R v Wood [2025] EWCA Crim 1372: Limits on Departures from Sentencing Guidelines; “School” Status Not a Stand‑Alone Aggravator; and Activation of a Suspended Sentence Is Not Double Counting

R v Wood [2025] EWCA Crim 1372: Limits on Departures from Sentencing Guidelines; “School” Status Not a Stand‑Alone Aggravator; and Activation of a Suspended Sentence Is Not Double Counting

Introduction

This Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision addresses the calibration of sentences within, and when moving beyond, the Sentencing Council guideline ranges in a multi-indictment case involving assaults on emergency workers, non‑domestic burglaries, theft, and common assaults. The appellant, Kevin Wood, then 46, had a substantial criminal record (41 convictions for 108 offences from 1996 to 2024). He pleaded guilty across three indictments encompassing serious public order and dishonesty offending, some committed while on bail and under a suspended sentence.

Sentenced in the Crown Court at Luton to an aggregate of 52 months’ imprisonment, Mr Wood appealed against sentence with leave of the single judge. The appeal focused on four central issues:

  • Whether the judge misapplied the assault guidelines by miscategorising culpability or harm, and whether uplifts above guideline ranges for assaults on emergency workers were excessive;
  • Whether it was wrong in principle to treat the fact of being under a suspended sentence as an aggravating factor when the suspended sentence was also activated (alleged “double counting”);
  • Whether the burglary of a primary school legitimately justified a sentence above the top of the relevant guideline category range by reference to the venue alone;
  • Whether the judge’s approach to totality and concurrency/consecutivity was flawed.

The Court (Lewis LJ) delivered clear guidance on the permissible scope of uplifts from guideline ranges, the distinct functions of culpability and harm within the assault guideline, the treatment of suspended sentence status as a legitimate aggravator without double counting, and the proper use of totality to ensure an overall just and proportionate sentence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the total sentence from 52 months to 43 months’ imprisonment. The key orders were:

  • Assaults on emergency workers (counts 1 and 2, indictment 41B21195523): sentences of 10 months on each count quashed; substituted with 6 months on each, concurrent with each other but consecutive to other sentences.
  • Burglary of a primary school (count 4, indictment 41B21445024): sentence of 14 months quashed; substituted with 9 months, consecutive.
  • All other sentences, including 17 months for the Tring commercial burglary (B1) and 4 months for the Amazon van theft (B3), were upheld.
  • Totality: The consecutive/concurrent structure was endorsed; the judge’s application of totality was broadly sound, with the Court adjusting quantum on the two assault counts and the school burglary to ensure proportionality.

The Court reaffirmed that:

  • Strangulation and persistent/prolonged assault properly place assaults within culpability A; harm is assessed separately by reference to the impact, and there was no double counting by recognising both.
  • Being on bail and being under a suspended sentence at the time of offending are legitimate aggravating factors; activating the suspended sentence does not foreclose using suspended sentence status as aggravation.
  • The fact that premises are a primary school did not, on the facts, justify a sentence above the top of the guideline range where harm and loss were already accounted for within the guideline categorisation.
  • Where multiple victims are sentenced concurrently, the existence of more than one victim may justify an upward movement from the single‑count starting point.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court did not cite reported case authorities. Its reasoning proceeded by close application of Sentencing Council guidelines and orthodox appellate principles. The judgment therefore anchors itself in:

  • Assault guidelines (including assault on emergency workers) — culpability/harm matrix, starting points, and ranges;
  • Non‑domestic burglary guidelines (category B1 and B2) — with starting points and ranges from community orders up to two years’ custody depending on culpability and harm;
  • Theft guidelines for acquisitive offences — including value‑based harm categorisation (e.g., harm category 3 where value exceeds £500) and planning as an indicator of culpability B;
  • The overarching guideline on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea — evident from the credits allowed (10%, 15%, 20%) depending on plea timing;
  • The overarching guideline on Totality — guiding how to structure concurrent and consecutive sentences and to adjust individual terms to ensure the overall sentence is just and proportionate.

Although no authorities were cited, the Court’s statements align with established appellate practice: interference with sentence is justified where the judge errs in principle or the sentence is manifestly excessive or wrong in law; guideline ranges are the primary reference point; departures require clear justification; and totality must be explicitly considered.

