaches of the peace.
Offending involving offensive weapons, vandalism and drugs.
Repeated breaches of bail.
A community payback order and driving disqualification imposed just three days before the index offences, for stealing a car and failing to stop after an accident.

He denied all of the offences to the social worker and at trial, providing alternative explanations for AA’s injuries and the crash. Despite this, the Justice Social Work Report (JSWR) contained statements to the effect that he “takes responsibility” and showed “deep regret and remorse”, which became a central issue in the appeal.

2.3 First instance sentence

On 16 July 2025, the sentencing judge imposed an extended sentence of 9 years and 1 month, with a custodial term of 7 years and 1 month, backdated to 6 June 2025 (the date of remand after the period on bail).

For charges 1–3 she considered a cumulative sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment appropriate.
For charge 4 she considered 7 years’ imprisonment the appropriate figure.
She concluded that making these sentences consecutive would be “grossly disproportionate” and instead fixed a headline custodial term of 8 years, reduced by 11 months to reflect time on remand and electronically monitored bail, resulting in 7 years and 1 month.
She imposed an extension period to achieve an extended sentence of 9 years and 1 month in total, in light of the risk to the public.

Time spent on remand and on bail subject to an electronic curfew was jointly calculated in mitigation as equivalent to 597 days, with reference to HM Advocate v O’Doherty [2022] HCJAC 31.

2.4 The Crown appeal

The Lord Advocate appealed on two bases:

Undue leniency: the 7‑year headline for charge 4 and the overall sentence were said to be outside the range reasonably open to the trial judge, given:
- The gravity of the attempted murder of three people, two of them children.
- The domestic abuse context and series of preceding assaults and abduction.
- The respondent’s extensive and relevant criminal record.
- The judge’s alleged misinterpretation of the JSWR regarding remorse.
Errors in dealing with time-credit:
- Failure to backdate the sentence to a notional remand date to reflect time on remand that had been interrupted by a period on bail, contrary to the approach in O’Doherty.
- Failure to comply with section 210ZA(2)(b) and (c) of the 1995 Act regarding the specific treatment of time spent on electronically monitored bail, as analysed in Brown (PF Airdrie) v Rea [2025] SAC Crim 2, 2025 SC (SAC) 63.

The respondent argued that, although towards the lower end of the appropriate range, the sentence was not unduly lenient. He accepted the Crown’s legal submissions on the time-credit issues, and suggested 1 February 2024 as the notional commencement date if the court decided to re-sentence.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Application of the undue leniency test

The court (Lord Justice Clerk (Beckett), sitting with Lord Doherty and Lord Matthews) reaffirmed the classic test in HM Advocate v Bell 1995 SCCR 244: the appeal court may only interfere if the sentence “falls outside the range of sentences which the judge at first instance, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably have considered appropriate”.

Applying that test, the court:

Accepted the trial judge’s assessment of criminality for charges 1–3.
Disagreed profoundly with her assessment of charge 4 and the overall custodial term, finding both unduly lenient in light of:
- The respondent’s high culpability (deliberate actions in a moving vehicle).
- The actual harm and the very substantial potential for fatal harm.
- The presence of three victims, including two very young children, and the domestic/breach of trust context.
- The respondent’s extensive and relevant prior convictions.

3.2 Remorse and the misuse of the Justice Social Work Report

A central feature of the judgment is the court’s treatment of remorse. It held:

The respondent continued to deny the offences in interview and to the social worker.
In those circumstances, the JSWR’s references to “remorse” and “taking responsibility” were incorrect.
The sentencing judge erred in treating these passages as evidence of genuine remorse and insight.

The court clarified that remorse, to operate as a mitigating factor, must be:

Grounded in acceptance of criminal responsibility for the offences.
Assessed by the sentencer as genuinely felt, not merely formulaic regret or self‑pity.

A maintained denial is incompatible with genuine remorse, though limited “insight” may have marginal relevance.

3.3 Re-sentencing

The court considered that an extended sentence remained necessary to protect the public from serious harm, particularly given the risk of future domestic abuse. Relying on McGowan v HM Advocate [2005] HCJAC 67, it reaffirmed that the length of the custodial term must be set by reference to the seriousness of the offences themselves and is not to be reduced merely because an extension period is added.

On that basis, the court:

Fixed the appropriate custodial term on charge 4 at 10 years’ imprisonment.
To avoid disproportion, fixed a total extended sentence on all charges of 13 years, with a custodial term of 11 years and an extension period of 2 years.

