Re B and the Limits of Acquiescence under the 1980 Hague Convention: Parental Intent, “Court Acquiescence” and Protective Measures

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision in B, Re (1980 Hague Convention: Article 13(A)/(B)) [2025] EWCA Civ 1603 is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. It deals with three interlocking questions:

When, if ever, can a left-behind parent be said to have acquiesced to a child’s wrongful removal or retention, particularly where there have been informal, community-based negotiations involving substantial payments?
Can a foreign court (as opposed to a parent) be treated as having “acquiesced” for the purposes of Article 13(a), and does the ordering of welfare assessments in the refuge State amount to that?
How should allegations of domestic abuse be assessed under Article 13(b), and what role do protective measures under the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention play in mitigating any “grave risk”?

The case concerns B, a boy born in England in June 2023 to Romanian Roma parents. Shortly after birth he went with his mother to Romania, where he lived for about 14 months. In August 2024 the mother returned to England with B. The father – who remained in Romania – regarded this as a wrongful removal and reacted promptly:

He made a criminal complaint in Romania.
He commenced Romanian family proceedings for parental responsibility and child arrangements.
He attempted a Hague return application in Romania (jurisdiction declined as B was then in England).
He eventually issued a 1980 Hague Convention return application in England in April 2025.

At first instance, Peel J ordered B’s summary return to Romania under the 1980 Convention, but only on the basis of a detailed suite of conditions and protective measures, and with a stay until those measures were shown to be enforceable in Romania under the 1996 Hague Convention or otherwise incorporated into Romanian court orders.

The mother opposed the return and relied on three of the Convention’s exceptions:

Article 13(a) – consent/acquiescence by the father, grounded chiefly in a September 2024 attempt at settlement facilitated by Roma elders, involving a proposed payment of €13,000 by the maternal family.
Article 13(a) – “acquiescence” by the Romanian court, said to arise from the way Romanian proceedings had been conducted, in particular ordering an assessment of B’s living conditions in England.
Article 13(b) – grave risk of physical or psychological harm / intolerable situation if B were returned, because of serious domestic abuse and threats from the father and paternal family.

Peel J rejected all these defences. The mother’s application for permission to appeal was refused below, but permission (on limited grounds) was granted by Moylan LJ. The Court of Appeal has now dismissed the appeal in full.

The judgment is especially important for:

Its strong scepticism about the notion of “court acquiescence” under Article 13(a).
Its application of the established law on parental acquiescence to complex, community-based negotiations involving large payments and inconsistent understandings.
Its reaffirmation of the Re E approach to Article 13(b) in a domestic abuse context, and its detailed reliance on protective measures enforceable through the 1996 Hague Convention.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural posture

The father applied in England in April 2025 under the 1980 Hague Convention for B’s return to Romania. After a contested two-day hearing in September 2025, Peel J ordered summary return, subject to:

Specified protective measures and financial undertakings from the father; and
A stay until those measures were either recognised and enforceable in Romania under the 1996 Hague Convention or otherwise incorporated into Romanian court orders.

The mother appealed, with permission limited to three grounds:

Ground 2 – that the judge was wrong to reject her Article 13(a) defence of acquiescence by the father.
Ground 3 – that the judge was wrong in holding that the Romanian court had not acquiesced under Article 13(a).
Ground 4 – that the judge was wrong to reject her Article 13(b) grave risk defence.

2.2 The Court of Appeal’s decision

The lead judgment (with which Laing LJ and Moylan LJ agreed) reaches these core conclusions:

