Introduction

This decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) clarifies how courts should sentence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 where grievous bodily harm (GBH) is caused with intent to resist or prevent apprehension. It confirms that, in cases involving extremely dangerous conduct where the risk of very serious injury is high, the culpability of an offender who intends to evade arrest but displays a high degree of recklessness can approach that of an offender who intends to cause really serious harm. In such cases, sentences may properly be calibrated by reference to (though not dictated by) the Sentencing Council guideline for s.18 cases involving an intention to cause really serious harm (ISSRH).

The appellant, Mr Woods, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and to causing GBH with intent to resist or prevent his apprehension after driving a van through a very narrow gap where a uniformed officer was standing, striking and then driving over the officer’s legs. The Crown Court imposed 6 years and 4 months’ imprisonment (with an 8 years 2 months driving disqualification and extended re-test). The key issue on appeal was whether that custodial term was manifestly excessive, said to be inflated by over-reliance on the s.18 ISSRH guideline and insufficient discount for the lesser intention to resist arrest and personal mitigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the sentencing judge’s analogical use of the ISSRH guideline, his assessment of high culpability, and his view that the difference between the two s.18 intents was narrow on these facts because the risk-taking and recklessness were so extreme.

Summary of the Judgment

- Offences: the appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and to causing GBH with intent to resist or prevent apprehension, stemming from an incident in which he drove a large van through a confined space, striking and then driving over a police officer who was attempting to stop him. The officer suffered a fractured ankle and significant ongoing physical and psychological effects.

- Sentence at first instance: 6 years 4 months’ imprisonment for the s.18 offence; no separate penalty for dangerous driving; 8 years 2 months’ disqualification and extended re-test.

- Grounds of appeal: the sentence was said to be manifestly excessive, arguing that the judge selected too high a pre-mitigation figure by adopting the top of the range of the ISSRH guideline and inadequately reduced it to reflect the lesser intent (resisting arrest) and personal mitigation.

- Holding: Appeal dismissed. The Court held that:

• The judge was entitled to have regard to the s.18 ISSRH guideline analogically even though the offence here was resisting arrest, for which there is no dedicated definitive guideline.
• On the facts, the manoeuvre was “highly dangerous,” with a “very high” risk of causing very serious injury. The culpability arising from intending to evade arrest combined with a high degree of recklessness was “not so very different” from the culpability for intending to cause really serious harm.
• Personal mitigation carried limited weight in the face of the gravity of the offence and its consequences, particularly against a serving police officer performing his duty.
• The ultimate sentence of 6 years 4 months after a 25% plea discount was not manifestly excessive.

Analysis

Statutory and Guideline Context

Section 18 OAPA 1861 covers two forms of high-seriousness offending, both carrying a maximum of life imprisonment:

• (i) causing GBH or wounding with intent to cause really serious harm (ISSRH), and
• (ii) causing GBH or wounding with intent to resist or prevent lawful apprehension or detainer.

The Sentencing Council has a definitive guideline for s.18 (ISSRH) effective from 1 July 2021. However, there is no dedicated guideline for the “intent to resist arrest” limb. In such cases, courts have looked to the ISSRH guideline for structured assistance, with appropriate adjustment to reflect the typically lower culpability where the intent is to evade rather than to injure (R v Talbot; R v Heywood; R v Lennox).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

R v Talbot [2012] EWCA Crim 2322

Talbot upheld an 8-year sentence for s.18 GBH with intent to resist arrest involving a vehicle striking an officer, noting that although the ISSRH guideline did not directly apply, the judge could consider it because the facts made “really serious harm” close to inevitable. Talbot supports analogical use of ISSRH levels where extreme risk is present, lending legitimacy to starting at a high notional level before adjusting for the lesser intent.

R v Heywood [2014] EWCA Crim 2006

Heywood (8 years 9 months after a late plea) emphasised that driving which creates an obvious risk of serious consequences reflects recklessness “not far short of intent.” The Court also observed Parliament’s equation of maxima for both limbs of s.18, recognising the gravity of serious harm caused in the course of resisting lawful arrest. Heywood thus supports two points seen in Woods: (1) the culpability gap may be narrow where risk-taking is extreme; and (2) it is proper to have regard to ISSRH levels when calibrating sentences, given the parity of statutory maximum.