3.4 Treatment of remand and electronically monitored bail

To reflect interrupted remand and compliant with O’Doherty, the court:

Backdated the new extended sentence to 1 February 2024, calculated by taking the original remand date (13 June 2023) and adding the 232‑day period on bail.

To comply with section 210ZA on electronically monitored bail, the court:

Noted that the respondent had been on EM bail with a 7pm–7am curfew for 232 days.
Held that he must be credited with one half of that period — 116 days — as time served, in accordance with section 210ZA(3).
Directed, following Rea, that the respondent is to be treated, for execution of the sentence by the Scottish Prison Service, as having already served 116 days of the extended sentence.

The non‑harassment order imposed at first instance remained in force, not having been appealed.

4. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Undue leniency and the limited role of first‑instance comparators

The court began with the classic Bell test for undue leniency, emphasising:

An appeal court does not simply substitute its own view because it would have passed a higher sentence.
It may only interfere where the sentence falls outside the reasonable range available to the trial judge, considering all relevant factors.
Deference is normally owed to the trial judge’s evaluation, especially where they presided over the trial and observed the evidence.

Within that framework, the Crown sought to rely on specific examples of sentencing for attempted murder, including unreported or first instance decisions (e.g. McBurnie, Danquah, Johnston).

The court’s approach is instructive:

It treated appeal decisions such as Budge and Iqbal as more persuasive comparators than unappealed first instance decisions.
It stressed that first instance decisions that have not been scrutinised on appeal have limited value in establishing sentencing ranges.
It therefore preferred to conduct its own assessment of the seriousness of the respondent’s conduct, viewing comparators only as loose background.

This reinforces a broader principle: appellate sentencing guidance is to be preferred over first‑instance practice, particularly in complex or serious cases such as attempted murder.

4.2 Seriousness: culpability and actual/potential harm

The court explicitly anchored its analysis of seriousness in the Scottish Sentencing Council’s Sentencing process guideline, which directs sentencers to assess seriousness based on:

Culpability: how blameworthy the offender’s conduct was.
Harm: both the actual harm caused and the potential harm that might reasonably have resulted.

Applying that framework:

Culpability was “considerable”: the respondent deliberately grabbed the steering wheel of a moving vehicle and pulled the handbrake fully on. This was not a momentary lapse of attention but purposeful interference with a vehicle in motion.
With respect to actual harm, the occupants suffered injuries (cuts and bruises), and AA’s ongoing PTSD and BB’s therapy illustrated significant psychological harm.
The potential harm was even more serious: the vehicle veered off the road and rolled over; all occupants could have been killed or badly injured; other road users were at risk; and there were two child victims (aged 3 and 9).

The court’s reasoning underlines a key point for future cases: the relative good fortune that catastrophic injury was avoided does not significantly diminish the seriousness where the natural and probable consequence of the deliberate act carried a high risk of death or very serious injury. For attempted murder, the potential for fatal harm is often as important as the injuries actually sustained.

4.3 Domestic context, children and prior record as aggravating factors

The court treated several features as materially aggravating:

The domestic abuse context, reflected in the statutory aggravations under section 1 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 for charges 1 and 3. The respondent presented a high risk of further domestic offending, and the offences formed part of a pattern of controlling, abusive conduct.
The presence of two young children among the victims in charge 4. The court explicitly treated this, and the breach of trust inherent in a parental role, as a serious aggravation.
The respondent’s extensive and relevant criminal record, including 11 previous assault convictions and repeated domestic aggravations, as well as bail aggravations and offences involving weapons and dangerous conduct.

The court disagreed with the characterisation of the respondent as “little more than a nuisance” advanced in mitigation. The record demonstrated:

A sustained pattern of violence.
Disregard for court orders and bail conditions.
Escalation in seriousness over time.

The judgment thus reinforces that in domestic attempted murder cases, prior domestic abuse and violence, particularly with bail aggravations, will significantly escalate the appropriate sentence.

4.4 Remorse, denial of guilt and the status of the Justice Social Work Report

The court’s treatment of remorse is one of the key doctrinal developments in this case.

4.4.1 Definition and conceptual basis

Drawing on:

The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “remorse” as “deep regret or guilt for doing something morally wrong”.
HM Advocate v Cooperwhite [2013] HCJAC 88, where a complete denial of culpability led to the conclusion that there was “no victim empathy or remorse”.
Gemmell v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 129, 2012 JC 223, where the court considered how and when remorse can legitimately reduce sentence.
English Sentencing Council material, which similarly requires the sentencer to be satisfied that remorse is genuine before treating it as mitigation.

the court crystallised the following principles:

Remorse requires acceptance of responsibility for the commission of the crime; one cannot be genuinely remorseful for conduct that one denies having carried out.
Remorse must be genuine, not merely formulaic expressions of regret, self‑pity, or frustration at the consequences.
Where there is no admission of guilt, any expressions of insight or regret have at best “very limited mitigating effect” and are not properly described as remorse.