Ground 2 (parental acquiescence): The mother failed to prove that the father had either subjectively or objectively acquiesced in B remaining in England. The September 2024 Roma elders’ negotiations did not amount to any concluded agreement that B would live in England, and did not satisfy the stringent “clear and unequivocal” test in Re H (Acquiescence).
Ground 3 (court acquiescence): The Court expresses serious doubt that a court can conceptually be said to “acquiesce” under Article 13(a) at all, distinguishing between a court’s status as having “rights of custody” and the state of mind of a wronged parent. Even assuming it were possible, the Romanian court did not acquiesce on the facts; its orders (including commissioning an assessment of B’s home in England) are not inconsistent with a summary return, and it has positively asserted jurisdiction based on B’s habitual residence in Romania.
Ground 4 (Article 13(b)): Taking the mother’s allegations of domestic abuse “at their highest”, the judge was entitled to conclude that:
- Any grave risk to B could be sufficiently mitigated by robust and enforceable protective measures in Romania; and
- The Article 13(b) threshold of “grave risk” or “intolerable situation” was therefore not met.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the return order – with its conditions and stay until protective measures are in place – stands, subject only to a revised return date to be fixed.

3. Key Background Facts

3.1 Family background and moves between England and Romania

The parents are Romanian nationals of Roma heritage, never married, and B is their only child.
The mother has lived in England since age 14, returning to Romania in 2022 to cohabit with the father and his family. She describes that period as physically and emotionally abusive, controlling and isolating.
The relationship broke down in March 2023; the pregnant mother returned to England to live with her parents and gave birth to B in June 2023. The father was not named on the English birth certificate.
After a reconciliation, the mother returned with B to Romania in July 2023 to live again with the father’s family. She alleged a renewed pattern of abuse, including physical assaults, confinement, threats to kill her and her family if the father’s name was not added to the birth certificate, and quasi-imprisonment in the house.
The mother visited England alone twice in 2023–24; she said the father would not permit her to bring B.

3.2 The August 2024 removal

In August 2024:

The father travelled to England for work.
The mother’s parents travelled to Romania for a holiday. The mother disclosed the alleged abuse to them.
On 12 August 2024, there was a key conversation between the parents about their relationship and the father’s intentions. The judge accepted that the father was non‑committal and indifferent to reconciliation.
On 20 August 2024, the mother left Romania with B and her parents for England. The judge found the father did not know the specific plan or date, but did have some inkling that she might leave with B.

The father immediately returned to Romania and began taking formal steps to seek B’s return.

3.3 Legal proceedings in Romania

From late August 2024 onwards, the father:

Lodged a criminal complaint about the mother’s removal of B (2 September 2024).
Brought proceedings for child arrangements (October 2024).
Attempted a Hague return application in Romania (November 2024), which the Romanian court declined for lack of jurisdiction as B was in England.
In March 2025, applied for urgent interim measures (a “presidential ordinance”) in Romania, seeking B’s residence with him or, alternatively, contact. The Romanian court:
- Determined that B was habitually resident in Romania and retained jurisdiction under Article 7 of the 1996 Hague Convention.
- On 20 August 2025, requested (via the 1970 Hague Evidence Convention) an assessment of B’s living conditions in England by the local authority.

3.4 The September 2024 Roma elders’ negotiations and the €13,000 payment

A central and unusual feature of the case is the September 2024 negotiation involving Roma community elders, sometimes described as the “Gypsy Court” or “Elders Committee”. This process:

Was conducted by two elders, one nominated by each side.
Did not involve any direct meeting between the father and the maternal grandfather; the elders shuttled between them.
Was not recorded in writing, and there was no evidence from the elders themselves.
Was only mentioned very late in the English proceedings, necessitating an adjournment to obtain evidence.

The key (and largely undisputed) elements are:

The mother did not personally engage except for a single phone call. Her stated aim was to seek reconciliation if possible, or failing that, obtain financial terms which would stop the father’s threats and “buy peace”.
The maternal grandfather’s aims were:
- To stop threats and restore peace between the families; and
- To secure a power of attorney enabling the mother to move B freely between England and Romania without risk that B would be retained in Romania.
He did not present, as an explicit term, that B would necessarily continue to live in England, though the court accepted this was his implicit expectation.
A sum of €13,000 was raised by the maternal family and given in cash to the elders “to achieve his priorities”.

The father’s evidence was that:

The elders presented him with two options:
- The mother’s family pays him €13,000 and B lives in England; or
- He pays them €100,000 and B returns to Romania.
He said he rejected both.
He was told nothing about any power of attorney.
He believed they had reached only a general understanding about shared care between Romania and England, to be later formalised, and that the mother would come back to Romania with B to agree details.
He has always denied receiving the €13,000.

