R v Odunuga: No Obligation to Direct Manslaughter Where Evidence Precludes Lesser Intent
Introduction
R v Odunuga ([2025] EWCA Crim 532) is a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) delivered on 1 April 2025 by Lord Justice Holgate. The applicant, Mr. Odunuga, was convicted at the Inner London Crown Court on 3 April 2024 of murder and possession of a bladed article. He received a life sentence with a minimum term of 27 years (less 191 days) for murder and a concurrent four‐year term for the blade offence. The procedural issue before the Court of Appeal was whether to grant a 10‐day extension of time to renew an application for leave to appeal against conviction on the ground that the trial judge ought to have left an alternative verdict of manslaughter to the jury.
Summary of the Judgment
The Court of Appeal refused the extension of time for a renewed appeal. It held that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for leaving a lesser alternative verdict—namely, that it must be “obviously raised by the evidence” and that an alert judge would see it as realistically available. On the facts (three deep stab wounds inflicted with significant force, one transecting the femoral vein, and evidence of intent to cause really serious bodily harm), there was no arguable basis to direct the jury on manslaughter. The conviction was therefore held to be safe.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
- R v Coutts [2005] EWCA Crim 52, [2006] 1 WLR 2154: Established that a judge must leave a lesser alternative offence when it is “obviously raised” by the evidence presented.
- R v Hodson [2009] EWCA Crim 1590, [2008] 1 WLR 1615: Confirmed that the question of leaving a lesser offence is highly fact‐sensitive; no mechanistic comparison with other cases is required.
Legal Reasoning
The Court emphasized a two‐stage inquiry: first, does any evidence at all point to the lesser offence; second, would a jury realistically entertain that alternative without speculation? The trial judge had correctly found no objective basis for manslaughter:
- The wounds were deep (15 –17 cm) and inflicted with at least moderate force, sufficient to satisfy really serious bodily harm (R v Morrison [premise]).
- There was no evidence about any moderation of intent at the scene—no hesitation or reduced force that might support a less‐serious‐harm intention.
- Permitting the jury a manslaughter verdict would have required them to speculate on the attacker’s state of mind or motives, which is impermissible.
The appellate court agreed: the trial judge’s application of guidance in Coutts and Hodson was beyond reproach. The facts simply did not reveal any realistic basis for a verdict of manslaughter.
Impact
This judgment reaffirms the stringent threshold for leaving a lesser alternative verdict in serious violence cases:
- It underscores that evidence of deep, multiple stab wounds with substantial force point conclusively to intent to cause really serious bodily harm.
- It cautions trial judges against diluting jury directions when the evidence offers no genuine fissure between murder and complete acquittal.
- It guides practitioners that appeals challenging omissions of less‐serious directions must demonstrate a real evidential fissure—not a theoretical possibility.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Alternative verdict: A lesser offence on which the jury may convict if the evidence does not fully support the principal charge but does support some criminal liability.
- Really serious bodily harm (RSBH): A level of injury more than merely “serious” – wounds deep enough or forceful enough to threaten life or cause permanent damage.
- Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act: Occurs when death results from an intentional act that falls short of intent to kill or cause RSBH, but is criminally dangerous.
- Speculation vs. evidence: Judges must not leave alternatives that rest purely on hypothetical inferences about a defendant’s mental state or conduct not grounded in the evidence.
Conclusion
R v Odunuga clarifies that the duty to leave a lesser alternative offence is confined to situations where the evidence genuinely opens up that possibility. Deep, forceful knife injuries establish, as a matter of law, an intention to cause really serious harm, removing any realistic basis for a manslaughter verdict. Trial judges and advocates should heed this ruling when framing jury directions and grounds of appeal in violent‐crime cases.
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