On that basis, the court held in terms:

The respondent’s statements to the social worker were not evidence of remorse.
The social worker “misunderstood the meaning of remorse”.
The sentencing judge erred in law by treating those passages as indicative of genuine remorse.

4.4.2 Practical significance

The judgment sends a clear message to:

Sentencers: they must independently evaluate whether what is described in a JSWR actually meets the legal understanding of remorse, rather than simply adopting the social worker’s terminology.
Justice social workers: they should use “remorse” only where there is clear acceptance of responsibility for the offence and convincing evidence of genuine regret, not simply where an accused expresses dissatisfaction with events or a wish that matters had turned out differently.

In doctrinal terms, STP tightens and clarifies the approach to remorse established in earlier cases, making it more difficult for a convicted person who maintains a full denial to obtain significant credit under the label of “remorse”.

4.5 Extended sentences: public protection and proportionality

The court accepted the trial judge’s view that an extended sentence was needed to protect the public, in particular women with whom the respondent might form relationships, from serious harm.

Relying on McGowan v HM Advocate [2005] HCJAC 67, the court reiterated that:

The custodial term must be set according to the seriousness of the offences themselves (culpability, harm, aggravations).
The presence of an extension period for supervision cannot be used as a reason to reduce the custodial term that would otherwise be appropriate.

In practice, the court:

Assessed that a 10‑year custodial term was warranted for the attempted murder of three people given the domestic context, child victims, and prior record.
Considered that a total custodial term of 11 years (for all four charges) and a 2‑year extension struck an appropriate balance between seriousness and proportionality.

This provides a clear indication that attempted murder in a domestic context with multiple victims, including young children, may attract double‑digit custodial terms even where injuries are not catastrophic.

4.6 Time on remand and electronically monitored bail

4.6.1 Interrupted remand and backdating

Referring to O’Doherty, the court endorsed the approach that where a period of remand in custody is interrupted by bail, the appropriate method is to backdate the sentence to a notional start date that ensures the full remand period is credited, rather than artificially reducing the headline custodial term.

Here:

The respondent was first remanded on 13 June 2023.
He was on bail (with electronic monitoring) for 232 days between 17 October 2024 and 5 June 2025.
He was again remanded on 6 June 2025.

By backdating the new extended sentence to 1 February 2024 (13 June 2023 + 232 days), the court ensured that the entirety of the earlier remand period was recognised, while keeping the nominal length of the sentence faithful to the seriousness of the offences.

4.6.2 Electronically monitored bail and section 210ZA

The court then turned to section 210ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which addresses how courts must treat time spent on “qualifying bail” (i.e. bail with an electronically monitored curfew of at least 9 hours per day).

Key statutory features (summarised by the court) are:

The court must “have regard” to the bail period (s 210ZA(2)(a)).
It must specify a “relevant period” (s 210ZA(2)(b)), which is usually half of the bail period, rounded up (s 210ZA(3)(a)).
It must then direct that the offender is to be treated as having served that relevant period for the purposes of executing the sentence (s 210ZA(2)(c)).
If the court decides to disregard part of the bail period, it must explain why (s 210ZA(3)(b), (4)).

In STP:

The bail period with electronic monitoring was 232 days.
The relevant period was therefore 116 days (half of 232, rounded up if necessary).
The court, agreeing with the Sheriff Appeal Court in Rea, emphasised that:
- The duty to “direct … for the purpose of executing the sentence” (s 210ZA(2)(c)) reflects that the sentencing decision is made by the court but executed by the Scottish Prison Service.
- The direction that the person is to be treated as having served a specified period is mandatory (unless the relevant period is nil).
It therefore directed that STP is to be treated as having served 116 days of his extended sentence.

Crucially, the court did not reduce the overall length of the sentence to account for EM bail. Instead, it complied with the statutory mechanism, leaving the custodial term at 11 years while specifying the time already served for execution purposes.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 HM Advocate v Bell (1995 SCCR 244): The undue leniency test

Bell remains the foundational authority on Crown appeals against sentence for undue leniency. The present court quoted it and applied its central propositions:

The appeal court does not revisit sentence de novo; there must be a material misjudgment such that the sentence falls outside the reasonable range.
Weight is given to the trial judge’s views, particularly after a trial.
There are cases where a lenient sentence is nevertheless appropriate and should not be disturbed.

