R v Pearl: The Identifiable-Risk Benchmark for Tailoring Sexual Harm Prevention Orders

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Pearl, R v ([2025] EWCA Crim 994) revisits the principles governing Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (“SHPOs”). The appellant—a 50-year-old deputy headteacher—had pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual activity in abuse of a position of trust involving a highly vulnerable pupil. The trial judge handed down a 28-month prison sentence and imposed an extremely onerous 10-year SHPO containing wide-ranging internet and child-contact prohibitions. Importantly, the custodial term was not challenged on appeal; only the scope and necessity of the SHPO were contested.

The Court of Appeal (Cavanagh J giving the only judgment) allowed the appeal, quashing the original SHPO and replacing it with a single, narrowly targeted prohibition on working with children. In so doing, the Court crystallised a new organising principle: an SHPO may only include restrictive terms where (i) there is an identifiable risk of further sexual harm and (ii) the prohibitions are strictly necessary and proportionate to that specific risk. Blanket restrictions—particularly on internet use and general contact with minors—cannot stand where the risk is confined to a single individual already protected by a restraining order.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court upheld the 28-month custodial sentence.
All internet-related clauses (¶¶1-7 of the SHPO) were struck out as neither necessary nor proportionate.
All blanket child-contact prohibitions (¶¶9-10) were likewise removed for want of an identifiable risk to children generally.
The Court retained only a single prohibition (former ¶8): the appellant must not seek or hold paid or voluntary employment placing her in authority over, or caring for, children under 18. This modified SHPO will run for 10 years from the original sentencing date (23 January 2025).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R v Smith & Ors [2011] EWCA Crim 1772
Smith was the key authority on the predecessor Sexual Offences Prevention Orders (“SOPOs”). It laid down the twin requirements that any order must be (a) necessary for public protection and (b) proportionate in its terms. The Court also warned of over-broad internet bans, noting “the use of the internet is nowadays a part of everyday living.” In Pearl, the Court transplanted Smith’s teachings directly onto SHPOs, emphasising that the technological ubiquity quoted in 2011 is even more pronounced in 2025.
R v Parsons & Morgan [2017] EWCA Crim 2163
Parsons & Morgan modernised the Smith principles for SHPOs, propounding a four-part test: necessity, clarity, non-oppressiveness (proportionality) and tailoring to the facts. Crucially, at [71] it introduced the “identifiable risk of contact offences” threshold for child-contact prohibitions. Pearl elevates that threshold from persuasive guidance to operative rule: absent an identifiable risk to children generally, sweeping child-contact bans are unsustainable.
NC v CPS (cited indirectly through Parsons & Morgan) – reinforced that SHPO terms must not be oppressive and must respect Article 8 ECHR rights (private and family life).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Cavanagh J grounded the Court’s reasoning in the statutory language of ss 103A–103E Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as amended), which require (i) that the defendant “poses a risk of sexual harm” and (ii) that prohibitions are “necessary to protect the public from such harm.” The Court’s analysis ran on three interlocking axes:

Nature of the Offending Conduct – The appellant’s crimes arose from a face-to-face, one-on-one breach of trust; there was no online facilitation and no evidence of paedophilic interest in children generally. Therefore internet restrictions and broad child-contact clauses did not address the actual risk profile.
Existing Protective Measures – The victim already enjoyed the protection of an indefinite restraining order. Additional, more general prohibitions had to clear a higher justificatory bar.
Consequential Oppression – The Court assessed the practical burden on the appellant. Internet bans would hamper reintegration and employment; child-contact clauses would functionally isolate her from normal family life (e.g., her 18-year-old child’s friends). Considering the low actuarial re-offending risk (0.54 %) recorded in the pre-sentence report, such burdens were disproportionate to the danger posed.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

Identifiable-Risk Benchmark – Courts must pinpoint the actual risk category (internet, images, stranger contact, grooming within authority etc.). Absent a factual nexus, the corresponding class of prohibition cannot be included.
Narrow Tailoring as Standard Practice – Drafting of SHPOs should start from the narrowest term that removes the particular risk; wider terms must be individually justified on the record.
Enhanced Scrutiny of Child-Contact Bans – Because such prohibitions intrude most upon Article 8 rights, Pearl will likely reduce their routine inclusion, especially in cases involving a sole complainant.
Rehabilitation-Friendly Approach – The judgment implicitly recognises the rehabilitative function of post-sentence life, signalling that technological access and family interaction are part of modern reintegration.
Sentencing Hearings – Defence advocates will cite Pearl to argue for deletion or carve-out of internet/child-contact clauses unless the prosecution can prove a specifiable future risk.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

SHPO (Sexual Harm Prevention Order): A civil order imposed by a criminal court either at sentence or on application, designed to prevent sexual harm by restricting behaviour. Breach is a separate criminal offence carrying up to five years’ imprisonment.
Necessity vs. Proportionality: “Necessary” means the order addresses a real, evidence-based risk; “proportionate” means the restriction goes no further than needed and balances the defendant’s rights (especially under Article 8 ECHR) with public protection.
Identifiable Risk: A concrete, evidence-supported likelihood that the defendant might commit a specific kind of sexual harm in the future (e.g., grooming online, contact offences, image offences). Abstract or speculative risks will not suffice.
Notification Requirements (“Sex Offenders’ Register”): A statutory obligation on certain offenders to notify police of personal details for a fixed period. It operates independently of SHPOs and already offers a layer of ongoing monitoring.
Disclosure and Barring Service (“DBS”) List: A list that bars individuals from regulated activity with children or vulnerable adults. Inclusion usually ends any prospect of working in schools or similar settings.

5. Conclusion

Pearl is more than a routine re-calibration of an individual’s restrictions; it is a doctrinal checkpoint for all courts imposing SHPOs. By insisting on an identifiable risk benchmark and by striking down over-broad internet and child-contact clauses, the Court of Appeal has:

Re-affirmed Smith and Parsons & Morgan while clarifying that their guidance is mandatory, not aspirational.
Provided a structured methodology for assessing necessity and proportionality, with special emphasis on the factual matrix of the offending behaviour.
Enhanced protection for Article 8 rights and promoted fairer, more rehabilitative post-sentence regimes.

Going forward, prosecutors must marshal concrete evidence of future risk, while sentencing judges must articulate how each individual prohibition responds to that risk. Defence counsel, armed with Pearl, have a robust basis to challenge SHPO terms that drift beyond the contours of the offence. In short, the case stands as a significant precedent ensuring that SHPOs remain precision tools, not blunt instruments.