R v Wood [2025] EWCA Crim 1257: Narrowing the F1 Exception and Confirming Uplifts for Multiple Serious Injuries in Causing Death by Dangerous Driving

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Judgment date: 6 August 2025

Neutral citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1257

Judge: Sir Robin Spencer

Introduction

This appeal against sentence arose from a devastating road traffic collision on Easter Sunday, 9 April 2023, near Nantwich. The appellant, then aged 20, drove a Ford Fiesta at excessive speed along rural roads while attempting to keep up with a friend’s vehicle. He lost control on a well-signed bend, collided with a tree, and the car suffered catastrophic damage. The front-seat passenger, 19-year-old Felix Davies, died at the scene from his injuries. Three rear passengers sustained very serious injuries.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the first Crown Court hearing to one count of causing death by dangerous driving (Road Traffic Act 1988, s.1) and three counts of causing serious injury by dangerous driving (s.1A). He received a total sentence of 10 years 6 months’ imprisonment on the death count (reflecting the criminality of the injury counts), with concurrent 3-year terms for each s.1A count, and a 12-year driving disqualification with an extended re-test.

The appeal challenged (i) the level of guilty plea credit (arguing for one-third rather than 25%), (ii) the sufficiency of the reduction for mitigation (youth, disability, remorse, etc.), and (iii) the overall length as manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, offering important clarification on when full guilty plea credit may exceptionally be preserved after the first appearance and how multiple serious injuries should inform the uplift within the death-by-dangerous-driving guideline range.

Summary of the Judgment

Guilty plea credit: The Court upheld the judge’s decision to allow 25% credit (plea at PTPH) and refused one-third credit. The appellant’s arguments—late service of a multimedia exhibit, limited recollection, and a late change of solicitors—did not satisfy the exception in section F1 of the Sentencing Council’s Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea guideline.
Need to see evidence: The Court stressed that F1 applies where it was necessary to have advice and/or sight of evidence to understand whether in fact and law the defendant was guilty. On the facts, the appellant “knew what his driving was”; the multimedia presentation was not necessary to understand guilt.
Mitigation and sentence length: The judge’s approach—assessing culpability at Category A (starting point 12 years; range 8–18), moving to the top of the range (18 years) due to three additional serious injuries, then reducing to 14 years for mitigation before applying 25% credit—was upheld. A 4-year reduction for mitigation was sufficient.
Concurrency: The injury counts properly attracted concurrent terms, as they arose from the same piece of dangerous driving, but were a “grossly aggravating factor” justifying uplift to the top of the death guideline range.
Outcome: Appeal dismissed; sentence neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

Analysis

Precedents and Guidelines Cited

Sentencing Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (F1 exception): The guideline preserves full one-third credit if particular circumstances significantly reduced the defendant’s ability to understand what was alleged or made it unreasonable to expect an earlier indication of a guilty plea. Importantly, courts must distinguish cases where evidence is necessary to understand guilt from those where a defendant merely delays to test the strength of the prosecution case.
R v Plaku [2021] EWCA Crim 568; [2022] 1 Cr App R (S) 7: Confirms that, exceptionally, an unequivocal plea notified very shortly after first appearance might be treated as tantamount to a first-stage plea, but such cases are rare. The Court in Wood found no such rare circumstances.
R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596: Addresses the sentencing of young adults, emphasizing maturity, development, and related mitigating factors. The Crown Court judge expressly applied ZA in considering youth and immaturity.
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving Guideline: Category A (high culpability) starting point 12 years; range 8–18 years. The presence of multiple serious injuries is an aggravating feature capable of moving a sentence to the top of the range.
Concurrency principle: Although not citing the Totality guideline expressly, the Court reaffirmed that concurrent sentences apply where offences stem from the same act, while the presence of additional harms (multiple serious injuries) can and should elevate the sentence within the guideline range on the principal count.

Legal Reasoning

1) The F1 Exception and the Timing of Guilty Pleas

The Court’s core reasoning on credit for plea turns on the objective test embedded in F1. The question is not whether the defence team would have preferred to see all material or to confer twice, but whether it was necessary to see evidence or receive advice in order to understand legal and factual guilt.

Ample opportunity to reflect: Fourteen months elapsed between collision and first appearance. The judge reasoned, and the Court endorsed, that the appellant necessarily knew the essence of his conduct—very high speed, overtaking, straddling double white lines, ignoring repeated warnings, losing control on a well-signed bend—such that he could have indicated guilt at the magistrates’ court.
Evidence necessity vs. evidence preference: The multimedia presentation contained only fleeting roadside camera glimpses and was not necessary to understand whether the driving was dangerous. Its utility was at most to refine a basis of plea, not the fact of guilt. This falls squarely into the category of “merely delaying to assess the strength of the prosecution case,” which F1 excludes.
Limited recollection and disability: The pre-sentence report posited either partial memory loss or minimisation; there was no medical evidence of amnesia. The Court held the appellant’s mild learning disability (Noonan’s syndrome) did not affect his ability to understand his conduct for the purposes of F1.
R v Plaku applied but not engaged: The defence notified intention to plead guilty several days before the PTPH. Wood confirms that such notification, even when relatively prompt after the first hearing, will seldom approximate a “first-stage” plea absent truly exceptional circumstances—none were present here.

Accordingly, 25% credit (PTPH plea) was correct; full one-third was not warranted.