However, the court concluded that, given the gravity of charge 4 and the cumulative weight of aggravating factors, the custodial term selected by the trial judge for attempted murder — and thus the overall extended sentence — could not be reconciled with the Bell test.

5.2 HM Advocate v Budge, Iqbal v HM Advocate and HM Advocate v Fergusson

The court discussed these cases as context for appropriate sentencing levels for attempted murder:

In Budge [2025] HCJAC 27, a Crown appeal, the court set a headline sentence of 14 years 6 months for a deliberate, repeated driving over of the complainer, causing very serious and permanent injuries. The court noted that this was a more serious case than STP, albeit with some mitigating features such as being a first offender and genuine remorse.
In Iqbal [2018] HCJAC 65, the court upheld a total sentence of 16 years for two attempted murders by fire‑bombing houses occupied by sleeping people, including children. With reference to the later approach in Fergusson [2024] HCJAC 22, the court inferred that each individual attempted murder could have attracted around 12 years.

The court used these authorities chiefly to help delineate the upper bound of sentencing ranges for attempted murder and to show that double‑digit sentences are entirely appropriate even where death is avoided, especially when there are multiple victims or child victims.

5.3 Cooperwhite and Gemmell: The doctrinal framework on remorse

HM Advocate v Cooperwhite and Gemmell v HM Advocate provided the analytical platform for the court’s stance on remorse:

Cooperwhite illustrated that where an offender continues to deny culpability and alleges a conspiracy against them, the court will find no remorse or victim empathy.
In Gemmell, the Lord Justice Clerk (Gill) explained that while it is often difficult to assess remorse, “convincing evidence of remorse” may justify a reduction in the starting figure for sentence, and other members of the court agreed that remorse is relevant at the stage of fixing the pre‑discount sentence.

STP builds on these authorities by explicitly tying remorse to:

Acceptance of the commission of the crime.
A sentencer’s positive finding of genuineness.

In doing so, it draws a sharp line between genuine remorse and:

“Insight” that does not include acceptance of guilt.
Self‑serving expressions of regret or distress.

5.4 O’Doherty and McGowan: Backdating and extended sentences

HM Advocate v O’Doherty provided the template for dealing with time on remand when there is an interruption by a period on bail. STP follows that approach by:

Maintaining the headline custodial term that properly reflects seriousness.
Using backdating to ensure that actual time spent on remand is fully credited, rather than compressing the headline sentence length.

McGowan v HM Advocate is cited for the principle that the custodial component of an extended sentence should be set at the level appropriate for the offence, independent of the extension period for supervision. This prevents the artificial reduction of custodial terms simply because an extension period is also imposed.

5.5 Brown (PF Airdrie) v Rea and section 210ZA: Electronically monitored bail

The Sheriff Appeal Court decision in Rea was endorsed in STP as a correct reading of section 210ZA. The Appeal Court agreed that:

Section 210ZA(2)(c) requires a specific direction that a defined “relevant period” is to be treated as time served for the purpose of executing the sentence.
The sentence remains what the court pronounces, but its operation is modified by the direction which the Scottish Prison Service must implement.

The combination of Rea and STP provides clear and binding appellate guidance on how electronically monitored bail must be reflected in sentencing practice.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Crown appeals for “unduly lenient” sentences

In Scotland, the Lord Advocate can appeal a sentence on the basis that it is “unduly lenient”. This does not mean:

“Any sentence lower than the appeal court would have imposed.”

Instead, it means:

The sentence falls outside the band of reasonable sentences that a judge could have imposed after properly considering all relevant factors.

The key features are:

There must be a material misjudgment by the sentencing judge.
The appeal court gives some deference to the first‑instance judge’s impressions, especially after trial.
Not every lenient sentence can be appealed successfully — only those which are “unduly” lenient.

6.2 Attempted murder in Scots law and “wicked recklessness”

Attempted murder in Scots law requires:

An assault (i.e. a deliberate attack on another person).
Accompanied by either an intention to kill or such “wicked recklessness” as to amount to an implied intention to kill.

“Wicked recklessness” is more than mere carelessness or even gross negligence; it involves:

Acting in a way that shows utter disregard for whether the victim lives or dies, where death is a likely consequence.

In STP, the jury’s verdict on charge 4 established that grabbing the steering wheel and fully applying the handbrake in a moving car, causing it to roll over with three occupants and other traffic present, amounted to such wicked recklessness.