R v Lennox [2020] EWCA 1082

Lennox cautioned that intent to resist arrest is generally less culpable than ISSRH intent and that the difference must be reflected in sentencing. In Woods, the Court accepted and applied this principle, but clarified how much difference exists is fact-sensitive: where recklessness is very high, the gap may be small.

How Woods Develops and Clarifies the Law

The Court synthesises Talbot, Heywood and Lennox, and articulates a practical calibration principle:

“The significance of the distinction between an intention to avoid arrest and an intention to cause really serious harm will depend upon the circumstances of the case… The combination of those factors [intent to evade plus a high degree of recklessness] was not so very different from the culpability involved in an intention to cause really serious harm.” (para 21)

In other words, there is a sliding scale of culpability within s.18 (resist arrest) driven by the nature and degree of risk taken. Where an offender’s conduct creates a very high risk of causing very serious injury—particularly through the use of a vehicle as a weapon-equivalent—the sentence may approach the ISSRH guideline range, with only a modest adjustment to reflect the lesser intent.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

1) Nature of the conduct:

• The appellant deliberately attempted to force a large van through a confined gap, in very close proximity to a visibly present officer who was attempting to stop him.
• The judge described the manoeuvre as “highly dangerous”; CCTV/body-worn video corroborated that assessment.
• The van struck the officer and drove over him; the officer’s legs were trapped under the wheels.

2) Harm and aggravation:

• Serious injuries followed: a fractured ankle, ongoing pain and sciatica, blood clots, and re-triggered PTSD—“very serious” effects (para 10).
• Victim was a police officer in the execution of his duty—an aggravating feature recognised in guidelines and case law.
• The appellant was on a community order and had relevant previous convictions (including prior dangerous driving), further aggravating seriousness.

3) Guideline structure adopted:

• The judge analogised to the s.18 ISSRH guideline, assessing harm as Category 2 and culpability as High because a vehicle was used as a “weapon or equivalent.”
• That yields a notional starting point of 7 years’ custody (range 6–10 years). Given the facts, the judge said this offence, if ISSRH, would merit the top of the range.
• He then adjusted down to 8.5 years to reflect the lesser intent (resisting arrest) and personal mitigation before applying plea credit.
• With a 25% discount for the guilty plea, the final sentence was 6 years 4 months.

4) Appellate evaluation:

• The Court confirmed that, had the appellant intended to cause really serious harm, a pre-mitigation sentence “in double figures” would be expected (para 20).
• Given the “very high” risk created, the gap between resisting-arrest intent and ISSRH was, on these facts, narrow; the judge’s calibration was not excessive.
• Personal mitigation, including family hardship and positive prison conduct, was of limited weight in the face of such seriousness and consequences for a police officer.
• Applying the appellate standard, the sentence was not “manifestly excessive,” so no interference was justified.

The Court’s Approach to Guilty Plea Credit

The Court proceeded on the basis that a 25% reduction for the guilty plea was appropriate on the facts and timing of this case. It is notable that the plea was not at the very first opportunity but nonetheless attracted a substantial discount; the judgment does not suggest any error in that aspect of the calculation.

Personal Mitigation and Public Interest Considerations

The Court acknowledged the appellant’s personal circumstances—family responsibilities, a prematurely born child, regret expressed in a letter, and positive prison reports. However, in line with established principles for grave violent offences, such mitigation was given limited weight in light of:

• the extreme risk-taking,
• the serious and lasting harm to the officer,
• the public policy imperative of protecting officers (and the public) from the use of vehicles as weapons, and
• the appellant’s relevant criminal history and breach of a community order.

Ancillary Orders

The extended driving disqualification and requirement for an extended re-test were uncontroversial in the appeal and reflect the gravity of the driving component and the need to protect the public.

