Introduction

The Fisher, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 1648) judgment from the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) represents a significant development in the sentencing of violent disorder offences, particularly those with a racial or religious element. The case involves Perrie Fisher, aged 29, who pleaded guilty to offences under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Bail Act 1976. The judgment touches upon two major grounds of appeal: (1) the misclassification of culpability level in relation to the starting point for sentencing, and (2) the alleged unfair disparity in sentencing compared to other defendants involved in the same incident.

The background is marked by a violent disorder incident that unfolded outside a hotel sheltering asylum seekers in Aldershot on 31 July 2024. The disorder occurred in a charged atmosphere following a tragic stabbing incident in Southport, fueling misinformation and far-right sentiment. The applicant’s involvement, as illustrated by CCTV evidence and eyewitness accounts, was clearly part of a coordinated mob exhibition of hostility fueled by racial motivation. This case is not only critical in understanding the applicable sentencing guidelines but also in appreciating how aggravating factors such as racial animus are accommodated within judicial reasoning.

Summary of the Judgment

Perrie Fisher pleaded guilty at the magistrates' court, and subsequently at Winchester Crown Court he received a cumulative sentence of 29 months' imprisonment (28 months for violent disorder and one month consecutively for the Bail Act offence). Central to the appeal was the contention that the trial judge had misclassified the offence as a Category 1A offence (with a starting point of four years) instead of a Category 1B offence (with a starting point of three years), leading to a higher sentence. Additionally, the applicant argued that his sentence was unduly harsh in comparison with those of defendants sentenced later for their role in the violent disorder.

In a detailed examination of the factual matrix, the appellate court confirmed that the incident involved widespread violence targeted deliberately at vulnerable asylum seekers. Although the judge’s categorisation of culpability (Level A versus Level B) was at the heart of the sentencing debate, the Court of Appeal concluded that even taking the error into account, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Furthermore, the court rejected the disparity argument by clarifying that sentencing by different judges on separate occasions does not necessarily imply a judicial mistake or unfairness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment makes critical reference to Cush and others [2024] EWCA Crim 1382, which examined similar issues of culpability categorisation in violent disorder offences. In the previous case, specifically during the appeal of Temesgen, the court noted that the Category A culpability factor should be confined to cases where there is targeting of an individual or a smaller number of individuals within a group context. This precedent influenced the analysis by reinforcing that an error in classification may not automatically render a sentence manifestly excessive if compensatory adjustments for aggravating factors have been adequately considered.

Additionally, case law such as Fawcett (1983) Cr. App. R. (S.) 158 was invoked to address the principles relating to sentencing disparity. The comparisons with the sentences pronounced for Kieran Marney and Clive Patfield underscored that differing levels of plea credit and distinct circumstances (such as the timeliness of entering a plea) could justify a degree of variability that falls within acceptable judicial discretion.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning pivots on a detailed factual and legal analysis. Initially, the trial judge categorised the incident as a Category 1A offence based on the presence of a group targeting vulnerable individuals and the accompanying racial and religious hostility. Despite the concession by the Crown that the categorisation might more aptly belong to Category 1B, the appellate court supported the conclusion that the overall aggravating factors—namely, the sustained violent disorder, significant harm to vulnerable communities, and explicit racial motivation—warrant an appropriate elevation of the sentence.

The court examined the numerical starting points for sentencing under the Sentencing Council guidelines (four years for Category 1A and three years for Category 1B) and noted that practical adjustments based on the facts might result in similar final sentences. In this case, the calculation leading to a pre-plea sentence of three-and-a-half years (42 months) was found to be justifiable even within a Category 1B framework once the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors were applied. The analysis emphasizes that the element of racial hostility mandated a “significant uplift,” a reasoning that has persuasive implications for future cases where hate-based motivations intersect with violent disorder.

Impact

This judgment is poised to influence future sentencing in cases marked by violent disorder and racially motivated violence. The case delineates the approach of accommodating errors in culpability classification while safeguarding the proportionality of the sentence. It sets a precedent that even if the categorisation of culpability is revised retrospectively, an error does not necessarily compel a reduction in sentence if the aggravating factors have been properly weighed.

Moreover, the judgment clarifies the judicial latitude in comparing sentences passed on different occasions by different judges. This nuanced approach provides broader guidance on how disparities in sentencing should be understood in scenarios characterized by urgent public disorder—especially those where early guilty pleas are involved and where the factors justifying variability in sentencing are explicitly acknowledged.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Many of the legal terms and concepts appearing in this judgment are highly technical. For example:

• Culpability Levels (Level A vs. Level B): This describes how responsible the offender is. Level A represents a higher degree of responsibility, particularly when an individual is targeted by a group. In contrast, Level B generally applies when the group’s actions, though serious, are not directed against a specific individual.
• Starting Points for Sentencing: The guidelines provide a baseline sentence range depending on the categorisation of the offence. A higher starting point (e.g., four years) suggests a more serious offence than a lower starting point (e.g., three years).
• Aggravating vs. Mitigating Factors: Aggravating factors (such as racial hostility or deliberate targeting of vulnerable individuals) can push the sentence upward, while mitigating factors (such as genuine remorse or strong character references) may lead to a downward adjustment.
• Credit for Plea: Early guilty pleas can reduce sentences, as they are viewed as a sign of remorse and save judicial resources. However, failure to plead promptly may reduce the available credit.

These concepts, though technical, are central to how courts calibrate sentences to ensure they are commensurate with both the offender’s actions and the broader public interest.

Conclusion

In summary, Fisher, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 1648) is a landmark judgment that reinforces the importance of comprehensive fact-finding when determining both the categorical nature of offences and the proportionality of sentences. While the trial judge’s classification of the offence as Category 1A has been subject to critique, the Court of Appeal ultimately upheld that the sentence was within acceptable limits once all aggravating and mitigating factors were taken into account.

The case illustrates that even if errors in categorising culpability occur, the ultimate sentencing decision may still be justified if the overall context, especially in cases involving racially motivated violence, demands a robust deterrent. Additionally, the judgment clarifies that variances in sentencing among defendants—when brought before different judges on different occasions—do not automatically indicate judicial error or an unfair administration of justice.

This decision is significant for its reaffirmation of judicial discretion and for setting a precedent in addressing both misclassification in relation to culpability levels and claims of sentencing disparity, thereby contributing substantial clarity to future hate-related violent disorder cases.