6.3 Extended sentences

An extended sentence has two parts:

A custodial term (time in prison), set with reference to the seriousness of the offences.
An extension period (time on licence in the community under supervision), imposed for the protection of the public from serious harm.

The key points are:

The extension period is not a substitute for an appropriate custodial term; it is in addition to the time considered necessary as punishment and deterrence.
Breach of licence conditions during the extension period can lead to recall to custody.

6.4 Remand, backdating and credit for time in custody

“Remand” is when an accused is held in custody awaiting trial or sentence. Scottish law requires that:

Time spent on remand for the offences should generally be credited towards any custodial sentence.
This is commonly achieved by backdating the sentence so that, on paper, it started earlier than the date of sentencing.

Where remand is interrupted by a period on bail, the court can calculate a notional start date for the sentence that ensures all remand time is counted, as in O’Doherty and STP.

6.5 Electronically monitored bail and section 210ZA

“Qualifying bail” under section 210ZA means bail with a curfew of at least 9 hours per day enforced by electronic monitoring (e.g. a tag).

When someone has been on such bail:

The court must calculate a “relevant period” — usually half the total days spent on electronically monitored bail.
It must state that period and direct that the prisoner is treated as if they had already served that many days of their custodial sentence.

This does not change the sentence length itself; it changes how much of that sentence is considered to have already been served.

7. Likely Impact of the Judgment

7.1 Sentencing for domestic attempted murder and vehicle-based attacks

STP will likely influence future sentencing in:

Domestic abuse cases where the violence culminates in potentially lethal acts, particularly in a moving vehicle.
Attempted murder cases involving children as victims or witnesses.

The decision underlines that:

Deliberate interference with a vehicle in motion, with multiple occupants and other traffic present, will normally be treated as highly culpable with very serious potential harm.
The presence of child victims and a domestic context significantly escalates the appropriate sentencing range, potentially into double‑digit custodial terms.

7.2 Remorse and professional practice in social work reporting

The judgment is also likely to change:

How justice social workers describe an offender’s attitude in their reports, particularly their use of the term “remorse”.
How sentencers evaluate JSWRs, making them less inclined to accept at face value assertions of “remorse” where the accused has denied the offences.

It strengthens the position that:

Genuine remorse is an important mitigating factor, but must be carefully evidenced.
Denial of guilt and “remorse” are logically and legally incompatible, save in the most exceptional circumstances (which were not present here).

7.3 Technical compliance with section 210ZA

On a more procedural level, STP will:

Encourage uniform application of section 210ZA, ensuring that sentencing remarks:
- Identify the bail period and whether it was qualifying (electronically monitored).
- Specify the precise relevant period (normally half the bail days).
- Expressly direct that the offender is to be treated as having served that period.
Reduce the previous variability where some courts simply adjusted headline sentences without a clear, statutory‑compliant direction.

7.4 Guidance on the use of first‑instance comparators

Finally, the court’s scepticism about the value of unappealed first instance sentences as comparative authorities will:

Encourage advocates to rely more heavily on appellate sentencing decisions when arguing for or against particular sentence levels.
Promote greater consistency by anchoring sentencing ranges in judgments that have been subject to full appellate scrutiny.

8. Conclusion

HM Advocate v STP [2025] HCJAC 51 is a significant sentencing decision with both principled and practical implications.

On the principled side, the court:

Reaffirmed the Bell test for undue leniency and applied it to a serious domestic attempted murder involving multiple victims, including young children.
Clarified that remorse as a mitigating factor requires both acceptance of guilt and genuine regret, and that mere “insight” or regret in the absence of such acceptance has, at best, marginal mitigating value.
Strengthened the doctrinal link between remorse, as developed in Cooperwhite and Gemmell, and the Sentencing Council’s guidance on mitigating factors.

On the practical side, the court:

Imposed a substantially higher extended sentence (13 years, with 11 years’ custody) to reflect the gravity of the attempted murder and its aggravations.
Confirmed the correct approach to interrupted remand, using backdating rather than artificial reductions in sentence length.
Gave clear, binding guidance on the operation of section 210ZA on electronically monitored bail, requiring specification of a relevant period and a direction that it is to be treated as time served.

Taken together, these elements make STP a leading authority on three interconnected aspects of Scottish sentencing law: the concept and evidential basis of remorse; the sentencing of attempted murder in a domestic and child‑victim context; and the technical mechanisms for crediting time on remand and electronically monitored bail. It will be a key reference point for courts, practitioners and justice social workers alike.