R v Miah [2025] EWCA Crim 1100: When remand, licence and post‑sentence supervision already satisfy punishment — Conditional discharge as the just disposal for a youth under s.8(4) Sentencing Act 2020

Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales

Neutral citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1100

Judgment date: 8 July 2025

Introduction

This appeal against sentence raises a practically significant and, in this combination, novel question: how should an appellate court respond where a youth (17 at the time of offending) has already served extensive time on remand and then endured a substantial period on licence and post‑sentence supervision, such that further punitive or supervisory measures would serve no sentencing purpose?

The case concerns a young offender convicted of intentional non‑fatal strangulation (Serious Crime Act 2015, s.75A), assault by beating, and criminal damage. The sentencing judge adopted the pre‑guideline approach in R v Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452, adjusted for youth, and imposed nine months’ detention in a young offender institution. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld in principle the seriousness of the offending and the legitimacy of detention and length as assessed at the time. However, taking a holistic view of what had actually occurred — 10 months’ remand, followed by 4.5 months’ licence and five months’ post‑sentence supervision — the Court concluded that any further supervision was inexpedient and replaced the sentence with concurrent conditional discharges under s.8(4) of the Sentencing Act 2020.

In doing so, the Court synthesised strands of authority on youth sentencing, the seriousness of non‑fatal strangulation, and the remedial use of conditional discharge where remand and supervisory tails have already delivered proportionate punishment. The judgment will matter in any case where significant time on remand is followed by a licence and post‑sentence supervision tail, especially for children and young people on the cusp of adulthood.

Case background and key issues

The parties and facts:

Appellant: Aged 17 at the time of offending, 18 at first appearance; no previous convictions.
Complainant: Former partner, aged 18; the couple were living at her family home.
Offending (31 December 2022): Following an argument, the appellant broke through a bathroom door panel, kicked the complainant (bruising), and intentionally strangled her with both hands for at least 5–6 seconds, restricting breathing and leaving marks. He had consumed alcohol and seized her phone, inhibiting her from calling the police.

Procedural history:

Initially indicated not guilty pleas; later pleaded guilty to counts of non‑fatal strangulation and assault; guilty to criminal damage from the outset. Another assault count was left on the file.
Sentenced on 11 September 2024 to:
- 9 months’ detention for intentional non‑fatal strangulation;
- 2 months concurrent for assault by beating;
- 1 month concurrent for criminal damage.
Extensive mitigation: PTSD and other mental health difficulties stemming from an acutely traumatic childhood, including domestic abuse, the murder of his mother by his father (when he was nine) and his father’s later death in custody.
Crucially, the appellant had been remanded from 11 November 2023 to 11 September 2024 (10 months), and later spent 4.5 months on licence and was subject to a further five months of post‑sentence supervision.

Issues on appeal:

Whether detention was wrong in principle because the judge did not properly apply youth sentencing principles and started from an adult sentence (per Cook).
Whether the length was manifestly excessive, including the extent of the youth reduction and recognition of mitigation.
Whether the judge misapprehended the release, licence and post‑sentence supervision consequences of the sentence, and failed to consider that significant community conditions would follow notwithstanding “time served”.
What the proper appellate disposal should be given the cumulative burden of remand, licence and supervision.

Summary of the judgment

Seriousness affirmed: Intentional non‑fatal strangulation is inherently serious; harm is inherent in the act and does not depend on visible injury (endorsing Cook).
Detention not wrong in principle: The sentencing judge did have regard to the overarching guideline for children and young people. Considering the aggravating features and the totality (three offences), it was open to the judge to conclude the custody threshold was crossed.
Length not manifestly excessive in principle: Applying the Cook approach then in force, and allowing for youth (one‑third reduction under para 6.46 of the Children and Young People guideline) and mitigation, the term reached was within appropriate bounds.
Practical effect decisive: The judge believed the sentence would produce near‑immediate release with minimal tail. In reality, after 10 months’ remand, the appellant served a further 4.5 months’ licence and faced 5 months’ post‑sentence supervision. The Court considered it would not serve any sentencing purpose for the appellant to be under any further conditions.
Remedy: Invoking s.8(4) Sentencing Act 2020 and guided by Dawes [2019] EWCA Crim 848, the Court quashed the detention sentences and substituted concurrent conditional discharges of two years on each count. The surcharge was adjusted to £20.
Additional clarifications:
- Remittal to the youth court is not mandatory under s.25 Sentencing Act 2020 where the Crown Court finds detention necessary.
- The judge did not find a community order “unenforceable”; that was not a basis of the decision.

Analysis

Precedents and materials cited

1) R v Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452

Cook filled the gap before definitive guidelines for the new offence of non‑fatal strangulation (Serious Crime Act 2015, s.75A) were adopted, positing an adult starting point of about 18 months for typical cases and emphasising that:

“The act of strangulation inevitably creates a real and justified fear of death... There is real harm inherent in the act of strangulation.”

In Miah, the sentencing judge — pre‑adoption of the specific guideline — took this as the starting point, then adjusted for aggravation, mitigation and youth. The Court of Appeal endorsed the use of Cook in those circumstances and reaffirmed the core principle that proof of injury is not required; the harm lies in the act and terror it causes.