Impact and Implications

This judgment provides clear and practical guidance for sentencing s.18 “resist arrest” cases involving vehicles or other conduct creating an exceptionally high risk of serious injury:

• Analogical use of ISSRH guideline: Courts may draw on the s.18 ISSRH guideline to structure sentence selection where no specific “resist arrest” guideline exists, provided they adjust for the generally lower culpability of resisting arrest.
• Fact‑sensitive culpability gap: The difference between the two s.18 intents is not fixed. Where conduct shows a high degree of recklessness with a very high risk of very serious injury, the culpability gap narrows and sentences may approach ISSRH levels.
• Vehicles as weapon-equivalents: Using a vehicle in a way that poses obvious grave risks supports a High culpability finding.
• Limited weight to personal mitigation: In offences of this seriousness—especially against police officers performing duties—personal mitigation is often of limited consequence.
• Appellate restraint: Woods reinforces that the Court of Appeal will not recalibrate a carefully reasoned sentence absent manifest excess or error in principle.

Practically, prosecutors and defence practitioners can expect sentencing in similarly dangerous “resist arrest” cases to trend towards the top of the analogous ISSRH ranges, with only modest reductions where the facts show recklessness close to intent.

Practical Checklist for Sentencers in s.18 (Resist Arrest) Cases

1. Identify whether the conduct involved a very high risk of causing very serious injury (e.g., vehicle used in close quarters to evade arrest).
2. Use the s.18 ISSRH guideline by analogy for structure: assess culpability (e.g., weapon-equivalent) and harm (Category 1 or 2).
3. Adjust downward to reflect the lesser intent to resist arrest (per Lennox), with the scale of adjustment being fact-sensitive.
4. Weigh aggravating factors: victim is a police officer, offending on a community order, relevant antecedents (e.g., prior dangerous driving), fleeing the scene, etc.
5. Weigh mitigation: remorse, personal circumstances, positive conduct; recognise limited weight in very serious cases.
6. Apply credit for plea in accordance with timing and the guideline on guilty pleas.
7. Consider ancillary orders (e.g., extended disqualification, extended re-test) to protect the public.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 18 OAPA 1861: A very serious offence covering GBH or wounding with either (i) intent to cause really serious harm or (ii) intent to resist/prevent lawful apprehension. Both carry a maximum of life imprisonment.
• ISSRH guideline (2021): The Sentencing Council’s definitive guideline for s.18 cases where the offender intended to cause really serious harm. There is no separate guideline for the “resist arrest” limb; courts use the ISSRH guideline for structure, with adjustments.
• “Weapon or equivalent”: Using an object—here, a vehicle—in a way that can cause serious injury can place the case in High culpability.
• Starting point vs range: The guideline provides a “starting point” sentence and a permissible “range.” The court moves within or beyond the range for case-specific aggravation/mitigation.
• Manifestly excessive: The appellate test for interfering with a sentence. The Court will not change a sentence unless it is obviously too high or wrong in principle.
• Basis of plea: A written statement of the facts the defendant accepts for sentencing. Even if the defendant denies intending harm, the court assesses objective risk and the foreseeability of serious injury.
• Guilty plea reduction: Sentences are reduced for timely guilty pleas, with the scale of reduction depending on how early the plea was entered.
• Driving disqualification and extended re-test: Ancillary orders aimed at public protection following serious driving-related offending.

Conclusion

R v Woods confirms and clarifies that in s.18 cases involving intent to resist arrest, the sentencing court may legitimately calibrate sentences by reference to the s.18 ISSRH guideline when the offender’s conduct creates a very high risk of very serious injury—particularly where a vehicle is used in a weapon-like manner. The judgment crystallises a sliding-scale approach: although resisting arrest is generally less culpable than intent to cause really serious harm, that difference may be modest where recklessness is extreme. In such circumstances, sentences approaching ISSRH levels are justified.

The decision also underscores limited weight for personal mitigation in the face of grave harm to a police officer performing his duty, and reiterates the Court of Appeal’s restrained approach to sentence appeals: a carefully reasoned sentence will stand absent manifest excess or legal error. For practitioners, Woods provides a structured, fact-sensitive framework for arguing and passing sentence in high-risk s.18 (resist arrest) cases, with clear signals on culpability assessment, analogical guideline use, and the relative weight of mitigating and aggravating factors.