Peel J found:

The maternal family had indeed raised and handed €13,000 to the elders to pass to the father.
It was plausible the elders may never have handed this to the father at all, given his rejection of the monetary proposal and the lack of any expectation of payment on his side.
Alternatively, if he did receive it, then he deceived the maternal family – but even then, from both sides’ perspectives the primary purpose was not to secure B’s residence in England, but to stop the father’s threatening behaviour (fear-driven) and to secure a power of attorney.
No overall agreement was reached, and specifically no clear agreement that B would live in England; each side left with a different understanding.

These findings on the September negotiations were crucial both to the acquiescence and to the grave risk analysis.

4. Legal Framework and Key Precedents

4.1 Article 13(a): Parental acquiescence – Re H and P v P

The central authority on acquiescence is Re H & Others (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1997] UKHL 12; [1998] AC 72. Lord Browne-Wilkinson drew a critical distinction between:

Subjective acquiescence (the normal case): did the wronged parent in fact consent to the child remaining in the new country?
A narrow category of “objective” acquiescence (the “exception”): where the wronged parent’s words or actions, even if not reflecting his actual intent, clearly and unequivocally lead the other parent reasonably to believe that the summary return will not be insisted upon.

The House of Lords’ summary of principles (quoted and applied in this case) is often cited:

The key question is the actual state of mind of the wronged parent; this is a question of fact.
The burden of proof lies on the abducting parent, who must show that the other has acquiesced.
The trial judge may give more weight to contemporaneous words and actions than to self‑serving later assertions.
Exceptionally, where the wronged parent’s words or conduct “clearly and unequivocally” show and have led the other parent to believe that he will not insist on summary return, and are inconsistent with such a claim, justice requires that he be held to have acquiesced.

In P v P [1998] 1 FLR 630 (Hale J, upheld by the Court of Appeal), negotiations about contact and settlement were held not to amount to acquiescence unless they resulted in a concluded agreement. Hale J stressed that parents should not be discouraged from trying to resolve matters sensibly:

“It would be most unfortunate if parents in this situation were deterred from seeking to make sensible arrangements … for fear that the mere fact that they are able to contemplate that the child should remain where he has been taken will count against them… Such negotiations are, if anything, to be encouraged.”

This reasoning is directly applied in Re B to the September 2024 Roma elders’ process.

4.2 Courts as “persons, institutions or other bodies having the care of the person of the child”

Article 13(a) refers not only to “a person” but also to an “institution or other body having the care of the person of the child” as potentially having consented or acquiesced. It has long been recognised that a court can have “rights of custody” by virtue of being seised of proceedings determining a child’s residence or care.

The leading authority is Re H (Abduction: Rights of custody) [2000] 2 AC 291, where the House of Lords gave a purposive construction to “rights of custody”:

The term includes rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.
A court may have such rights where it is seized of proceedings that necessarily involve decisions about residence or other core aspects of custody.

However, the present case raises a separate question: even if a court has rights of custody, can it meaningfully be said to “acquiesce” for Article 13(a) purposes in the way a parent can?

4.3 NM v SM and Haringey: prior discussion of “court acquiescence”

Two first‑instance decisions had tentatively suggested that a court might in some circumstances “acquiesce”:

NM v SM [2017] EWHC 1294 (Fam) (Holman J): the Irish court, in family proceedings, had the opportunity to retain the child in Ireland but did not do so; Holman J regarded that as the court acquiescing in the child’s retention in England for the purposes of Article 13(a).
London Borough of Haringey v T (1996 Hague Convention, Article 7) [2024] EWFC 151 (MacDonald J): the English court was the outgoing court and was asked to declare that it acquiesced in the child remaining in Poland, to allow Polish proceedings to continue. MacDonald J accepted that a court could acquiesce, though he declined to do so on the facts.

The Court of Appeal in Re B revisits these authorities and significantly limits their reach.

