Introduction

The Judgment in BQX, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 155) delivered by the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) outlines a significant precedent regarding the admissibility and timing of bad character evidence in cases involving historic sexual offences. The case centers on an Applicant convicted of numerous sexual offences against young male complainants spanning a documented period. The key issues in this case pertain to whether evidence relating to past convictions—particularly those inadvertedly omitted until later in the trial—could be admitted to counteract a defendant’s attempt to construct a misleading impression of his character and innocence.

The parties involved include the Applicant, who faced multiple charges including indecent assault, rape, and offences involving a child, and the Prosecution, which sought to introduce evidence of earlier convictions and bad character material. Central to the appeal was the Judge’s discretion to allow fresh bad character evidence—including evidence of a 2019 conviction—after the closure of the Prosecution’s case, a move aimed at countering the Applicant’s selective narrative during cross-examination.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial Judge's discretion to allow the admission of additional bad character evidence, specifically the 2019 conviction, despite its availability prior to the close of the Prosecution’s case. The Judgment emphasized that the evidence was both relevant and probative, being essential to rebut the false impression created by the Applicant during his cross-examination regarding his 2016 offences.

The Judge, MRS JUSTICE STACEY, ruled that the admission of such evidence was justified under section 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The decision was largely predicated on the fact that the Applicant had attempted to portray his past behaviour as a consequence of youthful inexperience, thereby masking his propensity for predatory conduct. Moreover, the timing of the Prosecution’s knowledge (from June 2021 onward) underscored that the evidence denominator was not an afterthought meant to remedy police procedural oversights, but rather an essential fact to present a balanced picture before the jury.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment referred to several precedents that help inform the court’s approach:

• Rice [1963] 1 QB 847: This case underscored the rule of practice that all probative evidence should be called before the close of the Prosecution case. In BQX, R. v, the Court acknowledged the general requirement but noted that certain exceptions, exercised under judicial discretion, permit later admission if it promotes fairness.
• Graham [2019] EWCA 2141: The Graham case was cited to illustrate the need for caution in admitting late evidence. However, it also recognized that under specific circumstances—especially where there is a risk of allowing the defendant to manipulate his narrative—the exercise of discretion might justify a deviation from the strict rule of early disclosure.

These precedents laid the foundation for the circuit court’s reasoning, supporting the view that while evidence should ideally be presented timely, exceptions exist where the interests of justice demand a flexible, case-specific approach.

Legal Reasoning

The core of the legal reasoning in this Judgment centers on balancing procedural fairness with the necessity of presenting a truthful and unblemished narrative to the jury. The court emphasized:

• Correcting a False Narrative: The Applicant’s attempt to dilute the gravity of his past conduct by emphasizing youthful indiscretion and innocence was at odds with the evidence presented by the Prosecution. The Judge ruled that the late admission of the 2019 conviction was critical to counterbalancing this skewed narrative.
• Judicial Discretion Under Section 101(1)(f): The statutory framework provided the Judge with discretionary powers to introduce new evidence even after the close of the Prosecution case. The ruling lean on this statutory provision to affirm that late evidence could be admitted when it prevented a misleading impression and was necessary to render a balanced and fair trial.
• Timing and Availability of Evidence: Although the 2019 conviction was available prior to the close of the Prosecution case, a failure by both sides to duly note it—in conjunction with the Applicant's knowingly misleading statements—provided an equitable ground for revisiting and admitting this evidence.

The Judges recognized that such discretion must be exercised sparingly so as not to encourage laxity in police or prosecutorial practice, yet in this instance the evidence was indispensable for conveying the full extent of the Applicant’s propensity to commit sexual offences.

Impact on Future Cases and Relevant Area of Law

The implications of this Judgment are multifaceted:

• Clarification of Discretionary Powers: The ruling provides a clearer framework for when late-admitted bad character evidence may be considered admissible, particularly in cases where a defendant is attempting to obscure or reformulate their past.
• Encouraging Comprehensive Case Preparation: Although the decision does not set a precedent mandating late evidence, it underscores the critical need for thorough attention to all relevant past convictions during pre-trial disclosure by both Prosecution and Defence.
• Enhanced Judicial Oversight: Future cases involving sexual offences, especially those with complex factual matrices and historical evidence, will likely see courts exercising robust judicial discretion in admitting evidence that is pivotal to understanding the true nature of the accused’s behaviour.

This ruling is set to influence similar cases, particularly when questions of character evidence and late disclosure arise, prompting a more nuanced, interests-of-justice-focused approach that takes into account both error avoidance and the imperative of disclosure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal principles emerge from this Judgment:

• Bad Character Evidence: This concept involves using evidence of past misconduct to show a propensity to commit similar offences. Here, such evidence was used to challenge the defendant’s portrayal of himself as innocent and naïve.
• Section 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: This statute empowers the court to permit additional or fresh evidence after the Prosecution’s case has closed if it is deemed necessary to counteract misleading representations made by the defendant.
• Rule of Timely Disclosure: As derived from Rice [1963], there exists a general principle that evidence should be disclosed before the close of arguments. However, this case demonstrates that exceptions will be made where withholding such evidence could hinder the jury’s proper understanding of the case facts.

By breaking down these concepts, the Judgment’s approach helps ensure that juries are not misled by selective presentations of character and that any attempt by defendants to minimize or obscure their past wrongdoings is effectively countered.

Conclusion

In BQX, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 155), the Court of Appeal’s decision to admit late bad character evidence represents a carefully calibrated balance between established procedural rules and the need to ensure a fair trial. The Court firmly held that in instances where a defendant attempts to create a false impression regarding his past offences, judicial discretion under section 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 can be appropriately exercised.

The Judgment serves as a vital reference point for legal practitioners, emphasizing the importance of comprehensive disclosure while also affirming that exceptions may be warranted in the interests of justice. In doing so, it reinforces that while procedural rules are critical, the overriding goal of achieving a truthful and balanced trial may sometimes necessitate a flexible, fact-sensitive approach.

Ultimately, this decision not only clarifies the circumstances under which late-admitted bad character evidence is admissible but also signals to future cases the paramount importance of preventing the manipulation of narrative by defendants through selective omission of adverse history.