Reaffirming Strict Limits on Fresh Evidence and Attacks on Trial Counsel in Sexual Offence Appeals: Commentary on R v Hobbs [2025] EWCA Crim 897

Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales

Case: R v Hobbs [2025] EWCA Crim 897

Judgment Date: 13 June 2025

Judge Giving Judgment: His Honour Judge St John-Stevens

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Hobbs [2025] EWCA Crim 897, a case arising from convictions for serious sexual offences and controlling and coercive behaviour. The judgment is procedurally modest – it concerns a renewed application for leave to appeal and to adduce fresh evidence – but it is significant in its clear reaffirmation of three key points:

the strict statutory test for admitting fresh evidence on appeal under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968;
the limited circumstances in which criticisms of trial counsel or solicitors will render a conviction unsafe;
the court’s robust treatment of supposedly exculpatory “relationship” material (such as videos) and third-party accounts as irrelevant or non-probative in the face of a jury’s verdict.

The case also reiterates the importance of complainant anonymity in sexual offence proceedings under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 and illustrates how the Court of Appeal handles unrepresented appellants making wide-ranging factual and procedural complaints about their trials.

1.1 Parties and Background

The applicant, Mr Hobbs, had been in an intimate relationship with the complainant, whom he met on the dating application Tinder in December 2019. At the outset of the COVID-19 lockdown, they lived together in a static caravan. Following a police welfare check on 28 April 2020, the complainant disclosed that she had been assaulted by the applicant. He was arrested and, in March 2021, convicted of assault in relation to that incident. Further allegations then emerged that, over the course of the relationship, he had displayed controlling and coercive behaviour and had raped and sexually assaulted her.

At trial in the Crown Court at Truro before Recorder Andrew Oldman KC, the defence was straightforward: the applicant denied the violence and sexual abuse as described, and maintained that all sexual activity was consensual. The jury rejected his account.

1.2 Convictions and Sentence

On 29 July 2022, the applicant (then aged 38) was convicted of:

one count of controlling and coercive behaviour (count 1);
three counts of rape (counts 2, 3 and 5);
one count of assault by penetration (count 4).

On 16 September 2022 he was sentenced to a total term of 10 years’ imprisonment, made up of:

2 years 6 months on count 1 (controlling and coercive behaviour);
10 years on each of the three rape counts (2, 3 and 5);
8 years on the assault by penetration (count 4);

all to run concurrently.

1.3 Nature of the Appeal

The judgment deals with a renewed application for:

an extension of time and leave to appeal against conviction;
bail pending appeal;
a representation order;
permission under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to adduce fresh evidence (witness evidence and video material).

A single judge (O’Farrell J) had previously refused leave and declined to admit the proposed fresh evidence. The applicant, now unrepresented, renewed his application before the full court and personally elaborated his written grounds. His criticisms fell into four broad categories:

Attacks on the complainant’s credibility and the assertion that she was the true abuser, combined with a claim that she was not properly cross-examined.
Reliance on alleged fresh evidence from new or previously unused witnesses (notably Paul Rooney and Michael Stearns).
Complaint about local media coverage during the trial potentially influencing the jury.
Serious criticism of his legal representatives, alleging they withheld material and failed to advance his case.

The Court of Appeal rejected all these grounds and refused all applications.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Anonymity and the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992

At the outset, the court reminded readers that the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applies. During the lifetime of a complainant in a sexual offence case, no matter likely to identify them as the victim may be published, unless the statutory anonymity is waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. This sets the framework: any reporting or commentary (including this one) must not include identifying details of the complainant.

2.2 Ground 1 – Alleged Failure to Cross-examine and Complainant’s Lies

The applicant alleged that:

the complainant lied about the events;
she was in fact abusive to him;
she was not cross-examined on these issues.

The court rejected this outright. It relied in particular on:

trial counsel’s detailed written response that he did cross-examine the complainant in the applicant’s absence, with the applicant’s permission, after the applicant had been removed from court for his behaviour and emotional state;
the Recorder’s summing-up, which contained multiple references to what had been put to the complainant in cross-examination and her responses.

The single judge had already observed that the conflicting accounts of the relationship were matters of fact properly left to the jury. The full court agreed and treated this ground as having “no merit”.