4.4 Article 13(b) and domestic abuse – Re E and its progeny

The Article 13(b) “grave risk” defence is of “restricted application” (Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2012] 1 AC 144). The Supreme Court there established the now-familiar approach:

The court should ask whether, assuming the allegations are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation.
If so, the further question is whether the risk can be sufficiently mitigated by protective measures, including undertakings or orders in the requesting State, so that a summary return is consistent with the Convention’s objectives.
The more serious and clear the risk, the more effective and robust the protective measures must be.

Subsequent authorities (including Re S (A Child) [2012] UKSC 10, Re C (Children) (Abduction: Article 13(b)) [2018] EWCA Civ 2834, Re IG [2021] EWCA Civ 1123, Re C (Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1354, and Re T (Abduction: Protective Measures) [2023] EWCA Civ 1415) refine this approach, but the basic structure remains the one applied here.

In domestic abuse cases, the English court must also consider:

The wide statutory definition of “domestic abuse” in section 1, Domestic Abuse Act 2021.
The guidance in Practice Direction 12J (Family Procedure Rules) on how such allegations should be managed procedurally.
The learning in Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448 about the nature and impact of patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour.

Re B operates within this established framework but places special emphasis on:

Detailed, country‑specific expert evidence on the enforceability of protective measures in the requesting state (Romania); and
Structuring the return order so that it only takes effect after the protective framework is secured there.

5. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

5.1 Ground 2 – Parental acquiescence and the September 2024 negotiations

5.1.1 The mother’s case

On appeal, the mother argued that:

The September 2024 negotiations, mediated by Roma elders, resulted in a concluded agreement that B would remain in England with her in return for payment of €13,000 to the father.
By entering into and proceeding with those negotiations, and by allowing the elders to convey the impression that the payment would secure B’s residence in England, the father subjectively agreed or, at the very least, objectively led her to believe that he had acquiesced.
The concept of achieving “peace” between the families, in context, meant peaceful acceptance of the mother and B living in England, thereby satisfying the Re H test.
The judge’s factual conclusion that no agreement had been reached was plainly wrong or illogical, especially as he accepted that the family had raised and handed over the €13,000 to the elders.

5.1.2 The factual findings upheld on appeal

The Court of Appeal subjected the evidence and transcript to careful review but ultimately deferred to Peel J’s factual evaluation, in line with the principle in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 that appellate courts should be slow to interfere with first‑instance findings of fact unless plainly wrong.

Key findings that the Court of Appeal endorsed include:

The evidence about the September negotiations was “convoluted”, “confused, unclear and uncertain”.
No overall agreement was reached, and in particular:
- There was no clear term that B would live in England.
- Each side left with a different, subjective understanding of what the elders had said.
The maternal grandfather’s genuine aims were chiefly:
- Securing “peace” and an end to the father’s threats; and
- Obtaining a power of attorney so that B could move freely between the two countries.
The father’s primary aim was to obtain some time with B; he believed a shared care arrangement might be workable.
As to the €13,000:
- The maternal family did raise and hand that sum to the elders.
- It was plausible, and not irrational, for the judge to conclude that the elders may never have passed it on to the father, given that on his case he had rejected the monetary proposal, and the elders needed no documentary audit trail.
- Even if he did receive it, the primary purpose, from both sides’ perspectives, was not to secure B’s permanent residence in England but to buy peace and obtain the power of attorney; the evidence did not support a concluded “sale” of B’s residence.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged a minor error by Peel J in describing the mother’s “primary aim” as effecting reconciliation, when in fact she had made clear she was not interested in reconciliation once the elders explored the point. However, this was held not to undermine his overall evaluation of the September negotiations.

5.1.3 No subjective or objective acquiescence

Against that factual backdrop, the Court of Appeal held that:

On the subjective test, there was no basis to find that the father had actually consented to B remaining in England. To the contrary, his conduct before and after the negotiations – lodging criminal complaints, starting proceedings in Romania, and later issuing the Hague application in England – showed he consistently opposed B’s removal and sought his return.
On the objective test (the Re H “exception”), the father’s words and conduct did not clearly and unequivocally lead the mother to believe that he would not insist on a summary return, nor were they inconsistent with his later return application. The September negotiations were properly characterised, following P v P, as attempts at settlement, not as an abandonment of his rights.