2) Culpability Assessment and Uplift for Multiple Serious Injuries

The sentencing judge found Category A (high culpability) under the causing death by dangerous driving guideline, identifying:

Prolonged and grossly excessive speed (observed at up to 90 mph on a rural single carriageway with a 60 mph limit).
Showing off and attempting to catch up with another vehicle.
Persistent disregard of passengers’ warnings to slow down.
Driving one-handed while holding an electronic device (a vape), markedly impairing control.
Straddling double white lines and failing to negotiate a well-signed bend.

These features placed the case firmly at the high end of seriousness. Critically, the presence of three additional serious injury offences—though properly sentenced concurrently because they arose from the same piece of dangerous driving—was treated as a gross aggravating factor, warranting movement to the top of the guideline range (18 years) before mitigation. The Court remarked that each injury offence “standing alone” would merit at least 4 years before plea, underscoring the gravity that multiple serious harms import to overall culpability and harm assessment within the death guideline.

3) Personal Mitigation and Youth

The judge then applied mitigation—good character, youth (20 at the time), mild learning disability, genuine remorse—reducing from 18 to 14 years before plea. The Court found a 4-year reduction was sufficiently generous and appropriately calibrated. Although some factors (e.g., clean driving record, immediate assistance at the scene, close friendship with the deceased) were not itemised in the remarks, the Court was satisfied they were considered, especially in light of a substantial bundle of references and the pre-sentence report. The 25% plea reduction took the sentence to 10 years 6 months.

Impact and Practical Implications

Tighter application of F1 (guilty plea credit): Wood narrows the lane for F1 exceptions. Claims of wanting to review video/CCTV or to wait for multimedia exhibits rarely justify delaying a plea if the defendant’s own knowledge of their conduct suffices to understand guilt. Defence teams should not assume that pre-PTPH notification of a plea preserves one-third credit.
Pre-court delay does not enlarge credit: A long interval between offence and first appearance will often undercut an F1 argument by reinforcing that the defendant had ample time to reflect, seek advice, and accept culpability at the first court opportunity.
Evidential necessity must be genuine and objective: To engage F1, demonstrate why evidence is truly necessary to establish legal and factual guilt—not merely useful for refining a basis of plea. Where memory is relied on, obtain medical evidence. Without it, claims of amnesia or limited recall will likely fail.
Multiple serious injuries as uplift drivers: Wood confirms that, while concurrent terms apply where harm stems from the same dangerous driving, multiple serious injuries are a powerful aggravator justifying movement to the top of the death-by-dangerous-driving range.
Distraction beyond mobile phones: The case illustrates that “prolonged use of an electronic device” can capture distracting conduct such as driving while holding a vape one-handed, supporting a higher culpability categorisation when control is impaired.
Youth and disability mitigation remains fact-sensitive: The Court endorsed a structured reduction for youth, immaturity, and mild learning disability but will uphold robust sentences where culpability and harm are extreme.
Advocacy practice point: If seeking exceptional credit, put full detail before the sentencing judge. The Court noted that the judge did not have the expanded chronology later presented on appeal, but even with it, the decisive point remained that the appellant knew the essential facts of his dangerous driving.

Complex Concepts Simplified

First-stage plea (credit): To receive the maximum one-third reduction, a defendant must normally indicate a guilty plea at the earliest court opportunity (usually the first magistrates’ court appearance). Later pleas typically get reduced credit (e.g., 25% at PTPH).
F1 exception: A narrow gateway preserving full credit where particular circumstances made it unreasonable to expect an earlier plea—because advice and/or sight of evidence was necessary to understand guilt. Not engaged by wanting to gauge the prosecution’s strength.
PTPH (Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing): The first main hearing in the Crown Court where the plea is taken and case management directions are set. Pleas here generally attract 25% credit.
Concurrency vs. uplift: Where several offences arise from one act (here, a single episode of dangerous driving), sentences for the related counts usually run concurrently. However, the presence of additional serious harms (e.g., multiple serious injuries) can significantly increase the sentence on the principal count within the guideline range.
Category A (causing death by dangerous driving): The highest culpability band, capturing factors like gross speeding, racing/showing off, ignoring warnings, distraction from devices, and significantly impaired control.
Extended disqualification and re-test: For causing death by dangerous driving, a lengthy driving ban is mandatory (minimum 5 years), often extended to reflect seriousness, and the driver must pass an extended re-test before regaining a licence.
Liaison and diversion report: A clinical assessment of vulnerabilities (e.g., learning difficulties). It informs mitigation but will not displace culpability where the defendant understood the nature of their conduct.

Conclusion

R v Wood provides a clear and practical refinement of two recurring sentencing issues. First, it tightens the path to exceptional one-third credit under F1. The Court emphasized that where a defendant knows the essential facts of their dangerous driving, a desire to review multimedia evidence or to await case materials will not usually make it “unreasonable” to plead earlier. Medical evidence is critical if memory loss is asserted. Pre-court delay does not improve the defendant’s position on credit; it may do the opposite by demonstrating time for reflection and advice.

Second, Wood affirms a principled approach to multi-victim collisions: although injury counts proceed concurrently with the death count when arising from a single driving episode, their presence is a gross aggravating factor properly moving sentences to the top of the death guideline range. The decision also signals that distracting conduct beyond phone use—such as driving one-handed while vaping—can aggravate culpability where it materially impairs control.

The key takeaways for practitioners are straightforward: if a client will plead guilty, do so at the earliest opportunity; reserve F1 arguments for genuinely necessary evidential issues affecting understanding of legal guilt; secure medical evidence for memory-based claims; and be prepared for substantial uplifts within the death-by-dangerous-driving guideline where multiple serious injuries are caused, even with youth and other mitigation present.