Introduction

The case R v. S ([1913] SLR 161) was adjudicated by the Scottish Court of Session on December 18, 1913. The legal dispute centered around an action for damages for slander, where the plaintiff, Miss M. J. R., sought £400 in damages against Mrs. H. M. or S. and her husband, J. F. S., who acted individually and as the curator and administrator-in-law of his wife. The crux of the controversy involved defamatory statements made by the defendants about the plaintiff's moral character, the subsequent apology by one of the defenders, and the legal implications of such an apology on the defense of truth (veritasveritas).

Summary of the Judgment

The Scottish Court of Session, through the judgments of Lord Dundas and Lord Skerrington (the latter being revisited), addressed whether the defender was precluded from using veritasveritas as a defense due to a prior letter of apology. The court held that the defender was indeed barred from pleading veritasveritas in the action for damages for slander, based on the earlier admission of false statements and the undertaking not to repeat them. However, this decision was not unanimous. Lords Salvesen, Guthrie, and others provided dissenting opinions, arguing for the allowance of veritasveritas under certain circumstances, emphasizing the importance of truth as a defense against slander regardless of prior apologies.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment references several key precedents that influenced the court's decision:

• Mackellar v. Sutherland (1859): Established that veritasveritas negates slander as true statements cannot be defamatory.
• Campbell v. Ferguson (1882): Reinforced the principle that truth serves as a complete defense in defamation cases.
• Adamson v. Collie (1878): Discussed the limits of personal bar or exceptions in altering legal positions.
• Bell's Principles, sec. 27A: Addressed the concept of "res novitieris" (a real change of position) as a foundation for personal exceptions.
• Everest and Strode on Estoppel: Provided insights into the doctrine of estoppel, particularly concerning letters of apology and subsequent defenses.

Legal Reasoning

The court's primary legal question was whether the defender's previous apology and admission of falsehood in defamatory statements irrevocably barred her from later asserting the truth (veritasveritas) as a defense. Lord Dundas, representing the majority view, concluded that the acceptance of the apology altered the plaintiff's legal position, thereby preventing the defender from reasserting the truth of her statements. This stance rested on the notion that the plaintiff, by accepting the apology, had effectively settled the matter, and the defender could not subsequently retract her apology to claim veritasveritas.

In contrast, Lord Salvesen and Lord Guthrie dissented, arguing that the essence of slander is its falsity, and if statements are indeed true, they should negate the slander claim regardless of prior apologies. They posited that allowing veritasveritas maintains the integrity of truth as a fundamental defense, preventing unjust prejudice against defendants who later prove their statements were accurate.

Impact

The judgment in R v. S has significant implications for defamation law. It underscores the tension between contractual or procedural settlements (like apologies) and the substantive truth defenses. By potentially limiting the ability to use veritasveritas after an apology, the judgment risks prioritizing procedural resolutions over the underlying truth of statements, which could have broader consequences for the enforcement of truth-based defenses in defamation cases.

However, the strong dissenting opinions highlight the legal community's divided stance on this issue, suggesting that future cases might navigate this balance differently, potentially favoring the protection of truth as a defense even after apologies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

The Judgment in R v. S [1913] SLR 161 presents a pivotal examination of the interplay between contractual apologies and the substantive defense of truth in defamation law. While the majority upheld the idea that an apology and admission can foreclose subsequent truth defenses, the dissent underscored the fundamental role of truth in negating defamation. This case highlights the delicate balance courts must maintain between procedural resolutions and ensuring that truth remains an inviolable defense against defamatory claims. As legal principles evolve, R v. S serves as a foundational reference point for future deliberations on the limits and applications of veritasveritas in defamation litigation.