The Court concluded that the mother had not discharged her burden of proof under either limb of Re H. The mere fact of opaque community-based negotiations and the transfer of money, in a setting where each side understood different things and no common understanding was ever shared or recorded, was not enough.

5.2 Ground 3 – Can a court “acquiesce” and did the Romanian court do so?

5.2.1 Conceptual doubts about “court acquiescence”

Perhaps the most novel and important aspect of the judgment lies in its treatment of the idea that a court – as opposed to a parent – can “acquiesce” within the meaning of Article 13(a).

While acknowledging that a court can, under Re H (Abduction: Rights of custody), hold “rights of custody”, the Court of Appeal expresses serious doubt that:

A court can subjectively acquiesce (it does not have a single, enduring “state of mind”; different judges may sit at different times).
A court can objectively acquiesce in the Re H sense, i.e. by conduct which “clearly and unequivocally” leads the abducting parent to believe the court will not insist on the child’s summary return, and which is inconsistent with such a claim.

The Court underscores a critical distinction:

Vesting rights of custody in a court is essentially about status and jurisdiction.
“Acquiescence” in Article 13(a) is framed around the conduct and state of mind of the wronged party – paradigmatically, a parent whose child has been abducted.

The judgment also notes the practical danger of confusion if courts were treated as capable of acquiescing independently of the parent:

There may be a parent with rights of custody who plainly does not acquiesce.
To overlay a supposed “acquiescence” by the court on top of that could create an incoherent and unfair outcome, contrary to the structure of the Convention.

Moreover, an INCADAT search revealed no international authority apart from NM v SM and Haringey in which a court had been held to acquiesce under Article 13(a).

5.2.2 Limiting NM v SM and Haringey

Against that background, the Court considers the two earlier English cases:

In NM v SM, Holman J found that the Irish court had acquiesced, but the Court of Appeal notes that:
- Holman J offered no substantial analysis as to why the court’s inaction should constitute acquiescence, and
- He himself said he did not know the reasons why the Irish court took the course it did.
The present judgment indicates that NM v SM should not be read as providing strong support for the proposition that foreign courts can be treated as having acquiesced.
In Haringey, MacDonald J accepted in principle that the English court (as outgoing court) could acquiesce, but there:
- He was deciding about his own court’s stance, not attributing acquiescence to a foreign court; and
- He described the objective test as “more attractive” but did not definitively exclude subjective acquiescence.
Peel J – and the Court of Appeal – emphasise that Haringey concerned an outgoing court deciding for itself whether to acquiesce; that is a very different question from an incoming court (here, England) pronouncing on whether a foreign court (Romania) has acquiesced.

5.2.3 Application to the Romanian proceedings

The mother’s argument was that the Romanian court had, in effect, accepted that B would remain in England because:

It had not ordered B’s immediate return.
It had ordered an assessment of B’s living conditions in England under the 1970 Evidence Convention, which she said was inconsistent with the notion of a summary return.

The Court of Appeal firmly rejects this:

It was entirely proper for the Romanian court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a 1980 Hague Convention return application, since that application properly lay in the State where B was actually present (England).
In the welfare proceedings, the Romanian court decided that B had been wrongfully removed, that he was habitually resident in Romania, and that it therefore retained jurisdiction under Article 7 of the 1996 Hague Convention. These findings are inconsistent with any notion of acquiescence.
Ordering a social enquiry report into B’s circumstances in England is not inconsistent with the idea of summary return:
- Such evidence can assist the Romanian court in case-management and in determining appropriate interim measures or protective arrangements.
- It does not signal that the Romanian court is content for B to stay in England indefinitely or that it “abandons” its jurisdiction.
There was no suggestion that the Romanian court had been invited to make any statement about acquiescing, nor any order documenting such a position.