2.3 Ground 2 – Alleged Fresh Evidence from Paul Rooney and Michael Stearns

The applicant contended that:

Paul Rooney could give evidence that the complainant abused the applicant, and that he was deterred by the police from giving a statement at the time;
Michael Stearns could show that an injury the complainant sustained in Thailand was not caused by the applicant.

The single judge had noted that Rooney was in fact contacted by the prosecution, but wished not to be involved and gave no statement; Stearns had not been identified at trial as a potential witness; and no witness statements were supplied with the original application. On that basis, the ground was found to have no merit.

By the time of the renewed application, the court had before it a statement from Mr Rooney. Nonetheless, the full court concluded that this did not alter the position. The proposed evidence did not meet the criteria for fresh evidence and provided no basis for a successful appeal.

2.4 Ground 3 – Local Media Story During Trial

The applicant complained that a local media story about the case was published during the trial, which might have been seen by jurors and prejudiced them. The court upheld the single judge’s view that:

the trial judge had properly directed the jury to decide the case solely on the evidence before them;
no misdirection had been identified.

This ground was also rejected as having no merit.

2.5 Ground 4 – Alleged Misconduct and Inadequacy of Legal Representation

The applicant levelled broad allegations against his legal team, including that:

they withheld witness statements and video footage which he believed were material to his defence;
they did not wish to advance his case properly;
counsel did not review agreed facts with him or cross-examine the complainant;
counsel was volatile, shouted at him and ignored his instructions.

Because the applicant had waived privilege, his trial counsel produced a six-page response, which was fully endorsed by his instructing solicitor, Hannah Turner. Their response included:

confirmation that counsel had met the applicant on ten occasions before trial, including several lengthy conferences;
confirmation that they acted on his instructions and advanced his case appropriately;
an explanation that the applicant was volatile, emotional, and sometimes aggressive, leading to a safeguard that he would never be seen alone by a single legal representative;
court records showing that the applicant was disruptive in court, suffered a panic attack, and had to be excluded from the courtroom on more than one occasion until he calmed down.

The Court of Appeal preferred this account, concluding that counsel and solicitor had acted properly “to the best of their ability” and that this ground had no merit.

2.6 Applications to Adduce Fresh Evidence

The applicant sought to amend his grounds of appeal to introduce further material, including statements or accounts from:

Michael Stearns – initially an undated, unsigned statement; later, a signed and dated statement;
Paul Rooney – an unsigned, undated statement;
Daniel Rousen – an account focused on the applicant’s conduct in court and his interactions with counsel, plus reference to a video/recording showing the applicant and complainant being amicable at another time;
Dawn Murphy – who in fact provided no statement at all.

The court refused to admit any of this material as fresh evidence, for reasons including:

no satisfactory explanation for why the evidence could not have been obtained and adduced at trial;
the statements were unsigned and undated (in Rooney’s case) or initially unsigned/undated (in Stearns’ case);
the material was classified as inadmissible hearsay and/or lacking probative value;
the evidence of Rousen about the applicant’s court behaviour was irrelevant to the safety of the conviction;
the video of the parties apparently being amicable at some other time was said to have “no probative value” in resolving the factual issues before the jury.

In particular, the court held that:

there was “no basis” to suggest that the applicant’s courtroom behaviour or occasional exclusion from the courtroom rendered the conviction unsafe;
trial counsel had considered the video material and, in proper exercise of judgment, decided not to deploy it at trial.

2.7 Overall Conclusion

The Court’s conclusion was succinct: “the proposed appeal is not reasonably arguable.” Accordingly, it:

refused leave to appeal against conviction;
refused leave to adduce fresh evidence;
dismissed the renewed applications (which implicitly disposed of the linked applications for bail and representation order).

3. Legal Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities

The judgment, as transcribed, does not cite specific case authorities by name. Instead, it applies established statutory principles and settled appellate practice. The key sources of law in play are:

Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 – providing automatic and lifelong anonymity for complainants in sexual offence cases, unless waived or lifted.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 23 – governing the admission of fresh evidence in criminal appeals.
The “unsafe conviction” test under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 – the Court of Appeal must allow an appeal against conviction if the conviction is unsafe; otherwise it must dismiss it.

