R v Peters [2025] EWCA Crim 1175: Standalone violent disorder in a fatal incident—Category 1A (4‑year) starting point affirmed and no parity with “academic” concurrent sentences

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Judgment Date: 27 August 2025

Neutral Citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1175

Judge: Freedman J

Introduction

This appeal concerned the proper categorisation and starting point when sentencing a standalone count of violent disorder arising out of an incident in which a person was killed, where the appellant was not charged with homicide. The appellant, Mr Kyle Joseph Peters, pleaded guilty to violent disorder shortly before a planned Newton hearing after abandoning his basis of plea and accepting the prosecution case. He was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment by HHJ Dhir KC, having been assessed at Category 1A under the Sentencing Council guideline for violent disorder, with a 4‑year starting point and a range of 3–4.5 years. He appealed with leave on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive, contending (i) a misclassification resulting in too high a starting point, and (ii) unjustified disparity with concurrent violent disorder sentences imposed on co-defendants who were convicted of homicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In doing so, it crystalised two important sentencing propositions:

• Where violent disorder is charged as a standalone offence arising from an incident that resulted in a death, the case can properly fall within Category 1A with a 4‑year starting point if the culpability and harm features are present—even though the defendant was not charged with, or responsible for, the homicide.
• Alleged disparity with violent disorder sentences passed concurrently alongside homicide counts is generally an inapt comparator: such sentences may be “academic” due to totality and concurrency, and any more lenient categorisation in those contexts does not justify reducing a correct standalone classification.

Summary of the Judgment

Mr Peters participated in group violence outside the Aura Lounge on Harrow Road during which a young man, Givani Espuet, was ultimately killed. The prosecution’s case—accepted by the appellant—was that he took part in the group pursuit and assaults, punched one of the victims, and produced a 10 cm knife from his waistband, at one point pointing the tip towards another victim. He left the scene before the fatal stabbing at a different location.

At first instance, the sentencing judge:

• Assessed culpability as A (targeting of individuals; widespread/large-scale violence; serious acts of violence) and harm as 1 (the incident resulted in a death and caused serious fear/distress), applying a Category 1A starting point of 4 years (range 3–4.5 years).
• Identified aggravating features: bringing and producing a knife; intoxication. Identified mitigation: no relevant previous convictions; family responsibilities; good employment; compliance on bail; and disengagement before the fatal stabbing.
• Moved down to 3 years to reflect mitigation, then reduced to 33 months (2 years 9 months) for the late guilty plea (abandonment of the basis shortly before the Newton hearing).

On appeal, the appellant argued that Category 2A or 1B with a 3‑year starting point should have been used and that, in any event, his sentence unfairly exceeded that imposed for violent disorder on co-defendants convicted of homicide, who received concurrent (and lower) sentences for violent disorder.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It held that:

• Category 1A was the correct categorisation on the accepted facts; the judge’s reasons properly supported both Culpability A and Harm 1.
• The judge then moved to the bottom of the range to reflect substantial mitigation; there was no error of principle and no manifest excess.
• Parity/disparity comparisons with co-defendants sentenced for homicide are inapt:
  • Those violent disorder sentences were “academic” (concurrent with homicide sentences).
  • The appellant’s offence was a standalone count, making like-for-like comparison inappropriate due to totality considerations in the co-defendants’ cases.
  • Any lower starting point used for the co-defendants (3 years rather than 4 years) may itself have been an error, but this was immaterial given concurrency and totality. The key point is that the 4‑year starting point was correct for the appellant’s standalone offence.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

No specific case authorities were cited in the judgment. The court’s reasoning is rooted in the Sentencing Council’s guideline for public order offences (violent disorder), and in established sentencing principles concerning totality, parity/disparity, and the appellate test of whether a sentence is “manifestly excessive” or wrong in principle.