Accordingly:

Even if one assumes (contrary to the Court’s strong doubts) that a court can in principle acquiesce under Article 13(a),
The Romanian court here had plainly not done so.

5.3 Ground 4 – Article 13(b) and domestic abuse

5.3.1 Taking the allegations at their highest

The mother alleged a course of serious domestic abuse by the father and his family, including:

Physical violence and threats to kill her and her family.
Confinement and imprisonment‑like conditions (being locked in a cellar, prevented from leaving, prevented from fully caring for B).
Continuing threats after she left Romania, directed at both her family in England and her relatives in Romania.

Peel J, adopting the Re E approach, indicated that he would take the mother’s allegations “at their highest” when considering Article 13(b). The Court of Appeal accepts that approach as correct.

The judge also had some independent corroboration:

Police reports reflecting the criminal complaint and the allegations made.
Abusive and threatening text messages from the father, including threats to kill.

The Court of Appeal accepts that these are “very grave” allegations and that it was reasonable to treat the risk of harm as grave in principle. The critical question then becomes whether that grave risk could be adequately ameliorated by protective measures on return.

5.3.2 The relevance of the mother’s own stance

A point heavily relied upon by the father, and accepted as relevant by the Court of Appeal, is the mother’s own expressed willingness:

She said she would be happy to travel to Romania to facilitate contact between B and the father, provided they were separated and not in a relationship.
She indicated she was content in principle for the father to have contact with B, including in Romania, and discussions in October 2024 texts contemplated B spending significant time with the father there.

The Court accepts that:

Victims of domestic abuse may minimise the risk they face and that this must be treated with care.
Nonetheless, the mother’s own evidence that she would be “relatively comfortable” about going to Romania (if not living with the father) is an important part of the overall risk picture.

Separately, it was relevant that:

The mother left Romania in August 2024 not because of immediate abuse, but because the father refused to reconcile; she continued to contemplate future contact arrangements in Romania.
There was no evidence that the father was likely to directly target B for violence, though that does not, of course, negate the potential indirect psychological harm to B from witnessing abuse.

5.3.3 Protective measures and Romanian law

The key to the Article 13(b) analysis was the availability and effectiveness of protective measures in Romania, both:

Substantive protective orders under Romanian domestic law (e.g. “ordin de protecție”); and
Recognition and enforcement of English orders via the 1996 Hague Convention.

The Single Joint Expert on Romanian law, Ms Eniko Fulop, provided detailed advice, summarised as follows:

Undertakings given to the English court can be made enforceable in Romania if they are included in an English judicial order as measures concerning the child’s protection or welfare.
The only available instrument for recognition and enforcement is the 1996 Hague Convention (EU instruments no longer apply to the UK); most of the proposed safeguards fall squarely within Article 3 of that Convention.
The English order must be submitted to a Romanian court for a summary exequatur (declaration of enforceability). Only then does it become coercively enforceable there.
Victims of domestic abuse can apply for a domestic protective order – including restraining orders, eviction of the aggressor, restrictions on contact, and temporary custody measures – and such orders can be made urgently.
Criminal proceedings arising from the father’s complaint are likely to have been closed after his withdrawal, but it would be prudent to obtain formal confirmation of closure before return.

In light of this evidence, Peel J ordered that the return would not occur unless and until:

The English conditions and undertakings were “declared enforceable” in Romania under the 1996 Convention or otherwise incorporated into Romanian orders;
Formal confirmation was obtained from the Romanian Prosecutor’s Office that the criminal file had been closed;
A series of financial and practical undertakings had been implemented, including:
- Father paying for the mother’s and B’s return flights.
- A lump sum payment of €4,000 to the mother prior to return, for housing or other needs, and monthly support of €500 for six months thereafter.
- Transfer of child benefit payments to the mother pending her own claim.
- Father meeting costs of any necessary therapy.
- Restrictions on father attending the airport at return, on contacting or harassing the mother, on attending her residence, and on obtaining her address.
- Lodging B’s passport with the mother’s Romanian lawyers, to be released only on direction of the Romanian court.