Although not expressly mentioned, the court’s approach is consistent with well-known authorities (all decided prior to the 2024 knowledge cut-off) which establish:

that fresh evidence may only be admitted if it could not with reasonable diligence have been adduced at trial, is credible, and might reasonably have affected the jury’s verdict;
that criticisms of counsel’s conduct at trial will rarely succeed in showing a conviction is unsafe unless there is a truly fundamental defect in representation causing substantial injustice;
that the Court generally assumes juries follow judicial directions, including directions to decide the case only on the evidence presented in court.

The significance of Hobbs lies thus not in announcing new doctrine but in its clear, practical reaffirmation of these principles in the context of contemporary sexual offence prosecutions and the increasing tendency for appellants to rely on unsworn statements, unsigned documents and casual video or social media material.

3.2 Legal Reasoning on Each Major Issue

3.2.1 Anonymity and Public Reporting in Sexual Offence Cases

The court begins with the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. The key points of law are:

Once an allegation of a sexual offence has been made, the complainant is entitled to anonymity in any publication, for life.
No matter likely to identify the complainant as the victim – often name, address, photographs, social media handles, or particularised descriptions – may be included in a report.
Anonymity can only be waived by the complainant or lifted by court order in tightly circumscribed circumstances under section 3.

By expressly invoking the Act at paragraph 1, the Court of Appeal emphasises the continuing importance of this protection, particularly in a judgment that must necessarily summarise sensitive factual background. It is a reminder that even appellate decisions – which often provide more detail than trial reports – remain subject to the same statutory limitations.

3.2.2 Ground 1 – Jury’s Role, Credibility and Cross-examination

Where an appellant argues that the complainant lied and that evidence was not properly tested in cross-examination, the court’s task is to ask:

Was there in fact cross-examination?
Were the issues placed before the jury?
Is there any sign of procedural unfairness or legal misdirection?

Here, the court answered affirmatively that there was cross-examination and that credibility issues were “front and centre” in the directions to the jury. Key aspects of the court’s reasoning include:

Reliance on the trial record: The summing-up recorded the defence case, the challenge to the complainant’s account, and her responses in cross-examination. This objective record carries significant weight against the applicant’s reconstruction of events.
Applicant’s removal from court: The applicant had been removed due to his behaviour and emotional state. Counsel’s account – that he was authorised to continue cross-examination in the applicant’s absence, after conferring with him – answers any suggestion that the complainant’s evidence went unchallenged.
Issues of pure fact are for the jury: Once the jury has been properly directed, conflicts of testimony (he said/she said) are quintessentially matters of fact for them. An appellate court is slow to interfere unless there is fresh, compelling evidence or a serious procedural flaw.

The court’s conclusion that “this ground has no merit” thus reflects a conventional and strict stance: absent clear misdirection or tangible evidence that crucial lines of cross-examination were wrongly withheld, challenges to the jury’s assessment of credibility will almost always fail.

3.2.3 Ground 2 and the Fresh Evidence Framework

Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 empowers the Court of Appeal to receive fresh evidence on appeal. Although the judgment does not quote the statutory test, the logic of the decision shows the court applying the usual criteria:

Availability: Could the evidence, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained for trial? If so, the starting point is that it should not be admitted later.
Credibility: Is the evidence credible and reliable? Unsigned, undated statements and hearsay accounts are inherently suspect.
Potential Impact: Might the evidence reasonably have affected the safety of the conviction or the jury’s verdict?

Applied to Mr Rooney and Mr Stearns:

Rooney:
- He was known to the prosecution at the time and chose not to become involved; this indicates the evidence was in principle available at trial.
- His later statement was unsigned and undated; no proper explanation was given for the failure to obtain or use his evidence at trial.
- His evidence was not shown to be truly central or decisive on the disputed issues, especially against the background of the complainant’s direct testimony.
Stearns:
- He was not identified as a potential witness at trial, but nothing suggests he was unidentifiable or beyond reach at that point.
- Again, the statement’s form and the absence of explanation for delay undermined its admissibility.
- Watching over an injury in Thailand not being attributed to the applicant was not obviously relevant to the specific counts tried in England, or capable of undermining the core prosecution case.

