Re-emphasising Holistic Risk Evaluation and Adequate Reason-Giving in Care Proceedings: Commentary on H (Care Proceedings: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 727

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in H (Care Proceedings: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 727 revisits two perennial themes in public-law children cases:

How a trial judge must evaluate risk—especially where domestic abuse and repeated failed protective measures feature prominently; and
The standard of reason-giving required to justify the ultimate welfare decision, particularly when that decision departs from professional recommendations.

The case concerns H, a girl not yet two, whose four elder siblings had already been adopted. The local authority (LA) appealed a first-instance ruling that dismissed its application for both a care order with a plan of adoption and a placement order, and instead returned H to her mother under a 12-month supervision order. The appellate court, led by Baker LJ, allowed the appeal, quashed the decision and remitted the matter for rehearing before a different judge.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s judgment:

Failed to analyse the totality of evidence—particularly the juxtaposition of historic risk (accepted threshold findings) with more recent positive developments.
Did not engage adequately with professional evidence of the social worker and guardian.
Omitted any structured application of the welfare checklist (s 1(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002) or Children Act 1989 principles when balancing options.
Provided insufficient reasons to show why the mother’s recent progress outweighed years of entrenched risk, or how risks would be managed post-return.

These deficiencies rendered the decision unsafe. The appellate court therefore:

Allowed the LA’s appeal;
Set aside the supervision order (and the care order made only to preserve the status quo pending appeal);
Remitted the matter for expedited hearing before a different judge.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court drew on an established line of authority requiring careful reasoning and holistic analysis in child-protection decisions:

Authority	Key Proposition Re-affirmed	Relevance to Present Appeal
Re ADA [2023] EWCA Civ 743 (and earlier cases cited therein: Re D 2022; Re K 2020; Re F 2018; Re B 2022)	Adoption is a draconian measure; court must be “driven to conclude” that “nothing else will do”.	Trial judge cited this passage but Court of Appeal held he failed to conduct the necessary evaluative exercise mandated by it.
Re R (Joinder of Foster Carers) [2021] EWCA Civ 875	Parameters for joining foster carers as parties.	Explained why foster carers were not joined; demonstrates trial judge’s awareness of procedural constraints.
Fage v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5	Appellate restraint; but reasons must be adequate to show basis of decision.	Provides the yardstick by which appellate intervention was justified despite general reluctance to disturb findings.
Re YM (Clarification of Reasons) [2024] EWCA Civ 71 & English v Emery Reimbold [2002] EWCA Civ 605	Parties should consider asking the judge to clarify inadequate reasons before appealing.	Used by mother to argue appeal premature; Court held deficiencies were too fundamental to be cured by clarification.
Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558	Evidence must be considered holistically.	Baker LJ relied on this to criticise compartmentalisation of evidence.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Threshold vs. Welfare Stage

The threshold criteria under s 31 Children Act 1989 were conceded and set out in detail, establishing that H had suffered and was likely to suffer significant harm through exposure to domestic abuse. The Court of Appeal made clear that once threshold is crossed, a judge’s welfare analysis must:

Re-examine those threshold findings as an active part of the risk calculus;
Explain how any new protective factors ameliorate the historic harms.

The trial judge acknowledged the threshold yet failed to revisit it during welfare evaluation—an error labelled “compartmentalisation”.

(b) Adequate Reasons

A bare assertion that the judge had “kept all the evidence in mind” is insufficient. Reasons must:

Identify key disputes;
Summarise material evidence;
Explain why certain evidence is preferred;
Demonstrate application of statutory factors.

The absence of such scaffolding prevents parties and an appellate court from discerning the logical path to the outcome, thereby vitiating the decision.

(c) Welfare Checklist

The Court expressly criticised the omission of a structured welfare-checklist analysis. Paragraphs (e) (harm suffered/likely) and (f)(ii) (capacity of relatives to provide security) were highlighted as critical yet absent. Although not mandatory to itemise each factor, failure to demonstrate that they informed the decision undermined its integrity.

(d) Treatment of Professional Evidence

The judge discounted the guardian’s and social worker’s professional opinions without articulating reasons—especially problematic where he also misstated the guardian’s actual recommendation (long-term fostering vs adoption). The appellate court emphasised that a judge may depart from professional advice but must explain why.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

While the judgment re-states rather than invents principles, its practical significance is considerable:

Bench Guidance: Trial judges in care proceedings must explicitly connect the dots between threshold findings and welfare analysis, especially concerning domestic-abuse risk.
Judgment-writing: Shortform judgments risk appeal where the issues are complex and professional advice is being overridden.
Case Management: Where a final hearing is split over many months, judges should consider calling refreshed oral evidence to test whether perceived changes are sustainable.
Local Authorities & Guardians: Encourages proactive requests for further reasons or re-opening oral evidence if post-hearing developments emerge.
Foster Carers: Reaffirms limited circumstances for joinder but highlights their growing role in permanency planning.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Threshold Criteria (s 31 CA 1989): Before the court can make a care or supervision order it must be satisfied that the child has suffered or is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to parental behaviour.
Welfare Checklist (s 1(4) ACA 2002 / Children Act): A statutory list of factors (e.g., the child’s needs, effect of change, harm suffered, capability of parents) guiding the court’s welfare decision.
Care Order vs. Supervision Order: A care order vests parental responsibility primarily in the LA; a supervision order leaves PR with parents but allows the LA to “advise, assist and befriend”.
“Nothing Else Will Do”: Phrase coined by the Supreme Court (Re B 2013) indicating adoption should only be ordered when no less-interventionist measure can meet the child’s welfare needs.
Compartmentalisation: Judicial error of treating pieces of evidence separately rather than evaluating them together.

5. Conclusion

H (Care Proceedings: Risk Assessment) is a salient reminder that:

Domestic-abuse risk must be assessed dynamically yet against the backdrop of entrenched history;
Judges must articulate, not merely hold, their reasoning—especially when professional consensus is rejected;
The welfare checklist remains an indispensable analytic framework that should be visible in the judgment;
Failure to provide adequate reasons invites appellate intervention, even in the inherently discretionary arena of child welfare.

As care proceedings grow more complex—frequently spanning years, multiple assessments and evolving family circumstances—this authority reinforces that clarity, structure and holistic evaluation are not decorative ideals but fundamental legal requirements. Practitioners, guardians and judges alike must therefore ensure that judgments lay bare the logical bridge from evidence to outcome, lest the bridge collapse under the weight of appellate scrutiny.