The Court of Appeal endorses this structured approach, as exactly what Re E contemplates: a focus on the sufficiency and enforceability of protective measures where serious allegations cannot be fully tried summarily.

5.3.4 The €13,000 payment as an “informal protective measure”

The mother argued that the payment of €13,000 in September 2024, intended to “buy peace”, showed the extent of fear and the inadequacy of less formal protections. The Court accepts that:

The payment was “principally motivated by fear of the father and a hope that he would cease his threatening behaviour”.
As an informal “protective measure” it had plainly not worked, at least to the extent that threats and abusive messages continued thereafter.

However, the Court distinguishes this from the present, formalised framework:

The 1980 Convention process requires the court to consider whether formal, legitimate mechanisms – judicially crafted and internationally enforceable – can adequately protect the child.
Here, robust, enforceable measures under both Romanian law and the 1996 Hague Convention are available and will be put in place before return.

On that basis, the Court agrees with Peel J that the grave risk to B on return would be sufficiently mitigated; the Article 13(b) defence is not established.

6. Clarifying Complex Concepts

6.1 Removal, retention and habitual residence

Wrongful removal occurs when a child is taken from the State of his or her habitual residence in breach of someone’s “rights of custody” under the law of that State.
Wrongful retention is where a child is lawfully removed (e.g. with consent) but then not returned at the agreed time or is kept in the new State in breach of custody rights.
Habitual residence is a factual concept – the place which reflects the child’s centre of life, determined by settled presence and the quality of integration in the new environment.

6.2 Consent vs acquiescence under Article 13(a)

Consent is typically given before removal and must be real, unequivocal and informed (e.g. agreeing that the other parent may relocate with the child).
Acquiescence is what happens after a wrongful removal/retention, where the left‑behind parent, by words or conduct, accepts that the child will remain in the new country and relinquishes the right to insist on a summary return.
Both are exceptions to the ordinary, near‑automatic return required by the Convention, and are therefore interpreted restrictively.

6.3 Rights of custody and courts as “institutions”

“Rights of custody” include the right to determine the child’s place of residence. They may be held by:

Parents or other individuals (e.g. guardians, local authorities), and
Courts, when seised of proceedings that require them to decide where the child should live.

In Re B, the Romanian court – in its welfare proceedings – had such rights of custody by virtue of Article 7 of the 1996 Hague Convention: it retained jurisdiction because B was habitually resident in Romania immediately before his removal.

6.4 Grave risk and intolerable situation – Article 13(b)

Article 13(b) allows a court to refuse return if there is a grave risk that the child’s return would:

Expose the child to physical or psychological harm; or
Otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

“Grave” emphasises seriousness, while “intolerable” is child‑focused: the situation must be something beyond the ordinary hardship and disruption associated with international moves or family litigation.

6.5 Protective measures, “soft landing” and the 1996 Hague Convention

Protective measures are specific legal safeguards – e.g. restraining orders, undertakings, no‑contact clauses, financial support – crafted to reduce the risks associated with a child’s return.
A “soft landing” return order is one conditioned on such measures being in place, so the child (and usually the primary carer) are not returned to an unregulated or unsafe environment.
The 1996 Hague Convention on child protection provides a framework for:
- International recognition and enforcement of protective measures made in one Contracting State.
- Emergency or interim measures in urgent cases.
An exequatur is a summary court procedure in the State of enforcement (here, Romania) to recognise and give enforceable effect to a foreign order (here, an English protective order) under the 1996 Convention.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Narrowing the scope for “court acquiescence”

The most striking doctrinal impact of Re B is its clear scepticism about the concept of “court acquiescence” under Article 13(a). While not issuing an absolute ruling that such acquiescence is impossible, the Court:

Identifies substantial conceptual difficulties with equating a court’s position to that of a “wronged parent” for acquiescence purposes.
Emphasises the risk of doctrinal confusion and unfairness if an incoming court declares that a foreign court has acquiesced, especially where the left‑behind parent plainly has not.
Limits the persuasive authority of NM v SM and confines Haringey to the quite different context of an outgoing court determining its own stance under the 1996 Convention.