Legal Reasoning

1) Proper categorisation under the Sentencing Council guideline

The Sentencing Council’s violent disorder guideline uses a matrix of culpability and harm. The judge found Culpability A and Harm 1 based on the prosecution case the appellant accepted:

• Culpability A: The group targeted specific individuals; the incident involved widespread/large-scale acts of violence; and there were serious acts of violence. Mr Peters chased victims, punched one, and produced a knife, pointing it at one point towards a victim.
• Harm 1: The incident resulted in a death and caused serious fear/distress/disruption. Crucially, the court underscored that a defendant can be sentenced on the basis that a death occurred during the violent disorder, raising harm to Level 1, even where the defendant is not charged with homicide. The death is part of the “harm” outcome of the incident of disorder for sentencing purposes.

On that footing, Category 1A—with a 4‑year starting point and a 3–4.5 year range—was plainly open to the judge. The Court of Appeal expressly approved that approach and rejected the invitation to reclassify to Category 2A or 1B (which would have had a 3‑year starting point).

2) Movement within the range: aggravation and mitigation

The sentencing judge’s balancing exercise is carefully described in the judgment:

• Aggravating features:
  • He took a knife to the scene and produced it (weapon carriage and use).
  • He acted under the influence of alcohol.
• Mitigating features:
  • No relevant previous convictions.
  • Stable family responsibilities (including a young daughter).
  • Compliance and no further offending on bail.
  • Strong work record (full-time, responsible, well-paid employment).
  • He walked away before the fatal stabbing occurred at another location.

Having identified Category 1A, the judge moved to the bottom of the range (3 years) before plea credit. The Court of Appeal characterised this as a “very substantial reduction” to reflect mitigation. Nothing in the judgment suggests any failure to consider a relevant factor or consideration of an irrelevant one. The balancing exercise was orthodox and within the generous ambit of a sentencing judge’s discretion.

3) Credit for plea

The appellant abandoned his basis of plea on the morning of the intended Newton hearing and accepted the prosecution case. The judge then allowed a reduction from 3 years to 2 years 9 months (33 months). The Court of Appeal did not criticise the level of credit and did not adjust the sentence on that ground. The key point for the court was that, even after this limited credit, the overall sentence remained properly anchored to the correct category and range.

4) Disparity and the limits of parity with “academic” concurrent sentences

The appellant’s headline disparity argument was that his sentence for violent disorder exceeded those imposed on co-defendants who were convicted of homicide and violent disorder, who had 3‑year starting points and post‑discount sentences of 2 years 6 months, 2 years 3 months and 1 year 10 months for the violent disorder counts. The Court of Appeal rejected that comparison for four related reasons:

• “Academic” concurrency: The violent disorder sentences for the homicide co-defendants were concurrent and subsumed within very substantial sentences for murder or manslaughter. As the sentencing judge said in those cases, the violent disorder sentences were “academic.”
• Not like-for-like: The appellant faced a standalone violent disorder count. Co-defendants faced violent disorder alongside homicide. Totality considerations arise in the latter situation that do not arise in the former, which makes direct comparison unreliable and inappropriate.
• Bottom-of-range parity: By moving to the bottom of the Category 1A range, the appellant’s sentence was already almost equivalent to a mid‑range outcome in Category 1B or 2A; in that sense, any perceived disparity largely evaporated when the structure of the guideline and ranges is properly appreciated.
• Any misstep below is immaterial: The Court noted that the earlier use of a 3‑year starting point for the co-defendants “may have” been an error. But even if that were so, it was immaterial because of concurrency and totality. A mistake in a different sentencing exercise does not entitle another defendant to a windfall reduction where the correct guideline starting point applies to his case.

5) The appellate test: “manifestly excessive” and error of principle

Reiterating the high threshold for appellate intervention, the Court found neither an error of principle nor manifest excess. The judge correctly identified the applicable guideline category, appropriately weighed aggravating and mitigating factors, made a substantial downward movement within the range for mitigation, and gave plea credit. The sentence was careful, reasoned, and imposed by a trial judge intimately familiar with the facts and the CCTV evidence, including the Ring Doorbell footage of the knife.