2) Children and Young People: Overarching Guideline (Sentencing Council)

The appellant argued that the judge failed to apply paras 6.1–6.3 (requiring focus on prevention of offending and welfare, and accounting for reduced maturity up to the mid‑20s). The Court held that the judge expressly said he had regard to the overarching guideline and, in substance, did so. Critical steps aligned with the guideline:

As instructed by para 6.1, the judge assessed culpability and seriousness in the context of youth, recognising profound mitigation (PTSD, trauma).
He applied the one‑third youth reduction under para 6.46, appropriate for a 17‑year‑old at the time of offending.

3) R v Khan [2024] EWCA Crim 401

Relied on by the appellant to stress developmental immaturity up to age 25. While not determinative, Khan reaffirmed principles already embedded in the youth guideline. The Court accepted the relevance of immaturity but found the judge sufficiently accounted for it.

4) R v Dawes [2019] EWCA Crim 848

Dawes is the key remedial authority underpinning the conditional discharge in Miah. In Dawes, the Court quashed a suspended sentence where the appellant had served 83 days on remand — double the judge’s starting point — and substituted a 12‑month conditional discharge. The “stark point” was that further punishment after the remand already served was unjustified.

Miah develops this logic for youth cases and modern release regimes: it expressly considers not just remand but also the burden of licence and post‑sentence supervision when deciding that further punishment is “inexpedient” under s.8(4) Sentencing Act 2020.

5) Statutory framework

Serious Crime Act 2015, s.75A: Creates the offence of intentional non‑fatal strangulation/suffocation; injury proof not required.
Sentencing Act 2020, s.25: Remittal of youths to the youth court is not mandatory where the Crown Court considers detention necessary; it may retain the case if remittal would be “undesirable”.
Sentencing Act 2020, s.8(4): Conditional discharge may be imposed if it is inexpedient to inflict punishment having regard to the nature of the offence and character of the offender.

The Court’s legal reasoning

1) Seriousness and custody threshold: The Court endorsed the sentencing judge’s recognition that intentional strangulation is inherently serious, with fear and harm inherent. Aggravating features here (domestic context, invasion of the bathroom sanctuary, seizing the phone, alcohol, prior kicking, threats to kill) justified the conclusion that the custody threshold was crossed notwithstanding youth.

2) Application of youth principles: While the judge did not recite the youth guideline verbatim, he:

Framed the exercise by reference to the sentence that would have been imposed had the appellant been sentenced when 17.
Engaged with substantial mitigation due to PTSD and profound childhood trauma.
Applied the one‑third reduction under para 6.46 for age at the time of the offence.

The Court rejected the submission that the judge had improperly “started with an adult sentence.” Rather, he used Cook as a structured anchor and then made reductions compatible with the youth guideline.

3) Remittal to youth court: The Court clarified that remittal under s.25 is not mandatory where detention is deemed necessary. It would have been “undesirable” to remit given the seriousness, so the Crown Court was right to retain jurisdiction.

4) Length and manifest excess: The Court found no error in principle in a 15‑month adult benchmark reduced for youth by one‑third, plus credit for plea. In principle, the term was not manifestly excessive, particularly given the multiple offences and aggravating features.

5) The decisive practical error — misapprehending the sentence’s effect: The sentencing judge believed the nine‑month sentence (after reductions) would produce near‑immediate release with only post‑sentence supervision. In reality, due to statutory release provisions for short determinate sentences:

The appellant had already served 10 months on remand (equivalent to a 20‑month sentence in custody time terms).
He then had to serve approximately 4.5 months on licence as part of his sentence. Time on remand does not count towards licence.
He was then subject to an additional five months’ post‑sentence supervision. Time on remand does not count towards this either.

Thus, what was intended as an effectively “spent” custodial term carried a substantial and, in the judge’s contemplation, unintended supervisory tail. The Court noted the sentencing judge appears not to have had the necessary assistance from counsel on release mechanics and supervision.

6) Proportionality and purposes of sentencing: Standing back, the Court concluded that the seriousness of the offending had already been reflected in the combination of:

10 months in custody on remand;
4.5 months on licence;
5 months of post‑sentence supervision.

In these unusual circumstances, the continued imposition of supervisory requirements would not promote the statutory purposes of sentencing (including punishment, rehabilitation and prevention of further offending) for a child/young person who had already borne these constraints.

7) Remedy and legal basis: Following Dawes and using the explicit power in s.8(4) Sentencing Act 2020, the Court determined it was “inexpedient to inflict punishment” and substituted two‑year concurrent conditional discharges on each count with an adjusted surcharge. This preserves public denunciation of the offence while avoiding further disproportionate supervisory burdens.

Impact and significance

1) Holistic accounting of “sentence already served” for youths: Miah confirms that when assessing the justice of a sentence for a youth, an appellate court may look beyond the nominal term to the total lived experience of the sentence, including:

Time on remand;
Time on licence post‑release;
Post‑sentence supervision obligations.