In practical terms, practitioners should be cautious about pleading or arguing Article 13(a) on the basis of alleged foreign court acquiescence. In the absence of an express, unambiguous statement or order by the foreign court clearly renouncing its rights of custody or endorsing the child’s continued stay abroad, such arguments are unlikely to prosper.

7.2 Reaffirming a high bar for parental acquiescence, even amid informal settlements

Re B strongly reaffirms the high threshold for parental acquiescence:

Attempts at settlement or community‑based “peace-making”, including substantial payments and involvement of religious or cultural elders, do not in themselves constitute acquiescence.
As P v P stressed, parents must be free to explore arrangements – sometimes in unconventional ways – without fear that openness to negotiation will later be used to bar a Convention return.
Only a concluded agreement, or conduct that is clearly and unequivocally

Where community‑based or informal mechanisms produce opaque outcomes, or where each side leaves with incompatible understandings (as here), it will be especially difficult for the abducting parent to meet the Re H test.

7.3 Domestic abuse and the centrality of enforceable protective measures

In Article 13(b) cases involving domestic abuse, Re B:

Reaffirms the Re E framework: take allegations at their highest, and then focus on whether robust protective measures can adequately reduce the risk.
Demonstrates how detailed, country‑specific expert evidence on the foreign legal system and on the operation of the 1996 Hague Convention is essential for a credible risk‑mitigation analysis.
Illustrates a careful, structured use of conditions and undertakings – including financial support, housing security, no‑contact terms, and control of travel documents – to create a genuinely protective “soft landing”.

The case underlines that in serious domestic abuse scenarios:

The more serious and clear the allegations, the more demanding the court must be about ensuring that protective measures are real, enforceable and in place before return.
Where such measures can be secured and enforced via the 1996 Convention and the foreign domestic law, the Article 13(b) exception is unlikely to be made out.

7.4 Comity and the interplay of the 1980 and 1996 Conventions

Re B is also a useful reminder of how the 1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions interlock:

The 1980 Convention is about prompt return and preventing jurisdiction-shopping.
The 1996 Convention provides the jurisdictional and protective framework for long‑term welfare decisions and for recognition and enforcement of interim or protective orders across borders.

The Court of Appeal’s refusal to treat the Romanian court’s welfare‑driven actions (including commissioning a report on B’s life in England) as “acquiescence” reflects a strong commitment to comity:

Each court must respect the other’s functional role.
The requesting State’s court is entitled to gather evidence and make interim arrangements without being taken to have surrendered its jurisdiction or acquiesced in continued retention.

8. Conclusion

Re B [2025] EWCA Civ 1603 is a rich and carefully reasoned judgment that:

Reaffirms the stringent standards for both subjective and objective acquiescence under Article 13(a), even in culturally specific and informally negotiated settings.
Strongly questions, and in practice largely closes down, the idea that an incoming court can treat a foreign court as having “acquiesced” in a child’s wrongful retention for Convention purposes, absent express and unequivocal indications from that court itself.
Reinforces the central role of enforceable protective measures – crafted under both domestic law and the 1996 Hague Convention – in answering serious domestic abuse-based Article 13(b) defences.

For future 1980 Convention litigation, especially in cases involving:

Informal or community-based dispute resolution (such as Roma elders’ “courts”);
Parallel welfare proceedings in the requesting State; and
Serious domestic abuse allegations with cross-border protective possibilities,

Re B provides a clear roadmap. It emphasises:

The primacy of fact‑sensitive evaluation of the evidence.
The limited, exceptional nature of the Article 13 exceptions.
The need to use the 1996 Hague Convention and foreign domestic frameworks to secure reliable, enforceable protection rather than displacing the 1980 Convention’s core commitment to summary return.

In doing so, the Court of Appeal maintains the delicate balance at the heart of international child abduction law: vindicating the prompt return of wrongfully removed children while ensuring that neither children nor their primary carers are exposed to unacceptable risks upon return.