The court thus refused to treat either witness as providing admissible or probative fresh evidence. In doing so, it sends a clear message:

Unsigned, untested, and unexplained witness statements will not ordinarily meet the threshold for fresh evidence on appeal, especially where the witness was, or could reasonably have been, contacted at the time of trial.

3.2.4 Ground 3 – Media Coverage and Jury Directions

The principle applied here is again orthodox: jurors are presumed to follow the trial judge’s directions to decide the case solely on the evidence. The court looks for:

any sign that jurors were exposed to and influenced by prejudicial publicity; and
whether the trial judge properly directed them on their duty to remain impartial and not to conduct outside research or rely on media reports.

In Hobbs, the court notes only that a local media story existed and that the judge directed the jury to consider the case on the evidence. There was no suggestion of juror misconduct (e.g. admitting to having read the coverage, or asking questions reflecting external material). With no misdirection or evidence of contamination, the complaint was bound to fail.

3.2.5 Ground 4 – Attacks on Legal Representation and Waiver of Privilege

A distinctive aspect of the case is the handling of extensive criticisms of trial counsel and solicitors. The applicant alleged, among other things, that:

counsel was aggressive toward him and ignored his instructions;
video footage and witness statements helpful to the defence were deliberately withheld from the jury;
counsel did not effectively challenge the complainant.

Several legal principles are engaged:

Waiver of legal professional privilege: By criticising counsel and solicitor, the applicant necessarily waived privilege over advice and communications relevant to those criticisms. This allows counsel and solicitors to respond in detail.
Deference to professional judgment: The court is slow to brand representation “incompetent” merely because counsel chose not to pursue every possible line, or assessed certain evidence as unhelpful.
Record-based evaluation: The court looks at objective indicators – conference notes, trial records, contemporaneous emails – to assess whether the defence was actively and competently conducted.

Here, the professional responses were compelling:

Counsel prepared a detailed, six-page explanation of decisions taken, which the solicitor fully endorsed.
Counsel had met the applicant on ten occasions, including “several lengthy conferences”, which is difficult to reconcile with the suggestion of neglect.
Both counsel and solicitor explained that the applicant’s volatility necessitated a two-lawyer presence and complicated communications.

Furthermore, the court referred to the formal court record: episodes of disruption, a panic attack, and necessary temporary exclusions from the courtroom. Rather than indicating neglect by counsel, this material suggests that counsel were managing a difficult client in challenging circumstances.

The Court of Appeal concluded, in line with well-established practice, that:

counsel and solicitor acted on the applicant’s instructions;
they represented him “to the best of their ability”; and
their conduct did not render the conviction unsafe.

In effect, the court reaffirmed that:

Disagreement with counsel’s tactical choices, or retrospective dissatisfaction with how a case was run, is not enough to show a conviction is unsafe. There must be a clear, demonstrable departure from competent representation, and that departure must realistically have affected the outcome.

3.2.6 Fresh Evidence: Relevance, Hearsay and Probative Value

In its more detailed discussion of the proposed fresh evidence, the court considered each new witness in turn. The key analytical threads are:

Form and admissibility:
- Unsigned, undated statements lack the reliability and accountability that come with formal witness statements.
- Hearsay evidence – statements made out of court, not subject to cross-examination – must pass specific statutory or common law gateways to be potentially admissible.
Relevance and probative value:
- Evidence must have a real tendency to prove or disprove one of the material issues in dispute.
- Evidence that the complainant and defendant appeared amicable at another time does not meaningfully assist where the issues concern particular incidents of coercive behaviour and non-consent on specified occasions.

Thus:

Michael Stearns: Even the signed, dated statement came too late without explanation, and the content was hearsay and not probative of any core issue.
Paul Rooney: The unsigned, undated statement, with no explanation for absence at trial, provided no admissible, probative evidence.
Daniel Rousen: His account focused on the applicant’s behaviour in court and interactions with counsel, which:
- was contradicted by counsel and solicitors;
- was irrelevant to whether the jury’s verdict was safe;
- contributed nothing to what the jury actually heard and decided.
His reference to a video of the applicant and complainant being amicable was similarly rejected as having “no probative value”.
Dawn Murphy: No statement was provided at all, and thus there was nothing to consider.

The court concluded that none of this material established even an arguable ground of appeal and refused leave to introduce it.