Impact

This decision gives clear, practical guidance for sentencing violent disorder where:

• Standalone counts coincide with a fatality: Courts may properly assess harm at Level 1, and apply Category 1A (with a 4‑year starting point) if the culpability features are present. The absence of a homicide charge against the defendant does not preclude Harm 1 when the death resulted from the overall incident of disorder.
• Parity arguments are advanced against co-defendants sentenced for homicide: Where violent disorder is sentenced concurrently with homicide, such sentences are often “academic” due to totality, and thus provide a poor comparator for standalone violent disorder. Defence parity arguments should, therefore, proceed with caution and identify genuinely like-for-like scenarios.
• Guideline consistency is re‑affirmed: The Court signalled that even if a lower starting point was used elsewhere, that does not dislodge the correct categorisation in a standalone case. Sentencers should resist the temptation to anchor standalone sentences to “concurrent” comparators that were influenced by totality and overall sentence structures.

In day‑to‑day practice, this means that Category 1A will often be the appropriate starting point where violent disorder features targeted group violence, serious acts of violence, weapon presence/use, and an incident outcome including death—even if the individual defendant did not commit or was not charged with homicide. The scope for material reduction then lies in mitigation and movement within the range, rather than reclassifying to a lower category in pursuit of parity with non‑comparable cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Violent disorder: A public order offence where three or more persons use or threaten unlawful violence and their conduct would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for their personal safety.
• Sentencing guideline categories (violent disorder):
  • Culpability A vs B: A indicates higher culpability, e.g., targeted victims, serious/widespread violence, group planning, weapons. B indicates lower culpability.
  • Harm 1 vs 2: Harm 1 generally reflects the most serious outcomes (e.g., death; very serious fear/distress/disruption). Harm 2 is less grave harm.
  • Starting point and range: A benchmark sentence for typical cases in the category (starting point) and the span within which the court may move up or down to reflect aggravation/mitigation (range). Category 1A carries a 4‑year starting point and a 3–4.5 year range.
• “Standalone” offence: The count is sentenced on its own terms, not concurrently with other more serious offences that might drive the overall sentence through the totality principle.
• Totality principle: When sentencing multiple offences, the court ensures the total sentence is just and proportionate for the combined offending. This can make some concurrent sentences “academic,” as they do not affect the overall term.
• Parity/disparity: The principle that sentences should be broadly consistent for similar offending and offenders. However, comparisons must be like-for-like; concurrent sentences imposed alongside more serious offences are often poor comparators for standalone sentences.
• Newton hearing: A fact‑finding hearing held after a guilty plea where there is a material dispute about the factual basis for sentence. If a defendant abandons a disputed basis and accepts the prosecution case, a Newton hearing becomes unnecessary.
• Manifestly excessive: The appellate threshold for reducing a sentence. The Court will intervene only if the sentence is plainly too high or if there was an error of principle.

Conclusion

R v Peters provides firm appellate confirmation that violent disorder arising out of a fatal incident can properly be sentenced at Category 1A with a 4‑year starting point when the culpability and harm features are present, notwithstanding the absence of a homicide charge against the defendant. Equally, the judgment places clear limits on parity arguments: violent disorder sentences passed concurrently alongside homicide are frequently “academic” due to totality and are not reliable comparators for standalone violent disorder.

The Court endorsed the sentencing judge’s approach of moving down to the bottom of the Category 1A range to reflect substantial mitigation, and applying a modest plea reduction given the timing. No error of principle was identified, and the total sentence—33 months—was not manifestly excessive.

For practitioners, the key takeaways are: (i) in a fatal-incident backdrop, Harm 1 can be engaged for violent disorder regardless of homicide charges; (ii) expect Category 1A to be the default starting point on facts like those here; (iii) focus advocacy on mitigation and careful movement within the range, rather than on parity with co-defendants sentenced in the shadow of homicide counts and totality.