Legal Reasoning

1) Assaults on emergency workers: separating culpability and harm; controlling uplifts beyond the range

The Court endorsed the judge’s categorisation of both assaults as culpability A:

  • PC Durrant: culpability A due to strangulation; harm category 1 because the impact was more than minor (including inability to breathe for around five seconds). The Court rejected a “double counting” argument, clarifying that strangulation (culpability) is distinct from its effects (harm).
  • PC Edwards: the Court held the judge was entitled to view the assault as “persistent or prolonged” (a culpability A factor), and to treat the harm as category 1.

However, while these features warranted moving towards — and even beyond — the top of the guideline range for a single offence (which capped at 26 weeks’ custody), the Court found the pre‑plea figure of 15 months for each assault to be “manifestly excessive.” The appropriate sentence after trial was “in the region of nine months” per count. After 15% plea credit and an extra reduction for totality, the Court substituted 6 months on each, concurrent.

Importantly, the Court confirmed that where two victims are sentenced concurrently, the multiplicity of victims can, in principle, justify an upwards adjustment from the single‑count starting point. That adjustment must still remain proportionate to the guideline structure and the totality of the case.

2) Commercial burglary (Tring convenience store): proper weight to aggravating features; no “double counting” with suspended sentence activation

This was assessed as a B1 burglary (significant planning/going equipped; category 1 harm), with a 12‑month starting point and a range up to 2 years. The judge imposed 24 months pre‑plea, reduced by 20% to 19 months, then reduced to 17 months for totality. The Court upheld this sentence, rejecting arguments that:

  • The co‑defendant’s lower sentence rendered the appellant’s manifestly excessive (sentencing is individualised; disparity alone does not demonstrate error);
  • Using the fact of the suspended sentence as an aggravator was double counting given its activation (there was no double counting: activation punishes the earlier offence; the aggravator addresses the enhanced culpability of offending under an extant court order).

3) Burglary of a primary school: “school” status not, by itself, a stand‑alone aggravator justifying an above‑range sentence

For the school burglary (B2: planning/reconnaissance/vehicle; moderate loss/damage/disturbance), the guideline starting point was 6 months (range up to 12 months). The judge’s post‑trial term of 18 months exceeded the range and was reduced by the Court. While the appellant’s record and bail status warranted the top of the range (12 months after trial), the Court held that the mere fact that the premises were a primary school did not, on the facts, justify further uplift above the top of the range, since loss and damage had already been accounted for within the harm categorisation.

After 10% plea credit and a totality reduction, the Court substituted 9 months consecutive for this count. The Court thereby signals that “venue‑based” aggravation must be tethered to demonstrable impacts beyond those captured by the guideline’s harm categorisation before it justifies moving beyond the top of the identified range.

4) Theft from the Amazon delivery van: value and planning properly located within B3

The Court affirmed the judge’s assessment of category B3 theft: planning (targeting delivery vans) and value over £500 (22 parcels) fitting the guideline’s threshold. The post‑trial starting point of 18 weeks and the resulting 4 months after plea was comfortably within the guideline’s range (up to 36 weeks). The argument that the value sat at the lower end of the band did not displace the categorisation: the judge is entitled to form a view on value and place the case within the appropriate category if the threshold is met.

5) Totality and sentence structure: concurrency, consecutivity, and proportionate overall outcome

The Court expressly endorsed the judge’s structuring of consecutive and concurrent terms and recognised the judge’s express and substantively correct application of totality. The Court’s own reductions were targeted adjustments to quantum on certain counts (two assaults on emergency workers and the school burglary) to restore proportionality within a multi‑episode, multi‑victim, multi‑indictment case. The final aggregate was recalibrated to 43 months.

Impact and Significance

The judgment furnishes practical, appellate-level guidance in several recurring sentencing scenarios:

  • Assaults on emergency workers: Strangulation and persistent/prolonged attacks justify culpability A, and harm should be assessed on actual impact. Uplifts above a range capped at 26 weeks can be warranted by aggravation, but must remain proportionate. In practice, numerous aggravators may push the sentence well above a community order starting point, but dramatic uplifts (e.g., to 15 months per count) require a particularly compelling justification; absent that, they are susceptible to reduction.
  • Multiple victims with concurrent sentences: Courts may use the multiplicity of victims as a reason to move above the single‑count starting point even where counts are concurrent. This ensures the overall sentence reflects the breadth of harm without mechanically imposing consecutive terms.
  • Suspended sentence status as aggravation: Offending while subject to a suspended sentence legitimately aggravates culpability. Activation of the suspended sentence penalises the earlier offence; it does not exhaust the aggravating quality of offending under a live court order. This decision makes that separation explicit and should deter arguments of “double counting.”
  • “School” (or institutional) venue as aggravator: Venue alone does not automatically justify an above‑range sentence. The impact associated with the venue must be demonstrated and distinguishable from the harm already captured within the guideline categorisation. Sentencers should pinpoint what additional features, if any, truly lift the case beyond the top of the range.
  • Value thresholds in theft: Where the value exceeds the threshold (e.g., £500 for harm category 3), the categorisation is sound even if the value sits near the bottom of the band; that may influence placement within the range rather than the category itself.
  • Totality discipline: The decision reemphasises that judges should explicitly apply totality, choose concurrency or consecutivity on principled bases (separate episodes, multiple victims, and different types of offending), and make modest, reasoned adjustments to individual counts to reach a just aggregate.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Culpability vs harm (guideline matrix): Culpability (A/B/C, etc.) captures how blameworthy the conduct was (e.g., strangulation; planning; using a weapon; prolonged attack). Harm (1/2/3, etc.) captures the impact (injury, loss, distress). The same fact should not serve both functions; strangulation (culpability A) is different from the harm it causes (e.g., inability to breathe), which informs harm level.
  • Double counting: Using the same factor twice to increase sentence is impermissible. Here, the Court showed careful separation: strangulation (culpability) vs its effects (harm); activation of a suspended sentence (punishing the earlier offence) vs treating the status of being under that sentence as aggravating current offending.
  • Totality: Ensures the overall sentence is just and proportionate to the entirety of the offending. Judges may:
    • Make some counts consecutive (typically for distinct episodes or different kinds of harm);
    • Run others concurrently (same incident or where concurrent punishment sufficiently reflects culpability); and
    • Adjust individual terms downwards to prevent an unduly crushing total.
  • Concurrent vs consecutive: Concurrent sentences run at the same time; consecutive sentences run one after another. Multiple victims or distinct episodes can justify consecutivity or upward calibration where concurrency is chosen.
  • Guilty plea credit: The earlier the plea, the greater the discount (up to one-third at the first stage). Later pleas attract lower discounts (e.g., 20% or 10%). The Court accepted the differing percentages applied by the judge, reflecting different plea timings.
  • Manifestly excessive: The appellate threshold for interference with sentence is crossed where, even absent a specific legal error, the sentence is so high as to fall outside the reasonable ambit of the guideline-informed sentencing discretion.

Practical Guidance for Sentencers and Advocates

  • When stepping above a guideline range, articulate precisely which aggravating features justify the departure and ensure proportionality to analogous cases and the range architecture.
  • For assaults on emergency workers, keep culpability (e.g., strangulation; persistent attack) analytically distinct from harm (physical/psychological impact). Avoid using the same fact twice.
  • Where counts are concurrent but involve multiple victims, it is legitimate to move upward from the starting point to recognise the additional harm, provided the total sentence remains proportionate under totality.
  • Offending while on bail or under a suspended sentence should be recorded as aggravation, even if related orders are separately activated; explain the distinct rationales to pre‑empt double‑counting arguments.
  • Venue-based harm (e.g., schools, hospitals) can aggravate only insofar as it evidences impact beyond that captured in guideline harm categorisation (e.g., particular vulnerability, disruption, or community impact). Identify those specifics before moving beyond the top of the range.
  • In value‑based theft categories, once the value threshold is crossed, use the lower/upper end of the range to reflect whether the case sits at the bottom or top of the band.
  • Record plea‑timing clearly to support calibrated guilty‑plea credits across different counts arising at different procedural stages.

Conclusion

R v Wood refines the sentencing landscape in three important ways. First, it reins in excessive uplifts above guideline ranges for assaults on emergency workers, while confirming that serious features like strangulation and persistent assault rightly attract high culpability and movement towards (and sometimes beyond) the range. Second, it clarifies that offending while under a suspended sentence remains an aggravating factor even when the suspended sentence is activated; these serve different purposes and do not constitute double counting. Third, it cautions against venue‑based enhancements (here, a primary school) that risk duplicating harm already accounted for by the guideline’s categorisation; only genuinely additional impact justifies moving above the top of the range.

The overall effect is a restatement of proportionality, faithful application of guideline structures, and disciplined use of totality. For future cases, Wood will be cited for its calibration of AEW sentences, its clear separation of aggravating factors from activation of suspended sentences, and its insistence that institutional settings, without more, do not automatically warrant above‑range terms. The result — a reduction from 52 to 43 months — exemplifies appellate correction that respects the trial judge’s structure while restoring balance to quantum.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

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