3.2.7 Conduct in Court and the Right to Be Present

Implicit in the judgment is an important point about the right of a defendant to be present at trial and the court’s power to remove a disruptive defendant. The case reflects the following principles:

A defendant has a fundamental right to be present at their trial and to hear and challenge the evidence.
However, if a defendant’s behaviour is disruptive, threatening or otherwise renders the trial unmanageable, the court may order their temporary removal to ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings.
If the defendant is removed, the court and counsel must take steps to ensure fairness – including communication with the defendant and, where possible, obtaining consent to procedural steps (here, to counsel continuing cross-examination in his absence).

In Hobbs, the court accepted counsel’s description that:

the applicant had been removed by the Recorder because of his behaviour and demeanour;
counsel then spoke with him in the cells, explained the position, and obtained his permission to cross-examine in his absence.

These findings were important because they:

undercut any suggestion that crucial evidence was heard without challenge;
show that fair trial rights were respected, notwithstanding the applicant’s own behaviour.

3.3 Impact and Broader Significance

3.3.1 Fresh Evidence Applications in Sexual Offence Appeals

Sexual offence appeals often feature attempts to deploy:

post-trial statements from friends, acquaintances or former partners about the complainant’s character or behaviour;
informal written accounts, text messages or social media interactions;
phone or video footage suggesting intimacy or amicability at other times.

Hobbs firmly illustrates that:

the court will insist on formal, admissible, properly explained evidence, not casual assertions or unsigned documents;
evidence of a generally amicable relationship, or friendly moments, will rarely be probative of whether particular incidents were non-consensual;
lack of due diligence at trial in locating and calling potential witnesses will usually preclude their evidence being introduced for the first time on appeal.

This decision will likely be cited (or at least relied on) in future to discourage reliance on loosely prepared “supportive” material and to underline the high threshold for fresh evidence applications in sexual offence cases.

3.3.2 Attacks on Counsel and the Integrity of the Trial Process

A second important strand is the court’s treatment of attacks on trial counsel. It underscores:

the seriousness of alleging misconduct or incompetence by legal representatives;
the fact that such allegations open the door to waiver of privilege and a detailed, often uncomfortable examination of the defendant’s own conduct;
the court’s primary reliance on objective records (court log, conferences, correspondence) rather than ex post facto accusations.

The case effectively warns appellants that:

If you allege that your lawyers failed you, you must expect the court to scrutinise the entire relationship, including any evidence that your own behaviour hampered preparation or conduct of the defence.

From a systemic perspective, this helps protect the integrity of the trial process and the professional reputation of advocates, while still allowing genuine miscarriages based on incompetent representation to be corrected in appropriate cases.

3.3.3 Weight of Jury Verdicts and Finality

The judgment also reinforces the high degree of respect accorded to jury verdicts in serious criminal cases:

Disagreements about factual findings – especially credibility – are not re-litigated on appeal absent compelling new evidence or significant misdirection.
Even in emotionally charged sexual offence cases, the appellate court maintains a clear boundary between its role and the jury’s.
Finality in litigation is an important value: an appellant cannot continually revisit the same disputes through recycled arguments dressed up as “fresh” evidence.

By concluding that the appeal was not “reasonably arguable”, the court applies a strict filter, preserving appellate time and resources for cases where genuine legal or evidential issues exist.

3.3.4 Practical Guidance for Practitioners

For defence practitioners, Hobbs offers several practical lessons:

Maintain clear records of conferences, advice, and tactical decisions – they may later be scrutinised in appeal proceedings.
Consider carefully whether to deploy video or social-media-style material: if it does not directly bear on the issues in the indictment (e.g. consent at the relevant time), an experienced advocate may reasonably conclude that it is of little forensic value.
Where a defendant is volatile or disruptive, ensure there are clear safeguards (e.g. never seeing them alone) and that critical decisions (like continuing in their absence) are properly documented and authorised.

For appellants and their advisers:

Fresh evidence must be properly prepared, signed, dated, and accompanied by an explanation for non-availability at trial.
Simply gathering supportive statements post-conviction is not sufficient; the focus must be on whether they could realistically have changed the outcome.
Wide-ranging complaints about lawyers, without concrete demonstration of prejudice, will almost never be enough to show a conviction is unsafe.

4. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

This section briefly explains several legal concepts used in the judgment, in accessible terms.

4.1 “Unsafe” Conviction

The Court of Appeal does not rehear the entire trial. Its central question is whether the conviction is “unsafe”. A conviction may be unsafe if, for example:

important evidence was wrongly excluded or wrongly admitted;
the judge misdirected the jury on the law in a way that might have affected their verdict;
new evidence emerges which strongly suggests the jury might have decided differently.

If the court cannot identify any such defect or new evidence, it must treat the conviction as safe and dismiss the appeal.

4.2 Fresh Evidence (Section 23, Criminal Appeal Act 1968)

“Fresh evidence” means evidence not available at the original trial which a party wants the Court of Appeal to consider. The court will only admit it if:

there is a good reason it was not used at trial (e.g. it did not exist then, or could not reasonably have been obtained);
the evidence is credible (that is, reliable and not inherently suspect);
it could realistically have made a difference to the verdict.

In Hobbs, the proposed fresh evidence failed on all or most of these criteria.

4.3 Hearsay and Probative Value

“Hearsay” is usually an out-of-court statement being used to prove the truth of what it says. Hearsay can sometimes be admitted under specific exceptions, but it is generally less reliable because it cannot be tested by cross-examination.

“Probative value” is the evidence’s ability to help prove or disprove a point that matters in the case. Evidence has low probative value if, even if true, it doesn’t really help the court decide the key issues. In this judgment:

unsigned, second-hand accounts were treated as inadmissible hearsay;
video material showing amicable interactions at some other time was treated as having “no probative value” to whether the complainant consented to the sexual acts in issue.

4.4 Waiver of Legal Professional Privilege

“Legal professional privilege” protects confidential communications between a client and their lawyer. However, if a client attacks their lawyer’s conduct or advice in court proceedings, they generally waive that privilege regarding the matters they have put in issue. This allows the lawyer to respond and disclose otherwise confidential material to defend their professional integrity and to assist the court in determining what truly occurred.

In Hobbs, the applicant’s complaints against counsel and solicitor resulted in:

counsel producing a six-page response outlining advice, conferences and tactical decisions;
the solicitor endorsing that response;
the Court of Appeal relying on those documents to reject the allegations of inadequate representation.

4.5 Representation Order and Single Judge Procedure

A “representation order” in criminal appellate proceedings is effectively a grant of legal aid to fund a lawyer to represent the appellant. The court can grant or refuse such an order depending on the merits of the case.

The “single judge” procedure is a filter: a single Lord or Lady Justice or High Court Judge considers applications on paper and decides whether to grant leave to appeal. If the single judge refuses leave, the applicant may renew the application to a full court, as happened in Hobbs. The renewed court will then look at the matter afresh. Here, the full court fully agreed with the single judge’s assessment.

4.6 Controlling and Coercive Behaviour

The offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship criminalises serious patterns of behaviour (such as isolation, monitoring, humiliation or threats) that cause a partner or ex-partner fear or serious alarm and distress, even if not every individual act is itself a separate crime.

In Hobbs, this count formed part of the wider pattern of alleged abuse. The jury’s acceptance of that pattern formed context for the sexual offence convictions.

5. Conclusion

R v Hobbs [2025] EWCA Crim 897 is a concise but instructive decision that:

reaffirms the strict approach to admitting fresh evidence on criminal appeals, particularly in sexual offence cases;
clarifies that informal, unsigned, hearsay-based material and “relationship” videos of amicable moments will rarely, if ever, suffice to undermine a jury’s verdict;
demonstrates the Court of Appeal’s robust treatment of post hoc attacks on trial counsel and solicitors, especially where detailed professional responses and court records contradict the appellant’s narrative;
emphasises the enduring importance of complainant anonymity in sexual offence proceedings under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992;
shows the court’s reliance on the presumption that juries follow judicial directions and decide cases on the evidence, not on media speculation.

The case does not establish new legal doctrine, but it powerfully illustrates the application of established principles to a modern sexual offence appeal featuring unrepresented argument, alleged fresh evidence, and extensive criticisms of representation. Its message is clear: criminal appeals must be grounded in properly prepared, admissible evidence and real legal error, not in general dissatisfaction with the outcome or speculative alternative narratives unsupported by credible proof.