This holistic approach is particularly important where the sentencing judge attempted to avoid onerous community sanctions but, through release mechanics, the sentence nonetheless generated a heavy supervisory tail.

2) Practical guidance for sentencers and advocates:

Sentencers should ascertain and expressly record the anticipated licence and post‑sentence supervision consequences, especially where remand has been lengthy and the offender is a child/young person.
Advocates should provide clear submissions on release calculations, the non‑crediting of remand towards licence and post‑sentence supervision, and the realistic impact of any proposed community order or conditional discharge.
Pre‑sentence reports for youths should grapple with whether rehabilitation is better served by structured community requirements or by concluding the case (including consideration of s.8(4) SA 2020) when the burdens of remand/licence have already been borne.

3) Substantive guidance on non‑fatal strangulation: The Court reiterates that this is a grave offence: fear of death is inherent, and visible injury is not required. This continues to anchor sentencing seriousness in domestic abuse contexts and will inform application of the subsequent definitive guideline for non‑fatal strangulation.

4) Youth jurisdiction and reductions: The judgment re‑emphasises:

Remittal to the youth court is not mandatory where detention is necessary (s.25 SA 2020).
The one‑third reduction for sentencing those who were 17 at the time of offending (para 6.46 of the youth guideline) remains a robust yardstick, subject to case‑specific factors.

5) Remedial use of conditional discharge in serious cases: Although non‑fatal strangulation usually warrants immediate custody, Miah shows that a conditional discharge can be the just appellate disposal in the truly exceptional situation where punishment has in substance already been served through remand and supervisory tails. This does not trivialise the offence; it avoids duplicative or counter‑productive extra punishment.

Complex concepts simplified

Non‑fatal strangulation (SCA 2015, s.75A)

An offence introduced to address a dangerous form of domestic abuse. The essence is intentional strangulation or suffocation. The prosecution does not need to prove visible injury; the act itself, and the terror it induces, is the harm.

Custody threshold

The point at which an offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. For youths, courts must first ask whether detention is necessary, factoring in welfare and prevention of reoffending. Domestic abuse in the home involving strangulation typically passes this threshold.

Totality

The sentencing principle requiring the court to ensure that the total sentence for multiple offences is just and proportionate. In Miah the judge imposed concurrent sentences to reflect totality.

Youth reductions and maturity

When sentencing those under 18 at the time of offending, courts typically reduce the adult equivalent to reflect lesser maturity and greater capacity for change. Under para 6.46 of the youth guideline, a reduction of around one‑third is a common starting point for a 17‑year‑old.

Remand, licence and post‑sentence supervision

Remand: Time spent in custody before sentence usually counts towards the custodial term.
Licence: After release from a determinate custodial sentence, offenders are supervised on licence for the remainder of the term. Time on remand does not count towards licence.
Post‑sentence supervision (PSS): For short custodial sentences (generally under two years), an additional period of statutory supervision may follow licence. Time on remand does not count towards PSS.

In Miah, the Court regarded the combination of 10 months on remand, 4.5 months on licence, and 5 months’ PSS as collectively satisfying the punitive and protective aims of sentencing.

Conditional discharge (SA 2020, s.8(4))

A conviction is recorded, but the court orders that the offender will not be punished unless they commit another offence within a specified period (here, two years). The power is used when punishment would be “inexpedient” in light of the offence and the offender’s circumstances. It is not an acquittal; breach can trigger re‑sentencing for the original offence. In Miah, it was the proportionate endpoint after the sentence’s real‑world effects had already been borne.

Remittal to the youth court (SA 2020, s.25)

When a defendant is under 18, the Crown Court must remit to the youth court unless it is “undesirable” to do so. Serious cases warranting detention often remain in the Crown Court.

Conclusion

R v Miah is not a departure from the strong denouncement of non‑fatal strangulation as an inherently serious domestic abuse offence. Nor does it dilute the principle that, even for youths, such offending will often cross the custody threshold. Its importance lies elsewhere: it instructs courts and practitioners to look at the whole picture of punishment already endured — remand time, licence and post‑sentence supervision — before layering on further sanctions.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the original term was justifiable in principle under Cook and the youth guideline, but the sentencing judge’s misapprehension of the licence and supervision tail meant that, in practice, the appellant had served more than enough. Harnessing s.8(4) of the Sentencing Act 2020 and the logic of Dawes, the Court rightly treated further punishment as inexpedient and substituted a two‑year conditional discharge.

Key takeaways:

Non‑fatal strangulation is gravely serious; injury proof is unnecessary; domestic settings aggravate seriousness.
For youths, explicit engagement with the overarching guideline and a meaningful youth reduction are required; remittal to the youth court is not mandatory where detention is necessary.
Sentencers must understand and record the real‑world effect of licence and post‑sentence supervision, particularly where remand has been substantial.
Conditional discharge is an appropriate appellate remedy where cumulative remand and supervisory burdens have already met the aims of sentencing.

Miah will stand as a practical sentinel for proportionality in youth sentencing: when the system’s tail has already wagged hard enough, the just course may be to stop rather than to add more.